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THE   DATA  OF   ETHICS. 


Spencer's  Synthetic  PWlosophy. 


(1.)  FIRST  PRINCIPLES $2.00 

I.  Thb  Unknowable. 
II.  Laws  op  the  Knowable. 

(2.)  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  BIOLOGY.    Vol.  I $2.00 

I.  The  Data  op  Biology. 
II.  The  Inductions  of  Biology. 
lU.  The  Evolution  or  Life. 

(3.)  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  BIOLOGY.    Vol.  II $2.00 

rV.  Morphological  Development. 
V.  Physiological  Development. 
VI.  Laws  of  Multiplication. 

(4.)  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY.    Vol.  I.  .        .       .  $2.00 
I.  The  Data  of  Psychology. 
n.  The  Inductions  of  Psychology. 
ni.  General  Synthesis. 
IV.  Special  Synthesis. 
V.  Physical  Synthesis. 

(5.)  THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY.    Vol.  IL        .       .  $2.00 
VI.  Special  Analysis. 
VII.  General  Analysis. 
VIII.  Corollaries. 

(6.)  PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.    Vol.  L        ....  $2.00 
I.  The  Data  op  Sociology. 
n.  The  Induction^  of  Sociology. 
III.  The  Domestic  [^ela^ions. 

(7.)  PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.^  ,Vo>.  H 

{Partially  written.)  ^  . 

(8.)  PRINCIPLES  OF  SOCIOLOGY.    Vol.  Ill 

*       *       ♦       * 

(9.)  PRINCIPLES  OF  MORALITY.    Vol.  I 

I.  The  Data  of  Ethics. $1.50 


(10.)  PRINCIPLES  OP  MORALITY.    Vol.  II. 
«       *       *       * 


D.  APPLETON  «fe  CO.,  Ptjblishbbs,  649  &  551  Broadway,  Nbw  Yoek. 


THE    DATA 


ETHICS. 


HERBERT    SPENCER. 


NEW  YORK: 

D.    APPLETON    AND    COMPANY, 

649  AND  551  BROADWAY. 

1879. 


3^^^^^ 


PEEFACE. 


A  REFERENCE  to  tlie  programme  of  the  ''  System  of 
Synthetic  Philosophy/'  will  show  that  the  chapters  herewith 
issued,  constitute  the  first  division  of  the  work  on  the 
Principles  of  Morality,  with  which  the  System  ends.  As 
the  second  and  third  volumes  of  the  Principles  of  Sociology 
are  as  yet  unpublished,  this  instalment  of  the  succeeding 
work  appears  out  of  its  place. 

I  have  been  led  thus  to  deviate  from  the  order  originally 
'  set  down,  by  the  fear  that  persistence  in  conforming  to  it 
might  result  in  leaving  the  final  work  of  tho  series 
unexecuted.  Hints,  repeated  of  late  years  with  increasing 
frequency  and  distinctness,  have  shown  me  that  health  may 
permanently  fail,  even  if  life  does  not  end,  before  I  reach 
the  last  part  of  the  task  I  have  marked  out  for  myself. 
This  last  part  of  the  task  it  is,  to  which  I  regard  all  the 
preceding  parts  as  subsidiary.  Written  as  far  back  as  1842, 
my  first  essay,  consisting  of  letters  on  The  Proper  Siiliere  of 
Government,  vaguely  indicated  what  I  conceived  to  be 
certain  general  principles  of  right  and  wrong  in  political 
conduct  j  and  from  that  time  onwards  my  ultimate  purpose, 
lying  behind  all  proximate  purposes,  has  been  that  of  finding 
for  the  principles  of  right  and  wrong  in  conduct  at  large,  a 
scientific  basis.  To  leave  this  purpose  unfulfilled  after 
making  so  extensive  a  preparation  for  fulfilling  it,  would  be 
a  failure  the  probability  of  which  I  do  not  like  to  contem- 
plate ;  and  I  am  anxious  to  preclude  it,  if  not  wholly,  still 
partially.  Hence  the  step  I  now  take.  Though  this  first 
division  of  the  work  terminating  the  Synthetic  Philosophy, 
cannot,  of  course,  contain  the  specific  conclusions  to  be  set 
forth  in  the  entire  work ;  yet  it  implies  them  in  such  wise 


VI  PREFACE. 

that,  definitely  to  formulate  them  requires  nothing  beyond 
logical  deduction. 

I  am  the  more  anxious  to  indicate  in  outline,  if  I  cannot 
complete,  this  final  work,  because  the  establishment  of  rules 
of  right  conduct  on  a  scientific  bg-sis  is  a  pressing  need. 
Now  that  moral  injunctions  are  losing  the  authority  given 
by  their  supposed  sacred  origin,  the  secularization  of  morals 
is  becoming  imperative.  Few  things  can  happen  more 
disastrous  than  the  decay  and  death  of  a  regulative  system 
no  longer  fit,  before  another  and  fitter  regulative  system  has 
grown  up  to  replace  it.  Most  of  those  who  reject  the  current 
creed,  appear  to  assume  that  the  controlling  agency  furnished 
by  it  may  safely  be  thrown  aside,  and  the  vacancy  left 
unfilled  by  any  other  controlling  agency.  Meanwhile,  those 
who  defend  the  current  creed  allege  that  in  the  absence 
of  the  guidance  it  yields,  no  guidance  can  exist :  divine 
commandments  they  think  the  only  possible  guides.  Thus 
between  these  extreme  opponents  there  is  a  certain 
community.  The  one  holds  that  the  gap  left  by  dis- 
appearance of  the  code  of  supernatural  ethics,  need  not  be 
filled  by  a  code  of  natural  ethics ;  and  the  other  holds  that  it 
cannot  be  so  filled.  Both  contemplate  a  vacuum,  which  the 
one  wishes  and  the  other  fears.  As  the  change  which 
promises  or  threatens  to  bring  about  this  state,  desired  or 
dreaded,  is  rapidly  progressing,  those  who  believe  that  the 
vacuum  can  be  filled,  and  that  it  must  be  filled,  are  called 
on  to  do  something  in  pursuance  of  their  belief. 

To  this  more  special  reason  I  may  add  a  more  general 
reason.  Great  mischief  has  been  done  by  the  repellent 
aspect  habitually  given  to  moral  rule  by  its  expositors ;  and 
immense  benefits  are  to  be  anticipated  from  presenting 
moral  rule  under  that  attractive  aspect  which  it  has  when 
undistorted  by  superstition  and  asceticism.  If  a  father, 
sternly  enforcing  numerous  commands,  some  needful  and 
some  needless,  adds  to  his  severe  control  a  behaviour 
wholly  unsympathetic — if  his  children  have  to  take   their 


PREFACE.  Vll 

pleasures  by  stealtli,  or,  when  timidly  looking  up  from  their 
play,  ever  meet  a  cold  glance  or  more  frequently  a  frown ; 
his  government  will  inevitably  be  disliked,  if  not  hated; 
and  the  aim  will  be  to  evade  it  as  much  as  possible.  Con- 
trariwise, a  father  who,  equally  firm  in  maintaining  restraints 
needful  for  the  well-being  of  his  children  or  the  well-being 
of  other  persons,  not  only  avoids  needless  restraints,  but, 
giving  his  sanction  to  all  legitimate  gratifications  and  pro- 
viding the  means  for  them,  looks  on  at  their  gambols  with  an 
approving  smile,  can  scarcely  fail  to  gain  an  influence  which, 
no  less  efiicient  for  the  time  being,  will  also  be  permanently 
efficient.  'The  controls  of  such  two  fathers  symbolize  the 
controls  of  Morality  as  it  is  and  Morality  as  it  should  be. 

Nor  does  mischief  result  only  from  this  undue  severity  of 
the  ethical  doctrine  bequeathed  us  by  the  harsh  past. 
Further  mischief  results  from  the  impracticability  of  its  ideal. 
In  violent  reaction  against  the  utter  selfishness  of  life  as 
carried  on  in  barbarous  societies,  it  has  insisted  on  a  life 
utterly  unselfish.  But  just  as  the  rampant  egoism  of  a 
brutal  militancy,  was  not  to  be  renjedied  by  attempts  at  the 
absolute  subjection  of  the  ego  in  convents  and  monasteries ; 
so  neither  is  the  misconduct  of  ordinary  humanity  as  now 
existing,  to  be  remedied  by  upholding  a  standard  of  abnega- 
tion beyond  human  achievement.  Rather  the  effect  is  to 
produce  a  despairing  abandonment  of  all  attempts  at  a 
higher  life.  And  not  only  does  an  effort  to  achieve  the 
impossible,  end  in  this  way,  but  it  simultaneously  discredits 
the  possible.  By  association  with  rules  that  cannot  be 
obeyed,  rules  that  can  be  obeyed  lose  their  authority. 

Much  adverse  comment  will,  I  doubt  not,  be  passed  on  the 
theory  of  right  conduct  which  the  following  pages  shadow 
forth.  Critics  of  a  certain  class,  far  from  rejoicing  that 
ethical  principles  otherwise  derived  by  them,  coincide  with 
ethical  principles  scientifically  derived,  are  off*ended  by  the 
coincidence.  Instead  of  recognizing  essential  likeness  they 
enlarge  on  superficial  difference.     Since  the  days  of  perse- 


Vlll  PREFACE, 


1 


cution,  a  curious  change  has  taken  place  in  the  behaviour 
so-called  orthodoxy  towards  so-called  heterodoxy.  The  tim< 
was  when  a  heretic,  forced  by  torture  to  recant,  satisfied 
authority  by  external  conformity :  apparent  agreement 
suflGlced,  however  profound  continued  to  be  the  real  disagree- 
ment. But  now  that  the  heretic  can  no  longer  be  coerced 
into  professing  the  ordinary  belief,  his  belief  is  made  to 
appear  as  much  opposed  to  the  ordinary  as  possible.  Does 
he  diverge  from  established  theological  dogma  ?  Then  he 
shall  be  an  atheist ;  however  inadmissible  he  considers  the 
term.  Does  he  think  spiritualistic  interpretations  of  pheno- 
mena not  valid  ?  Then  he  shall  be  classed  as  a  materialist ; 
indignantly  though  he  repudiates  the  name.  And  in  like 
manner,  what  differences  exist  between  natural  morality  and 
supernatural  morality,  it  has  become  the  policy  to  exaggerate 
into  fundamental  antagonisms.  In  pursuance  of  this  policy, 
there  will  probably  be  singled  out  for  reprobation  from  this 
volume,  doctrines  which,  taken  by  themselves,  may  readily 
be  made  to  seem  utterly  wrong.  With  a  view  to  clearness, 
I  have  treated  separately  some  correlative  aspects  of  conduct, 
drawing  conclusions  either  of  which  becomes  untrue  if 
divorced  from  the  other;  and  have  thus  given  abundant 
opportunity  for  misrepresentation. 

The  relations  of  this  work  to  works  preceding  it  in  the 
series,  are  such  as  to  involve  frequent  reference.  Containing, 
as  it  does,  the  outcome  of  principles  set  forth  in  each  of  them, 
I  have  found  it  impracticable  to  dispense  with  re-statements 
of  those  principles.  Further,  the  presentation  of  them  in 
their  relations  to  different  ethical  theories,  has  made  it  need- 
ful, in  every  case,  briefly  to  remind  the  reader  what  they  are, 
and  how  they  are  derived.  Hence  an  amount  of  repetition 
which  to  some  will  probably  appear  tedious.  I  do  not, 
however,  much  regret  this  almost  unavoidable  result;  for 
only  by  varied  iteration  can  alien  conceptions  be  forced  on 
reluctant  minds. 

June,  1879. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAP. 
^     I. — CONDUCT    IN    GENERAL 

y   II. THE    EVOLUTION    OP    COKDUCT 

^y<lU. GOOD    AND    BAD    CONDUCT 

»-     IV. V^AYS    OP   JUDGING    CONDUCT 

X   V.^-THE    PHYSICAL    VIEW 
^VI. — THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW 
*  VII. — THE    PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW    ... 
y>VlII. — THE    SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW       ... 
*      IX. — CRITICISMS    AND   EXPLANATIONS 

X     X. THE    RELATIVITY    OP    PAINS    AND    PLEASURES 

^    XI. EGOISM    VERSUS    ALTRUISM       ... 

XII. ^ALTRUISM    VERSUS     EGOISM     ... 

^XIII. — TRIAL  AND   COMPROMISE 

XIV. CONCILIATION 

XV. — ABSOLUTE    ETHICS   AND    RELATIV?!    ETHICS 
XVI. — THE    SCOrE   OF   ETHICS 


I 

8  K 

21 

47 

64 

75 
102 
132 
150 
174 
185 
201 
119 
242 
258 
281 


y 


CHAPTER  I. 
CONDUCT  IN  GENERAL. 

§  1.  Tlie  doctrine  that  correlatives  imply  one  another 
— that  a  father  cannot  be  thought  of  without  thinking  of 
a  childj  and  that  there  can  be  no  consciousness  of  superior 
without  a  consciousness  of  inferior — has  for  one  of  its 
common  examples  the  necessary  connexion  between  the 
conceptions  of  whole  and  part.  Beyond  the  primary 
truth  that  no  idea  of  a  whole  can  be  framed  without  a 
nascent  idea  of  parts  constituting  it,  and  that  no  idea  of  a 
part  can  be  framed  without  a  nascent  idea  of  some  whole  to 
which  it  belongs,  there  is  the  secondary  truth  that  there 
can  be  no  correct  idea  of  a  part  without  a  correct  idea  of  the 
correlative  whole.  There  are  several  ways  in  which  inade- 
quate knowledge  of  the  one  involves  inadequate  knowledge 
of  the  other. 

If  the  part  is  conceived  without  any  reference  to  the 
whole,  it  becomes  itself  a  whole — an  independent  entity ; 
and  its  relations  to  existence  in  general  are  misapprehended. 
Further,  the  size  of  the  part  as  compared  with  the  size  of 
the  whole,  must  be  misapprehended  unless  the  whole  is  not 
only  recognized  as  including  it,  but  is  figured  in  its  total 
extent.  And  again,  the  position  which  the  part  occupies 
in  relation  to  other  parts,  cannot  be  rightly  conceived 
<  nless  there  is  some  conception  of  the  whole  in  its  distribu- 
tion as  well  as  in  its  amount. 
1 


4  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

Still  more  when  part  and  whole,  instead  of  being  stati- 
cally related  only,  are  dynamically  related,  must  there  be  a 
general  understanding  of  the  whole  before  the  part  can  be 
understood.  By  a  savage  who  has  never  seen  a  vehicle,  no 
idea  can  be  formed  of  the  use  and  action  of  a  wheel.  To 
the  unsymmetrically-pierced  disk  of  an  eccentric,  no  place 
or  purpose  can  be  ascribed  by  a  rustic  unacquainted 
with  machinery.  Even  a  mechanician,  if  he  has  never 
looked  into  a  piano,  will,  if  shown  a  damper,  be  unable  to 
conceive  its  function  or  relative  value. 

Most  of  all,  however,  where  the  whole  is  organic,  does 

i    complete  comprehension  of  a  part  imply  extensive  comprehen- 

'  sion  of  the  whole.  Suppose  a  being  ignorant  of  the  human 
body  to  find  a  detached  arm.  If  not  misconceived  by  him 
as  a  supposed  whole,  instead  of  being  conceived  as  a  part,  still 
its  relations  to  other  parts,  and  its  structure,  would  be  wholly 
inexplicable.  Admitting  that  the  co-operation  of  its  bones 
and  muscles  might  be  divined,  yet  no  thought  could  be 
framed  of  the  share  taken  by  the  arm  in  the  actions  of  the 
unknown  whole  it  belonged  to ;  nor  could  any  interpretation 
be  put  upon  the  nerves  and  vessels  ramifying  through  it, 
which  severally  refer  to  certain  central  organs.     A  theory  of 

1  the  structure  of  the  arm  implies  a  theory  of  the  structure  of 

1  the  body  at  large. 

And  this  truth  holds  not  of  material  aggregates  only, 
but  of  immaterial  aggregates — aggregated  motions,  deeds, 
thoughts,  words.  The  Moon's  movements  cannot  be  fully 
interpreted  without  taking  into  account  the  movements  of 
the  Solar  System  at  large.  The  process  of  loading  a  gun 
is  meaningless  until  the  subsequent  actions  performed  with 
the  gun  are  known.  A  fragment  of  a  sentence,  if  not  unin- 
telligible, is  wrongly  interpreted  in  the  absence  of  the 
remainder.  Cut  off  its  beginning  and  end,  and  the  rest  of  a 
demonstration  proves  nothing.  Evidence  given  by  a  plain- 
tiff often  misleads  until  the  evidence  which  the  defendant 
produces  is  joined  witb  it. 


CONDUCT  IN   GENERAL.  5 

§  2.  Conduct  is  a  whole;  and^  in  a  sense,  it  is  an  organic 
whole — an  aggregate  of  inter-dependent  actions  performed 
by  an  organism.  That  division  or  aspect  of  conduct 
with  which  Ethics  deals,  is  a  part  of  this  organic  whole — a 
part  having  its  components  inextricably  bound  up  with  the 
rest.  As  currently  conceived,  stirring  the  fire,  or  reading 
a  newspaper,  or  eating  a  meal,  are  acts  with  which  Morality 
has  no  concern.  Opening  the  window  to  air  the  room,  putting 
on  an  overcoat  when  the  weather  is  cold,  are  thought  of  as 
having  no  ethical  significance.  These,  however,  are  all 
portions  of  conduct.  The  behaviour  we  call  good  and  the 
behaviour  we  call  bad,  are  included,  along  with  the  behaviour 
we  call  indifferent,  under  the  conception  of  behaviour  at 
large.  The  whole  of  which  Ethics  forms  a  part,  is  the 
whole  constituted  by  the  theory  of  conduct  in  general ;  and 
this  whole  must  be  understood  before  the  part  can  be  under- 
stood.    Let  us  consider  this  proposition  more  closely. 

And  first,  how  shall  we  define  conduct  ?  It  is  not  co- 
extensive with  the  aggregate  of  actions,  though  it  is  nearly 
so.  Such  actions  as  those  of  an  epileptic  in  a  fit,  are 
not  included  in  our  conception  of  conduct :  the  conception 
excludes  purposeless  actions.  And  in  recognizing  this  ex- 
clusion, we  simultaneously  recognize  all  that  is  included. 
The  definition  of  conduct  which  emerges  is  either — acts 
adjusted  to  ends,  or  else — the  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends^ 
according  as  we  contemplate  the  formed  body  of  acts,  or 
think  of  the  form  alone.  And  conduct  in  its  full  acceptation 
must  be  taken  as  comprehending  all  adjustments  of  acts  to 
ends,  from  the  simplest  to  the  most  complex,  whatever  their 
special  natures  and  whether  considered  separately  or  in  their 
totality. 

Conduct  in  general  being  thus  distinguished  from  the 
somewhat  larger  whole  constituted  by  actions  in  general,  let 
us  next  ask  what  distinction  is  habitually  made  between 
the  conduct  on  which  ethical  judgments  are  passed  and  the 
remainder  of  conduct.     As   already  said,   a  large  part  of 


6  THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

ordinary  conduct  is  indifferent.  Sliall  I  walk  to  the  water- 
fall to-day  ?  or  shall  I  ramble  along  the  sea- shore  ?  Here 
the  ends  are  ethically  indifferent.  If  I  go  to  the  waterfall, 
shall  I  go  over  the  moor  or  take  the  path  through  the 
wood  ?  Here  the  means  are  ethically  indifferent.  And 
from  hour  to  hour  most  of  the  things  we  do  are  not  to 
be  judged  as  either  good  or  bad  in  respect  of  either  ends  or 
means.  No  less  clear  is  it  that  the  tr^sition 

from  indifferent  acts  to  acts  which  are  good  or  bad.  is 
gradual.  If  a  friend  who  is  with  me  has  explored  the  sea- 
shore but  has  not  seen  the  waterfall,  the  choice  of  one  or 
othei  end  is  no  longer  ethically  indifferent.  And  if,  the 
waterfall  being  fixed  on  as  our  goal,  the  way  over  the  moor 
is  too  long  for  his  strength,  while  the  shorter  way  through 
the  wood  is  not,  the  choice  of  means  is  no  longer  ethically 
indifferent.  Again,  if  a  probable  result  of  making  the 
one  excursion  rather  than  the  othei^,  is  that  I  shall  not  be 
back  in  time  to  keep  an  appointment,  or  if  taking  the  longer 
route  entails  this  risk  while  takin^i  the  shorter  does  not,  the 
decision  in  favour  of  one  or  other  end  or  means  acquires  in 
another  way  an  ethical  character;  and  if  the  appointment 
is  one  of  some  importance,  or  one  of  great  importance,  or 
one  of  life -and- death  importance,  to  self  or  others,  the 
ethical  character  becomes  pronounced.  These  instances  will 
sufficiently  suggest  the  truth  that  conduct  with  which 
\  Morality  is' not  concerned,  passes  into  conduct  which  is  moral 
or  jjamoral,  by  small  degrees  and  in  countless  ways. 

But  the  conduct  that  has  to  be  conceived  scientifically 
before  we  can  scientifically  conceive  those  modes  of  conduct 
which  are  the  objects  of  ethical  judgments,  is  a  conduct 
immensely  wider  in  range  than  that  just  indicated.  Com- 
plete comprehension  of  conduct  is  not  to  be  obtained  by 
contemplating  the  conduct  of  human  beings  only  :  we  have 
to  regard  this  as  a  part  of  universal  conduct — conduct  as 
•exhibited  by  all  living  creatures.  For  evidently  this  comes 
within   our   definition — ^acts  adjusi^ed  to   ends.'    The  con- 


CONDUCT    IN    GENERAL.  7 

duct  of  the  higlier  animals  as  compared  with  that  of  man, 
and  the  conduct  of  the  lower  animals  as  compared  with  that 
of  the  higher,  mainly  differ  in  this,  that  the  adjustments 
of  acts  to  ends  are  relatively  simple  and  relatively  incom- 
plete. And  as  in  other  cases,  so  in  this  case,  we  must 
interpret  the  more  developed  by  the  less  developed.  Just 
as,  fully  to  understand  the  part  of  conduct  which  Ethics  deals!- 
with,  we  must  study  human  conduct  as  a  whole ;  so,  fully  to'  - 
understand  human  conduct  as  a  whole,  we  must  study  it  as 
a  part  of  that  larger  whole  constituted  by  the  conduct  of 
animate  beings  in  general. 

Nor  is  even  this  whole  coaceived  with  the  needful  fulness,  . 
so  long  as  we  think  only  of  the  conduct  at  present  dis- 
played around  us.     We  have  to  include  in  our  conception] 
the  less- developed  conduct  out  of  which  this  has  arisen  in  J 
course  of  time.    We  have  to  regard  the  conduct  now  shown  V 
us  by  creatures  of  all  orders,  as  an  outcome  of  the  conduct  jt 
wdiich  has  brought  life  of  every  kind  to  its  present  height/ 
And  this  is  tantamount  to  saying  that  our  preparatory  step 
must  be  to  study  the  evolution  of  conduct. 


CHAPTER  11. 

THE  EVOLUTION  OF  CONDUCT. 

§  3.  We  have  become  quite  familiar  wifh  tlie  idea  of  an 
evolution  of  structures  throughout  the  ascending  types  of 
animals.  To  a  considerable  degree  we  have  become  familiar 
with  the  thought  that  an  evolution  of  functions  has  gone  on 
fari  passu  with  the  evolution  of  structures.  Now  advancing 
a  step,  we  have  to  frame  a  conception  of  the  evolution  of 
conduct_,  as  correlated  with  this  evolution  of  structures 
and  functions. 

These  three  subjects  are  to  be  definitely  distinguished. 
Obviously  the  facts  comparative  morphology  sets  forth, 
form  a  whole  which,  though  it  cannot  be  treated  iu  general 
or  in  detail  without  taking  into  account  facts  belonging 
to  comparative  physiology,  is  essentially  independent.  No 
less  clear  is  it  that  we  may  devote  our  attention  exclusively 
to  that  progressive  differentiation  of  functions,  and  com- 
bination of  functions,  which  accompanies  the  development 
of  structures — may  say  no  more  about  the  characters 
and  connexions  of  organs  than  is  implied  in  describing 
their  separate  and  joint  actions.  'And  the  subject  of 
conduct  lies  outside  the  subject  of  functions,  if  not  as  far 
as  this  lies  outside  the  subject  of  structures,  still,  far  enough 
to  make  it  substantially  separate!  For  those  functions 
which  are  already  variously  compounded  to  achieve  what  we 
regard  as  single  bodily  acts,  are  endlossly  re-compounded 


T^E   EVOLUTION  OF   CONDUCT.  y 

to  achieve  tliafc^o- ordination  of  bodily  acts  which,  is  known 
as  conduct.  ^ 

We  are  con'ceriled  with  functions  in  the  true  sense,  while 
we  think  of  them  as  processes  carried  on  within  the  body ; 
and,  without  exceeding  the  limits  of  physiology,  we  may 
treat  of  their  adjusted  combinations,  so  long  as  these  are 
regarded  as  parts  of  the  vital  consensus.  If  we  observe 
how  the  lungs  aerate  the  blood  which  the  heart  sends  to 
them  j  how  heart  and  lungs  together  supply  aerated  blood  to 
the  stomach,  and  so  enable  it  to  do  its  work;  how  these 
co-operate  with  sundry  secreting  and  excreting  glands  to 
further  digestion  and  to  remove  waste  matter ;  and  how  all  of 
them  join  to  keep  the  brain  in  a  fit  condition  for  carrying  on 
those  actions  which  indirectly  conduce  to  maintenance  of  the 
life  eft  large ;  we  are  dealing  with  functions.  Even  when 
considering  how  parts  that  act  directly  on  the  environment — • 
legs,  arms,  wings — perform  their  duties,  we  are  still  concerned 
with  functions  in  that  aspect  of  them  constituting  physiology, 
so  long  as  we  restrict  our  attention  to  internal  processes, 
and    to    internal    combinations   of   them.  But 

we  enter  on  the  subject  of  conduct  when  we  begin  to 
study  such  combinations  among  the  actions  of  sensory  and 
mx)tor  organs  as  are  externally  manifested.  Suppose  that 
instead  of  observing  those  contractions  of  muscles  by  which 
the  optic  axes  are  converged  and  the  foci  of  the  eyes  ad- 
justed (which  is  a  portion  of  jjl^siology),  and  that  instead 
of  observing  the  co-operation  of  other  nerves,  muscles,  and 
bones,  by  which  a  hand  is  moved  to  a  particular  place  and  the 
fingers  closed  (which  is  also  a  portion  of  physiology),  we 
observe  a  weapon  being  seized  by  a  hand  under  guidance  of 
the  eyes.  We  now  pass  from  the  thought  of  combined  *^ 
internal  functions  to  the  thought  of  combined  external*^ 
motions.  Doubtless  if  we  could  trace  the  cerebral  processes 
which  accompany  these,  we  should  find  an  inner  physio- 
logical co-ordination  corresponding  with  the  outer  co-ordina- 
tion of  actions.     But  this  admission  is  consistent  with  tho 


10  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

assertion,  tliat  when  we  ignore  tlie  internal  43#Qbination  and 
attend  only  to  tlie  external  combination,  we  pass  from  a 
portion  of  physiology  to  a  portion  of  conduct.  For  though 
it  may  be  objected  that  the  external  combination  instanced, 
is  too  simple  to  be  rightly  included  under  the  name  conduct, 
yet  a  moment^s  thought  sljows  that  it  is  joined  with  what  we 
call  conduct  by  insensible  gradations.  Suppose  the  weapon 
seized  is  used  to  ward  off  a  blow.  Suppose  a  counter- 
blow is  given.  Suppose  the  aggressor  runs  and  is  chased. 
Suppose  there  comes  a  struggle  and  a  handing  him  over 
to  the  police.  Suppose  there  follow  the  many  and  varied 
acts  constituting  a  prosecution.  Obviously  the  initial 
adjustment  of  an  act  to  an  end,  inseparable  from  the 
rest,  must  be  included  with  them  under  the  same  general 
head ;  and  obviously  from  this  initial  simple  adjustment, 
having  intrinsically  no  moral  character,  we  pass  by  degrees 
to  the  most  complex  adjustments  and  to  those  on  which 
moral  judgments  are  passed. 

Hence,  excluding  all  internal  co-ordinations,  our  subject 
here  is  the  aggregate  of  all  external  co-ordinations;  and  this 
aggregate  includes  not  only  the  simplest  as  well  as  the  most 
complex  performed  by  human  beings,  but  also  those  per- 
formed by  all  inferior  beings  considered  as  less  or  more 
evolved. 

§  4.  Already  the  question-JVhat  constitutes  advance  in  tlie 
evolution  of  conduct,  as  we  trace  it  up  from  the  lowest  types 
of  living  creatures  to  the  highest  ?  has  been  answered  by 
implication.  A  few  examples  will  now  bring  the  answer  into 
conspicuous  relief. 

We  saw  that  conduct  is  -distinguished  from  the  totality 
of  actions  by  excluding  purposeless  actions*  but  during 
evolution  this  distinction  arises  by  degrees.  In  the  very 
lowest  creatures  most  of  the  movements  from  moment  to 
moment  made,  have  not  more  recognizable  aims  than  have 
the  struggles  of  an  epileptic.   An  infusorium  swims  randomly 


THE   EVOLUTION   OF   CONDUCT.  11 

about,  determined  in  its  course  not  by  a  perceived  object  to 
be  pursued  or  escaped,  but,  apparently,  by  varying  stimuli 
in  its  medium ;  and  its  acts,  unadjusted  in  any  appreciable 
way  to  ends,  lead  it  now  into  contact  with  some  nutritive 
substance  wbicli  it  absorbs,  and  now  into  tbe  neigbbourbood 
of  some  creature  by  wbicb  it  is  swallowed  and  digested. 
Lacking  those  developed  senses  and  motor  powers  wbicb 
higher  animals  possess,  ninety-nine  in  the  hundred  of  these 
minute  animals,  severally  living  for  but  a  few  hours,  dis- 
appear either  by  innutrition- or  by  destruction.  The  conduct 
is  constituted  of  actions  so  little  adjusted  to  ends,  that  life 
continues  only-  as  long  as  the  accidents  of  the  environment 
are  favourable.  But  when,  among  aquatic  creatures,  we 
observe  one  which,  though  still  low  in  type,  is  much  higher 
than  the  infusorium — say  a  rotifer — we  see  how,  along 
with  larger  size,  more  developed  structures,  and  greater 
power  of  combining  functions,  there  goes  an  advance  in  con- 
duct. We  see  how  by  its  whirling  cilia  it  sucks  in  as  food 
tliese  small  animals  moving  around ;  how  by  its  prehensile 
tail  it  fixes  itself  to  some  fit  object;  how  by' withdrawing 
its  outer  organs  and  contracting  its  body,  it  preserves  itself 
from  this  or  that  injury  from  time  to  time  threatened ;  and 
how  thus,  by  better  adjusting  its  own  actions,  it  becomes 
less  dependent  on  the  actions  going  on  around,  and  so  pre- 
serves itself  for  a  longer  period. 

A  superior  sub -kingdom,  as  the  Mollusca,  still  better 
exemplifies  this  contrast.  When  we  compare  a  low  mollusc, 
such  as  a  floating  ascidian,  with  a  high  mollusc,  such  as  a 
cephalopod,  we  are  again  shown  that  greater  organic  evolu- 
tion is  accompanied  by  more  evolved  conduct.  At  the 
mercy  of  every  marine  creature  large  enough  to  swallow  it, 
and  drifted  about  by  currents  which  may  chance  to  keep  it 
at  sea  or  may  chance  to  leave  it  fatally  stranded,  the 
ascidian  displays  but  little  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  in 
comparison  with  the  cephalopod ;  which,  now  crawling  over 
the  beach,  now  exploring  the  rocky  crevices,  now  swimming 


X 


12  THE    DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

tlirougli  the  open  water,  now  darting  after  a  fist,  now  hiding 
itself  from  some  larger  animal  in  a  cloud  of  ink,  and  using 
its  suckered  arms  at  one  time  for  anchoring  itself  and  at 
another  for  holding  fast  its  prey ;  selects,  and  combines,  and 
proportions^  its  movements  from  minute  to  minute,  so  as 
to  evade  dangers  which  threaten,  while  utilizing  chances  of 
food  which  offer :  so  showing  us  varied  activities  which,  in 
achieving  special  ends,  achieve  the  general  end  of  securing 
continuance  of  the  activities. 

Among  vertebrate  animals  we  similarly  trace  up,  along 
with  advance  in  structures  and  functions,  this  advance  in 
conduct.  A  fish  roaming  about  at  hazard  in  search  of 
something  to  eat,  able  to  detect  it  by  smell  or  sight  only 
within  short  distances,  and  now  and  again  rushing  away  in 
alarm  on  the  approach  of  a  bigger  fish,  makes  adjustments  of 
acts  to  ends  that  are  relatively  few  and  simple  in  their  kinds; 
and  shows  us,  as  a  consequence,  how  small  is  the  average 
duration  of  life.  So  few  survive  to  maturity  that,  to 
make  up  for  destruction  of  unhatched  young  and  small 
fry  and  half-grown  individuals,  a  million  ova  have  to  be 
spawned  by  a  cod-fish  that  two  may  reach  the  spawning  age. 
Conversely,  by  a  highly-evolved  mammal,  such  as  an  ele- 
phant, those  general  actions  performed  in  common  with  the 
fish  are  far  better  adjusted  to  their  ends.  By  sight  as  well, 
probably,  as  by  odour,  it  detects  food  at  relatively  great 
distances;  and  when,  at  intervals,  there  arises  a  need  for 
escape,  relatively-great  speed  is  attained.  But  the  chief 
difference  arises  from  the  addition  of  new  sets  of  adjust- 
ments. We  have  combined  actions  which  facilitate  nutrition 
— the  breaking  off  of  succulent  and  fruit-bearing  branches,  the 
selecting  of  edible  growths  throughout  a  comparatively  wide 
reach ;  and,  in  case  of  danger,  safety  can  be  achieved  not  by 
flight  only,  but,  if  necessary,  by  defence  or  attack  :  bringing 
into  combined  use  tusks,  trunk,  and  ponderous  feet.  Fur- 
ther, we  see  various  subsidiary  acts  adjusted  to  subsidiary 
ends — now  the  going  into  a  river  for  coolness^  and  using  the 


THE   EVOLUTION   OP   CONDUCT.  13 

tnink  as  a  means  of  projecting  water  over  the  body ;  now 
the  employment  of  a  bough  for  sweeping  away  flies  from 
the  back ;  now  the  making  of  signal  sounds  to  alarm 
the  herd,  and  adapting  the  actions  to  such  sounds  when 
made  by  others.  Evidently,  the  effect  of  this  more  highly- 
evolved  conduct  is  to  secure  the  balance  of  the  organic 
actions  throughout  far  longer  periods. 

And  now,  on  studying  the  doings  of  the  highest  of  mam- 
mals, mankind,  we  not  only  find  that  the  adjustments  of 
acts  to  ends  are  both  more  numerous  and  better  than 
among  lower  mammals ;  but  we  find  the  same  thing  on  com- 
paring the  doings  of  higher  races  of  men  with  those  of 
lower  races.  If  we  take  any  one  of  the  major  ends  achieved, 
we  see  greater  completeness  of  achievement  by  civilized  than 
by  savage ;  and  we  also  see  an  achievement  of  relatively 
numerous  minor  ends  subserving  major  ends.  Is  it  in 
nutrition  ?  The  food  is  obtained  more  regularly  in  response 
to  appetite;  it  is  far  higher  in  quality  ;  it  is  free  from  dirt; 
it  is  greater  in.  variety;  it  is  better  prepared.  Is  it  in 
warmth  ?  The  characters  of  the  fabrics  and  forms  of  the 
articles  used  for  clothing,  and  the  adaptations  of  them  to 
requirements  from  day  to  day  and  hour  to  hour,  are  much 
superior.  Is  it  in  dwellings  ?  Between  the  shelter  of  boughs 
and  grass  which  the  lowest  savage  builds,  and  the  mansion  of 
the  civilized  man,  the  contrast  in  aspect  is  not^  more  ex- 
treme than  is  the  contrast  in  number  and  efiiciency  of 
the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  betrayed  in  their  respective 
constructions.  And  when  with  the  ordinary  activities  of 
the  savage  we  compare  the  ordinary  civilized  activities — 
as  the  business  of  the  trader,  which  involves  multiplied  and 
complex  transactions  extending  over  long  periods,  or  as 
professional  |)|,vocations,  prepared  for  by  elaborate  studies 
and  daily  carried  on  in  endlessly -varied  forms,  or  as  political 
discussions  and  agitations,  directed  now  to  the  carrying  of 
this  measure  and  now  to  the  defeating  of  that, — we  see  sets 
of  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends,  not  only  immensely  exceeding 


14  THE   DATA  OP   ETHICS. 

those  seen  among  lower  races  of  men  in  variety  and  intri- 
cacy, but  sets  to  whicli  lower  races  of  men  present  nothing 
analogous.  And  along  witli  this  greater  elaboration  of  life 
produced  by  the  pursuit  of  more  numerous  ends,  there 
goes  tliat  increased  duration  of  life  which  constitutes  the 
supreme  end. 

And  here  is  suggested  the  need  for  supplementing  this 
conception  of  evolving  conduct.  For  besides  being  an 
improving  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends,  such,  as  furthers  pro- 
longation of  life,  it  is  sucb  as  f  m'tbers  increased  amount  of 
life.  Reconsideration  of  tlie  examples  above  given,  will 
sliow  that  lengtb  of  life  is  not  by  itself  a  measure  of  evolu- 
tion of  conduct ;  but  that  quantity  of  life  must  be  taken  into 
account.  An  oyster,  adapted  by  its  structure  to  the  diffused 
food  contained  in  the  water  it  draws  in,  and  shielded  by  its 
shell  from  nearly  all  dangers,  may  live  longer  than  a  cuttle- 
fish, which  has  such  superior  powers  of  dealing  witli 
numerous  contingencies ;  but  then,  the  sum  of  vital 
activities  during  any  given  interval  is  far  less  in  the  oyster 
than  in  the  cuttle-fisli.  So  a  worm,  ordinarily  sheltered  from 
most  enemies  by  the  eartb  it  burrows  through,  which  also 
supplies  a  sufficiency  of  its  poor  food,  may  have  greater 
longevity  than  many  of  its  annulose  relatives,  the  insects  ; 
but  one  of  these  during  its  existence  as  larva  and  imago, 
may  experience  a  greater  quantity  of  the  cbanges  which  con- 
stitute life.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  wlien  we  compare  the  more 
evolved  with  the  less  evolved  among  mankind.  The  differ- 
ence between  the  average  lengths  of  the  lives  of  savage  and 
civilized,  is  no  true  measure  of  the  difference  between  the 
totalities  of  their  two  lives,  considered  as  aggregates  of 
thought,  feeling,  and  action.  Hence,  estimating  life  by 
multiplying  its  length  into  its  breadth,  we  must  say  that  the 
augmentation  of  it  which  accompanies  evolution  of  conduct, 
results  from  increase  of  both  factors.  The  more  multiplied 
and  varied  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends,  by  which  the  more 
developed  creature  from  hour  to  hour  fulfils  more  numerous 


THE    EVOLUTION   OF   CONDUCT.  15 

requirements^  severally  add  to  the  activities  that  are  carried 
on  abreast^  and  severally  help  to  make  greater  the  period 
through  which  such  simultaneous  activities  endure.  Each 
further  evolution  of  conduct  widens  the  aggregate  of  actions 
while  conducing  to  elongation  of  it. 

§  5.  Turn  we  now  to  a  further  aspect  of  the  phenomena, 
separate  from,  but  necessarily  associated  with,  the  last. 
Thus  far  we  have  considered  only  those  adjustments  of  acts 
to^^nds  which  have  for  their  final  purpose  complete  individual 
life.  Now  we  have  to  consider  those  adjustments  which  have 
for  their  final  purpose  Ibhe  life  of  the  species. 

Self-preservation  in  each  generation  has  all  along  depended 
on  the  preservation  of  offspring  by  preceding  generations. 
And  in  proportion  as  evolution  of  the  conduct  subserving 
individual  life  is  high,  implying  high  organization,  there 
must  previously  have  b'6en  a  highly-evolved  conduct  sub- 
serving nurture  of  the  young.  Throughout  the  ascending 
grades  of  the  animal  kingdom,  this  second  kind  of  conduct 
presents  stages  of  advance  like  those  which  we  have  observed 
in  the  first.  Low  down,"  where  structures  and  functions  are. 
little  develop^ed,  and  the  power  of  adjusting  acts  to  ends| 
but  slight,  there  is  no  conduct,  properly  so  named,  further- ' 
ing  salvation  of  the  species.^  Race-maintaining  conduct,  liko 
self-maintaining  conduct,  arises  gradually  out  of  that  which 
cannot  be  called  conduct:  adjusted  actions  are  preceded 
by  unadjusted  ones.  .  Protozoa  spontaneously  divide 

and  sub-divide,  in  consequence  of  physical  changes  over 
which  they  have  no  control;  or,  at  other  times,  after  a  period 
of  quiescence,  break  up  into  minute  portions  which  severally 
grow  into  new  individuals.  In  neither  case  can  conduct 
be  alleged.  Higher  up,  the  process  is  that  of  ripening,  at 
intervals,  germ-cells  and  sperm-cells,  which,  on  occasion, 
are  sent  forth  into  the  surrounding  water  and  left  to  their 
fate:  perhaps  one  in  ten  thousand  surviving  to  maturity. 
Here,    again,    we   see    only   development    and    dispersion 


16  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

going  on  apart  from  parental  care.  Types  above  ttese,  as 
fisli  whicli  clioose  fit  places  in  whicli  to  deposit  their  ova, 
or  as  tlie  higher  crustaceans  which  carry  masses  of  ova 
about  until  they  are  hatched,  exhibit  adjustments  of  acts 
to  ends  which  we  may  properly  call  conduct ;  though  it  is  of 
the  simplest  kind.  Where,  as  among  certain  fish,  the  male 
keeps  guard  over  the  eggs,  driving  away  intruders,  there  is 
an  additional  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends;  and  the  appli- 
cability of  the  name  conduct  is  more  decided.  Passing 
at  once  to  creatures  far  superior,  such  as  birds  which, 
building  nests  and  sitting  on  their  eggs,  feed  their  broods 
for  considerable  periods,  and  give  them  aid  after  they  can 
fly  j  or  such  as  mammals  which,  suckling  their  young  for  a 
time,  continue  afterwards  to  bring  them  food  or  protect 
them  while  they  feed,  until  they  reach  ages  at  which  they 
can  provide  for  themselves ;  we  are  shown  how  this  conduct 
which  furthers  race-maintenance  evolves  hand-in-hand  with 
the  conduct  which  furthers  self-maintenance.  That  better 
organization  which  makes  possible  the  last,  makes  possible 
the  first  also.  Mankind  exhibit  a  great  progress 
of  like  nature.  Compared  with  brutes,  the  savage,  higher 
in  his  self -maintaining  conduct,  is  higher  too  in  his  race-main- 
taining conduct.  A  larger  number  of  the  wants  of  offspring 
are  provided  for;  and  parental  care,  enduring  longer, 
extends  to  the  disciplining  of  ofispring  in  arts  and  habits 
which  fit  them  for  their  conditions  of  existence.  Conduct  of 
this  order,  equally  with  conduct  of  the  first  order,  we  see  ■ 
becoming  evolved  in  a  still  greater  degree  as  we  ascend 
from  savage  to  civilized.  The  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends 
in  the  rearing  of  children  become  far  more  elaborate,  alikej 
in  number  of  ends  met,  variety  of  means  used,  and  efficiency] 
of  their  adaptations ;  and  the  aid  and  oversight  are  continued; 
throughout  a  much  greater  part  of  early  life. 

In  tracing  up  the  evolution  of  conduct,  so  that  we  may 
frame  a  true  conception  of  conduct  in  general,  we  have  thus 
to  recognize  these  two  kinds  as  mutually  dependent.  Speak* 


THE   EVOLUTION    OF   CONDUCT.  17 

ing  generally,  neither  can  evolve  without  evolution  of  the 
other ;  and  the  highest  evolutions  of  the  two  must  be  reached 
simultaneously. 

§  6.  To  conclude,  however,  that  on  reaching  a  perfect 
adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  subserving  individual  life  and 
the  rearing  of  offspring,  the  evolution  of  conduct  becomes 
complete,  is  to  conclude  erroneously.  Or  rather,  I  should 
say,  it  is  an  error  to  suppose  that  either  of  these  kinds  of 
conduct  can  assume  its  highest  form,  without  its  highest 
fonn  being  assumed  by  a  third  kind  of  conduct  yet  to  be 
named. 

The  multitudinous  creatures  of  all  kinds  which  fill  the 
Earth,  cannot  live  wholly  apart  from  one  another,  but  are  more 
or  less  in  presence  of  one  another — are  interfered  with  by 
one  another.  In  large  measure  the  adjustments  of  acts  to 
ends  which  we  have  been  considering,  are  components  of 
that  ''  struggle  for  existence  '^  carried  on  both  between 
members  of  the  same  species  and  between  members  of 
different  species ;  and,  very  generally,  a  successful  adjust- 
ment made  by  one  creature  involves  an  unsuccessful  adjust- 
ment made  by  another  creature,  either  of  the  same  kind  or 
of  a  different  kind.  That  the  carnivore  may  live  herbivores 
must  diej/and  that  its  yoiing  may  be  reared  the  young  of 
weaker  creatures  must  be  orphaned.  Maintenance  of  the 
hawk  audits  brood  involves  the  deaths  of  many  small  birds; 
and  that  small  birds  may  multiply,  their  progeny  must 
be  fed  with  innumerable  sacrificed  worms  and  larvae. 
Competition  among  members  of  the  same  species  has  allied, 
though  less  conspicuous,  results.  The  stronger  often  carries 
off  by  force  the  prey  which  the  weaker  has  caught.  Mono- 
polizing certain  hunting  grounds,  the  more  ferocious  drive 
others  of  their  kind  into  less  favourable,  places.  With  plant- 
eating  animals,  too,  the  like  holds  :  the^better  food  is  secured 
by  the  ffl^e  vigorous  individuals,  while  the  less  vigorous 
and  worse  fed,  succumb  either  directly  from  innutrition  or 


18  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

indirectly  from  resulting  inability  to  escape  enemies.  That 
is  to  say,  among  creatures  whose  lives  are  earned  on  anta- 
gonistically, each  of  the  two  kinds  of  conduct  delineated 
above,  must  remain  imperfectly  evolved.  Even  in  such  few 
kinds  of  them  as  have  little  to  fear  from  enemies  or  compe- 
titors, as  Jions  or  tigers,  there  is  still  inevitable  failure  in 
the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  towards  the  close  of  life. 
Death  by  starvation  from  inability  to  catch  prey,  shows  a 
falling  short  of  conduct  from  its  ideal. 

This  imperfectly-evolved  conduct  introduces  us  by  anti- 
thesis to  conduct  that  is  perfectly  evolved.     Contemplating 
these  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  which  miss  completeness 
because  they  cannot  be  made  by  one  creature  without  other  i 
creatures  being  prevented  from  making  them,  raises  the  \ 
thought  of  adjustments  such  that  each  creature  may  make 
them  without  preventing  them  from  being  made  by  other 
creatures.     That  the  highest  form  of  conduct  must  be  so  ' 
distinguished,  is  an  inevitable  implication ;  for  while  the  form 
of  conduct  is  such  that  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  by  some 
necessitate  non-adjustments  by  others,  there  remains  room 
for  modifications  which  bring  conduct  into  a  form  avoiding 
this,  and  so  making  the  totality  of  life  greater. 

From  the  abstract  let  us  pass  to  the  concrete.  Recogniz- 
ing men  as  the  beings  whose  conduct  is  most  evolved,  let 
us  ask  under  what  conditions  their  conduct,  in  all  three 
aspects  of  its  evolution,  reaches  its  limit.  Clearly  while 
the  lives  led  are  entirely  predatory,  as  those  of  savages,  the 
adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  fall  short  of  this  highest  form 
of  conduct  in  every  way.  Individual  life,  ill  carried  on 
from  hour  to  hour,  is  prematurely  cut  short ;  the  fostering 
of  offspring  often  fails,  and  is  incomplete  when  it  does  not 
fail ;  and  in  so  far  as  the  ends  of  self-maintenance  and  race- 
maintenance  are  met,  they  are  met  by  destruction  of  other 
beings,  of  different  kind  or  of  like  kind.  In  social  groups 
formed  by  compounding  and  re-compounding  primitive  hordes, 
conduct  remains  imperfectly  evolved  in  proportion  as  there 


D  .,  p  y-. 


THE   EVOLUTION   OP   C( 


^/poe^JS 


continue  antagonisms  between  tlie  groups  ana  uuiagMiisnis 
between  members  of  the  same  group — two  traits  necessarily 
associated;  since  the  nature  which  prompts  international! 
aggression  prompts  aggression  of  individuals  on  one  another. 
Hence  the  limit  of  evolution  can  be  reached  by  conduct  only 
in  permanently  peaceful  societies.  That  perfect  adjustment 
of  acts  to  ends  in  maintaining  individual  life  and  rearing 
new  individuals,  which  is  effected  by  each  without  hindering 
others  from  effecting  like  perfect  adjustments,  is,  in  its  very 
definition,  shown  to  constitufce  a  kind  of  conduct  that  can 
be  approached  only  as  war  decreases  and  dies  out. 

A  gap  in  this  outline  must  now  be  filled  up.  There  remains 
a  further  advance  not  yet  even  hinted.  For  beyond  so 
behaving  that  each  achieves  his  ends  without  preventing 
others  from  achieving  their  ends,  the  members  of  a  society 
may  give  mutual  help  in  the  achievement  of  ends.  And  if, 
either  indirectly  by  industrial  co-operation,  or  directly  by 
volunteered  aid,  fellow  citizens  can  make  easier  for  one 
another  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends,  then  their  conduct 
assumes  a  still  higher  phase  of  evolution ;  since  whatever 
facilitates  the  making  of  adjustments  by  each,  increases  the 
totality  of  the  adjustments  made,  and  serves  to  render  the 
lives  of  all  more  complete. 

§  7.  The  reader  who  recalls  certain  passages  in  First  Prin- 
ciples, in  the  Principles  of  Biology,  and  in  the  Principles  of 
Psychology,  will  perceive  above  a  re-statement,  in  another 
form,  of  generalizations  set  forth  in  those  works.  Especially 
will  he  be  reminded  of  the  proposition  that  Life  is  ^^  the 
definite  combination  of  heterogeneous  changes,  both-  simul- 
taneous and  successive,  in  correspondence  with  external 
coexistences  and  sequences/'  and  still  more  of  that 
abridged  and  less  specific  formula,  in  which  Life  is  said  to 
be  "the  continuous  adjustment  of  internal  relations  to 
external  relations.^' 

The  presentation  of  the  facts  here  made,  differs  from  tho 


20  THE   DATA    OF   ETHICS. 

presentations  before  made^  mainly  by  ignoring  the  inner 
part  of  the  correspondence  and  attending  exclusively  to  that 
outer  part  constituted  of  visible  actions.  But  the  two  are  in 
harmony;  and  the  reader  who  wishes  further  to  prepare  him- 
self for  dealing  with  our  present  topic  from  the  evolution 
point  of  view,  may  advantageously  join  to  the  foregoing 
more  special  aspect  of  the  plienomena,  the  more  general 
aspects  before  delineated. 

After  this  passing  remark,  I  recur  to  the  main  proposi- 
tion set  forth  in  these  two  chapters,  which  has,  I  think, 
been  fully  justified.  Guided  by  the  truth  that  as  thefcon- 
duct  with  which  Ethics  deals  is  part  of  conduct  at  large, 
conduct  at  large  must  be  generally  understood  before  this 
part  can  be  specially  understood ;  and  guided  by  the  further 
truth  that  t(>  understand  conduct  at  large  we  must  under- 
stand the  evolution  of  conduct ;  we  have  been  led  to  see 
that  Ethics  has  for  its  subject-matter,  that  foriii  which 
universal  conduct  assumes  during  the  last  stages  of  its 
evolution.  We  have  also  concluded  that  these  last  stages 
in  the  evolution  of  conduct  are  those  displayed  by  the 
highest  type  of  being,  when  he  is  forced,  by  increase  of 
numbers,  to  live  more  and  more  in  presence  of  his  fellows. 
And  there  has  followed  the  corollary  that  conduct  gains 
ethical  sanction  in  proportion  as  the  activities,  becoming 
less  and  less  militant  and  more  and  more  industrial, 
are  such  as  do  not  necessitate  mutual  injury  or  hindrance, 
but  consist  with,  and  are  furthered  by,  co-operation  and 
mutual  aid. 

These  implications  of  the  Evolution-Hypothesis,  we  shall 
now  see  harmonize  with  the  leading  moral  ideas  men  have 
otherwise  reached. 


CHAPTER  III. 

GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT. 

§  8.  By  comparing  its  meanings^  in  different  connexions 
and  observing  what  they  have  in  common,  we  learn  the 
essential  meaning  of  a  word  ;  and  the  essential  meaning  of 
a  word  that  is  variously  applied,  may  best  be  learnt  by 
comparing  with  one"  another  those  applications  of  it  which 
diverge  most  widely.  Let  us  thus  ascertain  what  good  and 
bad  mean. 

In  which  cases  do  we  distinguish  as  good,  a  knife,  a  gun, 
a  house?  And  what  trait  leads  us  to  speak  of  a  bad 
umbrella  or  a  bad  pair  of  boots  ?  The  characters  here 
predicated  by  the  words  good  and  bad,  are  not  intrinsic 
characters ;  for  apart  from  human  wants,  such  things  have 
neither  merits  nor  demerits.  We  call  these  articles  good 
or  bad  according  as  they  are  well  or  ill  adapted  to  achieve 
prescribed _ enda^  The  good  knife  is  one  which  will  cut; 
the  good  gun  is  one  which  carries  far  and  true;  the 
good  house  is  one  which  duly  yields  the  shelter,  comfort, 
and  accommodation  sought  for.  Conversely,  the  badness 
alleged  of  the  umbrella  or  the  pair  of  boots,  refers  to  their 
failures  in  fulfilling  the  ends  of  keeping  off  the  rain  and 
comfortably  protecting  the  feet,  with  due  regard  to  appear- 
ances. So  is  it  when  we  pass  from  inanimate  objects 
to  inanimate  actions.  We  call  a  day  bad  in  which  storms 
prevent    us    from    satisfying  certain   of    our   desires.      A 


22  THE   DATA  OP   ETHICS. 

good  season  is  tlie  expression  used  wlien  the  weather 
has  favoured  the  production  of  valuable  crops.  If 

from  lifeless  things  and  actions  we  pass  to  living  ones^  we 
similarly  find  that  these  words  in  their  current  applications 
refer  to  efficient  subservience.  The  goodness  or  badness  of 
a  pointer  or  a  hunter,  of  a  sheep  or  an  ox,  ignoring  all  other 
attributes  of  these  creatures,  refer  in  the  one  case  to  the 
fitness  of  their  actions  for  effecting  the  ends  men  use  them 
for,  and  in  the  other  case  to  the  qualities  of  their  flesh  as 
adapting  it  to  support  human  life.^^  And  those  doings  of  l^ 

men  which,  morally  considered,  are  indifferent,  we  class  as 
good  or  bad  according  to  their  success^  or  failure.  A  good 
jump  is  a  jump  which,  remoter  ends  ignored,  well  achieves 
the  immediate  purpose  of  a  jump ;  and  a  stroke  at  billiards 
is  called  good  when  the  movements  are  skilfully  adjusted  to 
the  requirements.  Oppositely,  the  badness  of  a  walk  that 
is  shuffling  and  an  utterance  that  is  indistinct,  is  alleged 
because  of  the  relative  non-adaptations  of  the  acts  to  the 
ends. 

Thus  recognizing  the  meanings  of  good  and  bad  as  other- 
wise used,  we  shall  understand  better  their  meanings  as 
used  in  characterizing  conduct  underwits  ethical  aspects. 
Here,  too,  observation  shows  that  we  apply  them  according 
as  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  are,  or  are  not,  efficient. 
This  truth  is  somewhat  disguised.  The  entanglement  of 
social  relations  is  such,  that  men's  actions  often  simul- 
taneously affect  the  wel%^  of  self,  of  offspring,  and  of 
fellow-citizens.  Hence  results  confasion  in  judging  of 
actions  as  good  or  bad ;  since  actions  well  fitted  to  achieve 
ends  of  one  order,  may  prevent  ends  of  the  other  orders  from 
being  achieved.  Nevertheless,  when  we  disentangle  the 
three  orders  of  ends,  and  consider  each  separately,  it  be- 
comes clear  that  the  conduct  which  achieves  each  kind|| 
of  end  is  regarded  as  relatively  gqod;  and  is  regarded  asj| 
relatively  bad  if  it  fails  to  achieve  it. 

Take  first  the  primary  set  of  adjustments — those  sub- 

f 


GOOD  AND  BAD   CONDUCT.  23 

serving  individual  life.  Apart  from  approval  or  disapproval 
of  his  ulterior  aims,  a  man  who  fights  is  said  to  make  a  good 
defence,  if  his  defence  is  well  adapted  for  self-preservation; 
and,  the  judgments  on  other  aspects  of  his  conduct  remain- 
ing the  same,  he  brings  down  on  himself  an  unfavourable 
verdict,  in  so  far  as  his  immediate  acts  are  concerned,  if 
these  are  futile.  The  goodness  ascribed  to  a  man  of 
business,  as  such,  is  measured  by  the  activity  and  ability 
with  which  he  buys  and  sells  to  advantage;  and  may 
coexist  with  a  hard  treatment  of  dependents  which  is  repro- 
bated. Though  in  repeatedly  lending  money  to  a  friend  who 
sinks  one  loan  after  another,  a  man  is  doing  that  which,  con- 
sidered in  itself  is  held  praiseworthy ;  yet,  if  he  does  it  to  the 
extent  of  bringing  on  his  own  ruin,  he  is  held  blameworthy 
for  a  self-sacrifice  carried  too  far.  And  thus  is  it  with  the 
opinions  we  express  from  hour  to  hour  on  those  acts  of 
people  around  which  bear  on  their  health  and  personal  wel- 
fare. "  You  should  not  have  done  that ; ''  is  the  reproof 
given  to  one  who  crosses  the  street  amid  a  dangerous  rush 
of  vehicles.  "  You  ought  to  have  changed  your  clothes  -/'  is 
said  to  another  who  has  taken  cold  after  getting  wet.  "  You 
were  right  to  take  a  receipt '/'  '^  you  were  wrong  to  invest 
without  advice ;''  are  common  criticisms.  All  such  approving 
and  disapproving  utterances  make  the  tacit  assertion  that, 
other  things  equal,  conduct  is  right  ,oiL_wrang  according  as 
its  special  acts,  well  or  ill  adjusted  to  special  ends,- do  or — 
do  not  further  the  gGaeral  end  of  self-preservation. 

These  ethical  judgments  we  pass  on  self-regarding  acts 
are  ordinarily  little  emphasized  ;  partly  because  the  prompt- 
ings of  the  self-regarding  desires,  generally  strong  enough, 
do  not  need  moral  enforcement,  and  partly  because  the 
promptings  of  the  other-regarding  desires,  less  strong,  and 
often  over-ridden,  do  need  moral  enforcement.  Hence 
results  a  contrast.  On  turning  to  that  second  class  of 
adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  which  subserve  the  rearing  of 
ofi'spring,  we  no  longer  find  any  obscurity  in  the  applip'atiou 


24  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

of  the  words  good  and  bad  to  them,  according  as  they  are 
efficient  or  inefficient.  The  expressions  good  nursing  and 
bad  nursing,  whether  they  refer  to  the  supply  of  food,  the 
quality  and  amount  of  clothing,  or  the  due  ministration 
to  infantine  wants  from  hour  to  hour,  tacitly  recognize  as 
special  ends  which  ought  to  be  fulfilled,  the  furthering  of 
the  vital  functions,  with  a  view  to  the  general  end  of  con- 
tinued life  and  growth.  A  mother  is  called  good  who, 
ministering  to  all  the  physical  needs  of  her  children,  also 
adjusts  her  behaviour  in  ways  conducive  to  their  mental 
health ;  and  a  bad  father  is  one  who  either  does  not  provide 
the  necessaries  of  life  for  his  family,  or  otherwise  acts  in  a 
manner  injurious  to  their  bodies  or  minds.  Similarly  of  the 
education  given  to  them,  or  provided  for  them.  Goodness  or 
badness  is  affirmed  of  it  (often  with  little  consistency,  how- 
ever) according  as  its  methods  are  so  adapted  to  physical 
and  psychical  requirements,  as  to  further  the  children's  lives 
for  the  time  being,  while  preparing  them  for  carrying  on 
complete  and  prolonged  adult  life. 

Most  emphatic,  however,  are  the  applications  of  the  words 
good  and  bad  to  conduct  throughout  that  third  division  of 
it  comprising  the  deeds  by  which  men  affect  one  ^another. 
In  maintaining  their  own  lives  and  fostering  their  offspring, 
men^s  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  are  so  apt  to  hinder  the 
kindred  adjustments  of  other  men,  that  insistance  on  the 
needful  limitations  has  to  be  perpetual;  and  the  mischiefs 
caused  by  men's  interferences  with  one  another's  life-sub- 
serving actions  are  so  great,  that  the  interdicts  have  to  be 
peremptory.  ^  Hence  the  fact  that  the  words  good  and 
bad  have  come  to  be  specially  associated  with  acts  which 
further  the  complete  living  of  others  and  acts  which 
obstruct  their  complete  living.  Goodness,  standing  by  itself, 
suggests,  above  all  other  things,  the  conduct  of  one  who 
aids  the  sick  in  re-acquiring  normal  vitality,  assists  the 
unfortunate  to  recover  the  means  of  maintaining  themselves, 
defends  those  whaare  threatened  ^•''^^^  i^^^  n'son,  pro- 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  25 

perty,  or  reputation,  and  aids  whatever  promises  to  improve 
the  living  of  all  his  fellows.  Contrariwise,  badness  brings  to 
mind,  as  its  leading  correlative,  the  conduct  of  one  who,  in 
carrying  on  his  own  life,  damages  the  lives  of  others  by 
injuring  their  bodies,  destroying  their  possessions,  defraud- 
ing them,  calumniating  them.  <^ 

Always,  then,  acts  are  called  good  or  bad,  according  asi/ 
they  are  well  or  ill  adjusted  to  ends ;  and  whatever  incon-/ ' 
sistency  there  is  in  our  uses  of  the  words,  arises  from 
inconsistency  of  the  ends.  Here,  however,  the  study  of 
conduct  in  general,  and  of  the  evolution  of  conduct,  have 
prepared  us  to  harmonize  these  interpretations.  The  fore- 
going exposition  shows  that  the  conduct  to  which  we  apply 
the  name  good,  is  the  relatively  more  evolved  conduct;  and 
that  bad  is  the  name  we  apply  to  conduct  which  is  relatively 
less  evolved.  We  saw  that  evolution,  tending  ever  towards 
self-preservation,  reaches  its  limit  when  individual  life  is  the 
greatest,  both  in  length  and  breadth  j  and  now  we  see  that, 
leaving  other  ends  aside,  we  regard  as  good  the  conduct 
furthering  self-preservation,  and  as  bad  the  conduct  tending 
to  self-destruction.  It  was  shown  that  along  with  increas- 
ing power  of  maintaining  individual  life,  which  evolution 
brings,  there  goes  increasing  power  of  perpetuating  the 
species  by  fostering  progeny,  and  that  in  this  direction  evolu- 
tion reaches  its  limit  when  the  needful  number  of  young, 
preserved  to  maturity,  are  then  fit  for  a  life  that  is  com- 
plete in  fulness  and  duration;  and  here  it  turns  out  that 
parental  conduct  is  called  good  or  bad  as  it  approaches  or 
falls  short  of  this  ideal  result.  Lastly,  we  inferred  that 
establishment  of  an  associated  state,  both  makes  possible 
and  requires  a  form  of  conduct  such  that  life  may  be  com- 
pleted in  each  and  in  his  offspring,  not  only  without  pre- 
venting completion  of  it  in  others,  but  with  furtherance  of 
it  in  others ;  and  we  have  found  above,  that  this  is  the  form 
of  conduct  most  emphatically  termed  good.  Moreover,  just 
as  weVthero  saw  that  evolution  becomes  thojiighest  possible 


26  ^  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

when  the  conduct  simultaneously  achieves  the  greatest 
totadity  of  life  in  self^  in  offsprings  and  in  fellow  men ;  so 
here  we  see  that  the  conduct  called  good  rises  to  the  con- 
duct conceived  as  best,  when  it  fulfils  all  three  classes  of 
ends  at  the  same  time. 

§  9.  Is  there  any  postulate  involved  in  these  judgments 
on  conduct  ?  Is  there  any  assumption  made  in  calling  good 
the  acts  conducive  to  life,  in  self  or  others,  and  bad  those 
which  directly  or  indirectly  tend  towards  death,  special  or 
general  ?  Yes ;  an  assumption  of  extreme  significance  has 
been  made — an  assumption  underlying  all  moral  estimates. 

The  question  to  be  definitely  raised  and  answered  before 
entering  on  any  ethical  discussion,  is  the  question  of  late 
much  agitated — Is  life  worth  living?  Shall  we  take  the 
pessimist  view  ?  or  shall  we  take  the  optimist  view  ?  or 
shall  we,  after  weighing  pessimistic  and  optimistic  argu- 
ments, conclude  that  the  balance  is  in  favour  of  a  qualified 
optimism  ?  I 

On  the  answer  to  this  question  depends  entirely  every 
decision  concerning  the  goodness  or  badness  of  conduct. 
By  those  who  think  life  is  not  a  benefit  but  a  misfortune, 
conduct  which  prolongs  it  is  to  be  blamed  rather  than 
praised :  the  ending  of  an  undesirable  existence  being  the 
thing  to  be  wished,  that  which  causes  the  ending  of  it  must 
be  applauded ;  while  actions  furthering  its  continuance, 
either  in  self  or  others,  must  be  reprobated.  Those  who, 
on  the  other  hand,  take  an  optimistic  view,  or  who,  if  not 
pure  optimists,  yet  hold  that  in  life  the  good  exceeds  the 
evil,  are  committed  to  opposite  estimates  ; .  and  must  regard 
as  conduct  to  be  approved  that  which  fosters  life  in  self 
and  others,  and  as  conduct  to  be  disapproved  that  which 
injures  or  endangers  life  in  self  or  others. 

The  ultimate  question,  therefore,  is — Has  evolution  been 
a  mistake ;  and  especially  that  evolution  which  improves  the 
adjustment  of  agts  to  ends  in  ascending  stages  of  organiza- 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  27 

tion  ?  If  it  is  held  that  there  had  better  not  have  been  any 
animate  existence  at  all^  and  that  the  sooner  it  conies  to  an 
end  the  better ;  then  one  set  of  conclusions  with  respect  to 
conduct  emerges.  If^  contrariwise,  it  is  held  that  there  is  a 
balance  in  favour  of  animate  existence,  and  if,  still  further, 
it  is  held  that  in  the  future  this  balance  may  be  increased ; 
then  the  opposite  set  of  conclusions  emerges.  Even  should 
it  be  alleged  that  the  worth  of  life  is  not  to  be  judged  by  its 
intrinsic  character,  but  rather  by  its  extrinsic  sequences — 
by  certain  results  to  be  anticipated  when  life  has  passed 
— the  ultimate  issue  re-appears  in  a  new  shape.  For 
though  the  accompanying  creed  may  negative  a  deliberate 
shortening  of  life  that  is  miserable,  it  cannot  justify  a 
gratuitous  lengthening  of  such  life.  Legislation  conducive 
to  increased  longevity  would,  on  the  pessimistic  view,  remain 
blameable ;  while  it  would  be  praiseworthy  on  the  optimistic 
view. 

But  now,  have  these  irreconcilable  opinions  anything  in 
common  ?  Men  being  divisible  into  two  schools  differing 
on  this  ultimate  question,  the  inquiry  arises — Is  there 
anything  which  their  radically-opposed  views  alike  take  for 
granted  ?  In  the  optimistic  proposition,  tacitly  made  when 
using  the  words  good  and  bad  after  the  ordinary  manner ; 
and  in  the  pessimistic  proposition  overtly  made,  which 
implies  that  the  words  good  and  bad  should  be  used  in 
the  reverse  senses ;  does  examination  disclose  any  joint  pro. 
position — any  proposition  which,  contained  in  both  of  them, 
may  be  held  more  certain  than  either — any  universally- 
asserted  proposition  ? 

§  10.  Yes,  there  is  o^^  postulate  in  which  pessimists  and 
optimists  agrec^^Both  their  arguments  assume  it  to  be  self-  1 
evident  that  life^sgood^or  bad,  according  as  it  does,  or  does  J 
not,  bring  a  surplus  of  agreeable  feeling.     The  pessimist' 
says  he  condemns  life  because  it  results  in  more  pain  than 
pleasure.     The  optimist  defends 'life  in  the  belief  that  it 
2 


28  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

brings  more  pleasure  than  pain.  Each  makes  the  kind  of  sen- 
tiency  which  accompanies  life  the  test.  They  agree  that  the 
justification  for  life  as  a  state  of  being,  turns  on  this  issue — 
whether  the  average  consciousness  rises  above  indifference- 
point  into  pleasurable  feeling  or  falls  below  it  into  painful 
feeling.  The  implication  common  to  their  antagonist  views 
is^  that  conduct  should  conduce  to  preservation  of  the  indi- 
vidualj  of  the  family,  and  of  the  society^  only  supposing  thaty 
life  brings  more  happiness  than  misery. 

Changing  the  venue  cannot  alter  the  verdict.  If  either 
the  pessimist,  while  saying  that  the  pains  of  life  predominate, 
or  the  optimist,  while  saying  that  the  pleasures  predominate, 
urges  tbat  the  pains  borne  here  are  to  be  compensated  by 
pleasures  received  hereafter;  and  that  so  life^  whether 
or  not  justified  in  its  immediate  results,  is  justified  in 
its  ultimate  results ;  the  implication  remains  the  same. 
The  decision  is  still  reached  by  balancing  pleasures  against 
pains.  Animate  existence  would  be  judged  by  both  a 
curse,  if  to  a  surplus  of  misery  borne  here,  were  added 
a  surplus  of  misery  to  be  borne  hereafter.  And  for  either 
to  regard  animate  existence  as  a  blessing,  if  here  its  pains 
were  held  to  exceed  its  pleasures,  he  must  hold  that  here- 

-after  its  pleasures  will  exceed  its  pains.     Thus  there  is  no 
escape  from  the  admission  that  in  calling  good  the  conduct 
which  subserves  life,  and  bad  the  conduct  which  hinders  or 
1    destroys  it,  and  in  so  implying  that  life  is  a  blessing  and  not 

•    a  curse,  we  are  inevitably  asserting  that  condufitjs  good  or 

I  baj3f  according  as  its  total  effects  are  pleasurable  or  painful. 

/'^'^^One  theory   only  is  imaginable  in  pursuance  of  which 
/     other  interpretations  of  good  and  bad  can  be  given.     This 

\  theory  is  that  men  were  created  with  the  intention  that  they 
should  be  sources  of  misery  to  themselves ;  and  that  they  are 
bound  to  continue  living  that  their  creator  may  have  the 
satisfaction  of  contemplating  their  misery.  Though  this  is 
not  a  theory  avowedly  entertained  by  many — though  it  is 
not  formulated  by  any  in  this  distinct  way ;  yet  not  a  few  do 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  29 

accept  it  under  a  disguised  form.  Inferior  creeds  are  per- 
vaded by  tlie  belief  that  tbe  sigbt  of  suffering  is  pleasing  to 
the  gods.  Derived  from  bloodthirsty  ancestors,  such  gods 
are  naturally  conceived  as  gratified  by  the  infliction  of  pain  : 
when  living  they  delighted  in  torturing  other  beings ;  and 
witnessing  torture  is  supposed  still  to  give  them  delight. 
The  implied  conceptions  long  survive.  It  needs  but  to  name 
Indian  fakirs  who  hang  on  hooks  and  Eastern  dervishes  who 
gash  themselves,  to  show  that  in  societies  considerably  ad- 
vanced, are  still  to  be  found  many  who  think  that  submission 
to  anguish  brings  divine  favour.  And  without  enlarging 
on  fasts  and  penances,  it  will  be  clear  that  there  has  existed, 
and  still  exists,  among  Christian  peoples,  the  belief  that 
the  Deity  whom  Jephthah  thought  to  propitiate  by  sacri- 
ficing his  daughter,  may  be  propitiated  by  self-inflicted 
pains.  Further,  the  conception  accompanying  this,  that  acts 
pleasing  to  self  are  offensive  to  God,  has  survived  along  with 
it,  and  still  widely  prevails ;  if  not  in  formulated  dogmas, 
yet  in  beliefs  that  are  manifestly  operative. 

Doubtless,  in  modern  days  such  beliefs  have  assumed 
qualified  forms.  The  satisfactions  which  ferocious  gods  were 
supposed  to  feel  in  contemplating  tortures,  has  be^n,  in  large 
measure,  transformed  into  the  satisfaction  felt  by  a  deity 
in  contemplating  that  self -infliction  of  pain  which  is  held 
to  further  eventual  happiness.  But  clearly  those  who  enter- 
tain this  modified  view,  are  excluded  from  the  class  whose 
position  we  are  here  considering.  Restricting  ourselves  to 
this  class — supposing  that  from  the  savage  who  immolates 
victims  to  a  cannibal  god,  there  are  descendants  among  the 
civilized,  who  hold  that  mankind  were  made  for  suffering', 
and  that  it  is  their  duty  to  continue  living  in  misery  for  the 
delight  of  their  maker,  we  can  only  recognize  the  fact  that 
devil-worshippers  are  not  yet  extinct. 

Omitting  people  of  this  class,  if  there  are  any,  as  beyond 
or  beneath  argument,  we  find  that  all  others  avowedly  or 
tacitly  hold  that  the  final  justification  for  maintaining  life. 


l/f 


30  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

can  only  be  the  reception  from  it  of  a  surplus  of  pleasurable 
feeling  over  painful  feeling ;  and  that  goodness  or  badness 
can  be  ascribed  to  acts  which  subserve  life  or  hinder  life, 
only  on  this  supposition. 

And  here  we  are  brought  round  to  those  primary  mean- 
ings of  the  words  good  and  bad,  which  we  passed  over 
when  considering  their  secondary  meanings.  For  on 
remembering  that  we  call  good  and  bad  the  things  which 
immediately  produce  agreeable  and  disagreeable  sensations, 
and  also  the  sensations  themselves — a  good  wine,  a  good 
appetite,  a  bad  smell,  a  bad  headache — we  see  that  by 
referring  directly  to  pleasures  and  pains,  these  meanings 
harmonize  with  those  which  indirectly  refer  to  pleasures 
and  pains.  If  we  call  good  the  enjoyable  state  itself,  as  a 
good  laugh— if  we  call  good  the  proximate  cause  of  an 
enjoyable  state,  as  good  music — if  we  call  good  any  agent 
which  conduces  immediately  or  remotely  to  an  enjoyable 
state,  as  a  good  shop,  a  good  teacher — if  we  call  good 
considered  intrinsically,  each  act  so  adjusted  to  its  end  as 
to  further  self-preservation  and  that  surplus  of  enjoyment 
which  makes  self-preservation  desirable — if  we  call  good 
every  kind  of  conduct  which  aids  the  lives  of  others,  and 
do  this  under  the  belief  that  life  brings  more  happiness 
than  misery ;  then  it  becomes  undeniable  that,  taking  into 
account  immediate  and  remote  effects  on  all  persons,  the 
good  is  universally  the  pleasurable. 

§  11.  Sundry  influences — moral,  theological,  and  political 
— conspire  to  make  people  disguise  from  themselves  this 
truth.  As  in  narrower  cases  so  in  this  widest  case,  they 
become  so  pre-occupied  with  the  means  by  which  an  end  is 
achieved,  as  eventually  to  mistake  it  for  the  end.  Just  as 
money,  which  is  a  means  of  satisfying  wants,  comes  to  bo 
regarded  by  a  miser  as  the  sole  thing  to  be  worked  for, 
leaving  the  wants  unsatisfied  j  so  the  conduct  men  have 
found  preferable  because  most  conducive  to  happiness,  has 


■!l 


GOOD  AND   BAD   CONDUC^^>  ^Jf'        .    ,-31. 

come  to  be  thouglit  of  as  intrinsically  preferabTS=*=?fefc=©«fy  to 
be  made  a  proximate  end  (wMcli  it  should  be),  but  to 
be  made  an  ultimate  end,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  true 
ultimate  end.  And  yet  cross-examination  quickly  compels 
everyone  to  confess  the  true  ultimate  end.  Just  as  the 
miser,  asked  to  justify  himself,  is  obliged  to  allege  the 
power  of  money  to  purchase  desirable  things,  as  his  reason 
for  prizing  it;  so  the  moralist  who  thinks  this  conduct 
intrinsically  good  and  that  intrinsically  bad,  if  pushed 
home,  has  no  choice  but  to  fall  back  on  their  pleasure-giving 
and  pain-giving  effects.  To  prove  this  it  needs  but  to 
observe  how  impossible  it  would  be  to  think  of  them  as  wel 
do,  if  their  effects  were  reversed.  / 

Suppose  that  gashes  and  bruises  caused  agreeable  sensa- 
tions, and  brought  in  their  train  increased  power  of  doing 
work  and  receiving  enjoyment;  should  we  regard  assault  in 
the  same  manner  as  at  present  ?  Or  suppose  that  self- 
mutilation,  say  by  cutting  off  a  hand,  was  both  intrinsically 
pleasant  and  furthered  performance  of  the  processes  by 
which  personal  welfare  and  the  welfare  of  dependents  is 
achieved;  should  we  hold  as  now,  that  deliberate  injury  to 
one's  own  body  is  to  be  reprobated  ?  Or  again,  suppose  that 
picking  a  man's  pocket  excited  in  him  joyful  emotions,  by 
brightening  his  prospects ;  would  theft  be  counted  among 
crimes,  as  in  existing  law-books  and  moral  codes  ?  In  these 
extreme  cases,  no  one  can  deny  that  what  we  call  the, 
badness  of  actions  is  ascribed  to  them  solely  for  the  reason, 
that  they  entail  pain,  immediate  or  remote,  and  would  not  bo 
so  ascribed  did  they  entail  pleasure. 

If  we  examine  our  conceptions  on  their  obverse  side,  this 
general  fact  forces  itself  on  our  attention  with  equal  dis- 
tinctness. Imagine  that  ministering  to  a  sick  person  always 
increased  the  pains  of  illness.  Imagine  that  an  orphan's 
relatives  who  took  charge  of  it,  thereby  necessai-ily  brought 
miseries  upon  it.  Imagine  that  liquidating  another  man's 
pecuniary  claims   on  you  redounded  to  his  disadvantage. 


32  THE    DATA   OF    ETHICS. 

Imagine  tliat  crediting  a  man  witli  noble  behaylour  hindered 
his  social  welfare  and  consequent  gratification.  What  should 
we  say  to  these  acts  which  now  fall  into  the  class  we  call 
praiseworthy  ?  Should  we  not  contrariwise  class  them  as 
blameworthy  ? 

Using,  then,  as  our  tests,  these  most  pronounced  forms  of 
good  and  bad  conduct,  we  find  it  unquestionable  that  our 
ideas  of  their  goodness  and  badness  really  originate  from 
our  consciousness  of  the  certainty  or  probability  that  they  will 
produce  pleasures  or  pains  somewhere.  And  this  truth  is 
brought  out  with  equal  clearness  by  examining  the  standards 
of  different  moral  schools;  for  analysis  shows  that  every 
one  of  them  derives  its  authority  from  this  ultimate  standard. 
Ethical  systems  are  roughly  distinguishable  according  as 
they  take  for  their  cardinal  ideas  (1)  the  character  of  the 
agent ;  (2)  the  nature  of  his  motive ;  (3)  tlie  quality  of  his 
deeds  ;  and  (4)  the  results.  Each  of  these  may  be  character- 
ized as  good  or  bad ;  a»d  those  who  do  not  estimate  a  mode 
of  life  by  its  effects  on  happiness,  estimate  it  by  the  implied 
goodness  or  badness  in  the  agent,  in  his  motive,  or  in  his 
deeds.  We  have  perfection  in  the  agent  set  up  as  a  test  by 
which  conduct  is  to  be  judged.  Apart  from  the  agent  we 
have  his  feeling  considered  as  moral.  And  apart  from  the 
feeling  we  have  his  action  considered  as  virtuous. 

Though  the  distinctions  thus  indicated  have  so  little 
definiteness  that  the  words  marking  them  are  used  inter- 
changeably, yet  there  correspond  to  them  doctrines  partially 
unlike  one  another ;  which  we  may  here  conveniently  examine 
separately,  with  the  view  of  showing  that  all  their  tests  of 
goodness  are  derivative.  *  * 

§  12.  It  is  strange  that  a  notion  so  abstract  as  that  of 
perfection,  or  a  certain  ideal  completeness  of  nature,  should 
ever  have  been  thought  one  from  which  a  sj^stem  of  guidance 
can  be  evolved;  as  it  was  in  a  general  way  by  Plato 
and  more  distinctly  by  Jonathan  Edwardes.     Perfection  is 


GOOD  AND  BAD  CONDUCT.  33 

synonymous  witli  goodness  in  the  Mgliest  degree ;  and  hence 
to  define  good  conduct  Id  terms  of  perfection,  is  indirectly  to 
define  good  conduct  in  terms  of  itself.  Naturally,  therefore, 
it  happens  that  the  notion  of  perfection  like  the  notion  of 
goodness  can  be  framed  only  in  relation  to  ends. 

We  allege  imperfection  of  any  inanimate  thing,  as  a  tool, 
if  it  lacks  some  part  needful  for  effectual  action,  or  if  some 
^art  is  so  shaped  as  not  to  fulfil  its  purpose  in  the  best 
manner.  Perfection  is  alleged  of  a  watch  if.  it  keeps  exact 
time,  however  plain  its  case ;  and  imperfection  is  alleged  of 
it  because  of  inaccurate  time-keeping,  however  beautifully 
it  is  ornamented.  Though  we  call  things  imperfect  if 
we  detect  in  them  any  injuries  or  flaws,  even  when  these 
do  not  detract  from  efficiency;  yet  we  do  this  because  they 
imply  that  inferior  workmanship,  or  that  wear  and  tear^ 
with  which  inefficiency  is  commonly  joined  in  experience  i 
absence  of  minor  imperfections  being  habitually  associated 
with  absence   of  major  imperfections. 

As  applied  to  living  things,  the  word  perfection  has  the 
same  meaning.  The  idea  of  perfect  shape  in  a  race-horse  is 
derived  by  generalization  from  those  observed  traits  of  race- 
horses which  have  usually  gone  along  with  attainment  of 
the  highest  speed ;  and  the  idea  of  perfect  constitution  in  a 
race-horse  similarily  refers  to  the  endurance  which  enables 
him  to  continue  that  speed  for  the  longest  time.  With  men, 
physically  considered,  it  is  the  same  :  we  are  able  to  furnish 
no  other  test  of  perfection,  than  that  of  complete  power  in  all 
the  organs  to  fulfil  their  respective  functions.  That  our 
conception  of  perfect  balance  among  the  internal  parts,  and 
of  perfect  proportion  among  the  external  parts,  originates 
thus,  is  made  clear  by  observing  that  imperfection  of  any 
viscus,  as  lungs,  heart,  or  liver,  is  ascribed  for  no  other 
reason  than  inability  to  meet  in  full  the  demands  which 
the  activities  of  the  organism  make  on  it ;  and  on  observ- 
ing that  the  conception  of  insufficient  size,  or  of  too  great 
size,  in  a  Kmb,  is  derived  from  accumulated  experiences 


t34  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

respecting  that  ratio  among  the  limbs  which  furthers  in  the 
highest  degree  the  performance  of  all  needful  actions. 

And  of  perfection  in  mental  nature  we  have  no  other 
measure.  If  imperfection  of  memory,  of  judgment,  of  temper, 
is  alleged,  it  is  alleged  because  of  inadequacy  to  the  require- 
ments of  life;  and  to  imagine  a  perfect  balance  of  the 
intellectual  powers  and  of  the  emotions,  is  to  imagine  that 
proportion  among  them  which  ensures  an  entire  discharge 
of  each  and  every  obligation  as  the  occasion  calls  for  it. 

So  that  the  perfection  of  man  considered  as  an  agont,  means 
the  being   constituted  for   effecting  complete   adjustment 
of  acts  to  ends  of  every  kind.     And  since,  as  shown  above, 
the  complete  adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  is  that  which  both 
secures  and  constitutes  the  life  that  is  most  evolved,  alike 
in  breadth  and  length ;  while,  as  also  shown,  the  justifica- 
^tion  for  whatever  increases  life  is  the  reception  from  life  of 
\  more  happiness  than  misery ;  it  follows  that  conduciveness  t 
^  to  happiness  is  the  ultimate  test  of  perfection  in  a  man's  \ 
,  nature.     To  be  fully  convinced  of  this  it  needs  but  to  observe  \ 
liow  the  proposition  looks  when  inverted.     It  needs  but  to   ' 
suppose  that  every  approach  towards  perfection  involved 
greater  misery  to  self,  or  others,  or  both,  to  show  by  opposi- 
tion that  approach  to  perfection  really  means  approach  to 
that  which  secures  greater  happiness. 

§  13.  Pass  we  now  from  the  view  of  those  who  make  excel- 
lence of  being  the  standard,  to  the  view  of  those  who  make 
virtuousness  of  action  the  standard.  I  do  not  here  refer  to 
moralists  who,  having  decided  empirically  or  rationally,  induc- 
tively or  deductively,  that  acts  of  certain  kinds  have  the 
character  we  call  virtuous,  argue  that  such  acts  are  to  be 
performed  without  regard  to  proximate  consequences :  these 
have  ample  justification.  But  I  refer  to  moralists  who 
suppose  themselves  to  have  conceptions  of  virtue  as  an  end, 
underived  from  any  other  end — who  think  that  the  idea  of 
virtue  is  not  resolvable  into  simpler  ideas. 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  OO 

This  is  the  doctrine  which  appears  to  have  been  enter- 
tained by  Aristotle.  I  say,  appears  to  have  been,  because  his 
statements  are  far  from  consistent  with  one  another.  Eecog- 
nizing  happiness  as  the  supreme  end  of  human  endeavour, 
it  would  at  first  sight  seem  that  he  cannot  be  taken  as 
typical  of  those  who  make  virtue  the  supreme  end.  Yet 
he  puts  himself  in  this  category  by  seeking*  to  define 
happiness  in  terms  of  virtue,  instead  of  defining  virtue  in 
terms  of  happiness.  The  imperfect  separation  of  words 
from  things  which  characterizes  Greek  speculation  in  general^ 
seems  to  have  been  the  cause  of  this.  In  primitive  thought 
the  name  and  the  object  named,  are  associated  in  such 
wise  that  the  one  is  regarded  as  a  part  of  the  other — so 
much  so,  that  knowing  a  savage's  name  is  considered  by  him 
as  having  some  of  his  being,  and  a  consequent  power  to  work 
evil  on  him.  This  belief  in  a  real  connexion  between  word 
and  thing,  continuing  through  lower  stages  of  progress,  and 
long  surviving  in  the  tacit  assumption  that  the  meanings  of 
words  are  intrinsic,  pervades  the  dialogues  of  Plato,  and  is 
traceable  even  in  Aristotle.  For  otherwise  it  is  not  easy 
to  see  why  he  should  have  so  incompletely  dissociated 
the  abstract  idea  of  happiness  from  particular  forms  of 
happiness.  Naturally   where   the   divorcing   of 

words  as  symbols,  from  things  as  symbolized,  is  imperfect, 
there  must  be  difficulty  in  giving  to  abstract  words  a 
sufficiently  abstract  meaning.  If  in  the  first  stages  of 
language  the  concrete  name  cannot  be  separated  in  thought 
from  the  concrete  object  it  belongs  to,  it  is  inferable  that  in 
the  course  of  forming  successively  higher  grades  of  abstract 
names,  there  will  have  to  be  resisted  the  tendency  to 
interpret  each  more  abstract  name  in  terms  of  some  one 
class  of  the  less  abstract  names  it  covers.  Hence,  I  think, 
the  fact  that  Aristotle  supposes  happiness  to  be  associated 
with  some  one  order  of  human  activities,  rather  than  with 
all  orders  of  human  activities.  Instead  of  including  in 
it    the    pleasurable    feelings    accompanying    actions    that 


36  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

constitute  mere  living,  wMcli  actions  lie  says  man  has  in 
common  witli  vegetables ;  and  instead  of  making  it  include 
the  mental  states  which  the  life  of  external  perception  yields, 
which  he  says  man  has  in  common  with  animals  at  large ;  he 
excludes  these  from  his  idea  of  happiness,  and  includes  in  it 
only  the  modes  of  consciousness  accompanying  rational  life. 
Asserting  that  the  proper  work  of  man  '^  consists  in  the 
active  exercise  of  the  mental  capacities  conformably  to 
reason  -^^  he  concludes  that  ^^  the  supreme  good  of  man 
will  consist  in  performing  this  work  with  excellence 
or  virtue :  herein  he  will  obtain  happiness/'  And 
he  finds  confirmation  for  his  view  in  its  correspondence 
with  views  previously  enunciated;  saying — "our  notion 
nearly  agrees  with  theirs  who  place  happiness  in  virtue ;  for 
we  say  that  it  consists  in  the  action  of  virtue ;  that  is,  not 
merely  in  the  possession,  but  in  the  use."*' 
^  Now  the  implied  belief  that  virtue  can  be  defined  other- 
wise than  in  terms  of  happiness  (for  else  the  proposition  is 
that  happiness  is  to  be  obtained  by  actions  conducive 
to  happiness)  is  allied  to  the  Platonic  belief  that  there  is 
an  ideal  or  absolute  good,  which  gives  to  particular  and 
relative  goods  their  property  of  goodness ;  and  an 
argument  analogous  to  that  which  Aristotle  uses  against 
Plato's  conception  of  good,  may  be  used  against  his  own 
conception  of  virtue.  As  with  good  so  with  virtue — it  is  not 
singular  but  plural :  in  Aristotle's  own  classification,  virtue, 
when  treated  of  at  large,  is  transformed  into  virtues.'  Those 
which  he  calls  virtues,  must  be  so  called  in  coftsequenfJe  of 
some  common  character  that  is  either  intrinsic  or  extrinsic. 
We  may  class  things  together  either  because  they  are  made 
alike  by  all  having  in  themselves  some  peculiarity,  as  we  do 
vertebrate  animals  because  they  all  have  vertebral  columns ; 
or  we  may  class  them  together  because  of  some  community  in 
their  outer  relations,  as  when  we  group  saws,  knives,  mallets, 
harrows,  under  the  head  of  tools.  Are  the  virtues  classed  as 
such  because  of  some  intrinsic  community  of  nature?     Then 


GOOD   AND   BAD  CONDUCT.  37 

there  must  be  identifiable  a  common  trait  in  all  tbe  cardinal 
virtues  which  Aristotle  specifies — '^^  Courage,  Temperance, 
Liberality,  Magnanimity,  Magnificence,  Meekness,  Amiability 
or  Friendliness,  Truthfulness,  Justice/'  What  now  is  the  trait 
possessed  in  common  by  Magnificence  and  Meekness  ?  and 
if  any  such  common  trait  can  be  disentangled,  is  it  that 
which  also  constitutes  the  essential  trait  in  Truthfulness  ? 
The  answer  must  be — No.  The  virtues,  then,  not  being  classed 
as  such  because  of  an  instrinsic  community  of  character,  must 
be  classed  as  such  because  of  something  extrinsic  ;  and  this 
something  can  be  nothing  else  than  the  happiness  which 
Aristotle  says  consists  in  the  practice  of  them.  They  are 
united  by  their  common  relation  to  this  result ;  while  they 
are  not  united  by  their  inner  natures. 

Perhaps  still  more  clearly  may  the  inference  be  drawn 
thus : — If  virtue  is  primordial  and  independent,  no  reason 
can  be  given  why  there  should  be  any  correspondence 
between  virtuous  conduct  and  conduct  that  is  pleasure- 
giving  in  its  total  effects  on  self,  or  others,  or  both ;  and  if 
there  is  not  a  necessary  correspondence,  it  is  conceivable 
that  the  conduct  classed  as  virtuous  should  be  pain-giving 
in  its  total  effects.  That  we  may  see  the  consequence 
of  so  conceiving  it,  let  us  take  the  two  virtues  con- 
sidered as  typically  such  in  ancient  times  and  in  modern 
times — courage  and  chastity.  By  the  hypothesis,  then, 
courage,  displayed  alike  in  self-defence  and  in  defence  of 
country,  is  to  be  conceived  as  not  only  entailing  pains 
incidentally,  but  as  being  necessarily  a  cause  of  misery  to 
the  individual  and  to  the  State ;  while,  by  implication,  the 
absence  of  it  redounds  to  personal  and  general  well-being. 
Similarly,  by  the  hypothesis,  we  have  to  conceive  that 
irregular  sexual  relations  are  directly  and  indirectly  bene- 
ficial— that  adultery  is  conducive  to  domestic  harmony  and 
the  careful  rearing  of  children ;  while  marital  relations  in 
proportion  as  they  are  persistent,  generate  discord  between 
husband  and  wife  and  entail  on  their  offspring,  suffering. 


38  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

disease,  and  death.  Unless  it  is  asserted  that  courage  and 
chastity  could  still  be  thought  of  as  virtues  though  thus  pro- 
ductive of  misery,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  conception  of 
virtue  cannot  be  separated  from  the  conception  of  happiness- 
producing  conduct;  and  that  as  this  holds  of  all  the  virtues, 
however  otherwise  unlike,  it  is  from  their  conduciveness  to 
happiness  that  they  come  to  be  classed  as  virtues. 

§  14.  When  from  those  ethical  estimates  which  take 
perfection  of  nature,  or  virtuousness  of  action,  as  tests,  we 
pass  to  those  which  take  for  test  rectitude  of  motive,  wo 
approach  the  intuitional  theory  of  morals;  and  we  may 
conveniently  deal  with  such  estimates  by  a  criticism  on  this 
theory. 

By  the  intuitional  theory  I  here  mean,  not  that  which 
recognizes  as  produced  by  the  inherited  effects  of  continued 
experiences,  the  feelings  of  liking  and  aversion  we  have  to 
acts  of  certain  kinds ;  but  I  mean  the  theory  which  regards  . 
such  feelings  as  divinely  given,  and  as  independent  of  results 
experienced  by  self  or  ancestors.  ^'  There  is  theref  ore,'' '  says 
Hutcheson,  ''^as  each  one  by  close  attention  and  reflection 
may  convince  himself,  a  natural  and  immediate  determination 
to  approve  certain  affections,  and  actions  consequent  upon 
them;''  and  since,  in  common  with  others  of  his  time,  he 
believes  in  the  special  creation  of  man,  and  all  other  beings, 
this  "  natural  sense  of  immediate  excellence"  he  considers  as 
a  supernaturally-derived  guide.  Though  he  says  that  the 
feelings  and  acts  thus  intuitively  recognized  as  good,  ^'  alf  ^ 
agree  in  one  general  character,  of  tending  to  the  happiness 
of  others ;"  yet  he  is  obliged  to  conceive  this  as  a  pre-or- 
dained correspondence.  Nevertheless,  it  may  be  shown  that  , 
conduciveness  to  happiness,  here  represented  as  an  incidental 
trait  of  the  acts  which  receive  these  innate  moral  approvals, 
is  really  the  test  by  which  these  approvals  are  recognized  as 
moral.  The  intuitionists  place  confidence  in  these  verdicts 
of  conscience,  simply  because  they  vaguely,  if  not  distinctly. 


GOOD  AND   BAD  CONDUCT.  39 

perceive  them  to  be  consonant  witli  tlie  disclosures  of  that 
ultimate  test.     Observe  the  proof. 

By  the  hypothesis,  the  wrongness  of  murder  is  known 
by  a  moral  intuition  which  the  human  mind  was  originally 
constituted  to  yield ;  and  the  hypothesis  therefore  negatives 
the  admission  that  this  sense  of  its  wrongness  arises,  imme- 
diately or  remotely,  from  the  consciousness  that  murder 
involves  deduction  from  happiness,  directly  and  indirectly. 
But  if  you  ask  an  adherent  of  this  doctrine  to  contrast  his 
intuition  with  that  of  the  Fijian,  who,  considering  murder  an 
honourable  action,  is  restless  until  he  has  distinguished 
himself  by  killing  some  one;  and  if  you  inquire  of  him  in 
what  way  the  civilized  intuition  is  to  be  justified  in 
opposition  to  the  intuition  of  the  savage ;  no  course  is  open 
save  that  of  showing  how  conformity  to  the  one  conduces 
to  well-being,  while  conformity  to  the  other  entails  sufifering, 
individual  and  general.  When  asked  why  the  moral 
sense  which  tells  him  that  it  is  wrong  to  take  another  man's 
goods,  should  be  obeyed  rather  than  the  moral  sense  of  a 
Turcoman,  who  proves  how  meritorious  he  considers  theft 
to  be  by  making  pilgrimages  to  the  tombs  of  noted  robbers 
to  make  offerings;  the  intuitionist  can  do  nothing  but 
urge  that,  certainly  under  conditions  like  ours,  if  not  also 
under  conditions  like  those  of  the  Turcomans,  disregard  of 
men's  claims  to  their  property  not  only  inflicts  immediate 
misery,  but  involves  a  social  state  inconsistent  with  happiness. 
Or  if,  again,  there  is  required  from  him  a  justification  for 
his  feeling  of  repugnance  to  lying,  in  contrast  with 
the  feeling  of  an  Egyptian,  who  prides  himself  on  skill 
in  lying  (even  thinking  it  praiseworthy  to  deceive  without 
any  further  end  than  that  of  practising  deception) ;  he  can 
do  no  more  than  point  to  the  social  prosperity  furthered 
by  entire  trust  between  man  and  man,  and  the  social  dis- 
organization that  follows  universal  untruthfulness — conse- 
quences that  are  necessarily  conducive  to  agreeable  feelings 
and  disagreeable  feelings  respectively. 


40  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

The  unavoidable  conclusion  is,  tlion,  tliat  tlie  intuitionis^ 
does  not,  and  cannot,  ignore  the  ultimate  derivations  of/ 
right  and  wrong  from  pleasure  and  pain.  However  mucE 
he  may  be  guided,  and  rightly  guided,  by  the  decisions  of 
conscience  respecting  the  characters  of  acts ;  he  has  come 
to  have  confidence  in  these  decisions  because  he  perceives, 
vaguely  but  positively,  that  conformity  to  them  furthers 
the  welfare  of  himself  and  others,  and  that  disregard  of 
them  entails  in  the  long  run  suffering  on  all.  Require 
him  to  name  any  moral-sense  judgment  by  which  he 
knows  as  right,  some  kind  of  act  that  will  bring  a  surplus 
of  pain,  taking  into  account  the  totals  in  this  life  and  in 
any  assumed  other  life,  and  you  find  him  unable  to  name 
one:  a  fact  proving  that  underneath  all  these  intuitions 
respecting  the  goodness  or  badness  of  acts,  there  lies  the 
fundamental  assumption  that  acts  are  good  or  bad  according 
as  their  aggregate  effects  increase  men's  happiness  or 
increase  their  misery. 


§  1^  It  is  curious  to  see  how  the  devil-worship  of  the 
savage,  surviving  in  various  disguises  among  the  civilized, 
and  leaving  as  one  of  its  products  that  asceticism  which  in 
many  forms  and  degrees  still  prevails  widely,  is  to  be  found 
influencing  in  marked  ways,  men  who  have  apparently 
emancipated  themselves,  not  only  from  primitive  supersti- 
tions but  from  more  developed  superstitions.  Views  of 
life  and  conduct  which  originated  with  those  who  propitiated 
deified  ancestors  by  self-tortures,  enter  even  still  into  the 
ethical  theories  of  many  persons  who  have  years  since  cast 
away  the  theology  of  the  past,  and  suppose  themselves  to  be 
no  longer  influenced  by  it. 

In  the  writings  of  one  who  rejects  dogmatic  Christianity 
together  with  the  Hebrew  cult  which  preceded  it,  a  career 
of  conquest  costing  tens  of  thousands  of  lives,  is  narrated 
with  a  sympathy  comparable  to  that  rejoicing  which  the 
Hebrew  traditions  show  us  over  destruction  of  enemies  in 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  41 

the  name  of  God.  You  may  find^  too^  a  deliglit  in  contem- 
plating tlie  exercise  of  despotic  power,  joined  witli  insistance 
on  tlie  salutariness  of  a  state  in  wliicli  the  wills  of  slaves 
and  citizens,  are  humbly  subject  to  the  wills  of  masters 
and  rulers — a  sentiment  also  reminding  us  of  that  ancient 
Oriental  life  which  biblical  narratives  portray.  Along  with 
this  worship  of  the  strong  man — along  with  this  justification 
of  whatever  force  may  be  needed  for  carrying  out  his 
ambition — along  with  this  yearning  for  a  form  of  society  in 
which  supremacy  of  the  few  is  unrestrained  and  the  virtue 
of  the  many  consists  in  obedience  to  them;  we  not  unnaturally 
find  repudiation  of  the  ethical  theory  which  takes,  in  some 
shape  or  other,  the  greatest  happiness  as  the  end  of  conduct : 
we  not  unnaturally  find  this  utilitarian  philosophy  designated 
by  the  contemptuous  title  of  ^^  pig-philosophy.'^  And  then, 
serving  to  show  what  comprehension  there  has  been  of  the 
philosophy  §o  nicknamed,  we  are  told  that  not  happiness 
but  blessedness  must  be  the  end. 

Obviously,  the  implication  is  that  blessedness  is'  not  a  kind 
of  happiness;  and  this  implication  at  once  suggests  the 
question — What  mode  of  feeling  is  it  ?  If  it  is  a  state  of 
consciousness  at  all,  it  is  necessarily  one  of  three  states — 
painful,  indifi'erent,  or  pleasurable.  Does  it  leave  the 
possessor  at  the  zero  point  of  sentiency  ?  Then  it  leaves  him 
just  as  he  would  be  if  he  had  not  got  it.  Does  it  not  leave 
him  at  the  zero  point  ?  Then  it  must  leave  him  below  zero 
or  above  zero. 

Each  of  these  possibilities  may  be  conceived  under  two 
forms.  That  to  which  the  term  blessedness  is  applied,  may 
be  a  particular  state  of  consciousness — one  among  the  many 
states  that  occur ;  and  on  this  supposition  we  have  to  recog- 
nize it  as  a  pleasurable  state,  an  indifferent  state,  or  a  painful 
state.  Otherwise,  blessedness  is  a  word  not  applicable  to  a 
particular  state  of  consciousness,  but  characterizes  the  aggre- 
gate of  its  states;  and  in  this  case  the  average  of  the 
aggregate  is  to  be  conceived  as  one  in  which  the  pleasurable 


42  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

predominates^  or  one  in  which  the  painful  predominates,  or 
one  in  which  pleasures  and  pains  exactly  cancel  one  another. 
Let  us  take  in  turn  these  two  imaginable  applications  of  the 
word. 

"  Blessed  are  the  merciful  /^  "  Blessed  are  the  peace- 
makers ;''  ''  Blessed  is  he  that  considereth  the  poor;"  are 
sayings  which  we  may  fairly  take  as  conveying  the  accepted 
meaning  of  blessedness.  What  now  shall  we  say  of  one  who 
is_,  for  the  time  being,  blessed  in  performing  an  act  of 
mercy  ?  Is  his  mental  state  pleasurable  ?  If  so  the  hypothesis 
is  abandoned  :  blessedness  is  a  particular  form  of  happiness. 
Is  the  state  indifferent  or  painful  ?  In  that  case  the  blessed 
man  is  so  devoid  of  sympathy  that  relieving  another  from 
pain,  or  the  fear  of  pain,  leaves  him  either  wholly  unmoved, 
or  gives  him  an  unpleasant  emotion.  Again,  if  one  who  is 
blessed  in  making  peace  receives  no  gratification  from  the 
act,  then  seeing  men  injure  each  other  does  not  affect  him 
at  all,  or  gives  him  a  pleasure  which  is  changed  into  a  pain 
when  he  prevents  the  injury.  Once  more,  to  say  that  the 
blessedness  of  one  who  "  considereth  the  poor  ''  implies  no 
agreeable  feeling,  is  to  say  that  his  consideration  for  the  poor 
leaves  him  without  feeling  or  entails  on  him  a  disagreeable 
feeling.  So  that  if  blessedness  is  a  particular  mode  of  con- 
sciousness temporarily  existing  as  a  concomitant  of  each  kind 
of  beneficent  action,  those  who  deny  that  it  is  a  pleasure, 
or  constituent  of  happiness,  confess  themselves  either  not 
pleased  by  the  welfare  of  others  or  displeased  by  it. 

Otherwise  understood,  blessedness  must,  as  we  have  seen, 
refer  to  the  totality  of  feelings  experienced  during  the  life  of 
one  who  occupies  himself  with  the  actions  the  word  con- 
notes. This  also  presents  the  three  possibilities — surplus  of 
pleasures,  surplus  of  pains,  equality  of  the  two.  If  the 
pleasurable  states  are  in  excess,  then  the  blessed  life  can  be 
distinguished  from  any  other  pleasurable  life  only  by  the 
relative  amount,  or  the  quality,  of  its  pleasures :  it  is  a  life 
which  makes  happiness  of  a  certain  kind  and  degree  its  end; 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  43 

and  the  assumption  that  blessedness  is  not  a  form  of  happi- 
ness, lapses.  If  the  blessed  life  is  one  in  which  the  pleasures 
and  pains  received  balance  one  another,  so  producing  an 
average  that  is  indifierent;  or  if  it  is  one  in  which  the 
pleasures  are  out-balanced  by  the  pains ;  then  the  blessed  life 
has  the  character  which  the  pessimist  alleges  of  Hfe  at  large, 
and  therefore  regards  it  as  cursed.  Annihilation  is  best,  he 
will  argue ;  since  if  an  average  that  is  indifferent  is  the  out- 
come of  the  blessed  life,  annihilation  at  once  achieves  it ; 
and  if  a  surplus  of  suffering  is  the  outcome  of  this  highest 
kind  of  life  called  blessed,  still  more  should  life  in  general 
be  ended. 

A  possible  rejoinder  must  be  named  and  disposed  of. 
WTiile  it  is  admitted  that  the  particular  kind  of  consciousness 
accompanying  conduct  that  is  blessed,  is  pleasurable ;  it  may 
be  contended  that  pursuance  of  this  conduct  and  receipt  of 
the  pleasure,  brings  by  the  implied  self-denial,  and  per- 
sistent effort,  and  perhaps  bodily  injury,  a  suffering  that 
exceeds  it  in  amount.  And  it  may  then  be  urged  that 
blessedness,  characterized  by  this  excess  of  aggregate  pains 
over  aggregate  pleasures,  should  nevertheless  be  pursued  as 
an  end,  rather  than  the  happiness  constituted  by  excess  of 
pleasures  over  pains.  But  now,  defensible  though  this 
conception  of  blessedness  may  be  when  limited  to  one  indi- 
vidual, or  some  individuals,  it  becomes  indefensible  when 
extended  to  all  individuals ;  as  it  must  be  if  blessedness  is 
taken  for  the  end  of  conduct.  To  see  .this  we  need  but  ask 
for  what  purpose  are  these  pains  in  excess  of  pleasures  to  be 
borne.  Blessedness  being  the  ideal  state  for  all  persons; 
and  the  self-sacrifices  made  by  each  person  in  pursuance 
of  this  ideal  state,  having  for  their  end  to  help  all  other 
persons  in  achieving  the  like  ideal  state ;  it  results  that  the 
blessed  though  painful  state  of  each,  is  to  be  acquired  by 
furthering  the  like  blessed  though  painful  states  of  others : 
the  blessed  consciousness  is  to  be  constituted  by  the  con- 
templation of  their  consciousnesses  in  a  condition  of  average 


44  THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

suffering.  Does  any  one  accept  tliis  inference  ?  If  not,  his 
rejection  of  it  involves  the  admission  that  the  motive  for 
bearing  pains  in  performing  acts  called  blessed,  is  not  the 
obtaining  for  others  like  pains  of  blessedness,  but  the  obtain- 
ing of  pleasures  for  others ;  and  that  thus  pleasure  somewhere 
is  the  tacitly-implied  ultimate  end. 

In  brief,  then,  blessedness  has  for  its  necessary  condition 
of  existence,  increased  happiness,  positive  or  negative,  in 
some  consciousness  or  other ;  and  disappears  utterly  if  we 
assume  that  the  actions  called  blessed,  are  known  to  cause 
decrease  of  happiness  in  others  as  well  as  in  the  actor. 

§  lb.  To  make  clear  the  meaning  of  the  general  argument 
set  forth  in  this  chapter,  its  successive  parts  must  be  briefly 
summarized. 

That  which  in  the  last  chapter  we  found  to  be  highly- 
evolved  conduct,  is  that  which,  in  this  chapter,  we  find  to  be 
what  is  called  good  conduct;  and  the  ideal  goal  to  the 
natural  evolution  of  conduct  there  recognized,  we  here 
recognize  as  the  ideal  standard  of  conduct  ethically  con- 
sidered. 

The  fl.ntf^  a.rljnRtPid  t<>  iP^^dsj  which  while  constituting  the 
outer  visible  life  from  moment  to  moment  further  the  con- 
tinuance of  life,  we  saw  become,  as  evolution  progresses^ 
better  adjusted;  until  finally  they  make  the  life  of  each 
individual  entire  in  length  and  breadth,  at  the  same  time 
that  they  efficiently  subserve  the  rearing  of  young,  and  do 
both  these  not  only  without  hindering  other  individuals 
from  doing  the  like,  but  while  giving  aid  to  them  in  doing 
the  like.  And  here  we  see  that  goodness  is  asserted  of  such 
conduct  under  each  of  these  three  aspects.  Other  things 
equal,  well-adjusted  self- conserving  acts  we  call  good  ;  other 
things  equal,  we  call  good  the  acts  that  are  well  adjusted 
for  bringing  up  progeny  capable  of  complete  living ;  and 
other  things  equal,  we  ascribe  goodness  to  acts  which 
further  the  complete  living  of  others. 


GOOD   AND   BAD   CONDUCT.  45 

This  judging  as  good,  conduct  wliicli  conduces  to  life  in 
eacli  and  all,  we  found  to  involve  the  assumption  that 
animate  existence  is  desirable.  By  the  pessimist,  conduct 
which  subserves  life  cannot  consistently  be  called  good  :  to 
call  it  good  implies  some  form  of  optimism.  We  saw,  how- 
ever, that  pessimists  and  optimists  both  start  with  the 
postulate  that  life  is  a  blessing  or  a  curse,  according  as  the 
average  consciousness  accompanying  it  is  pleasurable  or 
painful.  And  since  avowed  or  implied  pessimists,  and 
optimists  of  one  or  other  shade,  taken  together  constitute  all 
men,  it  results  that  this  postulate  is  universally  accepted. 
Whence  it  follows  that  if  we  call  good  the  conduct  conducive 
to  life,  we  can  do  so  only  with  the  implication  that'  it  is 
conducive  to  a  surplus  of  pleasures  over  pains. 

The  truth  that  conduct  is  considered  by  us  as  good  or 
bad,  according  as  its  aggregate  results,  to  self  or  others  or 
both,  are  pleasurable  or  painful,  we  found  on  examination 
to  be  involved  in  all  the  current  judgments  on  conduct :  the 
proof  being  that  reversing  the  applications  of  the  words 
creates  absurdities.  And  we  found  that  every  other  pro- 
posed standard  joi  conduct  derives  its  authority  from  this 
standard.  Whether  perfection  of  nature  is  the  assigned 
proper  aim,  or  virtue usness  of  action,  or  rectitude  of  motive, 
we  saw  that  definition  of  the  perfection,  the  virtue,  the  recti- 
tude, inevitably  brings  us  down  to  happiness  experienced 
in  some  form,  at  some  time,  by  some  person,  as  the  funda- 
mental idea.  Nor  could  we  discover  any  intelligible  con- 
ception of  blessedness,  save  one  which  implies  a  raising  of 
consciousness,  individual  or  general,  to  a  happier  state; 
either  by  mitigating  pains  or  increasing  pleasures. 

Even  with  those  who  judge  cf  conduct  from  the  religious 
point  of  view,  rather  than  from  the  ethical  point  of  view,  it  is 
the  same.  Men  who  seek  to  propitiate  God  by  inflicting 
pains  on  themselves,  or  refrain  from  pleasures  to  avoid 
offending  him,  do  so  to  escape  greater  ultimate  pains  or 
to  get  greater  ultimate  pleasures.     If  by  positive  or  negative 


46  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

suffering  here^  they  expected  to  achieve  more  suffering  Here- 
after, they  would  not  do  as  they  do.  That  which  they  now 
think  duty  they  would  not  think  duty  if  it  promised  eternal 
misery  instead  of  eternal  happiness.  Nay,  if  there  be  any 
who  believe  that  human  beings  were  created  to  be  unhappy, 
and  that  they  ought  to  continue  living  to  display  their 
unhappiness  for  the  satisfaction  of  their  creator,  such 
believers  are  obliged  to  use  this  standard  of  judgment ;  for 
i  the  pleasure  of  their  diabolical  god  is  the  end  to  bo 
achieved. 

So  that  no  school  can  avoid  taking  for  the  ultimate  moral 
aim  a  desirable  state  of  feeling  called  by  whatever  name — 
gratification,  enjoyment,  happiness.  Pleasure  somewhere,  at 
some  time,  to  some  being  or  beings,  is  an  inexpugnable 
element  of  the  conception.  It  is  as  much  a  necessary  form 
of  moral  intuition  as  space  is  a  necessary  form  of  intellectual 
intuition. 


^^"^-^^ 


m 


jj, 


^ 

'"''t 


'    y 


CHAPTER  IV. 

WAYS  OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT. 

§  17.     Intellectual  progress  is  by  no  one  trait  so  ade- 
quately characterized,  as  by  development  of  the  idea  of 
causation ;  since  development  of  this  idea  involves  develop- 
ment of  so  many  other  ideas.     Before  any  way  can  be  made, 
^.^  "thought  and  language  must  have  advanced  far  enough  to 
^render  properties  or  attributes  thinkable  as  such,  apart  from 
objects;  which,  in  low  stages  of  human  intelligence,  they  are 
-     not.    Again,  even  the  simplest  notion  of  cause,  as  we  under- 
stand it,  can  be  reached  only  after  many  like  instances  have 
been  grouped  into  a  simple  generalization ;  and  through  all 

\ ascending  steps,  higher  notions  of  causation  imply  wider 
notions  of  generality.  Further,  as  there  must  be  clustered 
ki  the  mind,  concrete  causes  of  many  kinds  before  there  can 
emerge  the  conception  of  cause,  apart  from  particular  causes; 
it  follows  that  progress  in  abstractness  of  thought  is  implied. 
Concomitantly,  there  is  implied  the  recognition  of  constant 
relations  among  phenomena,  generating  ideas  of  uniformity 
of  sequence  and  of  co-existence — the  idea  of  natural  law. 
These  advances  can  go  on  only  as  fast  as  perceptions  and 
resulting  thoughts,  are  made  definite  by  the  use  of  measures; 
serving  to  familkrize  the  mind  with  exact  correspondence, 
truth,  certainty.  And  only  when  growing  science  accumulates 
examples  of  quantitative  relations,  foreseen  and  verified, 
throughout  a  widening  range  of  phenomena,  does  causation 


48  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

come  to  be  conceived  as  necessary  and  universal.  So  that 
thougli  all  these  cardinal  conceptions  aid  one  another  in 
developing,  we  may  properly  say  that  the  conception  of 
causation  especially  depends  for  its  development  on  the 
developments  of  the  rest ;  and  therefore  is  the  best  measure 
of  intellectual  development  at  large. 

How  slowly,  as  a  consequence  of  its  dependence,  the 
conception  of  causation  evolves,  a  glance  at  the  evidence 
shows.  We  hear  with  surprise  of  the  savage  who,  falling 
down  a  precipice,  ascribes  the  failure  of  his  foothold  to  a 
malicious  demon ;  and  we  smile  at  the  kindred  notion  of  the 
ancient  Greek,  that  his  death  was  prevented  by  a  goddess 
who  unfastened  for  him  the  thong  of  the  helmet  by  which 
his  enemy  was  dragging  him.  But  daily,  without  surprise, 
we  hear  men  who  describe  themselves  as  saved  from  ship- 
wreck by  '^  divine  interposition,"  who  speak  of  having 
'^providentially''  missed  a  train  which  met  with  a  fatal 
disaster,  and  who  call  it  a  "  mercy  ''  to  have  escaped  injury 
from  a  falling  chimney-pot — men  who,  in  such  cases, 
recognize  physical  causation  no  more  than  do  the  uncivilized 
or  semi-civilized.  The  Yeddah  who  thinks  that  failure  to 
hit  an  animal  with  his  arrow,  resulted  from  inadequate 
invocation  of  an  ancestral  spirit,  and  the  Christian  priest  who 
says  prayers  over  a  sick  man  in  the  expectation  that  the 
course  of  his  disease  will  so  be  stayed,  differ  only  in  respect 
of  the  agent  from  whom  they  expect  supernatural  aid  and 
the  phenomena  to  be  altered  by  him  :  the  necessary  relations 
among  causes  and  effects  are  tacitly  ignored  by  the  last  as 
much  as  by  the  first.  Deficient  belief  in  causation  is,  indeed, 
exemplified  even  in  those  whose  discipline  has  been  specially 
fitted  to  generate  this  belief — even  in  men  of  science.  For 
a  generation  after  geologists  had  become  uniformitaTians 
in  Greology,  they  remained  catastrophists  in  Biology  :  while 
recognizing  none  but  natural  agencies  in  the  genesis  of  the 
Earth's  crust,  they  ascribed  to  supernatural  agency  the 
genesis  of  the  organisms  on  its  surface.     Nay  more — among 


WAYS   OF  JUDGING  CONDUCT.  49 

those  wlio  are  convinced  that  living  things  in  genera 
have  been  evolved  by  the  continued  inter-action  of  forces 
everywhere  operating^  there  are  some  who  make  an  excep- 
tion of  man ;  or  who,  if  they  admit  that  his  body  has  been 
evolved  in  the  same  manner  as  the  bodies  of  other  creatures, 
allege  that  his  mind  has  been  not  evolved  but  specially 
created.  If,  then,  universal  and  necessary  causation  is  only 
now  approaching  full  recognition,  even  by  those  whose 
investigations  are  daily  re -illustrating  it,  we  may  expect  to 
find  it  very  little  recognized  among  men  at  large,  whose 
culture  has  not  been  calculated  to  impress  them  with  it ; 
and  we  may  expect  to  find  it  least  recognized  by  them  in 
respect  of  those  classes  of  phenomena  amid  which,  in 
consequence  of  their  complexity,  causation  is  most  difficult 
to  trace — the  psychical,  the  social,  the  moral. 

Why  do  I  here  make  these  reflections  on  what  seems  an 
irrelevant  subject  ?  I  do  it  because  on  studying  the  various 
ethical  theories,  I  am  struck  with  the  fact  that  they  are  all 
characterized  either  by  entire  absence  of  the  idea  of 
causation,  or  by  inadequate  presence  of  it.  Whether 
theological,  political,  intuitional,  or  utilitarian,  they  all 
display,  if  not  in  the  same  degree,  still,  each  in  a  large 
degree,  the  defects  which  result  from  this  lack.  We  will 
consider  them  in  the  order  named. 

§  18.  The  school  of  morals  properly  to  be  considered  as 
the  still-extant  representative  of  the  most  ancient  school,  is 
that  which  recognizes  no  other  rule  of  conduct  than  the 
alleged  v/ill  of  God.  It  originates  with  the  savage  whose 
only  restraint  beyond  fear  of  his  fellow  man,  is  fear  of  an 
ancestral  spirit ;  and  whose  notion  of  moral  duty  as  dis- 
tinguished from  his  notion  of  social  prudence,  arises  from 
this  fear.  Here  the  ethical  doctrine  and  the  rehgious 
doctrine  are  identical — have  in  no  degree  differentiated. 

This  primitive  form  of  ethical  doctrine,  changed  only  by 
the   gradual   dying   out   multitudinous   minor  supernatural 


50  THE   DATA  OP   ETHICS. 

agents  and  accompanying  development  of  one  universal 
supernatural  agent,  survives  in  great  strength  down  to  our  own 
day.  Religious  creeds^  established  and  dissenting,  all  embody 
j  the  belief  that  right  and  wrong  are  right  and  wrong  simply  in 
virtue  of  divine  enactment.  And  this  tacit  assumption  has 
passed  from  systems  of  theology  into  systems  of  morality;  or 
rather,  let  us  say  that  moral  systems  in  early  stages  of 
development,  little  differentiated  from  the  accompanying 
theological  systems,  have  participated  in  this  assumption. 
We  see  this  in  the  works  of  the  Stoics,  as  well  as  in  the 
works  of  certain  Christian  moralists.  Among  recent  ones 
I  may  instance  the  Essays  on  the  Frinci;ples  of  Morality y  by 
Jonathan  Dymond,  a  Quaker,  which  makes  ''the  authority 
of  the  Deity  the  sole  ground  of  duty,  and  His  communicated 
will  the  only  ultimate  standard  of  right  and  wrong.^^  Nor 
is  it  by  -writers  belonging  to  so  relatively  unphilosophical  a 
sect  only,  that  this  view  is  held ;  it  is  held  with  a  difference 
by  writers  belonging  to  sects  contrariwise  distinguished. 
Jor  these  assert  that  in  the  absence  of  belief  in  a  deity, 
there  would  be  no  moral  guidance ;  and  this  amounts  to 
Asserting  that  moral  truths  have  no  other  origin  than  the 
^ill  of  God,  which,  if  not  considered  as  revealed  in  sacred 
writings,  must  be  considered  as  revealed  in  conscience. 

This  assumption  when  examined,  proves  to  be  suicidal. 
If  there  are  no  other  origins  for  right  and  wrong  than  this 
enunciated  or  intuited  divine  will,  then,  as  alleged,  were 
there  no  knowledge  of  the  divine  will,  the  acts  now  known  as 
wrong  would  not  be  known  as  wrong.  But  if  men  did  not 
know  such  acts  to  be  wrong  because  contrary  to  the  divine 
will,  and  so,  in  committing  them,  did  not  offend  by  disobe- 
dience ;  and  if  they  could  not  otherwise  know  them  to  be 
wrong ;  then  they  might  commit  them  indifferently  with  the 
acts  now  classed  as  right:  the  results,  practically  considered, 
would  be  the  same.  In  so  far  as  secular  matters  are 
concerned,  there  would  be  no  difference  between  the  two ; 
for  to  say  that  in  the  affairs  of  life,  any  evils  would  arise 


WAYS   OP  JUDGING  CONDUCT.  51 

from  continuing  to  do  the  acts  called  wrong  and  ceasing 
to  do  the  acts  called  right,  is  to  say  that  these  produce  in 
themselves  certain  mischievous  consequences  and  certain 
beneficial  consequences;  which  is  to  say  there  is  another 
source  for  moral  rules  than  the  revealed  or  inferred  divine 
will:  they  may  be  established  by  induction  from  these 
observed  consequences. 

From  this  implication  I  see  no  escape.  It  must  be  either 
admitted  or  denied  that  the  acts  called  good  and  the  acts 
called  bad,  naturally  conduce,  the  one  to  human  well-being 
and  the  other  to  human  ill-being.  Is  it  admitted  ?  Then 
the  admission  amounts  to  an  assertion  that  the  conduciveness 
is  shown  by  experience ;  and  this  involves  abandonment 
of  the  doctrine  that  there  is  no  origin  for  morals  apart  from 
divine  injunctions.  Is  it  denied,  that  acts  classed  as  good 
and  bad  differ  in  their  efiects  ?  Then  it  is  tacitly  affirmed 
that  human  affairs  would  go  on  just  as  well  in  ignorance  of 
the  distinction;  and  the  alleged  need  for  commandments 
from  God  disappears. 

And  here  we  see  how  entirely  wanting  is  the  conception 
of  cause.  This  notion  that  such  and  such  actions. are  made 
respectively  good  and  bad  simply  by  divine  injunction,  is 
tantamount  to  the  notion  that  such  and  such  actions  have 
not  in  the  nature  of  things  such  and  such  kinds  of  effects. 
If  there  is  not  an  unconsciousness  of  causation  there  is  an 
ignoring  of  it. 

§  19.  Following  Plato  and  Aristotle,  who  make  State- 
enactments  the  sources  of  right  and  wrong ;  and  following 
Hobbes,  who  holds  that  there  can  be  neither  justice  nor 
injustice  till  a  regularly-constituted  coercive  power  exists  to 
issue  and  enforce  commands;  not  a  few  modern  thinkers 
hold  that  there  is  no  other  origin  for  good  and  bad  in 
conduct  than  law.  And  this  implies  the  belief  that  moral 
obligation  originates  with  Acts  of  Parliament,  and  can  be 
changed  this  way  or  that  way  by  majorities.  They  ridicule 
3 


52  THE   DATA  OP  ETHICS. 

the  idea  that  men  have  any  natural  rights,  and  allege  that 
rights  are  wholly  results  of  convention :  the  necessary 
implication  being  that  duties  are  so  too.  Before  considering 
whether  this  theory  coheres  with  outside  truths,  let  us 
observe  how  far  it  is  coherent  within  itself. 

In  pursuance  of  his  argument  that  rights  and  duties 
originate  with  established  social  arrangements,  Hobbes 
says — 

"  Where  no  covenant  hath  preceded,  there  hath  no  right  been  transferred,  and 
every  man  has  right  to  every  thing;  and  consequently,  no  action  can  be  unjust. 
But  when  a  covenant  is  made,  then  to  break  it  is  unjust ;  and  the  definition  of 
INJUSTICE,  is  no  other  than  the  not  ^erjormance  of  covenant.  And  whatsoever 
is  not  unjust,  is  jwst.  .  .  .  Therefore  before  the  names  of  just  and  unjust  can 
have  place,  there  must  be  some  coercive  power,  to  compel  men  equally  to  the 
performance  of  their  covenants,  by  the  terror  of  some  punishment,  greater 
than  the  benefit  they  expect  by  the  breach  of  their  covenant."* 

In  this  paragraph  the  essential  propositions  are  : — justice 
is  fulfilment  of  covenant ;  fulfilment  of  covenant  implies  a 
power  enforcing  it :  *^'just  and  unjust  can  have  no  place" 
unless  men  are  compelled  to  perform  their  covenants.  But 
this  is  to  say  that  men  cannot  perform  their  covenants  without 
compulsion.  Grant  that  justice  is  performance  of  covenant. 
Now  suppose  it  to  be  performed  voluntarily  :  there  is  justice. 
In  such  case,  however,  there  is  justice  in  the  absence  of 
coercion ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  hypothesis.  The  only  con- 
ceivable rejoinder  is  an  absurd  one  : — voluntary  perform- 
ance of  covenant  is  impossible.  Assert  this,  and  the  doctrine 
that  right  and  wrong  come  into  existence  with  the  establish- 
ment of  sovereignty  is  defensible.  Decline  to  assert  it,  and 
the  doctrine  vanishes. 

From  inner  incongruities  pass  now  to  outer  ones.  The 
justification  for  his  doctrine  of  absolute  civil  authority  as 
the  source  of  rules  of  conduct,  Hobbes  seeks  in  the  miseries 
entailed  by  the  chronic  war  between  man  and  man  which  must 
exist  in  the  absence  of  society ;  holding  that  under  any  kind 
of  government  a  better  life  is  possible  than  in  the  state  of 

*  Jjeviathan,  ch.  xv. 


WAYS   OP  JUDGING   CONDUCT.  53 

nature.  Now  whether  we  accept  the  gratuitous  and  baseless 
theory  that  men  surrendered  their  liberties  to  a  sovereign 
power  of  some  kind,  with  a  view  to  the  promised  increase 
of  satisfactions ;  or  whether  we  accept  the  rational  theory, 
inductively  based,  that  a  state  of  political  subordination 
gradually  became  established  through  experience  of  the 
increased  satisfactions  derived  under  it ;  it  equally  remains 
obvious  that  the  acts  of  the  sovereign  power  have  no  other 
warrant  than  their  subservience  to  the  pui-pose  for  which 
it  came  into  existence.  The  necessities  which  initiate 
government,  themselves  prescribe  the  actions  of  govern- 
ment. If  its  actions  do  not  respond  to  the  necessities,  they 
are  unwarranted.  The  authority  of  law  is,  then,  by  the 
hypothesis,  derived ;  and  can  never  transcend  the  authority 
of  that  from  which  it  is  derived.  If  general  good,  or 
welfare,  or  utility,  is  the  supreme  end ;  and  if  State-enact- 
ments are  justified  as  means  to  this  supreme  end;  then. 
State-enactments  have  such  authority  only  as  arises  from 
conduciveness  to  this  supreme  end.  When  they  are  right, 
it  is  only  because  the  original  authority  endorses  them; 
and  they  are  wrong  if  they  do  not  bear  its  endorsement. 
That  is  to  say,  conduct  cannot  be  made  good  or  bad  by  law ; 
but  its  goodness  or  badness  is  to  the  last  determined  by  its 
effects  as  naturally  furthering,  or  not  furthering,  the  lives 
of  citizens. 

Still  more  when  considered  in  the  concrete,  than  when 
considered  in  the  abstract,  do  the  views  of  Hobbes  and  his 
disciples  prove  to  be  inconsistent.  Joining  in  the  general 
belief  that  without  such  security  for  life  as  enables  men  to 
go  fearlessly  about  their  business,  there  can  be  neither 
happiness  nor  prosperity,  individual  or  general,  they  agree 
that  measures  for  preventing  murder,  manslaughter,  assault, 
&c.,  are  requisite;  and  they  advocate  this  or  that  penal 
system  as  furnishing  the  best  deterrents :  so  arguing,  both 
in  respect  of  the  evils  and  the  remedies,  that  such  and  such 
causes  will,  by  the  nature  of  things,  produce  such  and  such 


54  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

effects.  They  recognize  as  inferable  a  priori,  tlie  trutli  that 
men  will  not  lay  by  property  unless  they  can  count  with 
great  probability  on  reaping  advantages  from  it ;  that 
consequently  where  robbery  is  unchecked^  or  where  a 
rapacious  ruler  appropriates  whatever  earnings  his  subjects 
do  not  effectually  hide^  production  will  scarcely  exceed 
immediate  consumption ;  and  that  necessarily  there  will 
be  none  of  that  accumulation  of  capital  required  for 
social  development,  with  all  its  aids  to  welfare.  In  neither 
case,  however,  do  they  perceive  that  they  are  tacity  assert- 
ing the  need  for  certain  restraints  on  conduct  as  deducible 
from  the  necessary  conditions  to  complete  life  in  the  social 
state;  and  are  so  making  the  authority  of  law  derivative 
and  not  original. 

If  it  be  said  by  any  belonging  to  this  school,  that  certain 
moral  obligations  to  be  distinguished  as  cardinal,  must  be 
admitted  to  have  a  basis  deeper  than  legislation,  and  that  it 
is  for  legislation  not  to  create  but  merely  to  enforce  them — 
if,  I  say,  admitting  this,  they  go  on  to  allege  a  legislative 
origin  for  minor  claims  and  duties;  then  we  have  the 
implication  that  whereas  some  kinds  of  conduct  do,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  tend  to  work  out  certain  kinds  of  results, 
other  kinds  of  conduct  do  not,  in  the  nature  of  things,  tend 
to  work  out  certain  kinds  of  results.  While  of  these  acts 
the  naturally  good  or  bad  consequences  must  be  allowed,  it 
may  be  denied  of  those  acts  that  they  have  naturally  good 
or  bad  consequences.  Only  after  asserting  this  can  it  be 
consistently  asserted  that  acts  of  the  last  class  are  made  right 
or  wrong  by  law.  For  if  such  acts  have  any  intrinsic 
tendencies  to  produce  beneficial  or  mischievous  effects,  then 
these  intrinsic  tendencies  furnish  the  warrant  for  legislative 
requirements  or  interdicts;  and  to  say  that  the  requirements 
or  interdicts  make  them  right  or  wrong,  is  to  say  that  they 
have  no  intrinsic  tendencies  to  produce  beneficial  or 
mischievous  effects. 

Here,  then,  we  have  another  theory  betraying  deficient 


WAYS   OF  JUDGINa   CONDUCT.  55 

consciousness  of  causation.  An  adequate  consciousness  of 
causation  yields  the  irresistible  belief  that  from  the  most 
serious  to  the  most  trivial  actions  of  men  in  society,  there 
must  flow  consequences  which^  quite  apart  from  legal 
agency,  conduce  to  well-being  or  ill-being  in  greater  or 
smaller  degrees.  If  murders  are  socially  injurious  whether 
forbidden  by  law  or  not — if  one  man's  appropriation  of 
another's  gains  by  force,  brings  special  and  general  evils, 
whether  it  is  or  is  not  contrary  to  a  ruler's  edicts — if  non- 
f  iilfilment  of  contract,  if  cheating,  if  adulteration,  work  mis- 
chiefs on  a  community  in  proportion  as  they  are  common, 
quite  irrespective  of  prohibitions ;  then,  is  it  not  manifest 
that  the  like  holds  throughout  all  the  details  of  men's 
behaviour  ?  Is  it  not  clear  that  when  legislation  insists  on 
certain  acts  which  have  naturally  beneficial  effects,  and  forbids 
others  that  have  naturally  injurious  effects,  the  acts  are  not 
made  good  or  bad  by  legislation;  but  the  legislation  derives  its 
authority  from  the  natux-al  effects  of  the  acts  ?  Non-recogni- 
tion of  this  implies  non-recognition  of  natural  causation. 
\ 

§  20.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  with  the  pure  intuitionists,  who 
hold  that  moral  perceptions  are  innate  in  the  original 
sense — thinkers  whose  view  is  that  men  have  been  divinely 
endowed  with  moral  faculties;  not  that  these  have  re- 
sulted from  inherited  modifications  caused  by  accumulated 
experiences. 

To  affirm  that  we  know  some  things  to  be  right  and 
other  things  to  be  wrong,  by  virtue  of  a  supernaturally- 
given  conscience ;  and  thus  tacitly  to  affirm  that  we  do  not 
otherwise  know  right  from  wrong ;  is  tacitly  to  deny  any 
natural  relations  between  acts  and  results.  For  if  there 
exist  any  such  relations,  then  we  may  ascertain  by  induction, 
or  deduction,  or  both,  what  these  are.  And  if  it  be  admitted 
that  because  of  such  natural  relations,  happiness  is  produced 
by  this  kind  of  conduct,  which  is  therefore  to  be  approved, 
while  misery  is  produced  by  that  kind  of  conduct,  which,  is 


56  THE   DATA  OP   ETHICS. 

tlierefore  to  be  condemned;  then  it  is  admitted  that  the 
Tightness  or  wrongness  of  actions  are  determinable^  and 
must  finally  be  determined,  by  the  goodness  or  badness  of 
the  effects  that  flow  from  them ;  which  is  contrary  to  the 
hypothesis. 

It  may,  indeed,  be  rejoined  that  ejBfects  are  deliberately 
ignored  by  this  school;  which  teaches  that  courses  recognized 
\    by  moral  intuition  as  right,  must  be  pursued  without  regard 
I    to  consequences.    But  on  inquiry  it  turns  out  that  the  conse- 
'    quences  to  be  disregarded  are  particular  consequences,  and  / 
not    general  consequences.      When,  for  example,  it  is  said ' 
that  property  lost  by  another  ought  to  be  restored  irrespec- 
tive of  evil  to  the  finder,  who  possibly  may,  by  restoring  it, 
lose  that  which  would  have  preserved  him  from  starvation ; 
it  is  meant  that  in  pursuance  of  the  principle,  the  immediate 
and   special   consequences   must   be   disregarded,   not   the 
diffused  and  remote  consequences.     By  which  we  are  shown 
i   that  though  the  theory  forbids  overt  recognition  of  causation, 
there  is  an  unavowed  recognition  of  it. 

And  this  implies  the  trait  to  which  I  am  drawing  attention. 
The  conception  of  natural  causation  is  so  imperlbctly 
developed,  that  there  is  only  an  indistinct  consciouAiess 
i»  that  throughout  the  whole  of  human  conduct,  necessary 
relations  of  causes  and  effects  prevail;  and  that  from  them 
are  ultimately  derived  all  moral  rules,  however  much  these 
/    may  be  proximately  derived  from  moral  intuitions. 

§  21.  Strange  to  say,  even  the  utilitarian  school,  which,  at 
first  sight,  appears  to  be  distinguished  from  the  rest  by 
recognizing  natural  causation,  is,  if  not  so  far  from  complete 
recognition  of  it,  yet  very  far. 

Conduct,  according  to  its  theory,  is  to  be  estimated  by 

observation  of  results.  When,  in  sufficiently  numerous  cases, 

\  it  has  been  found  that  behaviour  of  this  kind  works  evil 

^hile  behaviour  of  that  kind  works  good,  these  kinds  of 

behaviour  are  to  be  judged  as  wrong  and  right  respectively. 


WAYS   OP  JUDGINa   CONDUCT.  57 

Now  tlLOUgh  it  seems  tliat  tlie  Origin  of  moral  rules  in  natural 
causes,  is  thus  asserted  by  implication,  it  is  but  partially 
asserted.  Tbe  implication  is  simply  that  we  are  to  ascertain 
by  induction  that  such  and  such  mischiefs  or  benefits  do 
go  along  with  such  and  such  acts ;  and  are  then  to  infer 
that  the  like  relations  will  hold  in  future.  But  acceptance 
of  these  generalizations  and  the  inferences  from  them,  does 
not  amount  to  recognition  of  causation  in  the  full  sense  of 
the  word.  So  long  as  only  some  relation  between  cause  and 
effect  in  conduct  is  recognized,  and  not  the  relation,  a 
completely-scientific  form  of  knowledge  has  not  been 
reached.  At  present,  utilitarians  pay  no  attention  to  this 
distinction.  Even  when  it  is  pointed  out,  they  disregard  the 
fact  that  empirical  utilitarianism  is  but  a  transitional  form  / 
to  be  passed  through  on  the  way  to  rational  utilitarianism,  n 

In  a  letter  to* Mr.  Mill,  written  some  sixteen  years  ago, 
repudiating  the  title  anti-utilitarian  which  he  had  applied  to 
me  (a  letter  subsequently  published  in  Mr.  Bain's  work  on 
Mental  and  Moral  Science),  I  endeavoured  to  make  clear  the 
difference  ^ove  indicated ;  and  I  must  here  quote  certain 
passages  from  that  letter. 

The  view  for  yvftich  I  contend  is,  that  Morality  properly  so-called— the 
science  of  right  conduct — has  for  its  object  to  determine  how  and  why  certain 
modes  of  conduct  are  detrimental,  and  certain  others  modes  beneficial.    These     , 
good  and  bad  results  cannot  be  accidental,  but  must  be  necessary  consequences 
of  the  constitution  of  things  ;  and  I  conceive  it  to  be  the  business  of  Moral  \ 
Science  to  deduce,  from  the  laws  of  life  and  the  conditions  of  existence,  what  \ 
kinds  of  action  necessarily  tend  to  produce  happiness,  and  what  kinds  to 
produce  unhappiness.     Having  done  this,  its  deductions  are  to  be  recognized  as 
laws  of  conduct ;  and  are  to  be  conformed  to  irrespective  of  a  direct  estimation 
of  happiness  or  misery. 

Perhaps  an  analogy  will  most  clearly  show  my  meaning.  During  its'  early 
stages,  planetary  Astronomy  consisted  of  nothing  more  than  accumulated 
observations  respecting  the  positions  and  motions  of  the  sun  and  planets ;  from 
which  accumulated  observations  it  came  by  and  by  to  be  empirically  predicted, 
with  an  approach  to  truth,  that  certain  of  the  heavenly  bodies  wouid  have 
certain  positions  at  certain  times.  But  the  modern  science  of  planetary 
Astronomy  consists  of  deductions  from  the  law  of  gravitation — deductions 
showing  why  the  celestial  bodies  necessarily  occupy  certain  places  at  certain 
times.    Now,  the  kind  of  relation  which  thus  exists  between  ancient  and    , 


58  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

modern  Astronomy,  is  analogous  to  the  kind  of  relation  which,  I  conceive, 
exists  between  the  Expendiency-Morality  and  Moral  Science  properly  so 
called.  And  the  objection  which  I  have  to  the  current  Utilitarianism  is,  that 
it  recognizes  no  more  developed  form  of  Morality— does  not  see  that  it  has 
reached  but  the  initial  stage  of  Moral  Science. 

Doubtless  if  utilitarians  are  asked  wiietliey*  it  can  be  by 
mere  cbance  that  tbis  kind  of  action  works  evil  and  tbat 
works  goodj  they  will  answer — No  :  they  will  admit  that  sucli 
sequences  are  parts  of  a  necessary  order  among  pbenomena. 
But  though  this  truth  is  beyond  question ;  and  though  if 
there  are  causal  relations  between  acts  and  their  results, 
rules  of  conduct  can  become  scientific  only  when  they  are 
deduced  from  these  causal  relations ;  there  continues  to  bo 
entire  satisfaction  with  that  form  of  utilitarianism  in  which 
these  causal  relations  are  practically  ignored.  It  is  supposed 
that  in  future^  as  now,  utility  is  to  be  determined  only  by 
observation  of  results ;  and  that  there  is  no  possibility  of 
knowing  by  deduction  from  fundamental  principles,  what 
conduct  must  be  detrimental  and  what  conduct  must  be 
beneficial. 

§22.  To  make  more  specific  that  conception  of  ethical 
science  here  indicated,  let  me  present  it  under  a  concrete 
aspect;  beginning  with  a  simple  illustration  and  compli- 
cating this  illustration  by  successive  steps. 

If,  by  tying  its  main  artery,  we  stop  most  of  the  blood 
going  to  a  limb,  then,  for  as  long  as  the  limb  performs  its 
function,  those  parts  which  are  called  into  play  must  be 
wasted  faster  than  they  are  repaired:  whence  eventual 
disablement.  The  relation  between  due  receipt  of  nutritive 
matters  through  its  arteries,  and  due  discharge  of  its  duties 
by  the  limb,  is  a  part  of  the  physical  order.  If,  instead  of 
cutting  off  the  supply  to  a  particular  limb,  we  bleed  the 
patient  largely,  so  drafting  away  the  materials  needed  for 
repairing  not  one  limb  but  all  limbs,  and  not  limbs  only  but 
viscera,  there  results  both  a  muscular  debility  and  an 
enfeeblement  of  the  vital  functions.     Here,  again,  cause  and 


WAYS   OP  JUDGING   CONDUCT.  59 

effect  are  necessarily  related.  Tlie  miscMef  that  results  from 
great  depletion,  results  apart  from  any  divine  command_,  or 
political  enactment,  or  moral  intuition.  Now  advance  a  step. 
Suppose  tlie  man  to  be  prevented  from  taking  in  enougli  of 
tlie  solid  and  liquid  food  containing  those  substances  con- 
tinually abstracted  from  his  blood  in  repairing  his  tissues : 
suppose  he  has  cancer  of  the  oesophagus  and  cannot  swallow 
— what  happens  ?  By  this  indirect  depletion,  as  by  direct 
depletion,  he  is  inevitably  made  incapable  of  performing  the 
actions  of  one  in  health.  In  this  case,  as  in  the  other  cases, 
the  connexion  between  cause  and  effect  is  one  that  cannot 
be  established,  or  altered,  by  any  authority  external  to  the 
phenomena  themselves.  Again,  let  ns  say  that  instead  of 
being  stopped  after  passing  his  mouth,  that  which  he  would 
swallow  is  stopped  before  reaching  his  mouth ;  so  that  day 
after  day  the  man  is  required  to  waste  his  tissues  in  getting 
food,  and  day  after  day  the  food  he  has  got  to  meet  this  waste, 
he  is  forcibly  prevented  from  eating.  As  before,  the  progress 
towards  death  by  starvation  is  inevitable — the  connexion 
between  acts  and  effects  is  independent  of  any  alleged  theo- 
logical or  political  authority.  And  similarly  if,  being  forced 
by  the  whip  to  labour,  no  adequate  return  in  food  is  supplied 
to  him,  there  are  equally  certain  evils,  equally  indepen- 
dent of  sacred  or  secular  enactment.  Pass  now 
to  those  actions  more  commonly  thought  of  as  the  occa- 
sions for  rules  of  conduct.  Let  us  assume  the  man  to 
be  continually  robbed  of  that  which  was  given  him  in 
exchange  for  his  labour,  and  by  which  he  was  to  make  up 
for  nervo-muscular  expenditure  and  renew  his  powers.  'No 
less  than  before  is  the  connexion  between  conduct  and 
consequence  rooted  in  the  constitution  of  things ;  unchange- 
able by  State-made  law,  and  not  needing  establishment  by 
empirical  generalization.  If  the  action  by  which  the  man  is 
affected  is  a  stage  further  away  from  the  results,  or  produces 
results  of  a  less  decisive  kind,  still  we  see  the  same  basis  for 
morality  in  the  physical  order.     Imagine  that  payment  for , 


60  THE   DATA  OF   ETHICS. 

his  services  is  made  partly  in  bad  coin ;  or  that  it  is  delayed 
beyond  the  date  agreed  upon;  or  that  what' he  buys  to  eat 
is  adulterated  with  innutritive  matter.  Manifestly,  by  any 
of  these  deeds  which  we  condemn  as  unjust,  and  which  are 
punished  by  law,  there  is,  as  before,  an  interference  with 
the  normal  adjustment  of  physiological  repair  to  physiolo- 
gical waste.  Nor  is  it  otherwise  when  we  pass  to  kinds  of 
conduct  still  more  remotely  operative.  If  he  is  hindered 
from  enforcing  his  claim — if  class-predominance  prevents 
him  from  proceeding,  or  if  a  bribed  judge  gives  a  verdict 
contrary  to  evidence,  or  if  a  witness  swears  falsely ;  have  not 
these  deeds,  though  they  affect  him  more  indirectly,  the 
same  original  cause  for  their  wrongness  ?  Even 

with  actions  which  work  diffused  and  indefinite  mischiefs 
it  is  the  same.  Suppose  that  the  man,  instead  of  being 
dealt  with  fraudulently,  is  calumniated.  There  is,  as 
before,  a  hindrance  to  the  carrying  on  of  life- sustaining 
activities ;  for  the  loss  of  character  detrimentally  affects  his 
-business.  Nor  is  this  all.  The  mental  depression  caused 
partially  incapacitates  him  for  energetic  activity,  and  perhaps 
brings  on  ill-health.  So  that  mahciously  or  carelessly  pro- 
pagating false  statements,  tends  both  to  diminish  his  life 
and  to  diminish  his  ability  to  maintain  life.  Hence  its 
ilagitiousness.  Moreover,  if  we  trace  to  their  ultimate 

ramifications  the  effects  wrought  by  any  of  these  acts 
which  morality  called  intuitive  reprobates — if  we  ask  what 
results  not  to  the  individual  himself  only,  but  also  to  his 
belongings — if  we  observe  how  impoverishment  hinders  the 
rearing  of  his  children,  by  entailing  under-feeding  or  inade- 
quate clothing,  resulting  perhaps  in  the  death  of  some  and 
the  constitutional  injury  of  others  ;  we  see  that  by  the  neces- 
sary connexions  of  things  these  acts,  besides  tending  primarily 
to  lower  the  life  of  the  individual  aggressed  upon,  tend, 
secondarily,  to  lower  the  lives  of  all  his  family,  and,  thirdly 
to  lower  the  life  of  society  at  large ;  which  is  damaged  by 
whatever  damages  its  units. 


WAYS   OP  JUDGING   CONDUCT.  61 

A  more  distinct  meaning  will  now  be  seen  in  the  state- 
ment that  the  utilitarianism  which  recognizes  only  the 
principles  of  conduct  reached  by  induction,  is  but  preparatory 
to  the  utilitarianism  which  deduces  these  principles  from  the 
processes  of  life  as  carried  on  under  established  conditions 
oE  existence. 

§  23^  Thus,  then,  is  justified  the  allegation  made  at  the 
outset,  that,  irrespective  of  their  distinctive  characters  and 
their  special  tendencies,  all  the  current  methods  of  ethics 
have  one  general  defect — they  neglect  ultimate  causal  con- 
nexions. Of  course  I  do  not  mean  that  they  wholly  ignore 
the  natural  consequences  of  actions ;  but  I  mean  that  they 
recognize  them  only  incidentally.  They  do  not  erect  into  a 
method  the  ascertaining  of  necessary  relations  between  causes 
and  effects,  and  deducing  rules  of  conduct  from  formulated 
statements  of  them. 

Every  science  begins  by  accumulating  observations,  and 
presently  generalizes  these  empirically;  but  only  when  it 
reaches  the  stage  at  which  its  empirical  generalizations 
are  included  in  a  rational  generalization,  does  it  become 
developed  science.  Astronomy  has  already  passed  through  its 
successive  stages  :  first  collections  of  facts ;  then  inductions 
from  them ;  and  lastly  deductive  interpretations  of  these,  as 
corollaries  from  a  universal  principle  of  action  among  masses 
in  space.  Accounts  of  structures  and  tabulations  of  strata, 
grouped  and  compared,  have  led  gradually  to  the  assigning 
of  various  classes  of  geological  changes  to  igneous  and 
aqueous  actions ;  and  it  is  now  tacitly  admitted  that  G  eology 
becomes  a  science  proper,  only  as  fast  as  such  changes  are 
explained  in  terms  of  those  natural  processes  which  have 
arisen  in  the  cooling  and  solidifying  Earth,  exposed  to  the 
Sun's  heat  and  the  action  of  the  Moon  upon  its  ocean.  The 
science  of  life  has  been,  and  is  still,  exhibiting  a  like  series 
of  steps :  the  evolution  of  organic  forms  at  large,  is 
being  afiiliated  on  physical  actions  in  operation  from  the 


62  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

beginning;  and  tlie  vital  phenomena  eacli  organism 
presents,  are  coming  to  be  understood  as  connected  sets  of 
changes,  in  parts  formed  of  matters  that  are  affected  by 
certain  forces  and  disengage  other  forces.  So  is  it  with 
mind.  Early  ideas  concerning  thought  and  feeling  ignored 
everything  like  cause,  save  in  recognizing  those  effects  of 
habit  which  were  forced  on  men's  attention  aud  expressed 
in  proverbs;  but  there  are  growing  up  interpretations  of 
thought  and  feeling  as  correlates  of  the  actions  and  re-actions 
of  a  nervous  structure,  that  is  influenced  by  outer  changes 
and  works  in  the  body  adapted  changes  ;  the  implication 
being  that  Psychology  becomes  a  science,  as  fast  as  these 
relations  of  phenomena  are  explained  as  consequences  of 
ultimate  principles.  Sociology,  too,  represented  down  to 
recent  times  only  by  stray  ideas  about  social  organization^, 
scattered  through  the  masses  of  worthless  gossip  furnished 
us  by  historians,  is  coming  to  be  recognized  by  some 
as  also  a  science;  and  such  adumbrations  of  it  as  have 
from  time  to  time  appeared  in  the  shape  of  empirical 
generalizations,  are  now  beginning  to  assume  the  character 
of  generalizations  made  coherent  by  derivation  from  causes 
lying  in  human  nature  placed  under  given  conditions. 
Clearly  then,  Ethics,  which  is  a  science  dealing  with  the 
conduct  of  associated  human  beings,  regarded  under  one  of 
its  aspects,  has  to  undergo  a  like  transformation ;  and,  at 
present  undeveloped,  can  be  considered  a  developed  science 
only  when  it  has  undergone  this  transformation. 

A  preparation  in  the  simpler  sciences  is  pre-supposed. 
Ethics  has  a  physical  aspect ;  since  it  treats  of  human 
activities  which,  in  common  with  all  expenditures  of  energy, 
conform  to  the  law  of  the  persistence  of  energy :  moral 
principles  must  conform  to  physical  necessities.  It  has  a 
biological  aspect ;  since  it  concerns  certain  effects,  inner  and 
outer,  individual  and  social,  of  the  vital  changes  going  on 
in  the  highest  type  of  animal.  It  has  a  psychological 
aspect;  for  its  subject-matter  is  an  aggregate  of  actions 


WAYS  OP  JUDGING  CONDUCT.  63 

that  are  prompted  by  feelings  and  guided  by  intelligence. 
And  it  has  a  sociological  aspect;  for  these  actions,  some  of 
them  directly  and  all  of  them  indirectly,  affect  associated 
beings. 

What  is  the  implication  ?  Belonging  under  one  aspect  to 
each  of  these  sciences — physical,  biological,  psychological, 
sociological, — it  can  find  its  ultimate  interpretations  only 
in  those  fundamental  truths  which  are  common  to  all  of  them. 
Already  we  have  concluded  in  a  general  way  that  conduct  at 
large,  including  the  conduct  Ethics  deals  with,  is  to  be  fully 
understood  only  as  an  aspect  of  evolving  life ;  and  now  we 
are  brought  to  this  conclusion  in  a  more  special  way. 

§  23.  Here,  then,  wo  have  to  enter  on  the  consideration 
of  moral  phenomena  as  phenomena _of  evolution  j  being 
forced  to  do  this  by  finding  that  they  form  a  part  of  the 
aggregate  of  phenomena  which  evolution  has  wrought  out. 
If  the  entire  visible  universe  has  been  evolved — if  the  solar 
system  as  a  whole,  the  earth  as  a  part  of  it,  the  life  in 
general  which  the  earth  bears,  as  well  as  that  of  each 
individual  organism — if  the  mental  phenomena  displayed 
by  all  creatures,  up  to  the  highest,  in  common  with  the 
phenomena  presented  by  aggregates  of  these  highest — if  one 
and  all  conform  to  the  laws  of  evolution  ;  then  the  necessary 
implication  is  that  those  phenomena  of  conduct  in  these 
highest  creatures  with  which  Morality  is  concerned,  also 
conform. 

The  preceding  volumes  have  prepared  the  way  for  dealing 
with  morals  as  thus  conceived.  Utilizing  the  conclusions 
they  contain,  lei?  us  now  observe  what  data  are  furnished 
by  these.  We  will  take  in  succession — the  physical  view, 
the  biological  viev/,  the  psychological  view,  and  the  socio- 
logical view. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE    PHYSICAL    VIEW. 

§  24.  Every  moment  we  pass  instantly  from  men^s 
perceived  actions  to  the  motives  implied  by  tliem ;  and 
so  are  led  to  formulate  these  actions  in  mental  terms 
rather  than  in  bodily  terms.  Thoughts  and  feelings  are 
referred  to  when  we  speak  of  any  one's  deeds  with  praise 
or  blame ;  not  those  outer  manifestations  which  reveal  the 
thoughts  and  feelings.  Hence  we  become  oblivious  of  the 
truth  that  conduct  as  actually  experienced,  consists  of 
changes  recognized  by  touch,  sight  and  hearing. 

This  habit  of  contemplating  only  the  psychical  face  of 
conduct,  is  so  confirmed  that  an  effort  is  required  to  con- 
template only  the  physical  face.  Undeniable  as  it  is  that 
another's  behaviour  to  us  is  made  up  of  movements  of  his 
body  and  limbs,  of  his  facial  muscles,  and  of  his  vocal 
apparatus ;  it  yet  seems  paradoxical  to  say  that  these  are  the 
only  elements  of  conduct  really  known  by  us,  while  the 
elements  of  conduct  which  we  exclusively  think  of  as 
constituting  it,  are  not  known  but  inferred. 

Here,  however,  ignoring  for  the  time  being  the  inferred 
elements  in  conduct,  we  have  to  deal  with  the  perceived 
elements — ^we  have  to  observe  its  traits  considered  as  a 
set  of  combined  motions.  Taking  the  evolution  point  of 
view,  and  remembering  that  while  an  aggregate  evolves,  not 
only  the  matter  composing  it,  but  alsp  the  motion  of  that 


THE   PHYSICAL   VIEW.  65 

matter,  passes  from  an  indefinite  incoherent  homogeneity 
to  a  definite  coherent  heterogeneity,  we  have  now  to  ask 
whether  conduct  as  it  rises  to  its  higher  forms,  displays  in 
increasing  degrees  these  characters ;  and  whether  it  does  not 
display  them  in  the  greatest  degree  when  it  reaches  that 
highest  form  which  we  call  moral. 

§  25.  It  will  be  convenient  to  deal  first  with  the  trait  o£  ' 
increasing  coherence.  The  conduct  of  lowly-organized 
creatures  is  broadly  contrasted  with  the  conduct  of  highly- 
organized  creatures,  in  having  its  successive  portions  feebly 
connected.  The  random  movements  which  an  animalcule 
makes,  have  severally  no  reference  to  movements  made  a 
moment  before;  nor  do  they  affect  in  specific  ways  the 
movements  made  immediately  after.  To-day's  wanderings 
of  a  fish  in  search  of  food,  though  perhaps  showing  by 
their  adjustments  to  catching  different  kinds  of  prey  at 
different  hours,  a  slightly-determined  order,  are  unrelated  to 
the  wanderings  of  yesterday  and  to-morrow.  But  such  more 
developed  creatures  as  birds,  show  us  in  the  building  of 
nests,  the  sitting  on  eggs,  the  rearing  of  chicks,  and  the 
aiding  of  them  after  they  fly,  sets  of  motions  which  form  a 
dependent  series,  extending  over  a  considerable  period. 
And  on  observing  the  complexity  of  the  acts  performed 
in  fetching  and  fixing  the  fibres  of  the  nest  or  in  catching 
and  bringing  to  the  young  each  portion  of  food,  we  dis- 
cover in  the  combined  motions,  lateral  cohesion  as  well  as 
longitudinal  cohesion. 

Man,  even  in  his  lowest  state,  displays  in  his  conduct  far 
more  coherent  combinations  of  motions.  By  the  elaborate 
manipulations  gone  through  in  making  weapons  that  are  to 
serve  for  the  chase  next  year,  or  in  building  canoes  and 
wigwams  for  permanent  uses — by  acts  of  aggression  and 
defence  which  are  connected  with  injuries  long  since 
received  or  committed,  the  savage  exhibits  an  aggregate 
of  motions  which,   in    some   of  its  parts,   holds   together 


DO  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

over  great  periods.  Moreover_,  if  we  consider  the  many 
movements  implied  by  tlie  transactions  of  eacli  day^  in 
tlie  wood,  on  the  water,  in  the  camp,  in  the  family;  we 
see  that  this  coherent  aggregate  of  movements  is  composed 
of  many  minor  aggregates,  that  are  severally  coherent 
within  themselves  and  with  one  another.  In 

civilized  man  this  trait  of  developed  conduct  becomes 
more  conspicuous  still.  Be  his  business  what  it  may,  its 
processes  involve  relatively-numerous  dependent  motions; 
and  day  by  day  it  is  so  carried  on  as  to  show  connexions 
between  present  motions  and  motions  long  gone  by,  as  well 
as  motions  anticipated  in  the  distant  future.  Besides  the 
many  doings,  related  to  one  another,  which  the  farmer 
goes  through  in  looking  after  his  cattle,  directing  his 
labourers,  keeping  an  eye  on  his  dairy,  buying  his  imple- 
ments, selling  his  produce,  &c. ;  the  business  of  getting  his 
lease  involves  numerous  combined  movements  on  which  the 
movements  of  subsequent  years  depend ;  and  in  manuring 
his  fields  with  a  view  to  larger  returns,  or  putting  down 
drains  with  the  like  motive,  he  is  performing  acts  which 
are  parts  of  a  coherent  combination  relatively  extensive. 
That  the  like  holds  of  the  shopkeeper,  manufacturer,  banker, 
is  manifest ;  and  this  increased  coherence  of  conduct  among 
the  civilized,  will  strike  us  even  more  when  we  remember 
how  its  parts  are  often  continued  in  a  connected  arrangement 
through  life,  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  fortune,  found- 
ing a  family,  gaimng  a  seat  in  Parliament. 

Now  mark  that  a  greater  coherence  among  its  component 
motions,  broadly  distinguishes  the  conduct  we  call  moral 
'  from  the  conduct  we  call  immoral.  The  application  of  the 
■  word  dissolute  to  the  last,  and  of  the  word  self-restrained  to 
the  first,  implies  this — implies  that  conduct  of  the  lower 
kind,  constituted  of  disorderly  acts,  has  its  parts  relatively 
loose  in  their  relations  with  one  another;  while  conduct 
of  the  higher  kind,  habitually  following  a  fi'xed  order,  so 
gains  a  characteristic  unity  an(?  coherence.     In  proportion 


THE   PHYSICAL  VIEW.  67 

as  the  conduct  is  what  we  call  moral,  it  exhibits  com- 
paratively settled  connexions  between  antecedents  and 
consequents ;  for  the  doing  right  implies  that  under  given 
conditions  the  combined  motions  constituting  conduct  will 
follow  in  a  way  that  can  be  specified.  Contrariwise,  in  the 
conduct  of  one  whose  principles  are  not  high,  the  sequences 
of  motions  are  doubtful.  He  may  pay  the  money  or  he  may 
not ;  he  may  keep  his  appointment  or  he  may  fail ;  he  may 
tell  the  truth  or  he  may  lie.  The  words  trustworthiness  and 
untrustworthiness,  as  used  to  characterize  the  two  respec- 
tively, sufficiently  imply  that  the  actions  of  the  one  can  be 
foreknown  while  those  of  the  other  can  not ;  and  this  implies 
that  the  successive  movements  composing  the  one  bear 
more  constant  relations  to  one  another  than  do  those  com- 
posing the  other — are  more  coherent. 

§  26.  Indofiniteness  accompanies  incoherence  in  conduct 
that  is  little  evolved ;  and  throughout  the  ascending  stages 
of  evolving  conduct,  there  is  an  increasingly-definite  co- 
ordination-of  the  motions  constituting  it. 

Such  changes  of  form  as  the  rudest  protozoa  show  us,  are 
utterly  vague — admit  of  no  precise  description  ;  and  though 
in  higher  kinds  the  movements  of  the  parts  are  more 
definable,  yet  the  movement  of  the  whole  in  respect  of 
direction  is  indeterminate  :  there  is  no  adjustment  of  it 
to  this  or  the  other  point  in  space.  In  such  coelenterate 
animals  as  polypes,  we  see  the  parts  moving  in  ways  which 
lack  precision ;  and  in  one  of  the  locomotive  forms,  as  a 
medusa,  the  course  taken,  oth^wise  at  random,  can  be 
described  only  as  one  which  carries  it  towards  the  light, 
where  degrees  of  light  and  darkness  are  present.  Among 
annulose  creatures  the  contrast  between  the  track  of  a  worm , 
turning  this  way  or  that  at  hazard,  and  the  definite  course 
taken  by  a  bee  in  its  flight  from  flower  to  flower  or  back 
■  to  the  hive,  shows  us  the  same  thing:  the  bee^s  acts  in 
building  cells   and    feeding 'larvae  further  exhibiting  pre- 


68  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

cision  in  the  simultaneous  movements  as  well  as  in  the 
successive  movements.  Though  the  motions  made  by  a 
fish  in  pursuing  its  prey  have  considerable  definiteness, 
yet  they  are  of  a  simple  kind,  and  are  in  this  respect  con- 
trasted with  the  many  definite  motions  of  body,  head,  and 
limbs  gone  through  by  a  carnivorous  mammal  in  the 
course  of  waylaying,  running  down,  and  seizing  a  herbivore ; 
and  further,  the  fish  shows  us  none  of  those  definitely- 
adjusted  sets  of  motions  which  in  the  mammal  subserve 
the  rearing  of  young. 

Much  greater  definiteness,  if  not  in  the  combined  move- 
ments forming  single  acts,  still  in  the  adjustments  of  many 
combined  acts  to  various  purposes,  characterizes  human 
conduct,  even  in  its  lowest  stages.  In  making  and  using 
weapons  and  in  the  manceuvrings  of  savage  warfare,  numer- 
ous movements  all  precise  in  their  adaptations  to  proximate 
ends,  are  arranged  for  the  achievement  of  remote  ends, 
with  a  precision  not  paralleled  among  lower  creatures. 
The  lives  of  civilized  men  exhibit  this  trait  far  more 
conspicuously.  Each  industrial  art  exemplifies  the  effects 
of  movements  which  are  severally  definite ;  and  which  are 
definitely  arranged  in  simultaneous  and  successive  order. 
Business  transactions  of  every  kind  are  characterized  by 
exact  relations  between  the  sets  of  motions  constituting 
acts,  and  the  purposes  fulfilled,  in  time,  place,  and  quantity. 
Further,  the  daily  routine  of  each  person  shows  us  in  its 
periods  and  amounts  of  activity,  of  rest,  of  relaxation, 
a  measured  arrangement  which  is  not  shown  us  by  the 
doings  of  the  wandering  savage ;  who  has  no  fixed  times 
for  hunting,  sleeping,  feeding,  or  any  one  kind  of  action. 

Moral  conduct  differs  from  immoral  conduct  in  the  same 
manner  and  in  a  like  degree.  The  conscientious  man  is 
exact  in  all  his  transactions.  He  supplies  a  precise  weight 
for  a  specified  sum ;  he  gives  a  definite  quality  in 
fulfilment  of  understanding;  he  pays  the  full  amount  he 
bargained  to  do.     In  times  as  well  as  in  quantities,  his  acts 


THE   PHYSICAL  VIEW.  69 

answer  completely  to  anticipations.  If  lie  has  made  a 
business  contract  lie  is  to  the  day ;  if  an  appointment  he 
is  to  the  minute.  Similarly  in  respect  of  truth :  his 
statements  correspond  accurately  with  the  facts.  It  is  thus 
too  in  his  family  life.  He  maintains  marital  relations  that 
are  definite  in  contrast  with  the  relations  that  result  from 
breach*  of  the  marriage  contract;  and  as  a  father,  fitting 
his  behaviour  with  care  to  the  nature  of  each  child  and  to 
the  occasion,  he  avoids  the  too  much  and  the  too  little  of 
praise  or  blame,  reward  or  penalty.  Nor  is  it  otherwise 
in  his  miscellaneous  acts.  To  say  that  he  deals  equitably 
with  those  he  employs,  whether  they  behave  well  or  ill,  is 
to  say  that  he  adjusts  his  acts  to  their  deserts ;  and  to 
say  that  he  is  judicious  in  his  charities,  is  to  say  that 
he  portions  out  his  aid  with  discrimination  instead  of 
distributing  it  indiscriminately  to  good  and  bad,  as  do 
those  who  have  no  adequate  sense  of  their  social  respon- 
sibilities. 

That  progress  towards  rectitude  of  conduct  is  progress 
towards  duly-proportioned  conduct,  and  that  duly-pro- 
portioned conduct  is  relatively  definite,  we  may  see 
from  another  point  of  view.  One  of  the  traits  of  conduct 
we  call  immoral,  is  excess;  while  moderation  habitually 
characterizes  moral  conduct.  Now  excesses  imply  extreme 
divergences  of  actions  from  some  medium,  while  maintenance 
of  the  medium  is  implied  by  moderation ;  whence  it  follows 
that  actions  of  the  last  kind  can  be  defined  more  nearly 
than  those  of  the  first.  Clearly  conduct  which,  being  unre- 
strained, runs  into  great  and  incalculable  oscillations,  therein 
differs  from  restrained  conduct  of  which,  by  implication, 
the  oscillations  fall  within  narrower  limits.  And  falling 
within  narrower  limits  necessitates  relative  definiteness  of 
movements. 

§  27.  That  throughout  the  ascending  forms  of  life,  along 
with  increasing   heterogeneity  of  structure  and  function^ 


70  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

there  goes  increasing  heterogeneity  of  conduct- 
diversity  in  the  sets  of  external  motions  and  combined 
sets  of  such  motions — needs  not  be  shown  in  detail.  Nor 
need  it  be  shown  that  becoming  relatively  great  in  the 
motions  constituting  the  conduct  of  the  uncivilized  man, 
this  heterogeneity  has  become  still  greater  in  those  which 
the  civilized  man  goes  through.  We  may  pass  at  once  to 
that  further  degree  of  the  like  contrast  which  we  see  on 
ascending  from  the  conduct  of  the  immoral  to  that  of  the 
moral. 

Instead  of  recognizing  this  contrast,  most  readers  will  be 
inclined  to  identify  a  moral  life  with  a  life  little  varied  in  its 
activities.     But  here  we  come  upon  a  defect  in  the  current 
conception   of   morality.     This   comparative   uniformity  in 
the  aggregate  of  motions,  which  goes  along  with  morality 
as  commonly  conceived,  is  not  only  not  moral  Kut  is  the  • 
reverse  of  moral.     The  better  a  man  fulfils   every  require- 1 
ment  of  life,  alike  as  regards  his  own  bod^^  and  mind,  as/ 
regards  the  bodies  and  minds  of  those  dependent  on  him,i 
and  as    regards    the    bodies    and   minds   of    his   fellow-' 
citizens,  the  more  varied  do  his  activities  become.  The  moreJ 
fully  he  does    all  these    things,   the   more   heterogeneougf 
must  be  his  movements. 

One  who  satisfies   personal   needs    only,    goes  through, 
other  things  equal,  less  multiform  processes  than  one  who 
also  administers  to  the  needs  of  wife  and  children.     Sup- 
posing there  are  no  other  difierences,  the  addition  of  family 
relations  necessarily  renders  the  actions  of  the  man  who-  •* 
fulfils  the  duties  of  husband  and  parent,  more  heterogeneou^s 
than  those  of  the  man  who  has  no  such  duties  to  fulfil,  or,  • 
having  them,  does  not  fulfil  them ;  and  to  say  that  his  actions 
are  more  heterogeneous  is  to  say  that  there  is  a  greater 
heterogeneity  in  the  combined  motions  he  goes  through. 
The  like  holds  of  social  obligations.  These,  in  proportion  as  a 
citizen    duly   performs    them,    complicate    his   movements  v 
considerably.     If  he  is  helpful  to  inferiors   dependent  on  } 


THE   PHYSICAL   VIEW.  71 

him,  if  lie  takes  a  part  in  political  agitation,  if  he  aids  in 
diffusing  knowledge,  he,  in  each  of  these  ways,  adds  to  his 
kinds  of  activity — makes  his  sets  of  movements  more 
multiform ;  so  differing  from  the  man  who  is  the  slave 
of  one  desire  or  group  of  desires. 

Though  it  is  unusual  to  consider  as  having  a  moral  aspect, 
those  activities  which  culture  involves,  yet  to  the  few  who 
hold  that  due  exercise  of  all  the  higher  faculties,  intellectual 
and  iBsthetic,  must  be  included  in  the  conception  of  com- 
plete life,  here  identified  with  the  ideally  moral  life,  'it  will 
be  manifest  that  a  further  heterogeneity  is  implied  by 
them.  For  each  of  such  activities,  constituted  by  that  play 
of  these  faculties  which  is  eventually  added  to  their  life- 
subserving  uses,  adds  to  the  multiformity  of  the  aggregated 
motions. 

Briefly,  then,  if  the  conduct  is  the  best  possible  on  every 
occasion,  it  follows  that  as  the  occasions  are  endlessly 
varied  the  acts  will  be  endlessly  varied  to  suit — the  hetero- 
geneity in  the  combinations  of  motions  will  be  extreme. 

§  28.  Evolution  in  conduct  considered  under  its  moral 
aspect,  is,  like  all  other  evolution,  towards  equilibrium.  I 
do  not  mean  that  it  is  towards  the  equilibrium  reached  at 
death,  though  this  is,  of  course,  the  final  state  which  the 
evolution  of  the  highest  man  has  in  common  with  all  lower 
evolution ;  but  I  mean  that  it  is  towards  a  moving  equili- 
brium. 

We  have  seen  that  maintaining  life,  expressed  in  physical, 
terms,  is  maintaining  a  balanced  combination  of  internal 
actions  in  face  of  external  forces  tending  to  overthrow  it; 
and  we  have  seen  that  advance  towards  a  higher  life,  has 
been  an  acquirement  of  ability  to  maintain  the  balance  for 
a  longer  period,  .by  the  successive  additions  of  organic 
appliances  which  by  their  actions  counteract,  more  and 
more  fully,  the  disturbing  forces.  Here,  then,  we  are  led 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  life  called  moral  is  one  in  which 


72  THE   DATA   OP   ETIilCS. 

this  maintenance  of  the  moving  equilibrium  readies  com- 
pleteness, or  approaches  most  nearly  to  completeness. 

This  truth  is  clearly  disclosed  on  observing  how  those 
physiological  rhythms  which  vaguely  show  themselves 
when  organization  begins,  become  more  regular  as  well  as 
more  various  in  their  kinds,  as  organization  advances. 
Periodicity  is  but  feebly  marked  in  the  actions,  inner  and 
outer,  of  the  rudest  types.  Where  life  is  low  there  is 
passive  dependence  on  the  accidents  of  the  environment ; 
and  this  entails  great  irregularities  in  the  vital  processes. 
The  taking  in  of  food  by  a  polype  is  at  intervals  now  short 
now  very  long,  as  circumstances  determine;  and  the 
utilization  of  it  is  by  a  slow  dispersion  of  the  absorbed 
part  through  the  tissues,  aided  only  by  the  irregular  move- 
ments of  the  creature's  body;  while  such  aeration  as  is 
effected  is  similarly  without  a  trace  of  rhythm.  Much  higher 
up  we  still  find  very  imperfect  periodicities ;  as  in  the  in- 
ferior molluscs  which,  though  possessed  of  vascular  systems, 
have  no  proper  circulation,  but  merely  a  slow  movement  of 
the  crude  blood,  now  in  one  direction  through  the  vessels 
and  then,  after  a  pause,  in  the  opposite  direction.  Only\ 
with  well-developed  structures  do  there  come  a  rhythmical  r 
pulse  and  a  rhythm  of  the  respiratory  actions.  And  then  A 
in  birds  and  mammals,  along  with  great  rapidity  and  regu- 
larity in  these  essential  rhythms,  and  along  with  a  conse- 
quently great  vital  activity  and  therefore  great  expenditure, 
comparative  regularity  in  the  rhythm  of  the  alimentary 
■actions  is  established,  as  well  as  in  the  rhythm  of  activity 
and  rest ;  since  the  rapid  waste  to  which  rapid  pulsation  and 
respiration  are  instrumental,  necessitates  tolerably  regular 
supplies  of  nutriment,  as  well  as  recurring  intervals  of  sleep 
during  which  repair  may  overtake  waste.  And  from 
these  stages  the  moving  equilibrium  characterized  by  such 
inter- dependent  rhythms,  is  continually  made  better  by  the 
counteracting  of  more  and  more  of  those  actions  which 
tend  to  perturb  it.  So  is  it  as  we  ascend 


THE   PHYSICAL   VIEW.  73 

from  savage  to  civilized  and  from  tlie  lowest  among  the 
civilized  to  the  highest.  The  rhythm  of  external  actions 
required  to  maintain  the  rhythm  of  internal  actions^  becomes 
at  once  more  complicated  and  more  complete;  making 
them  into  a  better  moving  equilibrium.  The  irregularities  I 
which  their  conditions  of  existence  entail  on  primitive  men, ' 
continually  cause  wide  deviations  from  the  mean  state  of  the 
moving  equilibrium — wide  oscillations ;  which  imply  imper- 
fection of  it  for  the  time  being,  and  bring  about  its 
premature  overthrow.  In  such  civilized  men  as  we 
call  ill-conducted,  frequent  perturbations  of  the  moving 
equilibrium  are  caused  by  those  excesses  characterizing  a 
career  in  which  the  periodicities  are  much  broken;  and 
a  common  result  is  that  the  rhythm  of  the  internal  actions 
being  often  deranged,  the  moving  equilibrium,  rendered  by 
so  much  imperfect,  is  generally  shortened  in  duration. 
While  one  in  whom  the  internal  rhythms  are  best  main- 
tained is  one  by  whom  the  external  actions  required  to  fulfil 
all  needs  and  duties,  severally  performed  on  the  recur- 
ring occasions,  conduce  to  a  moving  equilibrium  that  is  at 
once  involved  and  prolonged. 

'  Of  course  the  implication  is  that  the  man  who  thus  - 
reaches  the  limit  of  evolution,  exists  in  a  society  congruous 
with  his  nature — is  a  man  among  men  similarly  constituted, 
who  are  severally  in  harmony  with  that  social  environment 
which  they  have  formed.  This  is,indeed,  the  only  possibility. 
For  the  production  of  the  highest  type  of  man,  can  go  on  only 
pari  passu  with  the  production  of  the  highest  type  of  society. 
The  implied  conditions  are  those  before  described  as 
accompanying  the  most  evolved  conduct — conditions  under 
which  each  can  fulfil  all  his  needs  and  rear  the  due  number 
of  progeny,  not  only  without  hindering  others  from  doing 
the  like,  but  while  aiding  them  in  doing  the  like.  And 
evidently,  considered  under  its  physical  aspect,  the  conduct 
of  the  individual  so  constituted,  and  associated  with  like 
individuals,  is  one  in  which  all  the  actions,  that  is  the  com- 
bined motions  of  all  kinds,  have  become  such  as  duly  to 


74 


THE  -DATA   OP   ETHICS. 


meet  every  daily  process,  every  ordinary  occurrence,  and 
every  contingency  in  his  environment.  Complete  life  in  a 
complete  society  is  but  another  name  for  complete  equili- 
brium between  the  co-ordinated  activities  of  each  social  unit 
and  those  of  the  aggregate  of  units. 

§  29.  Even  to  readers  of  preceding  volumes,  and  still 
more  to  other  readers,  there  will  seem  a  strangeness,  or 
even  an  absurdity,  in  this  presentation  of  moral  conduct 
in  physical  terms.  It  has  been  needful  to  make  it  however. 
If  that  re-distribution  of  matter  and  motion  constituting 
evolution  gqes  on  in  all  aggregates,  its  laws  must  be 
fulfilled  in  the  most  developed  being  as  in  every  other 
thing;  and  his  actions,  when  decomposed  into  motions, 
must  exemplify  its  laws.  This  w^e  find  that  they  do.  There 
is  an  entire  correspondence  between  moral  evolution  and 
evolution  as  physically  defined, 

/^  Conduct  as  actually  known  to  us  in  perception  and 
not  as  interpreted  into  the  accompanying  feelings  and 
ideas,  consists  of  combined  motions.  On  ascending 
through  the  various  grades  of  animate  creatures',  we  find 
these  combined  motions  characterized  by  increasing  cohe- 
rence, increasing  definiteness  considered  singly  and  in  their 
co-ordinated  groups,  and  increasing  heterogeneity  ;  and  in 
advancing  from  lower  to  higher  types  of  man,  as  well  as 
in  advancing  from  the  less  moral  to  the  more  moral  type  of 
man,  these  traits  of  evolving  conduct  become  more  marked 
still.  Further,  we  see  that  the  increasing  coherence, 
definiteness,  and  heterogeneity,  of  the  combined  motions, 
j^re  instrumental  to  the  better  maintenance  of  a  moving 
Equilibrium.  Where  the  evolution  is  small  this  is  very 
imperfect  and  soon  cut  short;  with  advancing  evolution, 
bringing  greater  power  and  intelligence,  it  becomes  more 
steady  and  longer  continued  in  face  of  adverse  actions ;  in 
the  human  race  at  large  it  is  comparatively  regular  and 
enduring  ;  and  its  regulari.ty  and  enduringness  are  greatest 
in  the  highest. 


CHAPTER  VL 

THE  BIOLOGICAL  VIE\V, 

§  3f .  The  truth  that  the  ideally  moral  man  is  one  in 
whom  the  moving  equilibrium  is  perfect,  or  approaches 
nearest  to  perfection,  becomes,  when  translated  into  physio- 
logical language,  the  l^uth  that  he  is  one  in  whom  the 
functions  of  all  kinds  are  duly  fulfilled.  Each  function  has 
some  relation,  direct  or  indirect,  to  the  needs  of  life :  the 
fact  of  its  existence  as  a  result  of  evolution,  being  itself  a 
proof  that  it  has  been  entailed,  immediately  or  remotely,  by 
the  adjustment  of  inner  actions  to  outer  actions.  Conse- 
quently, non-fulfilment  of  it  in  normal  proportion  is  non- 
fulfilment  of  a  requisite  to  complete  life.  If  there  is 
defective  discharge  of  the  function,  the  organism  expe- 
riences some  detrimental  result  caused  by  the  inadequacy. 
If  the  discharge  is  in  excess,  there  is  entailed  a  reaction 
upon  the  other  .functions,  which  in  some  way  diminishes 
their  efficiencies. 

It  is  true  that  during  full  vigour,  while  the  momentum 
of  the  organic  actions  is  great,  the  disorder  caused  by 
moderate  excess  or  defect  of  any  one  function,  soon 
disappears — the  balance  is  re-established.  But  it  is  none 
the  less  true  that  always  some  disorder  results  from 
excess  or  defect,  that  it  influences  every  function  bodily 
and  menfcal^and  that  it  constitutes  a  lowering  of  the  life  for 
the  time  being. 

Beyond  the  temporary  falling  short  of  complete  life 
4 


76  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

implied  by  undue  or  inadequate  discharge  of  a  function, 
there  is  entailed,  as  an  ultimate  result,  decreased  length  of 
life.  If  some  function  is  habitually  performed  in  excess  of 
the  requirement,  or  in  defect  of  the  requirement ;  and  if,  as 
a  consequence,  there  is  an  often-repeated  perturbation  of  the 
functions  at  large  j  there  results  some  chronic  derangement 
in  the  balance  of  the  functions.  Necessarily  reacting  on  the 
structures,  and  registering  in  them  its  accumulated  effects, 
this  derangement  works  a  general  deterioration;  and 
when  the  vital  energies  begin  to  decline,  the  moving  equili- 
brium, further  from  perfection  than  it  would  else  have  been, 
is  sooner  overthrown :  death  is  more  or  less  premature. 

Hence  the  moral  man  is  one  whose  functions — many  and 
varied  in  their  kinds  as  we  have  seen — are  all  discharged 
in  degrees  duly  adjusted  to  the  conditions  of  existence. 

§  31.  Strange  as  the  conclusion  looks,  it  is  nevertheless  a 
conclusion  to  be  here  drawn,  that  the  performance  of  every 
function  is,  in  a  sense,  a  moral  obligation. 

It  is  usually  thought  that  morality  requires  us  only  to 
restrain  such  vital  activities  as,  in  our  present  state, 
are  often  pushed  to  excess,  or  such  as  conflict  with 
average  welfare,  special  or  general ;  but  it  also  requires 
us  to  carry  on  these  vital  activities  up  to  their  normal 
limits.  All  the  animal  functions,  in  common  with  all 
the  higher  functions,  have,  as  thus  understood,  their 
imperativeness.  While  recognizing  the  fact  that  in  our 
state  of  transition,  characterized  by  very  imperfect  adap- 
tation of  constitution  to  conditions,  moral  obligations  of 
supreme  kinds  often  necessitate  conduct  which  is  physically 
injurious ;  we  must  also  recognize  the  fact  that,  considered 
apart  from  other  effects,  it  is  immoral  so  to  treat  the  body 
as  in  any  way  to  diminish  the  fulness  or  vigour  of  its 
vitality. 

Hence  results  one  test  of  actions.  There  may  in  every 
case  be  put  the  questions — Poes  the  action  tend  to  main- 


THE   BIOLOGICAL    VIEW.  77 

tenance  of  complete  life  for  tlie  time  being  ?  and  does  it  tend 
to  prolongation  of  life  to  its  full  extent  ?  To  answer  yes  or 
no  to  either  of  these  questions^  is  implicitly  to  class  the 
action  as  right  or  wrong  in  respect  of  its  immediate  bearings, 
whatever  it  may  be  in  respect  of  its  remote  bearings. 

The  seeming  paradoxicalness  of  this  statement  results 
from  the  tendency,  so  difficult  of  avoidance,  to  judge  a 
conclusion  which  pre-supposes  an  ideal  humanity,  by  its 
applicability  to  humanity  as  now  existing.  The  foregoing 
conclusion  refers  to  that  highest  conduct  in  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  evolution  of  conduct  terminates — that  con- 
duct in  which  the  making  of  all  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends 
subserving  complete  individual  life,  together  with  all  those 
subserving  maintenance  of  offspring  and  preparation  of 
them  for  maturity,  not  only  consist  with  the  making  of  like 
adjustments  by  others,  bat  furthers  it.  And  this  con- 
ception of  conduct  in  its  ultimate  form,  implies  the 
conception  of  a  nature  having  such  conduct  for  its  spon- 
taneous outcome — the  product  of  its  normal  activities. 
So  understanding  the  matter,  it  becomes  manifest  that 
under  such  conditions,  any  falling  short  of  function,  as 
well  as  any  excess  of  function,  implies  deviation  from  the 
best  conduct  or  from  perfectly  moral  conduct. 

§  32.  Thus  far  in  treating  of  conduct  from  the  biological 
point  of  view,  we  have  considered  its  constituent  actions 
under  their  physiological  aspects  only;  leaving  out  of 
sight  their  psychological  aspects.  We  have  recognized  the 
bodily  changes  and  have  ignored  the  accompanying  mental 
changes.  And  at  first  sight  it  seems  needful  for  us  here  to 
do  this ;  since  taking  account  of  states  of  consciousness, 
apparently  implies  an  inclusion  of  the  psychological  view  iu 
the  biological  view. 

This  is  not  so  however.  As  was  pointed  out  in  the 
Principles  of  Psychologij  (§§  52,  53)  we  enter  upon  psy- 
chology proper,   only  when  we  begin  to  treat   of  mental 


78  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

states  and  their  relations,  considered  as  referring  to  external 
agents  and  their  relations.  While  we  concern  ourselves 
exclusively  with  modes  of  mind  as  correlatives  of  nervous 
changes,  we  are  treating  of  what  was  there  distinguished  as 
osstho -physiology.  V  We  pass  to  psychology  only  when  we 
consider  the  correspondence  between  the  connexions  among  ■ 
subjective  states  and  the  connexions  among  objective 
actions.  \  Here,  then,  without  transgressing  the  limits  of 
our  immediate  topic,  we  may  deal  with  feelings  and  functions 
in  their  mutual  dependencies. 

We  cannot  omit  doing  this  ;  because  the  psychical  changes 
which  accompany  many  of  the  physical  changes  in  the 
organism,  are  biological  factors  in  two  ways.  Those  feel- 
ings, classed  as  sensations,  which,  directly  initiated  in 
the  bodily  framework,  go  along  with  certain  states  of  the 
vital  organs  and  more  conspicuously  with  certain  states 
of  the  external  organs,  now  serve  mainly  as  guides  to 
the  performance  of  functions  but  partly  as  stimuli,  and 
now  serve  mainly  as  stimuli  but  in  a  smaller  degree  as 
guides.  Visual  sensations  which^  as  co-ordinated,  enable 
us  to  direct  our  movements,  also,  if  vivid,  raise  the  rate  of 
respiration ;  while  sensations  of  cold  and  heat,  greatly 
depressing  or  raising  the  vital  actions,  serve  also  for  pur- 
poses of  discrimination.  So,  too,  the  feelings  classed  as 
emotions,  which  are  not  localizable  in  the  bodily  framework, 
act  in  more  general  ways,  alike  as  guides  and  stimuli — 
having  influences  over  the  performance  of  functions  more 
potent  even  than  have  most  sensations.  Fear,  at  the 
same  time  that  it  urges  flight  and  evolves  the  forces  spent 
in  it,  also  affects  the  heart  and  the  alimentary  canal ;  while 
joy,  prompting  persistence  in  the  actions  bringing  tt,  simul- 
taneously exalts  the  visceral  processes. 

y     Hence  in  treating  of  conduct  under  its  biological  aspect, 

l|  we  are  compelled  to  consider  that  inter-action  of  feelings  and    . 

I*  functions,  which  is  essential  to  animal  life  in  all  its  more  F 

1  developed  forms. 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  79 

§  33.  In  tlie  Principles  of  Psychology,  §  124,  it  was  sliown 
that  necessarily,  throughout  the  animate  world  at  large, 
'''pains  are  the  correlatives  of  actions  injurious  to  the 
organism,  while  pleasures  are  the  correlatives  of  actions 
conducive  to  its  welfare  -/'  since  ''  it  is  an  inevitable  deduc- 
tion from  the  hypothesis  of  Evolution,  that  races  of  sentient 
creatures  could  have  come  into  existence  under  no  other 
conditions/'     The  argument  was  as  follows  : — 

If  we  substitute  for  the  word  Pleasure  the  equivalent  phrase — a  feeling  which 
we  seek  to  bring  into  consciousness  and  retain  there,  and  if  we  substitute  for 
the  word  Pain  the  equivalent  phrase — a  feeling  which  we  seek  to  get  out  of 
consciousness  and  to  keep  out  ;  we  see  at  once  that,  if  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness which  a  creature  endeavours  to  maintain  are  the  correlatives  of  injurious 
actions,  and  if  the  states  of  consciousness  which  it  endeavours  to  expel  are  the 
correlatives  of  beneficial  actions,  it  must  quickly  disappear  through  persistence 
in  the  injurious  and  avoidance  of  the  beneficial.  In  other  words,  those  races 
of  beings  only  can  have  survived  in  which,  on  the  average,  agreeable  or  desired 
feelings  went  along  with  activities  conducive  to  the  maintenance  of  life,  while 
disagreeable  and  habitually-avoided  feelings  went  along  with  activities  directly 
or  indirectly  destructive  of  life  ;  and  there  must  ever  have  been,  other  things 
equal,  the  most  numerous  and  long-continued  survivals  among  races  in  which 
these  adj  ustments  of  feelings  to  actions  were  the  best,  tending  ever  to  bring 
f  bout  perfect  adjustment. 

Fit  connexions  between  acts  and  results  must  establish 
themselves  in  living  things,  even  before  consciousness 
arises  ;  and  after  the  rise  of  consciousness  these  connexions 
can  change  in  no  other  way  than  to  become  better  estab- 
lished. At  the  very  outset,  life  is  maintained  by  persistence 
in  acts  which  conduce  to  it,  and  desistance  from  acts  which 
impede  it ;  and  whenever  sentiency  make  its  appearance  as 
an  accompaniment,  its  forms  must  be  such  that  in  the  one 
case  the  produced  feeling  is  of  a  kind  that  will  be  sought — 
pleasure,  and  in  the  other  case  is  of  a  kind  that  will  be 
shunned — pain.  Observe  the  necessity  of  these  relations  as 
exhibited  in  the  concrete. 

A  plant  which  envelops  a  buried  bone  with  a  plexus  of 
rootlets,  or  a  potato  which  directs  its  blanched  shoots 
towards  a  grating  through  which  light  comes  into  the  cellar, 
shows  us  that  the  changes  which  outer  agents  themselves 


80  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

set  up  in  its  tissues  are  changes  which  aid  the  utilization 
of  these  agents.  If  we  ask  what  would  happen  if  a 
plant's  roots  grew  not  towards  the  place  where  there  was 
moisture  but  away  from  it,  or  if  its  leaves,  enabled  by  light 
to  assimilate,  nevertheless  bent  themselves  towards  the  dark- 
ness ;  we  see  that  death  would  result  in  the  absence  of  the 
existing  adjustments.  This  general  relation  is  still  better 
shown  in  an  insectivorous  plant,  such  as  the  Dioncea 
miiscipulaf  which  keeps  its  trap  closed  round  animal  matter 
but  not  round  other  matter.  Here  it  is  manifest  that  the 
stimulus  arising  from  the  first  part  of  the  absorbed  substance, 
itself  sets  up  those  actions  by  which  the  mass  of  the  sub- 
stance is  utilized  for  the  plant's  benefit When 

we  pass  from  vegetal  organisms  to  unconscious  animal 
organisms,  we  see  a  like  connexion  between  proclivity 
and  advantage.  On  observing  how  the  tentacles  of  a 
polype  attach  themselves  to,  and  begin  to  close  round,  a 
living  creature,  or  some  animal  substance,  while  they  are 
indifferent  to  the  touch  of  other  substance  j  we  are  similarly 
shown  that  diffusion  of  some  of  the  nutritive  juices 
into  the  tentacles,  which  is  an  incipient  assimilation, 
causes  the  motions  effecting  prehension.  ,  And  it  is  obvious 
that  life  would  cease  were  th^e  relations  reversed.  Nor 

is  it  otherwise  with  this  fundamental  connexion  between 
contact  with  food  and  taking  in  of  food,  among  con- 
scious creatures,  up  to  the  very  highest.  Tasting  a 
substance  implies  the  passage  of  its  molecules  through 
the  mucous  membrane  of  the  tongue  and  palate;  and 
this  absorption,  when  it  occurs  with  a  substance  serving 
for  food,  is  but  a  commencement  of  the  absorption  carried 
on  throughout  the  alimentary  canal.  Moreover,  the  sensation 
accompanying  this  absorption,  when  it  is  of  the  kind  pro- 
duced by  food,  initiates  at  the  place  where  it  is  strongest, 
in  front  of  the  pharynx,  an  automatic  act  of  swallowing, 
in  a  manner  rudely  analogous  to  thai/  in  which  the  stimulus 
of  absorption  in  a  polype's  tentacles  initiates  prehension. 


THE    BIOLOGICAL    VIEW.  81 

If  from  these  processes  and  relations  that  imply 
contact  between  a  creature's  surface  and  the  substance 
it  takes  in,  we  turn  to  those  set  up  by  diffused  particles 
of  the  substance,  constituting  to  conscious  creatures  its 
odour,  we  meet  a  kindred  general  truth.  Just  as,  after 
contact,  some  molecules  of  a  mass  of  food  are  absorbed 
by  the  part  touched,  and  excite  the  act  of  prehension ;  so 
are  absorbed  such  of  its  molecules  as,  spreading  througli 
the  water,  reach  the  organism ;  and,  being  absorbed  by  it, 
excite  those  actions  by  which  contact  with  the  mass  is 
effected.  If  the  physical  stimulation  caused  by  the  dispersed 
particles  is  not  accompanied  by  consciousness,  still  the 
motor  changes  set  up  must  conduce  to  survival  of  the 
organism  if  they  are  such  as  end  in  contact ;  and  there 
must  be  relative  innutrition  and  mortality  of  organisms  in 
which  the  produced  contractions  do  not  bring  about  this 
result.  Nor  can  it  be  questioned  that  whenever  and  wherever 
the  physical  stimulation  has  a  concomitant  sentiency,  this  must 
be  such  as  consists  with,  and  conduces  to,  movement  towards 
the  nutritive  matter  :  it  must  be  not  a  repulsive  but  an  attrac- 
tive sentiency.  And  this  which  holds  with  the  lowest  con- 
sciousness, must  hold  throughout;  as  we  see  it  do  in  all  such 
superior  creatures  as  are  drawn  to  their  food  by  odour. 

Besides  those  movements  which  cause  locomotion, 
those  which  effect  seizure  must  no  less  certainly 
become  thus  adjusted  The  molecular  changes  caused 
by  absorption  of  nutritive  matter  from  organic  substance 
in  contact,  or  from  adjacent  organic  substance,  initiate 
motions  which  are  indefinite  where  the  organization  is 
low,  and  which  become  more  definite  with  the  advance  of 
organization.  At  the  outset,  while  the  undifferentiated  proto- 
plasm is  everywhere  absorbent  and  everywhere  contractile, 
the  changes  of  form  initiated  by  the  physical  stimulation  of 
adjacent  nutritive  matter  are  vague,  and  ineffectually 
adapted  to  utilization  of  it ;  but  gradually,  along  with  the 
specialization  into  parts  that  are  contractile  and  parts  that 


82  THE   DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

are  absorbent,  these  motions  become  better  adapted;  for 
necessarily  individuals  in  wbicli  they  are  least  adapted  dis- 
appear faster  tlian  those  in  which  they  are  most  adapted. 
Recognizing  this  necessity  we  have  here  especially  to 
recognize  a  further  necessity.  The  relation  between  these 
stimulations  and  adjusted  contractions  must  be  such  that 
increase  of  the  one  causes  increase  of  the  other ;  since  the 
directions  of  the  discharges  being  once  established,  greater 
stimulation  causes  greater  contraction,  and  the  greater 
contraction  causing  closer  contact  with  the  stimulating 
agent,  causes  increase  of  stimulus  and  is  thereby  itself 
further  increased.  And  now  we  reach  the  corollary  which 
more  particularly  concerns  us.  Clearly  as  fast  as  an  accom- 
panying sentiency  arises,  this  cannot  be  one  that  is 
disagreeable,  prompting  desistance,  but  must  be  one  that  is 
agreeable,  prompting  persistence.  The  pleasurable  sensation 
must  be  itself  the  stimulus  to  the  contraction  by  which  the 
pleasurable  sensation  is  maintained  and  increased ;  or  must 
be  so  bound  up  with  the  stimulus  that  the  two  increase 
together.  And  this  relation  which  we  see  is  directly 
established  in  the  case  of  a  fundamental  function,  must  be 
indirectly  established  with  all  other  functions ;  since  non- 
establishment  of  it  in  any  particular  case  implies,  in  so  far, 
unfitness  to  the  conditions  of  existence. 

In  two  ways  then,  it  is  demonstrable  that  there  exists  a 
primordial  connexion  between  pleasure-giving  acts  and 
continuance  or  increase  of  life,  and,  by  implication,  between 
pain-giving  acts  and  decrease  or  loss  of  life.  On  the  one 
hand,  setting  out  with  the  lowest  living  things,  we  see 
that  the  beneficial  act  and  the  act  which  there  is  a  ten- 
dency to  perform,  are  originally  two  sides  of  the  same; 
and  cannot  be  disconnected  without  fatal  results.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  we  contemplate  developed  creatures  as  now 
existing,  we  see  that  each  individual  and  species  is  from  day 
to  day  kept  alive  by  pursuit  of  the  agreeable  and  avoid- 
ance of  the  disap^reeable. 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  83 

Thus  approacliing  the  facts  from  a  different  side^ 
analysis  brings  us  down  to  another  face  of  that  ultimate 
truth  disclosed  by  analysis  in  a  preceding  chapter.  Wo 
found  it  was  no  more  possible  to  frame  ethical  conceptions 
from  which  the  consciousness  of  pleasure,  of  some  kind,  at 
some  time^  to  some  being,  is  absent,  than  it  is  possible  to 
frame  the  conception  of  an  object  from  which  the  conscious- 
ness of  space  is  absent.  And  now  we  see  that  this  necessity 
of  thought  originates  in  the  very  nature  of  sentient  existence. 
Sentient  existence  can  evolve  only  on  condition  that  pleasure-i 
giving  acts  are  life-sustaining  acts. 

§  34.  Notwithstanding  explanations  already  made,  the 
naked  enunciation  of  this  as  an  ultimate  truth,  underlying 
all  estimations  of  right  and  wrong,  will  in  many,  if  not  in 
most,  cause  astpnishm'ent.  Having  in  view  certain  bene- 
ficial results  that  are  preceded  by  disagreeable  states  of 
consciousness,  such  as  those  commonly  accompanying 
labour ;  and  having  in  view  the  injurious  results  that  follow 
the  receipt  of  certain  gratifications,  such  as  those  which 
excess  in  drinking  produces ;  the  majority  tacitly  or  avowedly 
believe  that  the  bearing  of  pains  is  on  the  whole  beneficial, 
and  that  the  receipt  of  pleasures  is  on  the  whole  detrirnental. 
The  exceptions  so  fill  their  minds  as  to  exclude  the  rule. 

When  asked,  they  are  obliged  to  admit  that  the  pains 
accompanying  wounds,  bruises,  sprains,  are  the  concomitants 
of  evils,  alike  to  the  sufferer  and  to  those  around  him ;  and 
that  the  anticipations  of  such  pains  serve  as  deterrents  from 
careless  or  dangerous  acts.  They  cannot  deny  that  the 
tortures  of  burning  or  scalding,  and  the  miseries  which 
intense  cold,  starvation,  and  thirst  produce,  are  indissolubly 
connected  with  permanent  or  temporary  mischiefs,  tending 
to  incapacitate  one  who  bears  them  for  doing  things  that 
should  be  done,  either  for  his  own  welfare  or  the  welfare  of 
others.  The  agony  of  incipient  suffocation  they  are  com- 
pelled to  recognize  as  a  safeguard  to  life,  and  must  allow 


04  THE   DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

that  avoidance  of  it  is  conducive  to  all  that  life  caii 
bring  or  achieve.  Nor  will  they  refuse  to  own  that 
one  who  is  chained  in  a  cold,  damp,  dungeon,  in 
darkness  and  silence,  is  injured  in  health  and  efficiency; 
alike  by  the  positive  pains  thus  inflicted  on  him  and  by 
the  accompanying  negative  pains  due  to  absence  of  light, 
of    freedom,   of  companionship.  Conversely,  they 

do  not  doubt  that  notwithstanding  occasional  excesses  the 
pleasure  which  accompanies  the  taking  of  food,  goes  along 
with  physical  benefit ;  and  that  the  benefit  is  the  greater  the 
keener  the  satisfaction  of  appetite.  They  have  no  choice  but 
to  acknowledge  that  the  instincts  and  sentiments  which  so 
overpoweringly  prompt  marriage,  and  those  which  find  their 
gratification  in  the  fostering  of  offspring,  work  out  an 
immense  surplus  of  benefit  after  deducting  all  evils.  Nor 
dare  they  question  that  the  pleasure  taken  in  accumu- 
lating property,  leaves  a  large  balance  of  advantage,  private 
and  public,  after  making  all  drawbacks.  Yet  many  and 
conspicuous  as  are  the  cases  in  which  pleasures  and  pains, 
sensational  and  emotional,  serve  as  incentives  to  proper  acts 
and  deterrents  from  improper  acts,  these  pass  unnoticed ; 
and  notice  is  taken  only  of  those  cases  in  which  men  are 
directly  or  indirectly  misled  by  them.  The  well- working  in  ^ 
essential  matters  is  ignored;  and  the  ill-working  in 
unessential  matters  is  alone  recognized. 

Is  it  replied  that  the  more  intense  pains  and  pleasures, 
which  have  immediate  reference  to  bodily  needs,  guide 
us  rightly;  while  the  weaker  pains  and  pleasures,  not 
immediately  connected  with  the  maintenance  of  life,  guide 
us  wrongly  ?  Then  the  implication  is  that  the  system  of 
guidance  by  pleasures  and  pains,  which  has  ans:',ered  with* 
all  types  of  creatures  below  the  human,  fails  with  the 
human.  Or  rather,  the  admission  being  that  with  mankind 
it  succeeds  in  so  far  as  fulfilment  of  certain  imperative 
wants  goes,  it  fails  in  respect  of  wants  that  are  not  impera- 
tive.    Those  who  think  this  are  required,  in  the  first  place. 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW  85 

to  sliow  US  how  the  line  is  to  be  drawn  between  the  two ; 
and  then  to  show  us  why  the  system  which  succeeds  in 
the  lower  will  not  succeed  in  the  higher. 

§  35.  Doubtless,  however,  after  all  that  has  been  said, 
there  will  be  raised  afresh  the  same  difficulty — there  will 
be  instanced  the  mischievous  pleasures  and  the  beneficent 
pains.  The  drunkard,  the  gambler,  the  thief,  who  seve- 
rally pursue  gratifications,  will  be  named  in  proof  that  the 
pursuit  of  gratifications  misleads  ;  while  the  self-sacrificing 
relative,  the  worker  who  perseveres  through  weariness,  the 
honest  man  who  stints  himself  to  pay  his  way,  will  be 
named  in  proof  that  disagreeable  modes  of  consciousness 
accompany  acts  that  are  really  beneficial.  But  after 
recalling  the  fact  pointed  out  in  §  20,  that  this  objection 
does  not  tell  against  guidance  by  pleasures  and  pains  at 
llarge,  since  it  merely  implies  that  special  and  proximate 
pleasures  and  pains  must  be  disregarded  out  of  considera- 
tion for  remote  and  diff'used  pleasures  and  pains ;  and  after 
admitting  that  in  mankind  as  at  present  constituted, 
guidance  by  proximate  pleasures  and  pains  fails  through- 
out a  wide  range  of  cases ;  I  go  on  to  set  forth  the  inter- 
pretation Biology  gives  of  these  anomalies,  as  being  not 
necessary  and  permanent  but  incidental  and  temporary. 

Already  while  showing  that  among  inferior  creatures, 
pleasures  and  pains  have  all  along  guided  the  conduct 
by  which  life  has  been  evolved  and  maintained,  I  have 
pointed  out  that  since  the  conditions  of  existence  for  each 
species  have  been  occasionally  changing,  there  have  been 
occasionally  arising  partial  mis-adjustments  of  the  feelings 
to  the  requirements,  necessitating  re-adjustments.  This 
general  cause  of  derangement  operating  on  all  sentient 
beings,  has  been  operating  on  human  beings  in  a  manner 
unusually  decided,  persistent,  and  involved.  It  needs  but 
to  contrast  the  mode  of  life  followed  by  primitive  men, 
wandering  in  the  forests   and    living  on  wild   food,  with 


86  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

the  mode  of  life  followed  by  rustics^  artisans,  traders,  and 
professional  men  in  a  civilized  community ;  to  see  tliat  the 
constitution,  bodily  and  mental,  well-adjusted  to  the  one  is  ill- 
adjusted  to  the  other.  It  needs  but  to  observe  the  emotions 
kept  awake  in  each  savage  tribe,  chronically  hostile  to 
neighbouring  tribes,  and  then  to  observe  the  emotions 
which  peaceful  production  and  exchange  bring  into  play, 
to  see  that  the  two  are  not  only  unlike  but  opposed.  And  it 
needs  but  to  note  how,  during  social  evolution,  the  ideas 
and  sentiments  appropriate  to  the  militant  activities 
carried  on  by  coercive  co-operation,  have  been  at  variance 
with  the  ideas  and  sentiments  appropriate  to  the  in- 
dustrial activities,  carried  on  by  voluntary  co-operation; 
to  see  that  there  has  ever  been  within  each  society,  and 
still  continues,  a  conflict  between  the  two  moral  natures 
adjusted  to  these  two  unlike  modes  of  life.  Manifestly,  then, 
this  re-adjustment  of  constitution  to  conditions,  involving 
re-adjustment  of  pleasures  and  pains  for  guidance,  which 
all  creatures  from  time  to  time  undergo,  has  been  in  the 
human  race  during  civilization,  especially  difficult ;  not  only 
because  of  the  greatness  of  the  change  from  small  nomadic 
groups  to  vast  settled  societies,  and  from  predatory  habits 
to  peaceful  habits ;  but  also  because  the  old  life  of  enmity 
between  societies  has  been  maintained  along  with  the  new 
life  of  amity  within  each  society.  While  there  co- exist 
two  ways  of  life  so  radically  opposed  as  the  militant 
ani  the  industrial,  human  nature  cannot  become  properly 
adapted  to  either. 

That  hence  results  such  failure  of  guidance  by  pleasures 
and  pains  as  is  daily  exhibited,  we  discover  on  observing 
in  what  parts  of  conduct  the  failure  is  most  conspicuous. 
As  above  shown,  the  pleasurable  and  painful  sensations  are 
fairly  well  adjusted  to  the  peremptory  physical  requirements : 
the  benefits  of  conforming  to  the  sensations  which  prompt 
us  in  respect  of  nutrition,  respiration,  maintenance  of  tem- 
perature, &c.,  immensely  exceed  the  incidental  evils ;  and 


TilE   BIOLOGICAL  VIE^ 


such  mis-adjustments  as  occur  maybe  ascribed  to  the  change 
from  the  out-door  life  of  the  primitive  man  to  the  in-door 
life  which  the  civilized  man  is  often  compelled  to  lead.  It 
is  the  emotional  pleasures  and  pains  which  are  in  so  con- 
siderable a  degree  out  of  adjustment  to  the  needs  of  life  as 
carried  on  in  society  ;  and  it  is  of  these  that  the  re-adjust- 
ment is  made,  in  the  way  above  shown,  so  tardy  because  so 
difficult. 

From  the  biological  point  of  view  then,  we  see  that  the 
connexions  between  pleasure  and  beneficial  action  and  be- 
tween pain  and  detrimental  action,  which  arose  when  sentient 
existence  began,  and  have  continued  among  animate  creatures 
up  to  man,  are  generally  displayed  in  him  also  throughout 
the  lower  and  more  completely-organized  part  of  his  nature; 
and  must  be  more  and  more  fully  displayed  throughout  the 
higher  part  of  his  nature,  as  fast  as  his  adaptation  to  the 
conditions  of  social  life  increases. 

§  36.  Biology  has  a  further  judgment  to  pass  on  the 
relations  of  pleasures  and  pains  to  welfare.  Beyond  the 
connexions  between  acts  beneficial  to  the  organism  and 
the  pleasures  accompanying  performance  of  them,  and 
between  acts  detrimental  to  the  organism  and  the 
pains  causing  desistance  from  them,  there  are  connexions 
between  pleasure  in  general  and  physiological  exaltation, 
and  between  pain  in  general  and  physiological  depression. 
Every  pleasure  increases  vitality;  every  pain  decreases 
vitality.  Every  pleasure  raises  the  tide  of  life ;  every  pain 
lowers  the  tide  of  life.     Let  us  consider,  first,  the  pains. 

By  the  general  mischiefs  that  result  from  submission 
to  pains,  I  do  not  mean  those  arising  from  the  diffused 
efiiects  of  local  organic  lesions,  such  as  follow  an  aneurism 
caused  by  intense  effort  spite  of  protesting  sensations,  or 
such  as  follow  the  varicose  veins  brought  on  by  continued 
disregard  of  fatigue  in  the  legs,  or  such  as  follow  the 
atrophy  set  up  in  muscles  that  are  persistently  exerted  when 


88  THE   DATA   OF    ETHICS. 

extremely  weary  ;  but  I  mean  the  general  miscMefs  caused 
by  that  constitutional  disturbance  whicb  pain  forthwith  sets 
up.  These  are  conspicuous  when  the  pains  are  acute, 
whether  they  be  sensational  or  emotional.  Bodily 

agony  long  borne_,  produces  death  by  exhaustion.  More 
frequently,  arresting  the  action  of  the  heart  for  a  time,  it 
causes  that  temporary  death  we  call  fainting.  On  other 
occasions  vomiting  is  a  consequence.  And  where  such 
manifest  derangements  do  not  result,  we  still,  in  the  pallor 
and  trembling,  trace  the  general  prostration.  Beyond  the 
actual  loss  of  life  caused  by  subjection  to  intense  cold,  there 
are  depressions  of  vitality  less  marked  caused  by  cold  less 
extreme — temporary  enfeeblement  following  too  long  an 
immersion  in  icy  water ;  enervation  and  pining  away  con- 
sequent on  inadequate  clothing.  Similarly  is  it  with 
submission  to  great  heat :  we  have  lassitude  reaching 
occasionally  to  exhaustion;  we  have,  in  weak  persons, 
fainting,  succeeded  by  temporary  debilitation;  and  in 
steaming  tropical  jungles,  Europeans  contract  fevers  which 
when  not  fatal  often  entail  life-long  incapacities.  Consider, 
again,  the  evils  that  follow  violent  exertion  continued  in 
spite  of  painful  feelings — now  a  fatigue  which  destroys 
appetite  or  arrests  digestion  if  food  is  taken,  implying 
failure  of  the  reparative  processes  when  they  are  most 
needed  ;  and  now  a  prostration  of  the  heart,  here  lasting  for 
a  time  and  there,  where  the  transgression  has  been  repeated 
day  after  day,  made  permanent :  reducing  the  rest  of  life  to 
a  lower  level.  No  less  conspicuous  are  the  depressing 

effects  of  emotional  pains.  There  are  occasional  cases  of 
death  from  grief ;  and  in  other  cases  the  mental  suffering 
which  a  calamity  causes,  like  bodily  suffering,  shows  its  effects 
by  sjjicope.  Often  a  piece  of  bad  news  is  succeeded  by  sick- 
ness ;  and  continued  anxiety  will  produce  loss  of  appetite,  per- 
petual indigestion,  and  diminished  strength.  Excessive  fear, 
whether  aroused  by  physical  or  moral  danger,  will,  in  like 
manner,  arrest  for  a  time  the  processes  of  nutrition ;  acd^ 


THE   BIOEUGICAL   VIEW.  89 

not  unfrequently,  in  pregnant  women  brings  on  mis- 
carriage ;  while,  in  less  extreme  cases_,  the  cold  perspiration 
and  unsteady  hands  indicate  a  general  lowering  of  the  vital 
activities,  entailing  partial  incapacity  of  body  or  mind  or 
both.  How  greatly  emotional  pain  deranges  the  visceral 
actions  is  shown  us  by  the  fact  that  incessant  worry 
is  not  unfrequently  followed  by  jaundice.  And  here, 
indeed,  the  relation  between  cause  and  effect  happens  to 
have  been  proved  by  direct  experiment.  Making  such 
arrangements  that  the  bile-duct  of  a  dog  delivered  its 
product  outside  the  body,  Claude  Bernard  observed  that  so 
long  as  he  petted  the  dog  £tnd  kept  him  in  good  spirits, 
secretion  went  on  at  its  normal  rate;  but  on  speaking 
angrily,  and  for  a  time  so  treating  him  as  to  produce  depres- 
sion, the  flow  of  bile  was  arrested.  Should  it  be  said 
that  evil  results  of  such  kinds  are  proved  to  occur  only 
when  the  pains,  bodily  or  mental,  are  great ;  the  reply  is 
that  in  healthy  persons  the  injurious  perturbations  caused  by 
small  pains,  though  not  easily  traced,  are  still  produced ; 
and  that  in  those  whose  vital  powers  are  much  reduced 
by  illness,  slight  physical  irritations  and  trifling  moral 
annoyances,  often  cause  relapses. 

Quite  opposite  are  the  constitutional  effects  of  pleasure. 
It  sometimes,  though  rarely,  happens  that  in  feeble  persons 
intense  pleasure — pleasure  that  is  almost  pain — gives  a 
nervous  shock  that  is  mischievous;  but  it  does  not  do 
this  in  those  who  are  undebilitated  by  voluntary  or  enforced 
submission  to  actions  injurious  to  the  organism.  In  the 
normal  order,  pleasures,  great  and  small,  are  stimulants  to 
the  processes  by  which  life  is  maintained.  Among 

the  sensations  may  be  instanced  those  produced  by  bright 
light.  Sunshine  is  enlivening  in  comparison  with  gloom 
— even  a  gleam  excites  a  wave  of  pleasure ;  and  experiments 
have  shown  that  sunshine  raises  the  rate  of  respiration: 
raised  respiration  being  an  index  of  raised  vital  activities  in 
general.      A  warmth  that  is  agreeable  in  degree  favours  the 


90  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

heart's  action,  and  furthers  tlie  various  functions  to  whicli 
this  is  instrumental.  Though  those  who  are. in  full  vigour 
and  fitly  clothed,  can  maintain  their  temperature  in  winter, 
and  can  digest  additional  food  to  make  up  for  the  loss  of 
heat,  it  is  otherwise  with  the  feeble  ;  and,  as  vigour  declines, 
the  beneficence  of  warmth  becomes  conspicuous.  That 
benefits  accompany  tbe  agreeable  sensations  -produced  by 
fresh  air,  and  the  agreeable  sensations  that  accompany 
muscular  action  after  due  rest,  and  the  agreeable  sensations 
caused  by  rest  after  exertion,  cannot  be  questioned.  Receipt 
of  these  pleasures  conduces  to  the  maintenance  of  the  body 
in  fit  condition  for  all  the  purposes  of  life.  More 

manifest  still  are  the  physiological  benefits  of  emotional 
pleasures.  Every  power,  bodily  and  mental,  is  increased 
by  *'  good  spirits  /'  which  is  our  name  for  a  general 
emotional  satisfaction.  The  truth  that  the  fundamental 
vital  actions — those  of  nutrition— are  furthered  by  laughter- 
moving  conversation,  or  rather  by  the  pleasurable  feeling 
causing  laughter,  is  one  of  old  standing;;  and  every 
dyspeptic  knows  that  in  exhilarating  company,  a  large  and 
4-  varied  dinner  including  not  very  digestible  things,  may  be 
eaten  with  impunity,  and  indeed  with  benefit,  while  a  small, 
carefully-chosen  dinner  of  simple  things,  eaten  in  solitude, 
will  be  followed  by  indigestion.]  This  striking  effect  on 
the  alimentary  system  is  accompanied  by  effects,  equally 
certain  though  less  manifest,  on  the  circulation  and  the 
respiration.  Again,  one  who,  released  from  daily  labours 
and  anxieties,  receives  delights  from  fine  scenery  or  is 
enlivened  by  the  novelties  he  sees  abroad,  comes  back 
showing  by  toned-up  face  and  vivacious  manner,  the  greater 
energy  with  which  he  is  prepared  to  pursue  his  avocation. 
Invalids  especially,  on  whose  narrowed  margin  of  vitality 
the  influence  of  conditions  is  most  visible,  habitually  show 
the  benefits  derived  from  agreeable  states  of  feeling.  A 
lively  social  circle,  the  call  of  an  old  friend,  or  even  removal 
to  a  brighter  room,  will,  by  the  induced  cheerfulness,  much 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  YIEVV.  91 

improve  the  physical  •state.     In  brief,  as  every  medical  man 
knows,  there  is  no  such  tonic  as  happiness. 

These  diffused  physiological  effects  of  pleasures  and 
pains,  which  are  joined  with  the  local  or  special  physiolo- 
gical effects,  are,  indeed,  obviously  inevitable.  We  have  seen 
(Princijples  of  Psychology,  §§  123 — 125)  that  while  craving, 
or  negative  pain,  accompanies  the  under-activity  of  an 
organ,  and  while  positive  pain  accompanies  its  over-activity, 
pleasure  accompanies  its  normal  activity.  We  have  seen 
that  by  evolution  no  other  relations  could  be  established ; 
since,  through  all  inferior  types  of  creatures,  if  defect  or 
excess  of  function  produced  no  disagreeable  sentiency,  and 
medium  function  no  agreeable  sentiency,  there  would  bo 
nothing  to  ensure  a  proportioned  performance  of  function. 
And  as  it  is  one  of  the  laws  of  nervous  action  that 
each  -stimulus,  beyond  a  direct  discharge  to  the  particular 
organ  acted  on,  indirectly  causes  a  general  discharge 
throughout  the  nervous  system  {Prin.  of  Psy.  §§21,  39),  it 
results  that  the  rest  of  the  organs,  all  influenced  as  they 
are  by  the  nervous  system,  participate  in  the  stimu- 
lation. So  that  beyond  the  aid,  more  slowly  shown, 
which  the  organs  yield  to  one  another  through  tho 
physiological  division  of  labour,  there  is  the  aid,  more 
quickly  shown,  which  mutual  excitation  gives.  While 
there  is  a  benefit  to  be  presently  felt  by  the  whole  organism 
from  the  due  performance  of  each  function,  there  is  an 
immediate  benefit  from  the  exaltation  of  its  functions 
at  large  caused  by  the  accompanying  pleasure;  and  from 
pains,  whether  of  excess  or  defect,  there  also  come  these 
double  effects,  immediate  and  remote. 

§  37.  Non-recognition  of  these  general  truths  vitiates 
moral  speculation  at  large.  From  the  estimates  of  right 
and  wrong  habitually  framed,  these  physiological  efi'ects 
wrought  on  the  actor  by  his  feelings  are  entirely  omitted 
It   is   tacitly  assumed  that  pleasures  and  pains    have   no 


92  THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

reactions  on  the  body  of  tlie  recipient,  affecting  his  fitness 
/'  for  the  duties  of  life.  The  only  reactions  recognized  are 
those  on  character ;  respecting  which  the  current  supposi- 
tion is,  that  acceptance  of  pleasures  is  detrimental  and 
submission  to  pains  beneficial.  The  notion,  remotely 
descended  from  the  ghost-theory  of  the  savage,  that  mind 
and  body  are  independent,  has,  among  its  various  implica- 
tions, this  belief  that  states  of  consciousness  are  in  no 
wise  related  to  bodily  states.  "  You  have  had  your  gratifi- 
cation— it  is  past ;  and  you  are  as  you  were  before,'^  says 
the  moralist  to  one.  And  to  another  he  says,  '^  You  have 
borne  the  suffering — it  is  over ;  and  there  the  matter  ends.'^^ 
Both  statements  are  false.  Leaving  out  of  view  indirect 
results,  the  direct  results  are  that  the  one  has  moved  a  step 
away  from  death  and  the  other  has  moved  a  step  towards 
death. 

Leaving  out  of  view,  I  say,  the  indirect  results.  It  is 
these  indirect  results,  here  for  the  moment  left  out  of  view, 
which  the  moralist  has  exclusively  in  view:  being  so 
occupied  by  them  that  he  ignores  the  direct  results.  The 
gratification,  perhaps  purchased  at  undue  cost,  perhaps 
enjoyed  when  work  should  have  been  done,  perhaps  snatched 
from  the  rightful  claimant,  is  considered  only  in  relation  to 
remote  injurious  effects,  and  no  set-off  is  made  for  imme- 
diate beneficial  effects.  Conversely,  from  positive  and 
negative  pains,  borne  now  in  the  pursuit  of  some  future 
advantage,  now  in  discharge  of  responsibilities,  now  in 
performing  a  generous  act,  the  distant  good  is  alone  dwelt 
on  and  the  proximate  evil  ignored.  Consequences,  plea- 
surable and  painful,  experienced  by  the  actor  forthwith,  are 
of  no  importance;  and  they  become  of  importance  only 
when  anticipated  as  occurring  hereafter  to  the  actor  or  to 
other  persons.  And  further,  future  evils  borne  by  the 
actor  are  considered  of  no  account  if  they  result  from  self- 
denial,  and  are  emphasized  only  when  they  result  from 
self- gratification.     Obviously,  estimates  so  framed  are  erro- 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  /'^S"^ 

neous ;  and  obviously,  tlie  pervading  judgments  of  conduct 
based  on  sucb  estimates  must  be  distorted.  Mark  tlie 
anomalies  of  opinion  produced. 

If,  as  the  sequence  of  a  malady  contracted  in  pursuit  of 
illegitimate  gratification,  an  attack  of  iritis  injures  vision, 
the  mischief  is  to  be  counted  among  those  entailed  by 
immoral  conduct ;  but  if,  regardless  of  protesting  sensations, 
the  eyes  are  used  in  study  too  soon  after  ophthalmia,  and 
there  follows  blindness  for  years  or  for  life,  entailing  not  only 
personal  unhappiness  but  a  burden  on  others,  moralists 
are  silent.  The  broken  leg  which  a  drunkard's  accident 
causes,  counts  among  those  miseries  brought  on  self  and 
family  by  intemperance,  which  form  the  ground  for  repro- 
bating it;  but  if  anxiety  to  fulfil  duties  prompts  tho 
continued  use  of  a  sprained  knee  spite  of  the  pain,  and 
brings  on  a  chronic  lameness  involving  lack  of  exercise, 
consequent  ill-health,  inefficiency,  anxiety,  and  unhappiness, 
it  is  supposed  that  ethics  has  no  verdict  to  give  in  the 
matter.  A  student  who  is  plucked  because  he  has  spent 
in  amusement  the  time  and  money  that  should  have 
gone  in  study,  is  blamed  for  thus  making  parents 
unhappy  and  preparing  for  himself  a  miserable  future ; 
but  another  who,  thinking  exclusively  of  claims  on  him, 
reads  night  after  night  with  hot  or  aching  head,  and, 
breaking  down,  cannot  take  his  degree,  but  returns  home 
shattered  in  health  and  unable  to  support  himself,  is 
named  with  pity  only,  as  not  subject  to  any  moral  judg- 
ment; or  rather,  the  moral  judgment  passed  is  wholly 
favourable. 

Thus  recognizing  the  evils  caused  by  some  kinds  of  con- 
duct only,  men  at  large,  and  moralists  as  exponents  of 
their  beliefs,  ignore  the  siiflTfirino'  n.nd  fjpa^h  dn.ily  ransfid 
around  them  by  disreg^ard '  of  that  guidance  which  has 
established  itself  in  the  course  of  evolution,  ^ed  by  the 
tacit  assumption,  common  to  Pagan  stoics  and  Christian 
ascetics,  that  we  are  so  diabolically  organized  that  pleasures 


94  THE   DATA  OP  ETHICS. 

are  injurious  and  pains  beneficial,  people  on  all  sides 
yield  examples  of  lives  blasted  by  persisting  in  actions 
against  which  their  sensations  rebel.  Here  is  one  who, 
drenched  to  the  skin  and  sitting  in  a  cold  wind,  pooh-poohs 
his  shiverings  and  gets  rheumatic  fever  with  subsequent 
heart-disease,  which  makes  worthless  the  short  life  remain- 
ing to  him.  Here  is  another  who,  disregarding  painful 
feelings,  works  too  soon  after  a  debilitating  illness,  and 
establishes  disordered  health  that  lasts  for  the  rest  of  his 
days,  and  makes  him  useless  to  himself  and  others.  Now 
the  account  is  of  a  youth  who,  persisting  in  gymnastic  feats 
spite  of  scarcely  bearable  straining,  bursts  a  blood-vessel, 
and,  long  laid  on  the  shelf,  is  permanently  damaged ;  while 
now  it  is  of  a  man  in  middle  life  who,  pushing  muscular 
efibrt  to  painful  excess,  suddenly  brings  on  hernia.  In  fliis 
family  is  a  case  of  aphasia,  spreading  paralysis,  and  death, 
caused  by  eating  too  little  and  doing  too  much ;  in  that, 
softening  of  the  brain  has  been  brought  on  by -ceaseless 
mental  efforts  against  which  the  feelings  hourly  protested ; 
and  in  others,  less  serious  brain-affections  have  been  con- 
tracted by  over-study  continued  regardless  of  discomfort  and 
the  cravings  for  fresh  air  and  exercise.*  Even  without 
accumulating  special  examples,  the  truth  is  forced  on  us  by 
the  visible  traits  of  classes.  The  careworn  man  of  business 
too  long  at  his  office,  the  cadaverous  barrister  poring  half 
the  night  over  his  briefs,  the  feeble  factory  hands  and 
unhealthy  seamstresses  passing  long  hours  in  bad  air,  the 
anaemic,  flat-chested  school  girls,  bending  over  many  lessons 
and  forbidden  boisterous  play,  no  less  than  Sheffield  grinders 
who  die  of  sufi'ocating  dust,  and  peasants  crippled  with 
rheumatism  due  to  exposure,  show  us  the  wide-spread 
miseries  caused  by  persevering  in  actions  repugnant  to  the 
sensations  and  neglecting  actions  which  the  sensations 
prompt.      Nay  the   evidence  is  still   more    extensive    and 

*  I  can  count  up  more  thau  a  dozen  such  cases  among  those  personally 
well  known  to  mo. 


THE   BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  95 

conspicuous.  What  are  fhe  puny  malformed  children, 
seen  in  poverty-stricken  districts,  but  children  whose 
appetites  for  food  and  desires  for  warmth  have  not  been 
adequately  satisfied  ?  What  are  populations  stinted  in 
growth  and  prematurely  aged,  such  as  parts  of  France 
show  us,  but  populations  injured  by  work  in  excess  and 
food  in  defect :  the  one  implying  positive  pain  the  other 
negative  pain  ?  What  is  the  implication  of  that  greater 
mortality  which  occurs  among  people  who  are  weakened  by 
privations,  unless  it  is  that  bodily  miseries  conduce  to  fatal 
illnesses  ?  Or  once  more,  what  must  wo  infer  from  the 
frightful  amount  of  disease  and  death  suffered  by  armies  in 
the  field,  fed  on  scanty  and  bad  provisions,  lying  on  damp 
ground,  exposed  to  extremes  of  heat  and  cold,  inadequately 
sheltered  from  rain,  and  subject  to  exhausting  efforts; 
unless  it  be  the  terrible  mischiefs,  caused  by  continuously 
subjecting  the  body  to  treatment  which  the  feelings  protest 
against  ? 

It  matters  not  to  the  argument  whether  the  actions 
entailing  such  effects  are  voluntary  or  involuntary.  It 
matters  not  from  the  biological  point  of  view,  whether  the 
motives  prompting  them  are  high  or  low.  The  vital  functions 
accept  no  apologies  on  the  ground  that  neglect  of  them  was 
unavoidable,  or  that  the  reason  for  neglect  was  noble.  The 
direct  and  indirect  sufferings  caused  by  nonconformity  to 
thie  laws  of  life,  are  the  same  whatever  induces  the  non- 
conformity ;  and  cannot  be  omitted  in  any  rational  estimate 
of  conduct.  If  the  purpose  of  ethical  inquiry  is  to  establish 
rules  of  riff  lit  living^ ;  and  if-  the  rules  of  rip[ht  livinfY  are 
those  of  which  the  total  results,  individual  and  p^eneral. 
direct  and  indirect,  are  most  condnnivR  to  human  happiness.^ 
then  it  is  absurd  to  ignore  the  immediate  results  and 
recognize  only  the  remote  results. 

§  38.  Here  might  be  urged  the  necessity  for  preluding 
the   study   of  moral   science,   by   the   study   of  biological 


9^  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

science.  Here  miglit  be  dwelt  on  the  error  men  make  in 
thinking  they  can  understand  those  special  phenomena  of 
human  life  with  which  Ethics  deals^  while  paying  little 
or  no  attention  to  the  general  phenomena  of  human  life, 
and  while  utterly  ignoring  the  phenomena  of  life  at 
large.  And  doubtless  there  would  be  truth  in  the 
inference  that  such  acquaintance  with  the  world  of  living 
things  as  discloses  the  part  which  pleasures  and  pains  have 
played  in  organic  evolution,  would  help  to  rectify  ttiese 
one-sided  conceptions  of  moralists.  It  cannot  be  held, 
however,  that  lack  of  this  knowledge  is  the  sole  cause, 
or  the  main  cause,  of  their  one-sidedness.  For  facts  of  the 
kind  above  instanced,  which,  duly  attended  to,  would  prevent 
such  distortions  of  moral  theory,  are  facts  which  it  needs  no 
biological  inquiries  to  learn,  but  which  are  daily  thrust 
before  the  eyes  of  all.  The  truth  is,  rather,  that  the  general 
consciousness  is  so  possessed  by  sentiments  and  ideas  at 
variance  with  the  conclusions  necessitated  by  familiar  evi- 
dence, that  the  evidence  gets  no  attention.  These  adverse 
sentiments  and  ideas  have  several  roots. 

There  is  the  theological  root.  As  before  shown,  from  the 
worship  of  cannibal  ancestors  who  delighted  in  witnessing 
tortures,  there  resulted  the  primitive  conception  of  deities 
who  were  propitiated  by  the  bearing  of  pains,  and,  con- 
sequently, angered  by  the  receipt  of  pleasures.  Through 
the  religions  of  the  semi- civilized,  in  which  this  conception 
of  the  divine  nature  remains  conspicuous,  it  has  persisted, 
in  progressively  modified  forms,  down  to  our  own  times ; 
and  still  colours  the  beliefs,  both  of  those  who  adhere 
to  the  current  creed  and  of  those  who  nominally  reject 
it.  There  is  another  root  in  the  primitive  and  still- 

surviving  militancy.  While  social  antagonisms  continue  to 
generate  war,  which  consists  in  endeavours  to  inflict  pain 
and  death  while  submitting  to  the  risks  of  pain  and 
death,  and  which  necessarily  involves  great  privations; 
it   is    needful     that    physical     suffering,    whether    consi- 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  97 

dered  in  itself  or  in  the  evils  it  "bequeaths,  should  be  thought 
little  of,  and  that  among  pleasures  recognized  as  most  worthy 
should  be  those  which  victory  brings.  Nor  does 

partially- developed  industrialism  fail  to  furnish  a  root.  With 
social  evolution,  which  implies  transition  from  the  life  of 
wandering  hunters  to  the  life  of  settled  peoples  engaged  in 
labour,  and  which  therefore  entails  activities  widely  unlike 
those  to  which  the  aboriginal  constitution  is  adapted,  there 
comes  an  under-exercise  of  faculties  for  which  the  social 
state  affords  no'scope,  and  an  over-taxing  of  faculties  required 
for  the  social  state :  the  one  implying  denial  of  certain 
pleasures  and  the  other  submission  to  certain  pains.  Hence, 
along  'with  that  growth  of  population  which  makes  the 
struggle  for  existence  intense,  bearing  of  pains  and  sacrifice 
of  pleasures  is  daily  necessitated. 

Now  always  and  everywhere,  there  arises  among  men  a 
theory  conforming  to  their  practice.  The  savage  nature, 
originating  the  conception  of  a  savage  deity,  evolves  a  theory 
of  supernatural  control  sufficiently  stringent  and  cruel  to 
influence  his  conduct.  With  submission  to  despotic  govern- 
ment severe  enough  in  its  restraints  to  keep  in  order 
barbarous  natures,  there  grows  up  a  theory  of  divine  right 
to  rule,  and  the  duty  of  absolute  submission.  Where  war 
is  made  the  business  of  life  by  the  existence  of  warlike 
neighbours,  virtues  which  are  required  for  war  come  to  be 
regarded  as  supreme  virtues ;  while,  contrariwise,  when 
industrialism  has  grown  predominant,  the  violence  and  the 
deception  which  warriors  glory  in  come  to  be  held  criminal. 
In  like  manner,  then,  there  arises  a  tolerable  adjustment  of 
the  actually-accepted  (not  the  nominally-accepted)  theory  of 
right  living,  to  living  as  it  is  daily  carried  on.  If  the 
life  is  one  that  necessitates  habitual  denial  of  pleasures 
and  bearing  of  pains,  there  grows  up  an  answering  ethical 
system  under  which  the  receipt  of  pleasures  is  tacitly 
disapproved  and  the  bearing  of  pains  avowedly  approved. 
The  mischiefs   entailed   by  pleasures  in  excess  are   dwelt 


98  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

on,  while  the  benefits  wLicli  normal  pleasures  bring  are 
ignored ;  and  the  good  results  achieved  by  submission  to 
pains  are  fully  set  forth  while  the  evils  are  overlooked. 

But  while  recognizing  the  desirableness  of,  and  indeed 
the  necessity  for_,  systems  of  ethics  adapted,  like  religious 
systems  and  political  systems,  to  their  respective  times  and 
places  ;  we  have  here  to  regard  the  first  as,  like  the  others, 
transitional.  We  must  infer  that  like  a  purer  creed  and  a 
better  government,  a  truer  ethics  belongs  to  a  more  advanced 
social  state.  Led,  a  priori,  to  conclude  that  distortions  must 
exist,  we  are  enabled  to  recognize  as  such,  the  distortions 
we  find :  answering  in  nature,  as  these  do,  to  expectation. 
And  there  is  forced  on  us  the  truth  that  a  scientific 
morality  arises  only  as  fast  as  the  one-sided  conceptions 
adapted  to  transitory  conditions,  are  developed  into  both- 
sided  conceptions.  The  science  of  right  living  has  to  take 
account  of  all  consequences  in  so  far  as  they  affect  happi- 
ness, personally  or  socially,  directly  or  indirectly ;  and  by  as 
much  as  it  ignores  any  class  of  consequences,  by  so  much 
does  it  fail  to  be  science. 

§  39.  Like  the  physical  view,  then,  the  biological  view 
corresponds  with  the  view  gained  by  looking  at  conduct  in 
general  from  the  stand-point  of  Evolution. 

That_^  which  was  physically  defined  iis  a  moving  equili- 
brium, we  define  biologically  as  a  balance  of  functions.  The 
implication  of  such  a  balance  is  that  the  several  functions  in 
their  kinds,  amounts,  and  combinations,  are  adjusted  to  the 
several  activities  which  maintain  and  constitute  complete 
life;  and  to  be  so  adjusted  is  to  have  reached  the  goal 
towards  which  the  evolution  of  conduct  continually  tends. 

Passing  to  the  feelings  which  accompany  the  perform- 
ance of  functions,  we  see  that  of  necessity  during  the 
evolution  of  organic  life,  pleasures  have  become  the  con- 
comitants of  normal  amounts  of  functions,  while  pains, 
positive  and  negative,  have  become   the   concomitants  of 


THE   BIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  99 

excesses  and  defects  of  functions.  And  though  in  every 
species  derangements  of  these  relations  are  often  caused 
by  changes  of  conditions,  they  ever  re-establish  themselves  : 
disappearance  of  the  species  being  the  alternative. 

Mankind,  inheriting  from  creatures  of  lower  kinds,  such 
adjustments  between  feelings  and  functions  as  concern 
fundamental  bodily  requirements;  and  daily  forced  by 
peremptory  feelings  to  do  the  things  which  maintain  life  and 
avoid  those  which  bring  immediate  death ;  has  been  subject 
to  a  change  of  conditions  unusually  great  and  involved. 
This  has  considerably  deranged  the  guidance  by  sensations, 
and  has  deranged  in  a  much  greater  degree  the  guidance 
by  emotions.  The  result  is  that  in  many  cases  pleasures  are 
not  connected  with  actions  which  must  be  performed,  nor 
pains  with  actions  which  must  be  avoided,  but  contrariwise. 

Several  influences  have  conspired  to  make  men  ignore  the 
well-working  of  these  relations  between  feelings  and 
functions,  and  to  observe  whatever  of  ill-working  is  seen 
in  them.  Hence,  while  the  evils  which  some  pleasures  entail 
are  dilated  upon,  the  benefits  habitually  accompanying 
receipt  of  pleasures  are  unnoticed ;  at  the  same  time  that  the 
benefits  achieved  through  certain  pains  are  magnified  while 
the  immense  mischiefs  which  pains  bring  are  made  little  of. 

The  ethical  theories  characterized  by  these  perversions, 
are  products  of,  and  are  appropriate  to,  the  forms  of 
social  life  which  the  imperfectly-adapted  constitutions  of 
men  produce.  But  with  the  progress  of  adaptation,  bring- 
ing faculties  and  requirements  into  harmony,  such  incon- 
gruities of  experience,  and  consequent  distortions  of  theory, 
must  diminish  ;  until,  along  with  complete  adjustment,  of 
humanity  to  the  social  state,  will  go  recognition  of  the  truths 
that  actions  are  completely  right  only  when,  besides  being 
conducive  to  future  happiness,  special  and  general,  they  are 
immediately  pleasurable,  and  that  pamtulness,  not  only 
ultimate  but  proxnnate,  is  the  concomitant  oi:  actions  which 


100  THE   DATA  OP   ETHICS. 

So  that  from  the  biological  point  of  view,  etliical  science 
becomes  a  specification,  of  the  conduct  of  associated  men 
who  are  spyf^T-flHy  «n  rnTiRtitntnd  thfit  the  various  self-^re-- 
servinor  activities,  the  activities  required  for  rearinfy  offspring^, 
and  those  which  social  welfare  demands^  are  fulfilled  in  the 
spontaneous  exercise  of  duly  proportioned  faculties,  ^ach 
yielding  when  in  action  its  quantum  of  pleasure. ;  and  who 
are,  by  consequence,  so  constituted  that  excess  or  defect  in 
any  one  of  these  actions  brings  its  quantum  of  pain,  imme- 
Sate  and  remote. 


Note  to  §  33.  In  his  Physical  Ethics,  Mr.  Alfred  Barratt  has  expressed  a 
view  which  here  calls  for  notice.  Postulating  Evolution  and  its  general  laws, 
he  refers  to  certain  passages  in  the  Principles  of  Psychology  (1st  Ed.  Pt.  III. 
ch.  viii.  pp.  395,  sqq.  cf.  Pt.  IV.  ch.  iv.)  in  which  I  have  treated  of  the  relation 
between  irritation  and  contraction  which  "  marks  the  dawn  of  sensitive  life ; " 
have  pointed  out  that  "  the  primordial  tissue  must  be  differently  affected  by 
contact  with  nutritive  and  with  innutritive  matters  " — the  two  being  for  aquatic 
creatures  respectively  the  soluble  and  the  insoluble ;  and  have  argued  that 
the  contraction  by  which  a  protruded  part  of  a  rhizopod  draws  in  a  fragment 
of  assimilable  matter  *'  is  caused  by  a  commencing  absorption  of  the  assimilable 
matter."  Mr.  Barratt,  holding  that  consciousness  "must  be  considered  as 
an  invariable  property  of  animal  life,  and  ultimately,  in  its  elements,  of 
the  material  universe "  (p.  43),  regards  these  responses  of  animal  tissue 
to  stimuli,  as  implying  feeling  of  one  or  other  kind.  "  Some  kinds  of 
impressed  force,"  he  says,  "are  followed  by  movements  of  retraction  and 
withdrawal,  others  by  such  as  secure  a  continuance  of  the  impression.  These 
two  kinds  of  contraction  are  the  phenomena  and  external  marks  of  pain 
and  pleasure  respectively.  Hence  the  tissue  acts  so  as  to  secure  pleasure 
and  avoid  pain  by  a  law  as  truly  physical  and  natural  as  that  whereby  a 
needle  turns  to  the  pole,  or  a  tree  to  the  light"  (p.  52).  Now  without 
questioning  that  the  raw  material  of  consciousness  is  present  even  in  undiffer- 
entiated protoplasm,  and  everywhere  exists  potentially  in  that  Unknowable 
Power  which,  otherwise  conditioned,  is  manifested  in  physical  action  (^Prin.  of 
Psy.  §  272 — 3),  I  demur  to  the  conclusion  that  it  at  first  exists  under  the  forms  of 
pleasure  and  pain.  These,  I  conceive,  arise,  as  the  more  special  feelings  do,  by 
a  compounding  of  the  ultimate  elements  of  consciousness  {Prin.  of  Psy. 
§§  60,  61)  :  being,  indeed,  general  aspects  of  these  more  special  feelings  when 
they  reach  certain  intensities.  Considering  that  even  in  creatures  which  have 
developed  nervous  systems,  a  great  part  of  the  vital  processes  are  carried  on  by 
unconscious  reflex  actions,  I  see  no  propriety  in  assuming  the  existence  of  what 
we  understand  by  consciousness  in  creatm-es  not  only  devoid  of  nervous  systems 
but  devoid  of  structures  in  general. 

Note  to  §  36.    More  than  once  in  the  Emotions  and  the  Will,  Dr.  Bain 


THE    BIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  101 

insists  on  the  connexion  between  pleasure  and  exaltation  of  vitality,  and  the 
connexion  between  pain  and  depression  of  vitality.  As  above  shown,  I  concur 
in  the  view  taken  by  him  ;  which  is,  indeed,  put  beyond  dispute  by  general 
experience  as  well  as  by  the  more  special  experience  of  medical  men. 

When,  however,  from  the  invigorating  and  relaxing  effects  of  pleasure  and 
pain  respectively.  Dr.  Bain  derives  the  original  tendencies  to  persist  in  acts 
which  give  pleasure  and  to  desist  from  those  which  give  pain,  I  find  myself 
unable  to  go  with  him.  He  says — "We  suppose  movements  spontaneously 
begun,  and  accidentally  causing  pleausnre  ;  we  then  assume  that  with  the 
pleasure  there  will  be  an  increase  of  vital  energy,  in  which  increase  the 
fortunate  movements  will  share,  and  thereby  increase  the  pleasure.  Or,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  suppose  the  spontaneous  movements  to  give  pain,  and  assume 
that,  with  the  pain,  there  will  be  a  decrease  of  energy,  extending  to  the  move- 
ments that  cause  the  evil,  and  thereby  providing  a  remedy  "  (3rd  Ed.  p.  315). 
This  interpretation,  implying  that  "  the  fortunate  movements"  merely  share  in 
the  effects  of  augmented  vital  energy  caused  by  the  pleasure,  does  not  seem  to  me 
congruous  with  observation.  The  truth  appears  rather  to  be  that  though  there 
is  a  concomitant  general  increase  of  muscular  tone,  the  muscles  specially 
excited  are  those  which,  by  their  increased  contraction,  conduce  to  increased 
pleasure.  Conversely,  the  implication  that  desistance  from  spontaneous  move- 
ments which  cause  pain,  is  due  to  a  general  muscular  relaxation  shared  in  by 
the  muscles  causing  these  particular  movements,  seems  to  me  at  variance  with 
the  fact  that  the  retractation  commonly  takes  the  f orai  not  of  a  passive  lapse  but 
of  an  active  withdrawal.  Further,  it  may  be  remarked  that  depressing  as  pain 
eventually  is  to  the  system  at  large,  we  cannot  say  that  it  at  once  depresses  the 
muscular  energies.  Not  simply,  as  Dr.  Bain  admits,  does  an  acute  smart  produce 
spasmodic  movements,  but  pains  of  all  kinds,  both  sensational  and  emotional 
stimulate  the  muscles  {Essays  1st  series  p.  360,  l,or  2nd  ed.Vol.  I.  p.  211,12).  Pain 
however  (and  also  pleasure  when  very  intense)  simultaneously  has  an  inhibitory 
effect  on  all  the  reflex  actions  ;  and  as  the  vital  functions  in  general  are  carried 
on  by  reflex  actions,  this  inhibition,  increasing  with  the  intensity  of  the  pain, 
proportionately  depresses  the  vital  functions.  Arrest  of  the  heart's  action  and 
fainting  is  an  extreme  result  of  this  inhibition;  and  the  viscera  at  large  feel  its 
effects  in  degrees  proportioned  to  the  degrees  of  pain.  Pain,  therefore,  while 
directly  causing  a  discharge  of  muscular  energy  as  pleasure  does,  eventually 
lowers  muscular  power  by  lowering  those  vital  processes  on  which  the  supply 
of  energy  depends.  Hence  we  cannot,  I  think,  ascribe  the  prompt  desistance  from 
muscular  movements  causing  pain,  to  decrease  in  the  flow  of  energy  ;  for  this 
decrease  is  felt  only  after  an  interval.  Conversely,  we  cannot  ascribe  the  per- 
sistence in  a  muscular  act  which  yields  pleasure  to  the  resulting  exaltation  of 
energy  ;  but  must,  as  indicated  in  §  33,  ascribe  it  to  the  establishment  of  lines 
of  discharge  between  the  place  of  pleasurable  stimulation  and  those  contractile 
structures  which  maintain  and  increase  the  act  causing  the  stimulation — 
connexions  allied  with  the  reflex,  into  which  they  pass  by  insensible  gradations. 


CHAPTER  VIL 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW. 

§  40.  The  last  chapter,  in  so  far  as  it  dealt  with  feelings 
in  their  relations  to  conduct,  recognized  only  their  physio- 
logical aspects  :  their  psychological  aspects  were  passed  over. 
In  this  chapter,  conversely,  we  are  not  concerned  with 
the  constitutional  connexions  between  feelings,  as  in- 
centives or  deterrents,  and  physical  benefits  to  be  gained 
or  mischiefs  to  be  avoided ;  nor  with  the  reactive  effects  of 
feelings  on  the  state  of  the  organism,  as  fitting  or  unfitting 
it  for  future  action.     Here  we  have  to^consider  represented 


pleasures  and  pains,  sensat-ional  and  emotional,  a^s^^cgnsji- 
tutmg  deliberate  motives-^— as  forming  factors  in-  the  con- 
scious  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends. 

§  41.  The  rudimentary  psychical  act,  not  yet  differentiated 
from  a  phj^sical  act,  implies  an  excitation  and  a  motion.  In 
a  creature  of  low  type  the  touch  of  food  excites  prehension. 
In  a  somewhat  higher  creature  the  odour  from  nutritive 
matter  sets  up  motion  of  the  body  towards  the  matter. 
And  where  rudimentary  vision  exists,  sudden  obscuration  of 
light,  implying  the  passage  of  something  large,  causes  con- 
vulsive muscular  movements  which  mostly  carry  the  body 
away  from  the  source  of  danger.  In  each  of  these  cases  we 
may  distinguish  four  factors.  There  is  (a),  that  property  of 
the  external  object  which  primarily  affects  the  organism — • 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  103 

the  taste,  smell,  or  opacity;  and,  connected  with  such 
property,  there  is  in  the  external  object  that  character  (2i)^ 
which  renders  seizure  of  it,  or  escape  from  it,  beneficial. 
Within  the  organism  there  is  (c),  the  impression  or  sensation 
which  the  property  (a),  produces,  serving  as  stimulus ;  and 
there  is,  connected  with  it,  the  motor  change  {d),  by 
which  seizure  or  escape  is  effected.  Now  Psychology  is 

chiefly  concerned  with  the  connexion  between  the  relation 
a  &,  and  the  relation  c  d,  under  all  those  forms  which  they 
assume  in  the  course  of  evolution.  Eacli  of  the  factors,  and 
each  of  the  relations,  grows  more  involved  as  organization 
advances.  Instead  of  being  single,  the  identifying  attribute 
«;  often  becomes,  in  the  environment  of  a  superior  animal, 
a  cluster  of  attributes ;  such  as  the  size,  form,  colours, 
motions,  displayed  by  a  distant  creature  that  is  dangerous. 
The  factor  &,  with  which  this  combination  of  attri- 
butes is  associated,  becomes  the  congeries  of  characters, 
powers,  habits,  which  constitute  it  an  enemy.  Of  the 
subjective  factors,  c  becomes  a  complicated  set  of  visual 
sensations  co-ordinated  with  one  another  and  with  the 
ideas  and  feelings  established  by  experience  of  such,  enemies, 
and  constituting  the  motive  to  escape ;  while  d  becomes  the 
intricate,  and  often  prolonged,  series  of  runs,  leaps,  doubles, 
dives,   &c.,   made   in   eluding  the   enemy.  In 

human  life  we  find  the  same  four  outer  and  inner 
factors,  still  more  multiform  and  entangled  in  their 
compositions  and  connexions.  The  entire  assemblage  of 
physical  attributes  a,  presented  by  an  estate  that  is 
advertized  for  sale,  passes  enumeration ;  and  the  assemblage 
of  various  utilities,  h,  going  along  with  these  attributes, 
is  also  beyond  brief  specification.  The  perceptions  and 
ideas,  likes  and  dislikes,  c,  set  up  by  the  aspect  of 
the  estate,  and  which,  compounded  and  re-compounded, 
eventually  form  the  motive  for  buying  it,  make  a  whole  too 
large  and  complex  for  description;  and  the  transactions, 
legal,   pecuniary,  and  other,  gone  through  in  making  the 


104  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

purchase  and  taking  possession,  are  scarcely  less  numerous 
and  elaborate.  Nor  must   we   oyerlook  the  fact 

that  as  evolution  progresses,  not  only  do  the  factors  increase 
in  complexity  but  also  the  relations  among  them.  Origi- 
nally, a  is  directly  and  simply  connected  with  h,  while  c  is 
directly  and  simply  connected  with  d.  But  eventually,  the 
connexions  between  a  and  b,  and  between  c  and  dj  become 
very  indirect  and  involved.  On  the  one  hand,  as  the  first 
illustration  shows  us,  sapidity  and  nutritiveness  are  closely 
bound  together ;  as  are  also  the  stimulation  caused  by  the 
one  and  the  contraction  which  utilizes  the  other.  But,  as  we 
see  in  the  last  illustration^  the  connexion  between  the 
visible  traits  of  an  estate  and  those  characters  which  con- 
stitute its  value,  is  at  once  remote  and  complicated ;  while 
the  transition  from  the  purchaser's  highly-composite  motive 
to  the  numerous  actions  of  sensory  and  motor  organs> 
severally  intricate,  which  effect  the  purchase,  is  though  an 
entangled  plexus  of  thoughts  and  feelings  constituting  his 
decision. 

After  this  explanation  will  be  apprehended  a  truth 
otherwise  set  forth  in  the  Trinciples  of  Psychology.  Mind 
consists  of  feelings  and  the  relations  among  feelings.  By 
composition  of  the  relations,  and  ideas  of  relations,  intelli- 
gence arises.  By  composition  of  the  feelings,  and  ideas  of 
feelings,  emotion  arises.  And,  other  things  equal,  the 
evolution  of  either  is  great  in  proportion  as  the  composition 
is  great.  One  of  the  necessary  implications  is  that  cognition 
becomes  higher  in  proportion  as  it  is  remoter  from  reflex 
action ;  while  emotion  becomes  higher  in  proportion  as  it  is 
remoter  from  sensation. 

And  now  of  the  various  corollaries  from  this  broad  view 
of  psychological  evolution,  let  us  observe  those  which 
concern  the  motives  and  actions  that  are  classed  as  moral 
and  immoral. 

§  42.  The  mental  process  by  which,  in   any   case,  the 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  105 

adjustment  of  acts  to  ends  is  effected,  and  which,  under 
its  higher  forms,  becomes  the  subject-matter  of  ethical 
judgments,  is,  as  above  implied,  divisible  into  the  rise  of  a 
feeling  or  feelings  constituting  the  motive,  and  the  thought 
or  thoughts  through  which  the  motive  is  shaped  and  finally 
issues  in  action.  The  first  of  these  elements,  originally  an 
excitement,  becomes  a  simple  sensation ;  then  a  compound 
sensation;  then  a  cluster  of  partially  presentative  and 
partially  representative  sensations,  forming  an  incipient 
emotion ;  then  a  cluster  of  exclusively  ideal  or  representative 
sensations,  forming  an  emotion  proper;  then  a  cluster  of  such 
clusters,  forming  a  compound  emotion ;  and  eventually 
becomes  a  still  more  involved  emotion  composed  of  the  ideal 
forms  of  such  compound  emotions.  The  other  element, 
beginning  with  that  immediate  passage  of  a  single  stimulus 
into  a  single  motion,  called  reflex  action,  presently  comes 
to  be  a  set  of  associated  discharges  of  stimuli  producing 
associated  motions,  constituting  instinct.  Step  by  step  arise 
more  entangled  combinations  of  stimuli,  somewhat  variable  in 
their  modes  of  union,  leading  to  complex  motions  similarly 
variable  in  their  adjustments  ;  whence  occasional  hesitations 
in  the  sensori-motor  processes.  Presently  is  reached  a 
stage  at  which  the  combined  clusters  of  impressions,  not 
all  present  together,  issue  in  actions  not  all  simultaneous ; 
implying  representation  of  results,  or  thought.  After- 
wards follow  stages  in  which  various  thoughts  have  time 
to  pass  before  the  composite  motives  produce  the  appro- 
priate actions.  Until  at  last  arise  those  long  delibera- 
tions during  which  the  probabilities  of  various  consequences 
are  estimated,  and  the  promptings  of  the  correlative  feel- 
ings balanced;  constituting  calm  judgment.  That  under 
either  of  its  aspects  the  later  forms  of  this  mental  process 
are  the  higher,  ethically  considered  as  well  as  otherwise 
considered,  will  be  readily  seen. 

For  from  the  first,  complication  of  sentiency  has  accom- 
panied better  and  more  numerous  adjustments  of  acts  to 


106  THE    DATA   OP    ETHICS.      ' 

ends ;  as  also  lias  complicaiidn  of  movement,  and  compli- 
cation of  tlie  co-ordinating  or  intellectual  process  uniting 
the  two.  Whence  it  follows  that  the  acts  characterized  by 
the  more  complex  motives  and  the  more  involved  thoughts^ 
have  all  along  been  of  higher  authority  for  guidance. 
Some  examples  will  make  this  clear. 

Here  is  an  aquatic  creature  guided  by  the  odour  of 
organic  matter  towards  things  serving  for  food ;  but  a 
creature  which,,  lacking  any  other  guidance,  is  at  the  mercy 
of  larger  creatures  coming  near.  Here  is  another  which, 
also  guided  to  food  by  odour,  possesses  rudimentary  vision ; 
and  so  is  made  to  start  spasmodically  away  from  a  moving 
body  which  diffuses  this  odour,  in  those  cases  where  it  is 
large  enough  to  produce  sudden  obscuration  of  light — usually 
an  ^emy.  Evidently  life  will  frequently  be  saved  by  con- 
forming to  the  later  and  higher  stimulus,  instead  of  to  the 
^earlier  and  lower.  Observe  at  a  more  advanced  stage 

a  parallel  conflict.  This  is  a  beast  which  pursues  others  for 
prey,  and,  either  lacking  experience  or  prompted  by  raging 
hunger,  attacks  one  more  powerful  than  itself  and  gets 
destroyed.  Conversely,  that  is  a  beast  which,  prompted  by 
a  hunger  equally  keen,  but  either  by  individual  experience 
or  effects  of  inherited  experience,  made  conscious  of  evil 
by  the  aspect  of  one  more  powerful  than  itself,  is  deterred 
from  attacking,  and  saves  its  life  by  subordinating  the 
primary  motive,  consisting  of  craving  sensations,  to  the 
secondary  motive,  consisting  of  ideal  feelings,  distinct  or 
vague.  Ascending  at  once  from  these  examples  of 

conduct  in  animals  to  examples  of  human  conduct,  we 
shall  see  that  the  contrasts  between  inferior  and  superior 
have  habitually  the  same  traits.  The  savage  of  lowest  type 
devours  all  the  food  captured  by  to-day's  chase ;  and,  hungry 
on  the  morrow,  has  perhaps  for  days  to  bear  the  pangs 
of  starvation.  The  superior  savage,  conceiving  more  vividly 
the  entailed  sufferings  if  no  game  is  to  be  found,  is  deterred 
by  his  complex  feeling  from  giving  way  entirely  to  his 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  *  107 

simple  feeling.  Similarly  are  the  two  contrasted  in  the 
inertness  which  goes  along  with  lack  of  forethought,  and  the 
activity  which  due  forethought  produces.  The  primitive  man^ 
idly  inclined,  and  ruled  by  the  sensations  of  the  moment, 
will  not  exert  himself '  until  actual  pains  have  to  be 
escaped ;  but  the  man  somewhat  advanced,  able  more  dis- 
tinctly to  imagine  future  gratifications  and  sufferings,  is 
prompted  by  the  thought  of  these  to  overcome  his  love  of 
ease :  decrease  of  misery  and  mortality  resulting  from  this 
predominance  of  the  representative  feelings  over  the 
presentative  feelings.  Without  dwelling  on  the 

fact  that  among  the  civilized,  those  who  lead  the  life  of  the 
senses  are  contrasted  in  the  same  way  with  those  whose 
lives  are  largely  occupied  with  pleasures  not  of  a  sensual 
kind,  let  me  point  out  that  there  are  analogous  contrasts 
between  guidance  by  the  less  complex  representative  feel-  V 
ings,  or  lower  emotions,  and  guidance  by  the  more  complex  \ 
representative  feelings,  or  higher  emotions.  When  led  by  ' 
his  acquisitiveness — a  re-representative  feeling  which,  acting 
under  due  control,  conduces  to  welfare — the  thief  takes 
another  man's  property ;  his  act  is  determined  by  certain 
imagined  proximate  pleasures  of  relatively  simple  kinds, 
rather  than  by  less-clearly  imagined  possible  pains  that  are 
more  remote  and  of  relatively  involved  kinds.  But  in 
the  'conscientious  man,  there  is  an  adequate  restraining 
motive,  still  more  re-representative  in  its  nature,  including 
not  only  ideas  of  punishment,  and  not  only  ideas  of  lost 
reputation  and  ruin,  but  including  ideas  of  the  claims  of  the 
person  owning  the  property,  and  of  the  pains  which  loss  of 
it  will  entail  on  him :  all  joined  with  a  general  aversion  to 
acts  injurious  to  others,  which  arises  from  the  inherited 
effects  of  experience.  And  here  at  the  end  we  see,  as  we 
saw  at  the  beginning,  that  guidance  by  the  more  complex 
feeling,  on  the  average  conduces  to  welfare  more  than  does  | 
guidance  by  the  simpler  feeling. 

The  like  holds  with  the  intellectual  co-ordinations  through 


108  •  THE   DATA  OP   ETHICS. 

whicli  stimuli  issue  in  motions.  The  lowest  actions,  called 
reflex,  in  which  an  impression  made  on  an  afferent 
nerve  causes  by  discharge  through  an  efferent  nerve  a 
contraction,  shows  us  a  very  limited  adjustment  of  acts  to 
ends:  the  impression  being  simple,  and  the  resulting 
motion  simple,  the  internal  co-ordination  is  also  simple. 
Evidently  when  there  are  several  senses  which  can  be 
together  affected  by  an  outer  object ;  and  when,  according 
as  such  object  is  discriminated  as  of  one  or  other  kind, 
the  movements  made  in  response  are  combined  in  one  or 
other  way ;  the  intermediate  co-ordinations  are  necessarily 
more  involved.  And  evidently  each  further  step  in  the 
evolution  of  intelligence,  always  instrumental  to  better 
self-preservation,  exhibits  this  same  general  trait.  The 
adjustments  by  which  the  more  involved  actions  are 
made  appropriate  to  the  more  involved  circumstances, 
imply  more  intricate,  and  consequently  more  deliberate  and 
conscious,  co-ordinations ;  until,  when  we  come  to  civilized 
men,  who  in  their  daily  business  taking  into  account  many 
data  and  conditions  adjust  their  proceedings  to  various 
consequences,  we  see  that  the  intellectual  actions, 
becoming  of  the  kind  we  call  judicial,  are  at  once  very 
elaborate  and  very  deliberate. 

Observe,  then,  what  follows  respecting  the  relative 
authorities  of  motives.  Throughout  the  ascent  from  low 
creatures  up  to  man,  and  from  the  lowest  types  of  man 
up  to  the  highest,  self-preservation  has  been  increased 
by  the  subordination  of  simple  excitations  to  compound 
excitations — the  subjection  of  immediate  sensations  to  the 
ideas  of  sensations  to  come — the  over-ruling  of  presenta- 
tive  feelings  by  representative  feelings,  and  of  representa- 
tive feelings  by  re-representative  feelings.  As  life  has 
advanced,  the  accompanying  sentiency  has  become  in- 
creasingly ideal;  and  among  feelings  produced  by  the 
compounding  of  ideas,  the  highest,  and  those  which  have 
evolved  latest,  are  the  re -compounded  or  doubly  ideal.  Hence 


THE    PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  109 

it  follows  that  as  guides,  the  feelings  have  authorities 
proportionate  to  the  degrees  in  which  they  are  removed  by 
their  complexity  and  their  ideality  from  simple  sensa- 
tions and  appetites.  A  further  implication  is 
made  clear  by  studying  the  intellectual  sides  of  these 
mental  processes  by  which  acts  are  adjusted  to  ends. 
Where  they  are  low  and  simple,  these  comprehend 
the  guiding  only  of  immediate  acts  by  immediate  sti- 
muli— the  entire  transaction  in  each  case,  lasting  but  a 
moment,  refers  only  to  a  proximate  result.  But  with  the 
development  of  intelligence  and  the  growing  ideality  of 
the  motives,  the  ends  to  which  the  acts  are  adjusted  cease 
to  be  exclusively  immediate.  The  more  ideal  motives 
concern  ends  that  are  more  distant ;  and  with  approach  to\ 
the  highest  types,  present  ends  become  increasingly  sub- 
ordinate to  those  future  ends  which  the  ideal  motives  have 
for  their  objects.  Hence  there  arises  a  certain  presumption 
in  favour  of  a  motive  which  refers  to  a  remote  good,  in 
comparison  with  one  which  refers  to  a  proximate  good.    ^ 

§  43.  In  the  last  chapter  I  hinted  that  besides  the 
several  influences  there  named  as  fostering  the  ascetic 
belief  that  doing  things  which  are  agreeable  is  detrimental 
while  bearing  disagreeable  things  is  beneficial,  there 
remained  to  be  named  an  influence  of  deeper  origin.  This 
is  shadowed  forth  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs. 

For  the  general  truth  that  guidance  by  such  simple 
pleasures  and  pains  as  result  from  fulfilling  or  denying 
bodily  desires,  is,  under  one  aspect,  inferior  to  guidance  by 
those  pleasures  and  pains  which  the  complex  ideal  feelings 
yield,  has  led  to  the  belief  that  the  promptings  of  bodily 
desires  should  be  disregarded.  Further,  the  general  truth 
that  pursuit  of  proximate  satisfactions  is,  under  one  aspect, 
inferior  to  pursuit  of  ultimate  satisfactions,  has  led  to  the 
belief  that  proximate  satisfactions  must  not  be  valued. 

In  the  early  stages  of  every  science,  the  generalizations 


110  THE   DATA  OP  ETHICS. 

readied  are  not  qualified  enough.  The  discriminating  state- 
ments of  the  truths  formulated,  arise  afterwards,  by  limitation 
of  the  undiscriminating  statements.  As  with  bodily  vision, 
which  at  first  appreciates  only  the  broadest  traits  of  objects, 
and  so  leads  to  rude  classings  which  developed  vision, 
impressible  by  minor  differences,  has  to  correct;  so  with 
mental  vision  in  relation  to  general  truths,  it  happens  that 
at  first  the  inductions,  wrougly  made  all-embracing,  have 
to  wait  for  scepticism  and  critical  observation  to  restrict 
them,  by  taking  account  of  unnoticed  difierences.  Hence, 
we  may  expect  to  find  the  current  ethical  conclusions  too 
sweeping.  Let  us  note  how,  in  three  ways,  these  dominant 
beliefs,  alike  of  professed  moralists  and  of  people  at  large, 
are  made  erroneous  by  lack  of  qualifications. 

In  the  first  place,  the  authority  of  the  lower  feelings  as 
guides  is  by  no  means  always  inferior  to  the  authority  of 
the  higher  feelings,  but  is  often  superior.  Daily  occur 
occasions  on  which  sensations  must  be  obeyed  rather  than 
sentiments.  Let  any  one  think  of  sitting  all  night  naked  in 
a  snowstorm,  or  going  a  week  without  food,  or  letting  his 
head  be  held  under  water  for  ten  minutes,  and  he  will  see 
that  the  pleasures  and  pains  directly  related  to  main- 
tenance of  life,  may  not  be  wholly  subordinated  to  the 
pleasures  and  pains  indirectly  related  to  maintenance  of 
life.  Though  in  many  cases  guidance  by  the  simple  feelings 
rather  than  by  the  complex  feelings  is  injurious,  in  other 
cases  guidance  by  the  complex  feelings  rather  than  by  the 
simple  feelings  is  fatal ;  and  throughout  a  wide  range 
of  cases  their  relative  authorities  as  guides  are  inde- 
terminate. Grant  that  in  a  man  pursued,  the  protesting 
fcelings  accompanying  intense  and  prolonged  efibrt,  must, 
to  preserve  life,  be  over-ruled  by  the  fear  of  his  pursuers ; 
it  may  yet  happen  that,  persisting  till  he  drops,  the  resulting 
exhaustion  causes  death,  though,  the  pursuit  having  been 
abandoned,  death  would  not  otherwise  have  resulted.  Grant 
that  a  widow  left  in  poverty,  must  deny  her  appetite  that 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  Ill 

she  may  give  enough  food  to  her  children  to  keep  them 
alive ;  yet  the  denial  of  her  appetite  pushed  too  far^  may 
leave  them  not  only  entirely  without  food  but  without 
guardianship.  Grant  that^  working  his  brain  unceasingly 
from  dawn  till  dark,  the  man  in  pecuniary  difficulties  must 
disregard  rebellious  bodily  sensations  in  obedience  to  the 
conscientious  desire  to  liquidate  the  claims  on  him ;  yet  he 
may  carry  this  subjection  of  simple  feelings  to  complex 
feelings  to  the  extent  of  shattering  his  health,  and  failing 
in  that  end  which,  with  less  of  this  subjection,  he  might 
have  achieved.  Clearly,  then,  the  subordination  of  lower  ^ 
feelings  must  be  a  conditional  subordination.  The  supre- 
macy of  higher  feelings  must  be  a  qualified  supremacy. 

In  another  way  does  the  generalization  ordinarily  made 
err  by  excess.  With  the  truth  that  life  is  high  in  pro- 
portion as  the  simple  presentative  feelings  are  under  the 
control  of  the  compound  representative  feelings,  it  joins,  as 
though  they  were  corollaries,  certain  propositions  which 
are  not  corollaries.  The  current  conception  is,  not  that  the 
lower  must  yield  to  the  higher  when  the  two  conflict,  but 
that  the  lower  must  be  disregarded  even  when  there  is  no 
conflict.  This  tendency  which  the  growth  of  moral  ideas 
has  generated,  to  condemn  obedience  to  inferior  feelings 
when  superior  feehngs  protest,  has  begotten  a  tendency  to 
condemn  inferior  feelings  considered  intrinsically.  ^'  I  really 
think  she  does  things  because  she  likes  to  do  them,''  once  said 
to  me  one  lady  concerning  another  :  the  form  of  expression 
and  the  manner  both  implying  the  belief  not  only  that  such 
behaviour  is  wrong,  but  also  that  every  one  must  recognize 
it  as  wrong.  And  there  prevails  widely  a  notion  of  this 
kind.  In  practice,  indeed,  the  notion  is  very  generally 
inoperative.  Though  it  prompts  various  incidental  asce- 
ticisms, as  of  those  who  think  it  alike  manly  and  salutary  to 
go  without  a  great  coat  in  cold  weather,  or  to  persevere 
through  the  winter  in  taking  an  out-of-door  plunge,  yet, 
generally,  the  pleasurable  feelings  accompanying  due  fulfil- 


112  THE   DATA  OP  ETHICS. 

ment  of  bodily  needs,  are  acoepted :  acceptance  being, 
indeed,  sufficiently  peremptory.  But  oblivious  of  these 
contradictions  in  their  practice,  men  commonly  betray  a 
vague  idea  that  there  is  something  degrading,  or  injurious, 
or  both,  in  doing  that  which  is  agreeable  and  avoiding  that 
which  is  disagreeable.  ''  Pleasant  but  wrong,^'  is  a  phrase 
frequently  used  in  a  way  implying  that  the  two  are  naturally 
connected.  As  above  hinted,  however,  such  beliefs  result  from 
a  confused  apprehension  of  the  general  truth  that  the  more 
compound  and  representative  feelings  are,  on  the  average, 
of  higher  authority  than  the  simple  and  presentative  feel-  • 
ings.  Apprehended  with  discrimination,  this  truth  implies  p 
that  the  authority  of  the  simple,  ordinarily  less  than  that  of 
the  compound  but  occasionally  greater,  is  habitually  to  bo 
accepted  when  the  compound  do  not  oppose. 

In  yet  a  third  way  is  this  principle  of  subordination 
misconceived.  One  of  the  contrasts  between  the  earlier- 
evolved  feelings  and  the  later-evolved  feelings,  is  that  they 
refer  respectively  to  the  more  immediate  effects  of  actions 
and  to  the'  more  remote  effects ;  and  speaking  generally, 
guidance  by  that  which  is  near  is  inferior  to  guidance  by 
that  which  is  distant.  Hence  has  resulted  the  belief  that, 
irrespective  of  their  kinds,  the  pleasures  of  the  present 
must  be  sacrificed  to  the  pleasures  of-  the  future.  We  see 
this  in  the  maxim  often  impressed  on  children  when  eating 
their  meals,  that  they  should  reserve  the  nicest  morsel  till 
the  last :  the  check  on  improvident  yielding  to  immediate 
impulse,  being  here  joined  with  the  tacit  teaching  that 
the  same  gratification  becomes  more  valuable  as  it  becomes 
more  distant.  Such  thinking  is  traceable  throughout 
daily  conduct ;  by  no  means  indeed  in  all,  but  in  those  who 
are  distinguished  as  prudent  and  well  regulated  in  their 
conduct.  Hurrying  over  his  breakfast  that  he  may  catch 
the  train,  snatching  a  sandwich  in  the  middle  of  the  day, 
and  eating  a  late  dinner  when  he  is  so  worn  out  that  he  is 
incapacitated  for  evening  recreation,  ^the  man  of  business 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  113 

pursues  a  life  in  wMcli  not  only  tlie  satisfactions  of  bodily 
desires,  but  also  those  of  higher  tastes  and  feelings,  are,  as 
far  as  may  be,  disregarded,  that  distant  ends  may  be  achieved ; 
and  yet  if  you  ask  what  are  these  distant  ends,  you  find  (in 
cases  where  there  are  no  parental  responsibilities)  that 
they  are  included  under  the  conception  of  more  comfortable 
living  in  time  to  come.  So  ingrained  is  this  belief  that  it 
is  wrong  to  seek  immediate  enjoyments  and  right  to  seek 
remote  ones  only,  that  you  may  hear  from  a  busy  man  who 
has  been  on  a  pleasure  excursion,  a  kind  of  apology  for  his 
conduct.  He  deprecates  the  unfavourable  judgments  of  his 
friends  by  explaining  that  the  state  of  his  health  had  com- 
pelled him  to  take  a  holiday.  Nevertheless,  if  you  sound 
him  with  respect  to  his  future,  you  find  that  his  ambition  is 
by-and-by  to  retire  and  devote  himself  wholly  to  the  relaxa- 
tions which  he  is  now  somewhat  ashamed  of  taking. 

The  general  truth  disclosed  by  the  study  of  evolving 
conduct,  sub-human  and  human,  that  for  the  better  preser- 
vation of  life  the  primitive,  simple,  presentative  feehngs  must 
be  controlled  by  the  later- evolved,  compound,  and  repre- 
sentative feelings,  has  thus  come,  in  the  course  of  civilization, 
to  be  recognized  by  men;  but  necessarily  at  first  in  too 
indiscriminate  a  way.  The  current  conception,  while  it 
errs  by  implying  that  the  authority  of  the  higher  over  the 
lower  is  unlimited,  errs  also  by  implying  that  the  rule  of  the 
lower  must  be  resisted  even  when  it  does  not  conflict  with 
the  rule  of  the  higher,  and  further  errs  by  implying  that  a 
gratification  which  forms  a  proper  aim  if  it  is  remote,  forms 
an  improper  aim  if  it  is  proximate. 

§  44.  Without  explicitly  saying  so,  we  have  been  here 
tracing  the  genesis  of  the  moral  consciousness.  For  un- 
questionably the  essential  trait  in  the  moral  consciousness, 
is  the  control  of  some  feeHng  or  feelings  by  some  other 
feeling  or  feelings. 

Among  the  higher  animals  we  may  see,  distinctly  enough, 


114  THE  DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

the  conflict  of  feelings  and  the  subjection  of  simpler  to 
more  compound  j  as  when  a  dog  is  restrained  from 
snatching  food  by  fear  of  the  penalties  which  may  come  if 
he  yields  to  his  appetite;  or  as  when  he  desists  from  scratch- 
ing at  a  hole  lest  he  should  lose  his  master,  who  has  walked 
on.  Here,  however,  though  there  is  subordination,  there 
is  not  conscious  subordination — there  is  no  introspection 
revealing  the  fact  that  one  feeling  has  yielded  to  another.  So 
is  it  even  with  human  beings  when  little  developed  mentally. 
The  pre-social  man,  wandering  about  in  families  and  ruled 
by  such  sensations  and  emotions  as  are  caused  by  the 
circumstances  of  the  moment,  though  occasionally  subject  to 
conflicts  of  motives,  meets  with  comparatively  few  cases  in 
which  the  advantage  of  postponing  the  immediate  to  the 
remote  is  forced  on  his  attention;  nor  has  he  the  intelligence 
requisite  for  analyzing  and  generalizing  such  of  these  cases 
as  occur.  Only  as  social  evolution  renders  the  life  more 
complex,  the  restraints  many  and  strong,  the  evils  of 
impulsive  conduct  marked,  and  the  comforts  to  be  gained  by 
providing  for  the  future  tolerably  certain,  can  there  come 
experiences  numerous  enough  to  make  familiar  the  benefit 
of  subordinating  the  simpler  feelings  to  the  more  complex 
ones.  Ouly  then,  too^  does  there  arise  a  sufficient  intel- 
lectual power  to  make  an  induction  from  these  experiences, 
followed  by  a  sufficient  massing  of  individual  inductions 
into  a  public  and  traditional  induction  impressed  on  each 
generation  as  it  grows  up. 

And  here  We  are  introduced  to  certain  facts  of  profound 
significance.  This  conscious  relinquishment  of  immediate 
and  special  good  to  gain  distant  and  general  good, 
while  it  is  a  cardinal  trait  of  the  self-restraint  called  moral, 
is  also  a  cardinal  trait  of  self-restraints  other  than  those 
called  moral — the  restraints  that  originate  from  fear  of  the 
visible  ruler,  of  the  invisible  ruler,  and  of  society  at  large. 
Whenever  the  individual  refrains  from  doing  that  which  the 
passing   desire  prompts,   lest  he   should  afterwards  suffer 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  115 

legal  punishment,  or  divine  vengeance,  or  public  repro- 
bation, or  all  of  them,  he  surrenders  the  near  and 
definite  pleasure  rather  than  risk  the  remote  and  greater, 
though  less  definite,  pains,  which  taking  it  may  bring  on 
him;  and,  conversely,  when  he  undergoes  some  present  pain, 
that  he  may  reap  some  probable  future  pleasure,  political, 
religious,  or  social.  But  though  all  these  four  kinds  of 
internal  control  have  the  common  character  that  the  simpler 
and  less  ideal  feelings  are  consciously  over-ruled  by  the 
more  complex  and  ideal  feelings ;  and  though,  at  first,  they 
are  practically  co-extensive  and  undistinguished ;  yet,  in  the 
course  of  social  evolution  they  diS'erentiate  ;  and,  eventually, 
the  moral  control  with  its  accompanying  conceptions  and 
sentiments,  emerges  as  independent.  Let  us  glance  at  the 
leading  aspects  of  the  process. 

While,  as  in  the  rudest  groups,  neither  political  nor 
religious  rule  exists,  the  leading  check  to  the  immediate 
satisfaction  of  each  desire  as  it  arises,  is  consciousness  of 
the  evils  which  the  anger  of  fellow  savages  may  entail,  if 
satisfaction  of  the  desire  is  obtained  at  their  cost.  In  this 
early  stage  the  imagined  pains  which  constitute  the 
governing  motive,  are  those  apt  to  be  inflicted  by  beings 
of  like  nature,  undistinguished  in  power :  the  political, 
religious,  and  social  restraints,  are  as  yet  represented  only 
by  this  mutual  dread  of  vengeance.  When  special 

strength,  skill,  or  courage,  makes  one  of  them  a  leader  in 
battle,  he  necessarily  inspires  greater  fear  than  any  other ; 
and  there  comes  to  be  a  more  decided  check  on  such 
satisfactions  of  the  desires  as  will  injure  or  oSend  him. 
Gradually  as,  by  habitual  war,  chieftainship  is  established, 
the  evils  thought  of  as  likely  to  arise  from  angering  the 
chief,  not  only  by  aggression  upon  him  but  by  disobedi- 
ence to  him,  become  distinguishable  both  from  the  smaller 
evils  which  other  personal  antagonisms  cause,  and  from 
the  more  difi'used  evils  thought  of  as  arising  from  social 
reprobation.      That    is,     political  control    begins  to   dif- 


116  IHE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

ferentiate  from  the  more  indefinite  control  of  mutual 
dread.  Meanwhile  there  has  been   developing  the 

ghost-theory.  In  all  but  the  rudest  groups,  the  double 
of  a  deceased  man,  propitiated  at  death  and  afterwards,  is 
conceived  as  able  to  injure  the  survivors.  Consequently, 
as  fast  as  the  ghost-theory  becomes  established  and 
definite,  there  grows  up  another  kind  of  check  on  immediate 
satisfaction  of  the  desires — a  check  constituted  by  ideas 
of  the  evils  which  ghosts  may  inflict  if  offended;  and 
when  political  headship  gets  settled,  and  the  ghosts  of 
dead  chiefs,  thought  of  as  more  powerful  and  more  relentless 
than  other  ghosts,  are  especially  dreaded,  there  begins  to 
take  shape  the  form  of  restraint  distinguished  as  reli- 
gious. For  a  long  time  these  three  sets  of 
restraints,  with  their  correlative  sanctions,  though  becoming 
separate  in  consciousness,  remain  co-extensive;  and  do  so 
because  they  mostly  refer  to  one  end — success  in  war. 
The  duty  of  blood-revenge  is  insisted  on  even  while  yet 
nothing  to  be  called  social  organization  exists.  As  the  chief 
gains  predominance,  the  killing  of  enemies  becomes  a  poli- 
tical duty ;  and  as  the  anger  of  the  dead  chief  comes  to  be 
dreaded,  the  killing  of  enemies  becomes  a  religious  duty. 
Loyalty  to  the  ruler  while  he  lives  and  after  he  dies, 
is  increasingly  shown  by  holding  life  at  his  disposal  for 
purposes  of  war.  The  earliest  enacted  punishments  are  those 
for  insubordination  and  for  breaches  of  observances  which  ex- 
press subordination — all  of  them  militant  in  origin.  While 
the  divine  injunctions,  originally  traditions  of  the  dead  king's 
will,  mainly  refer  to  the  destruction  of  peoples  with  whom  he 
was  at  enmity ;  and  divine  anger  or  approval  are  conceived 
as  determined  by  the  degrees  in  which  subjection  to  him 
is  shown,  directly  by  worship  and  indirectly  by  fulfilling  these 
injunctions.  The  Fijian^  who  is  said  on  entering  the  other 
world  to  commend  himself  by  narrating  his  successes  in 
battle,  and  who,  when  alive,  is  described  as  sometimes  greatly 
distressed  if  he  thinks  he  has  not  killed  enemies  enough  to 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL    VIEW.  117 

please  his  gods,  shows  us  the  resulting  ideas  and  feelings ; 
and  reminds  us  of  kindred  ideas  and  feelings  betrayed  by 
ancient  races.  To  all  which  add  that  the  control 

of  social  opinion,  besides  being  directly  exercised,  as  in 
the  earliest  stage,  by  praise  of  the  brave  and  blame  of 
the  cowardly,  comes  to  be  indirectly  exercised  with  a 
kindred  general  eifect  by  applause  of  loyalty  to  the  ruler 
and  piety  to  the  god.  So  that  the  three  differentiated 
forms  of  control  which  grow  up  along  with  militant  organi- 
zation and  action,  while  enforcing  kindred  restraints  and 
incentives,  also  enforce  one  another ;  and  their  separate  and 
joint  disciplines  have  the  common  character  that  they  in- 
volve the  sacrifice  of  immediate  special  benefits  to  obtain 
more  distant  and  general  benefits. 

At  the  same  time  there  have  been  developing  under  the 
same  three  sanctions,  restraints  and  incentives  of  another 
order,  similarly  characterized  by  subordination  of  the  proxi- 
mate to  the  remote.  Joint  aggressions  upon  men  outside 
the  society,  cannot  prosper  if  there  are  many  aggressions  of 
man  on  man  within  the  society.  War  implies  co-operation ; 
and  co-operation  is  prevented  by  antagonisms  among  those 
who  are  to  co-operate.  We  saw  that  in  the  primitive  un- 
govOrned  group,  the  main  check  on  immediate  satisfaction  of 
his  desires  by  each  man,  is  the  fear  of  other  men's  vengeance 
if  they  are  injured  by  taking  the  satisfaction ;  and  through 
early  stages  of  social  development,  this  dread  of  retaliation 
continues  to  be  the  chief  motive  to  such  forbear^ince  as 
exists.  But  though  long  after  pohtical  authority  has  become 
established  the  taking  of  personal  satisfaction  for  injuries 
persists,  the  growth  of  political  authority  gradually  checks 
it.  The  fact  that  success  in  war  is  endangered  if  his  followers 
fight  among  themselves,  forces  itself  on  the  attention  of 
the  ruler.  He  has  a  strong  motive  for  restraining  quarrels, 
and  therefore  for  preventing  the  aggressions .  which  cause 
quarrels ;  and  as  his  power  becomes  greater  he  forbids  the 
aggressions    and    inflicts    punishments    for    disobedience. 


118  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

Presently,  political  restraints  of  this  class,  like  those  of  the 
preceding  class,  are  enforced  by  religious  restraints.  The 
sagacious  chief,  succeeding  in  war  partly  because  he  thus 
enforces  order  among  his  followers,  leaves  behind  him  a 
tradition  of  the  commands  he  habitually  gave.  Dread  of  his 
ghost  tends  to  produce  regard  for  these  commands ;  and 
they  eventually  acquire  sacredness.  With  further  social 
evolution  come,  in  like  manner,  further  interdicts,  checking 
aggressions  of  less  serious  kinds  :  until  eventually  there  grows 
up  a  body  of  civil  laws.  And  then  in  the  way  shown,  arise 
beliefs  concerning  the  divine  disapproval  of  these  minor,  as 
well  as  of  the  major,  civil  offences :  ending,  occasionally,  in 
a  set  of  religious  injunctions  harmonizing  with,  and  en^ 
forcing,  the  political  injunctions.  While  simultaneously 
there  develops,  as  before,  a  social  sanction  for  these  rules  of 
internal  conduct,  strengthening  the  political  and  religious 
sanctions. 

But  now  observe  that  while  these  three  controls,  political, 
religious,  and  social,  severally  lead  men  to  subordinate 
proximate  satisfactions  to  remote  satisfactions ;  and  while 
they  are  in  this  respect  like  the  moral  control,  which  habi- 
tually requires  the  subjection  of  simple  presentative  feelings 
to  complex  representative  feelings  and  postponement  of 
present  to  future;  yet  they  do  not  constitute  the  moral 
control,  but  are  only  preparatory  to  it — are  controls  within 
which  the  moral  control  evolves.  The  command  of  the 
political  ruler  is  at  first  obeyed,  not  because  of  its  perceived 
rectitude;  but  simply  because  it  is  his  command,  which 
there  will  be  a  penalty  for  disobeying.  The  check  is 
not  a  mental  representation  of  the  evil  consequences  which 
the  forbidden  act  will,  in  the  nature  of  things,  cause ;  but 
it  is  a  mental  representation  of  the  factitious  evil  conse- 
quences. Down  to  our  own  time  we  trace  in  legal  phrases, 
the  original  doctrine  that  the  aggression  of  one  citizen 
on  another  is  wrong,  and  will  be  punished,  not  so  much 
because  of  the  injury  done  him,  as  because  of  the  implied 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  119 

disregard  of  tlie  king's  will.  Similarly,  the  sinfulness  of 
breaking  a  divine  injunction  was  universally  at  one  time, 
and  is  still  by  many,  held  to  consist  in  the  disobedience  to 
God,  rather  than  in  the  deliberate  entailing  of  injury ;  and 
even  now  it  is  a  common  belief  that  acts  are  right  only 
if  performed  in  conscious  fulfilment  of  the  divine  will :  nay, 
are  even  wrong  if  otherwise  performed.  The  like  holds,  too, 
with  that  further  control  exercised  by  public  opinion. 
On  listening  to  the  remarks  made  respecting  conformity  to 
social  rules,  it  is  noticeable  that  breach  of  them  is  condemned 
not  so  much  because  of  any  essential  impropriety  as  because 
the  world's  authority  is  ignored.  How  imperfectly  the 
truly  moral  control  is  even  now  differentiated  from  these 
controls  within  which  it  has  been  evolving,  we  see  in  the  fact 
that  the  systems  of  morality  criticized  at  the  outset,  severally 
identify  moral  control  with  one  or  other  of  them.  For 
moralists  of  one  class  derive  moral  rules  from  the  com- 
mands of  a  supreme  political  power.  Those  of  another 
class  recognize  no  other  origin  for  them  than  the  revealed 
divine  will.  And  though  men  who  take  social  prescription  for 
their  guide  do  not  formulate  their  doctrine,  yet  the  belief, 
frequently  betrayed,  that  conduct  which  society  permits  is 
not  blameworthy,  implies  that  there  are  those  who  think 
right  and  wrong  can  be  made  such  by  public  opinion. 

Before  taking  a  further  step  we  must  put  together  the 
results  of  this  analysis.  The  essential  truths  to  be  carried 
with  us  respecting  these  three  forms  of  external  control  to 
which  the  social  unit  is  subject,  are  these  : — First,  that  they 
have  evolved  with  the  evolution  of  society,  as  means  to 
social  self-preservation,  necessary  under  the  conditions ;  and 
that,  by  implication,  they  are  in  the  main  congruous  with 
one  another.  Second,  that  the  correlative  internal  restraints 
generated  in  the  social  unit,  are  representations  of  remote 
results  which  are  incidental  rather  than  necessary — a  legal 
penalty,  a  supernatural  punishment,  a  social  reprobation. 
Third,  that  these  results,  simpler  and  more  directly  wrought 


120  THE    DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

by  personal  agencies^  can  be  more  vividly  conceived  than 
can  the  results  which,  in  the  course  of  things,  actions 
naturally  entail ;  and  the  conceptions  of  them  are  therefore 
more  potent  over  undeveloped  minds.  Fourth,  that  as  with 
the  restraints  thus  generated  is  always  joined  the  thought 
of  external  coercion,  there  arises  the  notion  of  obligation ; 
which  so  becomes  habitually  associated  with  the  surrender  of 
immediate  special  benefits  for  the  sake  of  distant  and  general 
benefits.  Fifth,  that  the  moral  control  corresponds  in  large 
measure  with  the  three  controls  thus  originating,  in  respect 
of  its  injunctions;  and  corresponds,  too,  in  the  general 
nature  of  the  mental  processes  producing  conformity  to 
those  injunctions ;  but  differs  in  their  special  nature. 

§  45.  For  now  we  are  prepared  to  see  that  the  restraints 
properly  distinguished  as  moral,  are  unlike  these  restraints 
out  of  which  they  evolve,  and  with  which  they  are  long 
confounded,  in  this — they  refer  not  to  the  extrinsic  efiects 
of  actions  but  to  their  intrinsic  eSects.  The  truly  moral 
deterrent  from  murder,  is  not  constituted  by  a  representation 
of  hanging  as  a  consequence,  or  by  a  representation  of 
tortures  in  hell  as  a  consequence,  or  by  a  representation  of 
the  horror  and  hatred  excited  in  fellow  men;  but  by  a 
representation  of  the  necessary  natural  results — the  inflic- 
tion of  death-agony  on  the  victim,  the  destruction  of  all  his 
possibilities  of  happiness,  the  entailed  sufferings  to  his 
belongings.  Neither  the  thought  of  imprisonment,  nor  of 
divine  anger,  nor  of  social  disgrace,  is  that  which  constitutes 
the  moral  check  on  theft;  but  the  thought  of  injury  to  the 
person  robbed,  joined  with  a  vague  consciousness  of  the 
general  evils  caused  by  disregard  of  proprietary  rights. 
Those  who  reprobate  the  adulterer  on  moral  grounds,  have 
their  minds  filled,  not  with  ideas  of  an  action  for  damages, 
or  of  future  punishment  following  the  breach  of  a  com- 
mandment, or  of  loss  of  reputation ;  but  they  ar§  occupied 
with  ideas  of  unhappiness  entailed  on  the  aggrieved  wife  or 


THE   PSYCH0L0GICAL^11W>  ^  121 

husband,  the  damaged  lives  of  diildren^'aSfc^fesflafftlsed 
mischiefs  which  go  along  with  disregard  of  the  marriage  tie. 
Conversely,  the  man  who  is  moved  bj  a  moral  feeling  to  help 
another  in  difficulty,  does  not  picture  to  himself  any  reward 
here  or  hereafter;  but  pictures  only  the  better  condition 
he  is  trying  to  bring  about.  One  who  is  morally  prompted 
to  fight  against  a  social  evil,  has  neither  material  benefit 
nor  popular  applause  before  his  mind;  but  only  the  mis- 
chiefs he  seeks  to  remove  and  the  increased  well-being 
which,  will  follow  their  removal.  Throughout,  then,  the 
moral  motive  differs  from  the  motives  it  is  associated  witb 
in  this,  that  instead  of  being  constituted  by  representations 
of  incidental,  collateral,  non-necessary  consequences  of 
acts,  it  is  constituted  by  representations  of  consequences 
which  the  acts  naturally  produce.  These  representations 
are  not  all  distinct,  though  some  of  such  are  usually  present ; 
but  tbey  form  an  assemblage  of  indistinct  representations 
accumulated  by  experience  of  tlie  results  of  like  acts  in  the 
life  of  the  individual,  super-posed  on  a  still  more  indistinct 
but  voluminous  consciousness  due  to  the  inherited  effects 
of  such  experiences  in  progenitors  :  formiug  a  feeling  that 
is  at  once  massive  and  vague. 

And  now  we  see  why  the  moral  feelings  and  corre- 
lative restraints  have  arisen  later  than  the  feelings  and 
restraints  that  originate  from  political,  religious,  and  social 
authorities;  and  have  so  slowly,  and  even  yet  so  incom- 
pletely, disentangled  themselves.  For  only  by  these  lower 
feelings  and  restraints  could  be  maintained  the  conditions 
under  which  the  higher  feelings  and  restraints  evolve.  It  is 
thus  alike  with  the  self-regarding  feelings  and  with  the 
other-regarding  feelings.  The  pains  which  improvidence 
will  bring,  and  the  pleasures  to  be  gained  by  storing  up 
things  for  future  use  and  by  labouring  to  get  such  things, 
can  be  habitually  contrasted  in  thought,  only  as  fast  as 
settled  social  arrangements  make  accumulation  possible; 
and  that  there  may  arise  such  settled  arrangements,  fear  of 


122  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

tte  seen  ruler,  of  the  unseen  ruler,  and  of  public  opinion, 
must  come  into  play.  Only  after  political,  religious,  and 
social  restraints  have  produced  a  stable  community,  can 
there  be  sufficient  experience  of  the  pains,  positive  and 
negative,  sensational  and  emotional,  which  crimes  of  aggres- 
sion cause,  as  to  generate  that  moral  a,version  to  them 
constituted  by  consciousness  of  their  intrinsically  evil 
results.  And  more  manifest  still  is  it  that  such  a  moral 
sentiment  as  that  of  abstract  equity,  which  is  offended  not 
only  by  material  injuries  done  to  men  but  also  by  political 
arrangements  that  place  them  at  a  disadvantage,  can  evolve 
only  after  the  social  stage  reached  gives  familiar  experience 
both  of  the  pains  flowing  directly  from  injustices  and  also 
of  those  flowing  indirectly  from  the  class-privileges  which 
make  injustices  easy.. 

That  the  feelings  called  moral  have  the  nature  and  origin 
alleged,  is  further  shown  by  the  fact  that  we  associate  the 
name  with  them  in  proportion  to  the  degree  in  which  they 
have  these  characters — firstly  of  being  re-representative; 
secondly  of  being  concerned  with  indirect  rather  than  with 
direct  effects,  and  generally  with  remote  rather  than  imme- 
diate; and  thirdly  of  referring  to  effects  that  are  mostly 
general  rather  than  special.  Thus,  though  we  condemn  one  man 
for  extravagance  and  approve  the  economy  shown  by  another 
man,  we  do  not  class  their  acts  as  respectively  vicious  and 
virtuous  :  these  words  are  too  strong  :  the  present  and  future 
results  here  differ  too  little  in  concreteness  and  ideality  to 
make  the  words  fully  applicable.  Suppose,  however,  that 
the  extravagance  necessarily  brings  distress  on  wife  and 
children — brings  pains  diffused  over  the  lives  of  others 
as  well  as  of  self,  and  the  viciousness  of  the  extravagance 
becomes  clear.  Suppose,  further,  that  prompted  by  the  wish 
to  relieve  his  family  from  the  misery  he  has  brought  on 
them,  the  spendthrift  forges  a  bill  or  commits  some  other 
fraud.  Though,  estimated  apart,  we  characterize  his  over- 
ruling emotion  as  moral^  and  make  allowance  for  him  in 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  123 

consideration  of  it^  yet  his  action  taken  as  a  whole  we 
condemn  as  immoral :  we  regard  as  of  superior  authority, 
the  feelings  which  respond  to  men^s  proprietary  claims — 
feelings  which  are  re-representative  in  a  higher  degree 
and  refer  to  more  remote  diffused  consequences.  The 
difference,  habitually  recognized,  between  the  relative 
elevations  of  justice  and  generosity,  well  illustrates 
this  truth.  The  motive  causing  a  generous  act  has 
reference  to  effects  of  a  more  concrete^  special,  and  proxi- 
mate kind,  than  has  the  motive  to  do  justice ;  which, 
beyond  the  proximate  effects,  usually  themselves  less 
concrete  than  those  that  generosity  contemplates,  includes  a 
consciousness  of  the  distant,  involved,  diffused  effects  of 
maintaining  equitable  relations.  And  justice  we  hold  to  be 
higher  generosity. 

Comprehension  of  this  long  argument  will  be  aided  by 
here  quoting  a  further  passage  from  the  before-named  letter 
to  Mr.  Mill,  following  the  passage  already  quoted  from  it. 

"  To  make  any  position  fully  understood,  it  seems  needful  to  add  that, 
corresponding  to  the  fundamental  propositions  of  a  developed  Moral  Science, 
there  have  been,  and  still  are,  developing  in  the  race,  certain  fundamental 
moral  intuitions ;  and  that,  thoiigh  these  moral  intuitions  are  the  results  of 
accumulated  experiences  of  Utility,  gradually  organized  and  inherited,  they 
have  come  to  be  quite  independent  of  conscious  experience.  Just  in  the  same 
way  that  I  believe  the  intuitiou  of  space,  possessed  by  any  living  individual, 
to  have  arisen  from  organized  and  consolidated  experiences  of  all  antecedent 
individuals  who  bequeathed  to  him  their  slowly-developed  nervous  organizations 
— just  as  I  believe  that  this  intuition,  requiring  only  to  be  made  definite  and 
complete  by  personal  experiences,  has  practically  become  a  form  of  thought, 
apparently  quite  independent  of  experience  ;  so  do  I  believe  that  the  ex- 
periences of  utility  organized  and  consolidated  through  all  past  generations  of 
the  human  race,  have  been  producing  corresponding  nervous  modifications, 
which,  by  continued  transmission  and  accumulation,  have  become  in  us  certain 
faculties  of  moral  intuition — certain  emotions  responding  to  right  and  wrong 
conduct,  which  have  no  apparent  basis  in  the  individual  experiences  of  utility. 
I  also  hold  that  just  as  the  space-intuition  responds  to  the  exact  demonstrations 
of  Geometry,  and  has  its  rough  conclusions  interpreted  and  verified  by  them  ; 
so  will  moral  intuitions  respond  to  the  demonstrations  of  Moral  Science,  and 
will  have  their  rough  conclusions  interpreted  and  verified  by  them." 

To  this,  in  passing,  I  will  add  only  that  -the  evolution- 


124  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

hypothesis  thus  enables  us  to  reconcile  opposed  moral 
theories,  as  it  enables  us  to  reconcile  opposed  theories^, 
of  knowledge.  For  as  the  doctrine  of  innate  forms 
of  intellectual  intuition  falls  into  harmony  with  the  ex- 
periential doctrine,  when  we  recognize  the  production  of 
intellectual  •  faculties  by  inheritance  of  effects  wrought  by 
experience ;  so  the  doctrine  of  innate  powers  of  moral  per- 
ception becomes  congruous  with  the  utilitarian  doctrine, 
when  it  is  seen  that  preferences  and  aversions  are  rendered 
organic  by  inheritance  of  the  effects  of  pleasurable  and 
painful  experiences  in  progenitors. 

§  46.  One  further  question  has  to  be  answered — How  does 
there  arise  the  feeling  of  moral  obligation  in  general  ?  Whence 
comes  the  sentiment  of  duty,  considered  as  distinct  from 
the  several  sentiments  which  prompt  temperance,  providence, 
kindness,  justice,  truthfulness,  &c.  ?  The  answer  is  that  it 
is  an  abstract  sentiment  generated  in  a  manner  analogous  to 
that  in  which  abstract  ideas  are  generated. 

The  idea  of  each  colour  had  originally  entire  concreteness 
given  to  it  by  an  object  possessing. the  colour;  as  some  of 
the  unmodified  names,  such  as  orange  and  violet,  show  us. 
The  dissociation  of  each  colour  from  the  object  specially 
associated  with  it  in  thought  at  the  outset,  went  on  as  fast 
as  the  colour  came  to  be  associated  in  thought  with  objects 
unlike  the  first,  and  unlike  one  another.  The  idea  of  orange 
was  conceived  in  the  abstract  more  fully  in  proportion  as  the 
various  orange-coloured  objects  remembered,  cancelled  one 
another's  diverse  attributes,  and  left  outstanding  their  com- 
mon attribute.  So  is  it  if  we  ascend  a  stage  and 
note  how  there  arises  the  abstract  idea  of  colour  apart  from 
particular  colours.  Were  all  things  red  the  conception  of 
colour  in  the  abstract  could  not  exist.  Imagine  that  every 
object  was  either  red  or  green,  and  it  is  manifest  that  the 
mental  habit  would  be  to  think  of  one  or  other  of  these  two 
colours  in  connexion  with  anything  named.     But  multiply 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL  VIEW.  125 

the  colours  so  tliat  thought  rambles  undecidedly  among  the 
ideas  of  them  that  occur  along  with  any  object  named,  and 
there  results  the  notion  of  indeterminate  colour — the 
common  property  which  objects  possess  of  affecting  us  by 
light  from  their  surfaces,  as  well  as  by  their  forms.  For 
evidently  the  notion  of  this  common  property  is  that  which 
remains  constant  while  imagination  is  picturing  every  pos- 
sible variety  of  colour.  It  is  the  uniform  trait  in  all  coloured 
things  ;  that  is — colour  in  the  abstract.  Words 

referring  to  quantity  furnish  cases  of  more  marked  dis- 
sociation of  abstract  from  concrete.  Grouping  various 
things'  as  small  in  comparison  either  with  those  of  their 
kind  or  with  those  of  other  kinds ;  and  similarly  grouping 
some  objects  as  comparatively  great ;  we  get  the  opposite 
abstract  notions  of  smallness  and  greatness.  Applied  as 
these  are  to  innumerable  very  diverse  things— not  objects 
only,  but  forces,  times,  numbers,  values, — they  have  become 
so  little  connected  with  concretes,  that  their  abstract 
meanings  are  very  vague.  *       Further,  we  must 

note  that  an  abstract  idea  thus  formed  often  acquires  an  \ 
illusive  independence ;  as  we  may  perceive  in  the  case  of    \ 
motion,  which,  dissociated   in  thought  from   all   particular 
bodies  and  velocities  and  directions,  is  sometimes  referred 
to  as  though  it  could  be  conceived  apart  from  something 
moving.  Now  all  this   holds  of  the  subjective  as 

well  as  of  the  objective ;  and  among  other  states  of  con- 
sciousness, holds  of  the  emotions  as  known  by  introspection. 
By  the  grouping  of  those  re-representative  feelings  above 
described,  which,  differing  among  themselves  in  other 
respects  have  a  component  in  common ;  and  by  the  con- 
sequent mutual  cancelling  of  their  diverse  components  ;  this 
common  component  is  made  relatively  appreciable,  and 
becomes  an  abstract  feeling.  Thus  is  produced  the  senti- 
ment of  moral  obligation  or  duty.  Let  us  observe  its  genesis. 
We  have  seen  that  during  the  progress  of  animate 
existence,  the  later-evolved,  more  compound  and  more  re- 


126  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

presentative  feelings,  serving  to  adjust  the  conduct  to  more 
distant  and  general  needs,  have  all  alojig  had  an  authority 
as  guides  superior  to  that  of  the  earlier  and  simpler  feelings 
— excluding  cases  in  which  these  last  are  intense.  This 
superior  authority,  unrecognizable  by  lower  types  of 
creatures  which  cannot  generalize,  and  little  recognizable  by 
primitive  men,  who  have,  but  feeble  powers  of  generalization, 
has  become  distinctly  recognized  as  civilization  and  accom- 
panying mental  development  have  gone  on.  Accumulated 
experiences  have  produced  the  consciousness  that  guidance 
by  feelings  which  refer  to  remote  and  general  results,  is 
usually  more  conducive  to  welfare  than  guidance  by  feelings 
to  be  immediately  gratified.  For  what  is  the  common 
character  of  the  feelings  that  prompt  honesty,  truthfulness, 
diligence,  providence,  &c.,  which  men  habitually  find  to 
be  better  prompters  than  the  appetites  and  simple  im- 
pulses ?  They  are  all  complex,  re -representative  feelings, 
occupied  with  the  future  rather  fchan  the  present.  The  idea 
of  authoritativeness  has  therefore  come  to  be  connected  with 
feelings  having  these  traits  :  the  implication  being  that  the 
lower  and  simpler  feelings  are  without  authority.  And  this 
idea  of  authoritativeness  is  one  element  in  the  abstract  con- 
sciousness of  duty. 

But  there  is  another  element — the  element  of  coercive- 
ness.  This  originates  from  experience  of  those  several 
forms  of  restraint  that  have,  as  above  described,  estabhshed 
themselves  in  the  course  of  civilization — the  political,  re- 
ligious, and  social.  To  the  efi'ects  of  punishments  inflicted 
by  law  and  public  opinion  on  conduct  of  certain  kinds. 
Dr.  Bain  ascribes  the  feeling  of  moral  obligation.  And  I 
agree  with  him  to  the  extent  of  thinking  that  by  them  is 
generated  the  sense  of  compulsion  which  the  consciousness 
of  duty  includes,  and  which  the  word  obligation  indicates. 
The  existence  of  an  earlier  and  deeper  element,  gene- 
rated as  above  described,  is  however,  I  think,  implied 
by   the  fact    that    certain    of    the    higher    self -regarding 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL   VIEW.  127 

feelings,  instigating  prudence  and  economy,  liave  a  moral 
authority  in  opposition  to  the  simpler  self-regarding  feelings : 
showing  that  apart  from  any  thought  of  factitious  penalties 
on  improvidence,  the  feeling  constituted  by  representation 
of  the  natural  penalties  has  acquired  an  acknowledged 
superiority.  But  accepting  in  the  main  the  view  that  fears 
of  the  political  and  social  penalties  (to  which,  I  think,  the 
religious  must  be  added)  have  generated  that  sense  of 
coerciveness  which  goes  along  with  the  thought  of  post- 
poning present  to  future  and  personal  desires  to  the  claims 
of  others,  it  here  chiefly  concerns  us  to  note  that  this  sense 
of  coerciveness  becomes  indirectly  connected  with  the 
feelings  distinguished  as  moral.  For  since  the  political, 
religious,  and  social  restraining  motives,  are  mainly  formed  of 
represented  future  results ;  and  since  the  moral  restraining 
motive  is  mainly  formed  of  represented  future  results  ;  it 
happens  that  the  representations,  having  much  in  common, 
and  being  often  aroused  at  the  same  time,  the  fear  joined 
with  three  sets  of  them  becomes,  by  association,  joined  with 
the  fourth.  Thinking  of  the  extrinsic  effects  of  a  forbidden 
act,  excites  a  dread  which  continues  present  while  the  in- 
trinsic effects  of  the  act  are  thought  of;  and  being  thus 
linked  with  these  intrinsic  effects  causes  a  vague  sense  of 
moral  compulsion.  Emerging  as  the  moral  motive  does  but 
slowly  from  amidst  the  political,  religious,  and  social 
motives,  it  long  participates  in  that  consciousness  of  sub- 
ordination to  some  external  agency  which  is  joined  with 
them;  and  only  as  it  becomes  distinct  and  predominant 
does  it  lose  this  associated  consciousness — only  then  does 
the  feeling  of  obligation  fade. 

This  remark  implies  the  tacit  conclusion,  which  will  be  to 
most  very  startling,  that  the  sense  of  duty  or  moral  obli- 
gation is  transitory,  and  will  diminish  as  fast  as  moralization 
increases.  Startling  though  it  is,  this  conclusion  may  be 
satisfactorily  defended.  Even  now  progress  towards  the 
implied  ultimate  state  is  traceable.      The  observation  is  not 


128  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

infrequent  that  persistence  in  performing  a  duty  ends  in 
making  it  a  pleasure ;  and  tMs  amounts  to  the  admission 
that  while  at  first  the  motive  contains  an  element  of  coercion, 
at  last  this  element  of  coercion  dies  out,  and  the  act  is 
performed  without  any  consciousness  of  being  obliged  to 
perform  it.  The  contrast  between  the  youth  on  whom  dili- 
gence is  enjoined,  and  the  man  of  business  so  absorbed  in 
afiairs  that  he  cannot  be  induced  to  relax,  shows  us  how  the 
doing  of  work,  originally  under  the  consciousness  that  it 
ought  to  be  done,  may  eventually  cease  to  have  any  such 
accompanying  consciousness.  Sometimes,  indeed,  the  relation 
comes  to  be  reversed ;  and  the  man  of  business  persists  in 
work  from  pure  love  of  it  when  told  that  he  ought  not. 
Nor  is  it  thus  with  self-regarding  feelings  only.  That  the 
maintaining  and  protecting  of  wife  by  husband  often  result 
solely  from  feelings  directly  gratified  by  these  actions,  with- 
out any  thought  of  must ;  and  that  the  fostering  of  children 
by  parents  is  in  many  cases  made  an  absorbing  occupation 
without  any  coercivo  feeling  of  ought ;  are  obvious  truths 
which  show  us  that  even  now,  vrith  some  of  the  fundamental 
other-regarding  duties,  the  sense  of  obligation  has  retreated 
into  the  background  of  the  mind.  And  it  is  in  some  degree 
so  with  other-regarding  duties  of  a  higher  kind.  Conscien- 
tiousness has  in  many  out-grown  that  stage  in  which  the 
sense  of  a  compelling  power  is  joined  with  rectitude  of 
action.  The  truly  honest  man,  here  and  there  to  be  found, 
is  not  only  without  thought  of  legal,  religious,  or  social 
compulsion,  when  he  discharges  an  equitable  claim  on  him  ; 
but  he  is  without  thought  of  self-compulsion.  He  does 
the  right  thing  with  a  simple  feeling  of  satisfaction  in  doing 
it ;  and  is,  indeed,  impatient  if  anything  prevents  him  from 
having  the  satisfaction  of  doing  it. 

Evidently,  then,  with  complete  adaptation  to  the  social 
state,  that  element  in  the  moral  consciousness  which  is  ex- 
pressed by  the  word  obligation,  will  disappear.  The  higher 
actions  required  for  the  harmonious  carrying  on    of  life. 


THE    PSYCHOLOGICAIt   VIEW.  129 

will  be  as  mucli  matters  of  course  as  are  those  lower  actions 
whicli  the  simple  desires  prompt.  In  their  proper  times  and 
places  and  proportions,  the  moral  sentiments  will  guide 
men  just  as  spontaneously  and  adequately  as  now  do  the 
sensations.  And  though,  joined  with  their  regulating  in- 
fluence when  this  is  called  for,  will  exist  latent  ideas  of  the 
evils  which  nonconformity  would  bring ;  these  will  occupy 
the  mind  no  more  than  do  ideas  of  the  evils  of  starvation 
at  the  time  when  a  healthy  appetite  is  being  satisfied  by 
a  meal. 

§  47.  This  elaborate  exposition,  which  the  extreme  com- 
plexity of  the  subject  has  necessitated,  may  have  its  leading 
ideas  re-stated  thus  : — 

Symbolizing  by  a  and  6,  related  phenomena  in  the  ^nvi- 
ronment,  which  in  some  way  concern  the  welfare  of  the 
organism;  and  symbolizing  by  c  and  d,  the  impressions, 
simple  or  compound,  which  the  organism  receives  from  the 
one,  and  the  motions,  single  or  combined,  by^  which  its.  acts 
are  adapted  to  meet  the  other  ;  we  saw  that  psychology  in 
general  is  concerned:  with  the  eonnexion  between  the  relation 
a  h  and  the  relation  c  d.  Further,  we  saw  that  by  impli- 
cation the  psychological  aspect  of  Ethics,  is  that  aspect 
under  which  the  adjustment  of  c  cZ  to  a  b,  appears,  not  as  an 
intellectual  co-ordination  simply,  but  as  a  co-ordination 
in  which  pleasures  and  pains  are  alike  factors  and  results. 

It  was  shown  that  throughout  Evolution,  motive  a,nd 
act  become  more  complex,  as  the  adaptation  of  inner 
related  actions  to  outer  related  actions  extends  in  range 
and  variety.  Whence  followed  the  corollary  that  the 
later-evolved  feelings,  more  representative  and  re-repre- 
sentative in  their  constitution,  and  referring  to  remoter 
and  wider  needs,  have,  on  the  average,  an  authority  as 
guides  greater  than  have  the  earlier  and  simpler  feelings. 

After  thus  observing  that  even  an  inferior  creature  is 
ruled  by  a  hierarchy  of  feelings  so  constituted  that  general 


130  THE   DATA    OP   ETHICS. 

welfare  depends  on  a  certain  subordination  of  lower  to 
higlier,  we  saw  that  in  man,  as  lie  passes  into  the  social 
state,  there  arises  the  need  for  sundry  additional  subordina- 
tions of  lower  to  higher  :  co-operation  being  made  possible 
only  by  them.  To  the  restraints  constituted  by  mental 
representations  of  the  intrinsic  effects  of  actions,  which, 
in  their  simpler  forms,  have  been  evolving  from  the 
beginning,  are  added  the  restraints  caused  by  mental  repre- 
sentations of  extrinsic  effects,  in  the  shape  of  political, 
religious,  and  social  penalties. 

"With  the  evolution  of  society,  made  possible  by  institu- 
tions maintaining  order,  and  associating  in  men's  minds 
the  sense  of  obligation  with  prescribed  acts  and  with 
desistances  from  forbidden  acts,  there  arose  opportunities  for 
seeing  the  bad  conseqiiences  naturally  flowing  from  the 
conduct  interdicted  and  the  good  consequences  from  the 
conduct  required.  Hence  eventually  grew  up  moral 
aversions  and  approvals :  experience  of  the  intrinsic  effects 
necessarily  here  coming  later  than  experience  of  the  extrinsic 
effects,  and  therefore  producing  its  results  later. 

The  thoughts  and  feelings  constituting  these  moral 
aversions  and  approvals,  being  all  along  closely  connected 
with  the  thoughts  and  feelings  constituting  fears  of  political, 
religious,  and  social  penalties,  necessarily  came  to  participate 
in  the  accompanying  sense  of  obligation.  The  coercive 
element  in  the  consciousness  of  duties  at  large,  evolved  by 
converse  with  external  agencies  which  enforce  duties,  diffused 
itself  by  association  through  that  consciousness  of  duty,  pro- 
perly called  moral,  which  is  occupied  with  intrinsic  results 
instead  of  extrinsic  results. 

But  this  self-compulsion,  which  at  a  relatively-high  stage 
becomes  more  and  more  a  substitute  for  compulsion  from 
without,  must  itself,  at  a  still  higher  stage,  practically  dis- 
appear. If  some  action  to  which  the  special  motive  is 
insufficient,  is  performed  in  obedience  to  the  feeling  of  moral 
obligation,  the  fact    proves  that  the   special    faculty  con- 


THE    PSYCHOIiOGICAL   VIEW.  131 

cerned  is  not  yet  equal  to  its  function — has  not  acquired  sucli 
strength  that  the  required  activity  has  become  its  normal 
activity,  yielding  its  due  amount  of  pleasure.    With  complete 
evolution  then,  the  sense  of  obligation,  not  ordinarily  present 
in  consciousness,  will  be   awakened  only  on  those    extra- 
ordinary occasions  that  prompt  breach  of  the  laws  otherwise 
spontaneously  conformed  to. 
I      And   this  brings  us  to  the  psychological  aspect  of  that 
\  conclusion  which,  in  the  last  chapter,  was  reached  under  its 
1  biological  aspect.     The  pleasures  and  pains  which  the  moral 
U  sentiments  originate,  will,  like  bodily  pleasures  and  pains, 
►ecome    incentives   and   deterrents    so    adjusted    in  their 
strengths  to  the  needs,  that  the  moral  conduct  will  be  the 
itural  conduct. 


CHAPTER  Vm. 

THE  SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 

§  48.  Not  for  the  human  race  only,  but  for  every  race, 
there  are  laws  of  right  living.  Given  its  environment  and 
its  structure,  and  there  is  for  each  kind  of  creature  a 
set  of  actions  adapted  in  their  kinds,  amounts,  and  combi- 
nations, to  secure  the  highest  conservation  its  nature 
permits.  The  animal,  like  the  man,  has  needs  for  food, 
warmth,  activity,  rest,  and  so  forth ;  which  must  be  fulfilled 
in  certain  relative  degrees  to  make  its  life  whole.  Main- 
tenance of  its  race  implies  satisfaction  of  special  desires, 
sexual  and  philoprogenitive,  in  due  proportions.  Hence 
there  is  a  supposable  formula  for  the  activities  of  each 
species,  which,  could  it  be  drawn  out,  would  constitute  a 
system  of  morality  for  that  species.  But  such  a  system 
of  morality  would  have  little  or  no  reference  to  the 
welfare  of  others  than  self  and  offspring.  Indifferent  to 
individuals  of  its  own  kind,  as  an  inferior  creature  is,  and 
habitually  hostile  to  individuals  of  other  kinds,  the  formula 
for  its  life  could  take  no  cognizance  of  the  lives  of  those 
with  which  it  came  in  contact ;  or  rather,  such  formula 
would  imply  that  maintenance  of  its  life  was  at  variance 
with  maintenance  of  their  lives. 

But  on  ascending    from   beings   of   lower  kinds  to  the 
highest  kind  of  being,  man ;  or,  more  strictly,  on  ascending 


THE    SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  133 

from  man  in  his  pre-social  stage  to  man  in  his  social  stage  ; 
the  formula  has  to  include  an  additional  factor.  Though 
not  peculiar  to  human  life  under  its  developed  form,  the 
presence  of  this  factor  is  still,  in  the  highest  degree, 
characteristic  of  it.  Though  there  are  inferior  species 
displaying  considerable  degrees  of  sociality;  and  though 
the  formulas  for  their  complete  lives  would  have  to  take 
account  of  the  relations  arising  from  union;  yet  our  own 
species  is,  on  the  whole,  to  be  distinguished  as  having  a 
formula  for  complete  life  which  specially  recognizes  the 
relations  of  each  individual  to  others,  in  presence  of  whom, 
and  in  co-operation  with  whom,  he  has  to  live. 

This  additional  factor  in  the  problem  of  complete  living, 
is,  indeed,  so  important  that  the  necessitated  modifications 
of  conduct  have  come  to  form  a  chief  part  of  the  code 
of  conduct.  Because  the  inherited  desires  which  directly 
refer  to  the  maintenance  of  individual  life,  are  fairly 
adjusted  to  the  requirements,  there  has  been  no  need  to 
insist  on  that  conformity  to  them  which  furthers  self- 
conservation.  Conversely,  because  these  desires  prompt 
activities  that  often  conflict  with  the  activities  of  others; 
and  because  the  sentiments  responding  to  other's  claims 
are  relatively  weak ;  moral  codes  emphasize  those  restraints 
on  conduct  which  the  presence  of  fellow  men  entails. 

From  the  sociological  point  of  view,  then.  Ethics 
becomes  nothing  else  than  a  definite  account  of  the  forms 
of  conduct  that  are  fitted  to  the  associated  state,  in  such 
vnse  that  the  lives  of  each  and  all  may  be  the  greatest 
possible,  alike  in  length  and  breadth. 

§  49.  But  here  we  are  met  by  a  fact  which  forbids  us  thus 
to  put  in  the  foreground  the  welfares  of  citizens,  individually 
considered,  and  requires  us  to  put  in  the  foreground  the 
welfare  of  the  society  as  a  whole.  The  life  of  the  social 
organism  must,  as  an  end,  rank  above  the  lives  of  its 
units.     These  two  ends  are  not  harmonious  at  the  outset . 


134  THE   DATA  OF   ETHICS. 

and  thougli  the  tendency  is  towards  harmonization  of  them, 
they  are  still  partially  conflicting. 

As  fast  as  the  social  state  establishes  itself,  the  pre- 
servation of  the  society  becomes  a  means  of  preserving 
its  units.  Living  together  arose  because,  on  the  average,  it 
proved  more  advantageous  to  each  than  living  apart ;  and 
this  implies  that  maintenance  of  combination  is  maintenance 
of  the  conditions  to  more  satisfactory  living  than  the  com- 
bined persons  would  otherwise  have.  Hence,  social  self- 
preservation  becomes  a  proximate  aim  taking  precedence  of 
the  ultimate  aim,  individual  self-preservation. 

This  subordination  of  personal  to  social  welfare  is,  how- 
ever, contingent :  it  depends  on  the  presence  of  antagonistic 
societies.  So  long  as  the  existence  of  a  community  is 
endangered  by  the  actions  of  communities  around,  it  must 
remain  true  that  the  interests  of  individuals  must  be  sacri- 
ficed to  the  interests  of  the  community,  as  far  as  is  needful 
for  the  community's  salvation.  But  if  this  is  manifest,  it  is, 
by  implication,  manifest,  that  when  social  antagonisms  cease, 
this  need  for  sacrifice  of  private  claims  to  public  claims 
ceases  also ;  or  rather,  there  cease  to  be  any  public  claims  at 
variance  with  private  claims,  ^l  along,  furtherance  of  indi- 
vidual lives  has  been  the  ultimate  end ;  and  if  this  ultimate 
end  has  been  postponed  to  the  proximate  end  of  preserving 
the  community's  life,  it  has  been  so  only  because  this  proxi- 
mate end  was  instrumental  to  the  ultimate  end.  When  the 
aggregate  is  no  longer  in  danger,  the  final  object  of  pursuit, 
the  welfare  of  the  units,  no  longer  needing  to  be  postponed, 
becomes  the  immediate  object  of  pursuit. 

Consequently,  unlike  sets  of  conclusions  respecting  human 
conduct  emerge,  according  as  we  are  concerned  with  a  state 
of  habitual  or  occasional  war,  or  are  concerned  with  a  state 
of  permanent  and  general  peace.  Let  us  glance  at  these 
alternative  states  and  the  alternative  implications. 

§  50.  At  present  the  individual  man  has  to  carry  on  his 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  135 

life  witli  due  regard  to  the  lives  of  others  belonging  to  the 
same  society ;  while  he  is  sometimes  called  on  to  be 
regardless  of  the  lives  of  those  belonging  to  other  societies. 
The  same  mental  constitution  having  to  fulfil  both  these 
requirements,  is  necessarily  incongruous;  and  the  correlative 
conduct,  adjusted  first  to  the  one  need  and  then  to  the  other, 
cannot  be  brought  within  any  consistent  ethical  system. 

Hate  and  destroy  your  fellow  man,  is  now  the  command ; 
and  then  the  command  is,  love  and  aid  your  fellow  man.  Use 
every  means  to  deceive,  says  the  one  code  of  conduct ;  while 
the  other  code  says,  be  truthful  in  word  and  deed.  Seize 
what  property  you  can  and  burn  all  you  cannot  take  away, 
are  injunctions  which  the  religion  of  enmity  countenances ; 
while  by  the  religion  of  amity,  theft  and  arson  are  con- 
demned as  crimes.  And  as  conduct  has  to  be  made  up  of 
parts  thus  at  variance  with  one  another,  the  theory  of 
conduct  remains  confused.  There  co-exists  a 

kindred  irreconcilability  between  the  sentiments  answering 
to  the  forms  of  co-operation  required  for  militancy  and 
industrialism  respectively.  While  social  antagonisms  are 
habitual,  and  while,  for  efficient  action  against  other  societies, 
there  needs  great  subordination  to  men  who  command,  the 
virtue  of  loyalty  and  the  duty  of  implicit  obedience  have  to 
be  insisted  on  :  disregard  of  the  ruler's  will  is  punished  with 
death.  But  when  war  ceases  to  be  chronic,  and  growing 
industrialism  habituates  men  to  maintaining  their  own 
claims  while  respecting  the  claims  of  others,  loyalty  becomes 
less  profound,  the  authority  of  the  ruler  is  questioned  or 
denied  in  respect  of  various  private  actions  and  beliefs. 
State-dictation  is  in  many  directions  successfully  defied, 
and  the  political  independence  of  the  citizen  comes  to  bo 
regarded  as  a  claim  which  it  is  virtuous  to  maintain  and 
vicious  to  yield  up.  Necessarily  during  the  transition,  these 
opposite  sentiments  are  incongruously  mingled.  So 

is  it,  too,  with  domestic  institutions  under  the  two  regimes. 
While  the  first  is  dominant,  ownership  of  a  slave  is  honour- 


136  THE   DATA  Of   ETHICS. 

able,,  and  in  tlie  slave  submission  is  praiseworthy;  but  as 
the  last  grows  dominant,  slave-owning  becomes  a  crime  and 
servile  obedience  excites  contempt.  Nor  is  ife  otherwise 
in  the  family.  The  subjection  of  women  to  men,  complete 
while  war  is  habitual  but  qualified  as  fast  as  peaceful  occupa- 
tions replace  it,  comes  eventually  to  be  thought  wrong; 
and  equality  before  the  law  is  asserted.  At  the  same  time 
the  opinion  concerning  paternal  power  changes.  The  once 
unquestioned  right  of  the  father  to  take  his  children's  lives  is 
denied;  and  the  duty  of  absolute  submission  to  him,  long 
insisted  on,  is  changed  into  the  duty  of  obedience  within 
reasonable  limits. 

Were  the  ratio  between  the  life  of  antagonism  with  alien 
societies,  and  the  life  of  peaceful  co-operation  within  each 
society,  a  constant  ratio,  some  permanent  compromise  between 
the  conflicting  rules  of  conduct  appropriate  to  the  two  lives 
might  be  reached.  But  since  this  ratio  is  a  variable  one, 
the  compromise  can  never  be  more  than  temporary.  Ever 
the  tendency  is  towards  congruity  between  beliefs  and 
requirements.  Either  the  social  arrangements  are  gradually 
changed  until  they  come  into  harmony  with  prevailing  ideas 
and  sentiments ;  or,  if  surrounding  conditions  prevent 
change  in  the  social  arrangements,  the  necessitated  habits 
of  life  modify  the  prevailing  ideas  and  sentiments  to  the 
requisite  extent.  Hence,  for  each  kind  and  degree  of  social 
evolution  determined  by  external  conflict  and  internal 
friendship,  there  is  an  appropriate  compromise  between 
the  moral  code  of  enmity  and  the  moral  code  of  amity  : 
not,  indeed,  a  definable,  consistent  compromise,  but  a  com- 
promise fairly  well  understood. 

This  compromise,  vague,  ambiguous,  illogical,  though  it 
may  be,  is  nevertheless  for  the  time  being  authoritative. 
For  if,  as  above  shown,  the  welfare  of  the  society 
must  take  precedence  of  the  welfares  of  its  component 
individuals,  during  those  stages  in  which  the  individuals  have 
to  preserve    themselves  by  preserving  their  society;  then 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  137 

such  temporaiy  compromise  between  the  two  codes  of  con- 
duct as  duly  regards  external  defence,  while  favouring 
internal  co-operation  to  the  greatest  extent  practicable, 
subserves  the  maintenance  of  life  in  the  highest  degree ; 
and  thus  gains  the  ultimate  sanction.  So  that  the  perplexed 
and  inconsistent  moralities  of  which  each  society  and  each  age 
shows  us  a  more  or  less  different  one,  are  sevei'ally  justified 
as  being  approximately  the  best  under  the  circumstances. 

But  such  moralities  are,  by  their  definitions,  shown  to 
be  long  to  incomplete  conduct ;  not  to  conduct  that  is  fully 
evolved.  We  saw  that  the  adjustments  of  acts  to  ends  which, 
while  constituting  the  external  manifestations  of  life  conduce 
to  the  continuance  of  life,  have  been  rising  to  a  certain 
ideal  form  now  approached  by  the  civilized  man.  But  this 
form  is  not  reached  so  long  as  there  continue  aggressions  of 
one  society  upon  another.  Whether  the  hindrances  to  com- 
plete living  result  from  the  trespasses  of  fellow-citizens,  or 
from  the  trespasses  of  aliens,  matters  not:  if  they  occur  there 
does  not  yet  exist  the  state  defined.  The  limit  to  the  evolu- 
tion of  conduct  is  arrived  at  by  the  members  of  each  society 
only  when,  being  arrived  at  by  members  of  other  societies 
also,  the  causes  of  international  antagonism  end  simulta- 
neously with  the  causes  of  antagonism  between  individuals. 

And  now  having  from  the  sociological  point  of  view 
recognized  the  need  for,  and  authority  of,  these  changing 
systems  of  ethics,  proper  to  changing  ratios  between  war- 
like activities  and  peaceful  activities,  we  have,  from  the  same 
point  of  view,  to  consider  jbhe  system  of  ethics  proper  to  the 
state  in  which  peaceful  activities  are  undisturbed. 

§  51.  If,  excluding  all  thought  of  dangers  or  hindrances 
from  causes  external  to  a  society,  we  set  ourselves  to  specify 
those  conditions  under  which  the  life  of  each  person,  and 
therefore  of  the  aggregate,  may  be  the  greatest  possible; 
we  come  upon  certain  simple  ones  which,  as  here  stated, 
assume  the  form  of  truisms. 


138  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

For,  as  we  have  seen^  the  definition  of  that  highest  life 
accompanying  completely- evolved  conduct,  itself  excludes 
all  acts  of  aggression — not  only  murder,  assault,  robbery 
and  the  major  offences  generally,  but  minor  offences,  such 
as  libel,  injury  to  property  and  so  forth.  While  directly 
deducting  from  individual  life,  these  indirectly  cause  pertur- 
bations of  social  life.  Trespasses  against  others  rouse  anta- 
gonisms in  them ;  and  if  these  are  numerous  the  group 
loses  coherence.  Hence,  whether  the  integrity  of  the  group 
itself  is  considered  as  the  end;  or  whether  the  end  con- 
sidered is  the  benefit  ultimately  secured  to  its  units  by 
maintaining  its  integrity ;  or  whether  the  immediate  benefit 
of  its  units  taken  separately,  is  considered  the  end;  the 
implication  is  the  same :  such  acts  are  at  variance  with 
achievement  of  the  end,  That  these  inferences  are  self- 
evident  and  trite  (as  indeed  the  first  inferences  drawn  from 
the  data  of  every  science  that  reaches  the  deductive  stage 
naturally  are)  must  not  make  us  pass  lightly  over  the  all-'M- 
important  fact  that,  from  the  sociological  point  of  view, 
the  leading  moral  laws  are  seen  to  follow  as  corollaries 
from  the  definition  of  complete  life  carried  on  under  social 
conditions. 

Kespect  for  these  primary  moral  laws  is  not  enough, 
however.  Associated  men  pursuing  their  several  lives 
without  injuring  one  another  but  without  helping  one 
another,  reap  no  advantages  from  association  beyond  \ 
those  of  companionship.  If,  while  there  is  no  co-operation 
for  defensive  purposes  (which  i"S  here  excluded  by  the 
hypothesis)  there  is  also  no  co-operation  for  satisfying 
wants,  the  social  state  loses  its  raison  d'etre — almost, 
if  not  entirely.  There  are,  indeed,  people  who  live  in  a 
condition  little  removed  from  this ;  as  the  Esquimaux. 
But  though  these,  exhibiting  none  of  the  co-operation 
necessitated  by  war,  which  is  unknown  to  them,  lead  lives 
such  that  each  family  is  substantially  independent  of  others, 
occasional  co-operation  occurs.     And,  indeed,  that  families 


THE    SOCIOLOGICAL  YIEW.  139 

should  live  in   company  without  ever  yielding  mutual  aid, 
is  scarcely  conceivable. 

Neverttieless,  whether  actually  existing  or  only  approached, 
we  must  here  recognize  as  hypothetically  possible,  a  state  in 
which  these  primary  moral  laws  alone  are  conformed  to  ;  for 
the  purpose  of  observing,  in  their  uncomplicated  forms,  what 
are  the  negative  conditions  to  harmonious  social  life.  Whe- 
ther the  members  of  a  social  group  do  or  do  not  co-operate, 
certain  limitations  to  their  individual  activities  are  necessi- 
tated by  their  association ;  and  after  recognizing  these  as 
arising  in  the  absence  of  co-operation,  we  shall  be  the  better 
prepared  to  understand  how  conformity  to  them  is  effected 
when  co-operation  begins. 

§  52.  For  whether  men  live  together  in  quite  independent 
ways,  careful  only  to  avoid  aggressing ;  or  whether,  advancing 
from  passive  association  to  active  association,  they  co- 
operate ;  their  conduct  must  be  such  that  the  achievement 
of  ends  by  each  shall  at  least  not  be  hindered.  And 
it  becomes  obvious  that  when  they  co-operate,  there 
must  not  only  be  no  resulting  hindrance  but  there  must 
be  facilitation ;  since  in  the  absence  of  facilitation  there  can 
be  no  motive  to  co-operate.  What  shape,  then,  must  the 
mutual  restraints  take  when  co-operation  begins  ?  or  rather — 
What,  in  addition  to  the  primary  mutual  restraints  already 
specified,  are  those  secondary  mutual  restraints  required  to 
make  co-operation  possible  ? 

One  who,  living  in  an  isolated  way,  expends  effort  in 
pursuit  of  an  end,  gets  compensation  for  the  effort  by  secur- 
ing the  end ;  and  so  achieves  satisfaction.  If  he  expends 
the  effort  without  achieving  the  end,  there  results  dissatis- 
faction. The  satisfaction  and  the  dissatisfaction,  are  mea-^ 
sures  of  success  and  failure  in  life-sustaining  acts;  since 
that  which  is  achieved  by  effort  is  something  which  directly 
or  indirectly  furthers  life,  and  so  pays  for  the  cost  of  the 
effort ;  while  if  the  effort  fails  there  is  nothing  to  pay  for  the 


140  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

cost  of  it,  and  so  mucli  life  is  wasted.  What  must  result 
from  this  when  men's  efforts  are  joined  ?  The  reply  will  be 
made  clearer  if  we  take  the  successive  forms  of  co-operation 
in  the  order  of  ascending  complexity.  We  may  distinguish 
as  homogeneous  co-operation,  (1),  that  in  which  like  efforts 
are  joined  for  like  ends  that  are  simultaneously  enjoyed.  As 
co-operation  that  is  not  completely  homogeneous,  we  may 
distinguish,  (2),  that  in  which  like  efforts  are  joined  for  like 
ends  that  are  not  simultaneously  enjoyed.  A  co-operation  of 
which  the  heterogeneity  is  more  distinct  is,  (3),  that  in  which 
unlike  efforts  are  joined  for  like  ends.  And  lastly  comes 
the  decidedly  heterogeneous  co-operation,  (4),  that  in  which 
unlike  efforts  are  joined  for  unlike  ends. 

The  simplest  and  earliest  of  these,  in  which  men's  powers, 
similar  in  kind  and  degree,  are  united  in  pursuit  of  a  benefit 
which,  when  obtained,  they  all  participate  in,  is  most  fami- 
liarly exemplified  in  the  catching  of  game  by  primitive 
men :  this  simplest  and  earliest  form  of  industrial  co-operation 
being  also  that  which  is  least  differentiated  from  militant  co- 
operation ;  for  the  co-operators  are  the  same,  and  the  pro- 
cesses, both  destructive  of  life,  are  carried  on  in  analogous 
ways.  The  condition  under  which  such  co-operation  may 
be  successfully  carried  on,  is  that  the  co-operators  shall 
share  alike  in  the  produce.  Each  thus  being  enabled  to 
repay  himself  in  food  for  the  expended  effort,  and  being 
further  enabled  to  achieve  other  such  desired  ends  as  main- 
tenance of  family,  obtains  satisfaction:  there  is  no  aggression 
of  one  on  another,  and  the  co-operation  is  harmonious.  Of 
course  the  divided  produce  can  be  but  roughly  proportioned 
to  the  several  efforts  joined  in  obtaining  it ;  but  there  is 
actually  among  savages,  as  we  see  that  for  harmonious  co- 
operation there  must  be,  a  recognition  of  the  principle  that 
efforts  when  combined  shall  severally  bring  equivalent  bene- 
fits, as  they  would  do  if  they  were  separate.  Moreover, 
beyond  the  taking  equal  shares  in  return  for  labours  that 
are  approximately   equal,   there  is   generally  an    attempt 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  141 

at  proportioning  benefit  to  acliievement^  by  assigning  some- 
thing extra,  in  tlie  shape  of  the  best  part  or  the  trophy,  to 
the  actual  slayer  of  the  game.  And  obviously,  if  there  is  a 
wide  departure  from  this  system  of  sharing  benefits  when 
there  has  been  a  sharing  of  efibrts,  the  co-operation  will 
cease.  Individual  hunters  will  prefer  to  do  the  best  they 
can  for  themselves  separately. 

Passing  from  this  simplest  case  of  co-operation  to  a  case 
not  quite  so  simple — a  case  in  which  the  homogeneity  is 
incomplete — let  us  ask  how  a  member  of  the  group  may  be 
led  without  dissatisfaction  to  expend  efibrt  in  achieving  a 
benefit  which,  when  achieved,  is  enjoyed  exclusively  by 
another  ?  Clearly  he  may  do  this  on  condition  that  the  other, 
shall  afterwards  expend  a  like  effort,  the  beneficial  result  of 
which  shall  be  similarly  rendered  up  by  him  in  return.  This 
exchange  of  equivalents  of  effort  is  the  form  which  social  co- 
operation takes  while  yet  there  is  little  or  no  division  of  labour 
save  that  between  the  sexes.  For  example,  the  Bodo  and 
Dhimals  '^  mutually  assist  each  other  for  the  nonce,  as  well  in 
constructing  their  houses  as  in  clearing  their  plots  for  culti- 
vation.''^ And  this  principle — I  will  help  you  if  you  will 
help  me — common  in  simple  communities  where  the  occupa- 
tions are  alike  in  kind,  and  occasionally  acted  upon  in  more 
advanced  communities,  is  one  under  which  the  relation 
between  effort  and  benefit,  no  longer  directly  maintained,  is 
maintained  indirectly.  For  whereas  when  men's  activities 
are  carried  on  separately,  or  are  joined  in  the  way 
exemplified  above,  effort  is  immediately  paid  for  by  benefit, 
in  this  form  of  co-operation  the  benefit  achieved  by  effort  is 
exchanged  for  a  like  benefit  to  be  afterwards  received  when 
asked  for.  And  in  this  case  as  in  the  preceding  case,  co- 
operation can  be  maintained  only  by  fulfilment  of  the  tacit 
agreements.  For  if  they  are  habitually  not  fulfilled,  there 
will  commonly  be  refusal  to  give  aid  when  asked ;  and  each 
man  will  be  left  to  do  the  best  he  can  by  himself.  All  those 
advantages    to    be    gained  by  union  of   efforts  in  doing 


142  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

things  that  are  beyond  the  powers  of  the  single  individual, 
will  be  unachievable.  At  the  outset,  then,  fulfilment  of 
contracts  that  are  implied  if  not  expressed,  becomes  a 
condition  to  social  co-operation;  and  therefore  to  social 
development. 

'  From  these  simple  forms  of  co-operation  in  which  the 
labours  men  carry  on  are  of  like  kinds,  let  us  turn  to  the  more 
complex  forms  in  which  they  carry  on  labours  of  unlike 
kinds.  Where  men  mutually  aid  in  building  huts  or  felling 
trees,  the  number  of  days'  work  now  given  by  one  to 
another,  is  readily  balanced  by  an  equal  number  of  days' 
work  afterwards  given  by  the  other  to  him.  And  no  esti- 
mation of  the  relative  values  of  the  labours  being  required, 
a  definite  understanding  is  little  needed.  But  when  division 
of  labour  arises — when  there  come  trausactions  between 
one  who  makes  weapons  and  another  who  dresses  skins  for 
clothing,  or  between  a  grower  of  roots  and  a  catcher  of  fish 
— neither  the  relative  amounts  nor  the  relative  qualities  of 
their  labours  admit  of  easy  measure ;  and  with  the 
multiplication  of  businesses,  implying  numerous  kinds  of 
skill  and  power,  there  ceases  to  be  anything  like  manifest 
equivalence  between  either  the  bodily  and  mental  efforts  set 
against  one  another,  or  between  their  products.  Hence  the 
arrangement  cannot  now  be  taken  for  granted,  as  while  the 
things  exchanged  are  like  in  kind :  it  has  to  be  stated.  If 
A  allows  B  to  appropriate  a  product  of  his  special  skill,  on 
condition  that  he  is  allowed  to  appropriate  a  different  pro- 
duct of  B's  special  skill,  it  results  that  as  equivalence  of  the 
two  products  cannot  be  determined  by  direct  comparison  of 
their  quantities  and  qualities,  there  must  be  a  distinct 
understanding  as  to  how  much  of  the  one  may  be  taken  in^ 
consideration  of  so  much  of  the  other. 

Only  under  voluntary  agreement,  then,  no  longer  tacit 
and  vague  but  overt  and  definite,  can  co-operation  be 
harmoniously  carried  on  when  division  of  labour  becomes 
established.     And  as  in  the  simplest  co-operation,  where  like 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  143 

efforts  are  joined  to  secure  a  common  good,  the  dissatisfac- 
tiou  caused  in  those  who,  having  expended  their  labours  do 
not  get  their  shares  of  the  good,  prompts  them  to  cease 
co-operating;  as  in  the  more  advanced  co-operation, 
achieved  by  exchanging  equal  labours  of  like  kind  expended 
at  diflferent  times,  aversion  to  co-operate  is  generated 
if  the  expected  equivalent  of  labour  is  not  rendered; 
so  in  this  developed  co-operation,  the  failure  of  either  to  sur- 
render to  the  other  that  which  was  avowedly  recognized  as 
of  like  value  with  the  labour  or  product  given,  tends  to 
prevent  co-operation  by  exciting  discontent  with  its  results. 
And  evidently,  while  antagonisms  thus  caused  impede  the 
lives  of  the  units,  the  life  of  the  aggregate  is  endangered 
by  diminished  cohesion. 

§  53.  Beyond  these  comparatively  direct  mischiefs, 
special  and  general,  there  have  to  be  noted  indirect  mis- 
chiefs. As  already  implied  by  the  reasoning  in  the  last 
paragraph,  not  only  social  integration  but  also  social  differen- 
tiation, is  hindered  by  breach  of  contract. 

In  Part  II  of  the  Principles  of  Sociology y  it  was  shown 
that  the  fundamental  principles  of  organization  are  the 
same  for  an  individual  organism  and  for  a  social  organism ; 
because  both  consist  of  mutually-dependent  parts.  In  the 
one  case  as  in  the  other,  the  assumption  of  unlike  activities 
by  the  component  members,  is  possible  only  on  condition  that 
they  severally  benefit  in  due  degrees  by  one  another's 
activities.  That  we  may  the  better  see  what  are  the  impli- 
cations in  respect  of  social  structures,  let  us  first  note  tho 
implications  in  respect  of  individual  structures. 

The  welfare  of  a  living  body  implies  an  approximate 
equilibrium  between  waste  and  repair.  If  the  activities 
involve  an  expenditure  not  made  good  by  nutrition, 
dwindling  follows.  If  the  tissues  are  enabled  to  take  up 
fi'om  the  blood  enriched  by  food,  fit  substances  enough  to 
replace  those  used  up  in  efforts  made,  the  weight  may  be 
maintained.     And  if  the  gain  exceeds  the  loss,  growth 


144  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

results.  That  wliicli  is  true  of  the  whole  in  its 

relations  to  the  external  world_,  is  no  less  true  of  the  parts 
in  their  relations  to  one  another.  Each  organ,  like  the 
entire  organism,  is  wasted  by  performing  its  function,  and 
has  to  restore  itself  from  the  materials  brought  to  it.  If 
the  quantity  of  materials  furnished  by  the  joint  agency  of 
the  other  organs  is  deficient,  the  particular  organ  dwindles. 
If  they  are  sufficient,  it  can  maintain  its  integrity.  If  they 
are  in  excess,  it  is  enabled  to  increase.  To  say  that  this 
arrangement  constitutes  the  physiological  contract,  is  to 
use  a  metaphor  which,  though  not  true  in  aspect  is  true  in 
essence.  For  the  relations  of  structures  are  actually  such 
that,  by  the  help  of  a  central  regulative  system,  each 
organ  is  supplied  with  blood  in  proportion  to  the  work  it 
does.  As  was  pointed  out  {Principles  of  Sociology,  §  254) 
well-developed  animals  are  so  constituted  that  each  muscle 
or  viscus,  when  called  into  action,  sends  to  the  vaso-motor 
centres  through  certain  nerve- fibres,  an  impulse  caused  by 
its  action;  whereupon  through  other  nerve-fibres,  there 
comes  an  impulse  causing  dilatation  of  its  blood-vessels.  That 
is  to  say,  all  other  parts  of  the  organism  when  they  jointly 
require  it  to  labour,  forthwith  begin  to  pay  it  in  blood. 
During  the  ordinary  state  of  physiological  equilibrium,  the 
loss  and  the  gain  balance,  and  the  organ  does  not  sensibly 
change.  If  the  amount  of  its  function  is  increased  within 
such  moderate  limits  that  the  local  blood-vessels  can  bring 
adequately-increased  supplies,  the  organ  grows :  beyond 
replacing  its  losses  by  its  gains,  it  makes  a  profit  on  its 
extra  transactions ;  so  being  enabled  by  extra  structures  to 
meet  extra  demands.  But  if  the  demands  made  on  it 
become  so  great  that  the  supply  of  materials  cannot  keep  pace 
with  the  expenditure,  either  because  the  local  blood-vessels  are 
not  large  enough  or  for  any  other  reason  ;  then  the  organ 
begins  to  decrease  from  excess  of  waste  over  repair :  there 
sets  in  what  is  known  as  atrophy.  Now  since  each  of  the 
organs  has  thus  to  be  paid  in  nutriment  for  its  services  by 
the    rest  5    it    follows  that   the    due    balancing  of    their 


THE   SOCIOLOGICAL   VIEW.  145 

respective  claims  and  payments  is  requisite,  directly  for  the 
welfare  of  eacH  organ,  and  indirectly  for  tlie  welfare  of  the 
organism.  For  in  a  whole  formed  of  mutually-dependent 
parts,  anything  which  prevents  due  performance  of  its  duty 
by  one  part  reacts  injuriously  on  all  the  parts. 

With  change  of  terms  these  statements  and  inferences 
hold  of  a  society.  That  social  division  of  labour  which 
parallels  in  so  many  other  respects  the  physiological 
division  of  labour,  parallels  it  in  this  respect  also.  As 
was  shown  at  large  in  the  Principles  of  Sociology,  Part  II, 
each  order  of  functionaries  and  each  group  of  pro- 
ducers, severally  performing  some  action  or  making 
some  article  not  for  direct  satisfaction  of  their  own 
needs  but  for  satisfaction  of  the  needs  of  fellow-citizens 
in  general,  otherwise  occupied,  can  continue  to  do  this 
only  so  long  as  the  expenditures  of  effort  and  returns 
of  profit  are  approximately  equivalent.  Social  organs 
like  individual  organs  remain  stationary  if  there  come 
to  them  normal  proportions  of  the  commodities  produced 
by  the  society  as  a  whole.  If  because  the  demands 
made  on  an  industry  or  profession  are  unusually  great, 
those  engaged  in  it  make  excessive  profits,  more  citizens 
flock  to  it  and  the  social  structure  constituted  by  its 
members  grows ;  while  decrease  of  the  demands  and 
therefore  of  the  profits,  either  leads  its  members  to 
choose  other  careers  or  stops  the  accessions  needful 
to  replace  those  who  die,  and  the  structure  dwindles. 
Thus  is  maintained  that  proportion  among  the  powers 
of  the  component  parts  which  is  most  conducive  to  the 
welfare  of  the  whole. 

And  now  mark  that  the  primary  condition  to  achieve- 
ment of  this  result  is  fulfilment  of  contract.  If  from 
the  members  of  any  part  payment  is  frequently  withheld, 
or  falls  short  of  the  promised  amount,  then,  through  ruin 
of  some  and  abandonment  of  the  occupation  by  others, 
the  part  diminishes ;    and  if  it  was  before  not  more  than 


146  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

competent  to  its  duty,  it  now  becomes  incompetent,  and  the 
society  suffers.  Or  if  social  needs  throw  on  some  part 
great  increase  of  function,  and  the  members  of  it  are  enabled 
to  get  for  their  services  unusually  high  prices;  fulfilment 
of  the  agreements  to  give  them  these  high  prices,  is  the 
only  way  of  drawing  to  the  part  such  additional  number 
of  members  as  will  make  it  equal  to  the  augmented 
demands.  For  citizens  will  not  come  to  it  if  they  find 
the  high  prices  agreed  upon  are  not  paid. 

Briefly,  then,  the  universal  basis  of  co-operation  is  the 
proportioning  of  benefits  received  to  services  rendered. 
Without  this  there  can  be  no  physiological  division  of  labour; 
without  this  there  can  be  no  sociological  division  of  labour. 
And  since  division  of  labour,  physiological  or  sociological, 
profits  the  whole  and  each  part ;  it  results  that  on  mainte- 
nance of  the  arrangements  necessary  to  it,  depend  both 
special  and  general  welfare.  In  a  society  such  arrangements 
are  maintained  only  if  bargains,  overt  or  tacit,  are  carried 
out.  So  that  beyond  the  primary  requirement  to  harmonious 
co-existence  in  a  society,  that  its  units  shall  not  directly 
aggress  on  one  another ;  there  comes  this  secondary  require- 
ment, that  they  shall  not  indirectly  aggress  by  breaking 
agreements. 

§  54.  But  now  we  have  to  recognize  the  fact  that  complete 
fulfilment  of  these  conditions,  original  and  derived,  is  not 
enough.  Social  co-operation  may  be  such  that  no  one  is 
impeded  in  the  obtainment  of  the  normal  return  for 
effort,  but  contrariwise  is  aided  by  equitable  exchange 
of  services;  and  yet  much  may  remain  to  be  achieved. 
There  is  a  theoretically-possible  form  of  society,  purely 
industrial  in  its  activities,  which,  though  approaching  nearer 
to  the  moral  ideal  in  its  code  of  conduct  than  any  society 
not  purely  industrial,  does  not  fully  reach  it. 

For  while  industrialism  requires  the  life  of  each  citizen 
to  be   such  that  it  may  be   carried  on  without  direct  or 


THE    SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW. 


147 


indirect  aggressions  on  other  citizens,  it  does  not  require 
his  Hfe  to  be  such  that  it  shall  directly  further  the  lives 
of  other  citizens.  It  is  not  a  necessary  implication  of 
industrialism,  as  thus  far  defined,  that  each,  beyond  the 
benefits  given  and  received  by  exchange  of  services,  shall 
give  and  receive  other  benefits.  A  society  is  conceivable 
formed  of  men  leading  perfectly  inoffensive  lives,  scru- 
pulously fulfilling  their  contracts,  and  efficiently  rearing 
their  ofi*spring,  who  yet,  yielding  to  one  another  no 
advantages  beyond  those  agreed  upon,  fall  short  of  that 
highest  degree  of  life  which  the  gratuitous  rendering  of 
services  makes  possible.  Daily  experiences  prove  that  every 
one  would  sufi'er  many  evils  and  lose  many  goods,  did  none 
give  him  unpaid  assistance.  The  life  of  each  would  be  more 
or  less  damaged  had  he  to  meet  all  contingencies  single- 
handed.  Further,  if  no  one  did  for  his  fellows  anything 
more  than  was  required  by  strict  performance  of  contract, 
private  interests  would  sufier  from  the  absence  of  attention 
to  public  interests.  The  limit  of  evolution  of  conduct  is 
consequently  not  reached,  until,  beyond  avoidance  of  direct 
and  indirect  injuries  to  others,  there  are  spontaneous  efibrts 
to  further  the  welfare  of  others. 

It  may  be  shown  that  the  form  of  nature  which  thus 
to  justice  adds  beneficence,  ia  one  which  adaptation  to 
the  social  state  produces.  The  social  man  has  not 
reached  that  harmonization  of  constitution  with  con- 
ditions, formings  the  limit  of  evolution,  so  long  as  there 
remains  space  for  the  growth  of  faculties  which,  by  their 
exercise,  bring  positive  benefit  to  others  and  satisfaction  to 
self.  If  the  presence  of  fellow-men,  while  putting  certain 
limits  to  each  man's  sphere  of  activity,  opens  certain 
other  spheres  of  activity  in  which  feelings  while  achieving 
their  gratifications,  do  not  diminish  but  add  to  the  gratifi- 
cations of  others,  then  such  spheres  will  inevitably  be 
occupied.  Kecognition  of  this  truth  does  not,  however,  call 
on  us  to  qualify  greatly  that  conception  of  the  industrial 

7 


148  THE    DATA   OF   ETTIICS. 

state  above  set  forth ;  since  sympathy  is  the  root  of  both 
justice  and  beneficence. 

§  55.  Thus  the  sociological  view  of  Ethics  supplements 
the  physical,  the  biological,  and  the  psychological  views,  by 
disclosing  those  conditions  under  which  only  associated 
activities  can  be  so  carried  on,  that  the  complete  living  of 
each  consists  with,  and  conduces  to,  the  complete  living 
of  all. 

At  first  the  welfare  of  social  groups,  habitually  in 
antagonism  with  other  such  groups,  takes  precedence  of 
individual  welfare;  and  the  rules  of  conduct  whieh  are 
authoritative  for  the  tinie  being,  involve  incompleteness  of 
individual  life  that  the  general  life  may  be  maintained.  At 
the  same  time  the  rules  have  to  enforce  the  claims  of  indi- 
vidual life  as  far  as  may  be ;  since  on  the  welfare  of  the 
units  the  welfare  of  the  aggregate  largely  depends. 

In  proportion  as  societies  endanger  one  another  less, 
the  need  for  subordinating  individual  lives  to  the  general 
life,  decreases ;  and  with  approach  to  a  peaceful  state,  the 
general  life,  having  from  the  beginning  had  furtherance  of 
individual  lives  as  its  ultimate  purpose,  comes  to  have  this 
as  its  proximate  purpose. 

During  the  transitional  stages  there  are  necessitated  suc- 
cessive compromises  between  the  moral  code  which  asserts 
the  claims  of  the  society  versus  those  of  the  individual, 
and  the  moral  code  which  asserts  the  claims  of  the  indivi- 
dual versus  those  of  the  society.  And  evidently  each  such 
compromise,  though  for  the  timfe  being  authoritative,  admits 
of  no  consistent  or  definite  expression. 

But  gradually  as  war  declines — gradually  as  the  compulsory 
co-operation  needful  in  dealing  with  external  enemies  becomes 
unnecessary,  and  leaves  behind  the  voluntary  co-operation 
which  efiectually  achieves  internal  sustentation ;  there  grows 
increasingly  clear  the  code  of  conduct  which  voluntary  co- 
operation implies.  And  this  final  permanent  code  alone  admits 


THE    SOCIOLOGICAL  VIEW.  149 

of  being  definitely  formulated,  and  so  constituting  ethics  as 
a  science  in  contrast  with  empirical  ethics. 

The  leading  traits  of  a  code  under  which  complete  living 
through  voluntary  co-operation  is  secured,  may  be  simply 
stated.  The  fundamental  requirement  is  that  the  life- 
sustaining  actions  of  each  shall  severally  bring  him 
the  amounts  and  kinds  of  advantage  naturally  achieved 
by  them ;  and  this  implies  firstly  that,  he  shall  suffer  no 
direct  aggressions  on  his  person  or  property,  and  secondly 
that  he  shall  suffer  no  .indirect  aggressions  by  breach  of 
contract.  Observance  of  these  negative  conditions  to  volun- 
tary co-operation  having  facilitated  life  to  the  greatest  extent 
by  exchange  of  services  under  agreement,  life  is  to  be  further 
facilitated  by  exchange  of  services  beyond  agreement :  the 
highest  life  being  reached  only  when,  besides  helping  to 
complete  one  another's  lives  by  specified  reciprocities  of  aid, 
men  otherwise  help  to  complete  one  another's  lives. 


CHAPTER  IX. 
CRITICISMS  AND  EXPLANATIONS. 

§  56.  Comparisons  of  the  foregoiog  chapters  with  one 
another,  suggest  sundry  questions  which  must  be  answered 
partially,  if  not  completely,  before  anything  can  be  done 
towards  reducing  ethical  principles  from  abstract  forms  to 
concrete  forms. 

We  have  seen  that  to  admit  the  desirableness  of  conscious 
existence,  is  to  admit  that  conduct  should  be  such  as  will 
produce  a  consciousness  which  is  desirable — a  consciousness 
which  is  as  much  pleasurable  and  as  little  painful  as  may  be. 
We  have  also  seen  that  this  necessary  implication  corre- 
sponds with  the  a  'priori  inference,  that  the  evolution  of  life 
has  been  made  possible  only  by  the  establishment  of 
connexions  between  pleasures  and  beneficial  actions  and 
between  pains  and  detrimental  actions.  But  the  general 
conclusion  reached  in  both  of  these  ways,  though  it  covers 
the  area  within  which  our  special  conclusions  must  fall, 
does  not  help  us  to  reach  those  special  conclusions. 

Were  pleasures  all  of  one  kind,  differing  only  in  degree  ; 
were  pains  all  of  one  kind,  differing  only  in  degree ;  and 
could  pleasures  be  measured  against  pains  with  definite 
results;  the  problems  of  conduct  would  be  greatly  sim- 
plified. Were  the  pleasures  and  pains  serving  as  incen- 
tives and  deterrents,  simultaneously  present  to  consciousness 
with  like  vividness,  or  were  they  all  immediately  impending, 
or  were  they  all  equi-distant  in  time ;  the  problems  would 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  151 

be  further  simplified.  And  they  would  be  still  further 
simplified  if  the  pleasures  and  pains  were  exclusively  those 
of  the  actor.  But  both  the  desirable  and  the  undesirable 
feelings  are  of  various  kinds,  making  quantitative  com- 
parisons difficult;  some  are  present  and  some  are  future, 
increasing  the  difficulty  of  quantitative  comparison;  some 
are  entailed  on  self  and  some  are  entailed  on  others ;  again 
increasing  the  difficulty.  So  that  the  guidance  yielded  by 
the  primary  principle  reached,  is  of  little  service  unless 
supplemented  by  the  guidance  of  secondary  principles. 

Already,  in  recognizing  the  needful  subordination  of 
presentative  feelings  to  representative  feelings,  and  the 
implied  postponement  of  present  to  future  throughout  a 
wide  range  of  cases,  some  approach  towards  a  secondary 
principle  of  guidance  has  been  made.  Already,  too,  in 
recognizing  the  limitations  which  men's  associated  state 
puts  to  their  actions,  with  the  implied  need  for  restraining 
feelings  of  some  kinds  by  feelings  of  other  kinds,  we  have 
come  in  sight  of  another  secondary  principle  of  guidance. 
Still,  there  remains  much  to  be  decided  respecting  the 
relative  claims  of  these  guiding  principles,  general  and 
special. 

Some  elucidation  of  the  questions  involved,  will  be 
obtained  by  here  discussing  certain  views  and  arguments 
set  forth  by  past  and  present  moralists. 

§  57.  Using  the  name  hedonism  for  that  ethical  theory 
which  makes  happiness  the  end  of  action ;  and  distinguish- 
ing hedonism  into  the  two  kinds,  egoistic  and  universalistic, 
according  as  the  happiness  sought  is  that  of  the  actor 
himself  or  is  that  of  all,  Mr.  Sidgwick  alleges  its  implied 
belief  to  be  that  pleasures  and  pains  are  commensurable. 
In  his  criticism  on  (empirical)  egoistic  hedonism  he  says : — 

"  The  fundamental  assumption  of  Hedonism,  clearly  stated,  is  that  all 
feelings  considered  merely  as  feelings  can  be  arranged  in  a  certain  scale  of 
desirability,  so  that  the  desirability  or  pleasantness  of  each  bears  a  definite 
ratio  to  that  of  all  the  others." — Methods  of  Ethics,  2nd  ed.  p.  115. 


152  .THE   DATA  OP   ETHICS. 

And  asserting  this  to  be  its  assumption,  he  proceeds  to 
point  out  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  hedonistic 
calculation;  apparently  for  the  purpose  of  implying  that 
these  difficulties  tell  against  the  hedonistic  theory. 

Now  though  it  may  be  shown  that  by  naming  the 
intensity,  the  duration,  the  certainty,  and  the  proximity,  of 
a  pleasure  or  a  pain,  as  traits  entering  into  the  estimation  of 
its  relative  value,  Bentham  has  committed  himself  to  the 
specified  assumption ;  and  though  it  is  perhaps  reasonably 
taken  for  granted  that  hedonism  as  represented  by  him, 
is  identical  with  hedonism  at  large ;  yet  it  seems  to  me  that 
the  hedonist,  empirical  or  other,  is  not  necessarily  committed 
to  this  assumption.  That  the  greatest  surplus  of  pleasures 
over  pains  ought  to  be  the  end  of  action,  is  a  belief  which 
he  may  still  consistently  hold  after  admitting  that  the 
valuations  of  pleasures  and  pains  are  commonly  vague 
and  often  erroneous.  He  may  say  that  though  indefinite 
things  do  not  admit  of  definite  measurements,  yet  approxi- 
mately true  estimates  of  their  relative  values  may  be  made 
when  they  differ  considerably  ;  and  he  may  further  say  that 
even  wlien  their  relative  values  are  not  determinable,  it 
remains  true  that  the  most  valuable  should  be  chosen.  Let 
us  listen  to  him. 

"  A  debtor  who  cannot  pay  me,  offers  to  compound  for  his 
debt  by  making  over  one  of  sundry  things  he  possesses — 
a  diamond  ornament,  a  silver  vase,  a  picture,  a  carriage. 
Other  questions  being  set  aside,  I  assert  it  to  be  my  pecu- 
niary interest  to  choose  the  most  valuable  of  these ;  but 
I  cannot  say  which  is  the  most  valuable.  Does  the  pro- 
position that  it  is  my  pecuniary  interest  to  choose  the  most 
valuable  therefore  become  doubtful  ?  Must  I  not  choose  as 
well  as  I  can ;  and  if  I  choose  wrongly  must  I  give  up  my 
ground  of  choice  ?  Must  I  infer  that  in  matters  of  business 
I  may  not  act  on  the  principle  that,  other  things  equal,  the 
more  profitable  transaction  is  to  be  preferred ;  because  in 
many   cases  I  cannot    say  which  is  the   more  profitable. 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  153 

and  have  often  chosen  the  less  profitable  ?  Because  I 
believe  that  of  many  dangerous  courses  I  ought  to  take  the 
least  dangerous,,  do  I  make  '  the  fundamental  assumption ' 
that  courses  can  be  arranged  according  to  a  scale  of 
dangerousness  ;  and  must  I  abandon  my  belief  if  I  cannot 
so  arrange  them  ?  If  I  am  not  by  consistency  bound  to  do 
this,  then  I  am  no  more  by  consistency  bound  to  give  up 
the  principle  that  the  greatest  surplus  of  pleasures  over 
pains  should  be  the  end  of  action,  because  the  ^  commen- 
surability  of  pleasures  and  pains'  cannot  be  asserted/^ 

At  the  close  of  his  chapters  on  empirical  hedonism, 
Mr.  Sidgwick  himself  says  he  does  "not  think  that  the 
common  experience  of  mankind,  impartially  examined,  really 
sustains  the  view  that  Egoistic  Hedonism  is  necessarily 
suicidal;''  adding,  however,  that  the  "uncertainty  of  hedon- 
istic calculation  cannot  be  denied  to  have  great  weight." 
But  here  the  fundamental  assumption  of  hedonism,  that 
happiness  is  the  end  of  action,  is  still  supposed  to  involve 
the  assumption  that  '^^Qelings  can  be  arranged  in  a  certain 
Rnn.]ft  of  dft!^ir?'bi1ity."  Thiswe  nave  seen  it  does  noF:  its 
fundamental  assumption  is  in  no  degree  invalidated  by  proof 
that  such  ari'angement  of  them  is  impracticable. 

To  Mr.  Sidgwick's  argument  there  is  the  further  objection, 
no  less  serious,  that  to  whatever  degree  it  tells  against 
egoistic  hedonism,  it  tells  in  a  greater  degree  against 
universalistic  hedonism,  or  utilitarianism.  He  admits  that 
it  tells  as  much ;  saying  *'  whatever  weight  is  to  be  attached 
to  the  objections  brought  against  this  assumption  [the  com- 
mensurability  of  pleasures  and  pains]  must  of  course  tell 
against  the  present  method."  Not  only  does  ii  tell,  but  it 
tells  in  a  double  way.  I  do  not  mean  merely  that,  as  he 
points  out,  the  assumption  becomes  greatly  complicated  if 
we  take  all  sentient  beings  into  account,  and  if  we  include 
posterity  along  with  existing  individuals.  I  mean  that, 
taking  as  the  end  to  be  achieved  the  greatest  happiness  of 
the  existing  individuals  forming  a  single  community,  the  set 


154j  the  data  op  ethics. 

of  difficulties  standing  in  the  way  of  egoistic  hedonism,  is 
compounded  with  another  set  of  difficulties  no  less  great, 
when  we  pass  from  it  to  universalistic  hedonism.  For  if  the 
dictates  of  universalistic  hedonism  are  to  be  fulfilled,  it 
must  be  under  the  guidance  of  individual  judgments,  or  of 
corporate  judgments,  or  of  both.  Now  any  one  of  such 
judgments  issuing  from  a  single  mind,  or  from  any  aggregate 
of  minds,  necessarily  embodies  conclusions  respecting  the 
happinesses  of  other  persons ;  few  of  them  known,  and  the 
great  mass  never  seen.  All  these  persons  have  natures 
differing  in  countless  ways  and  degrees  from  the  natures  of 
those  who  form  the  judgments;  and  the  happinesses  of 
which  they  are  severally  capable  differ  from  one  another, 
and  differ  from  the  happinesses  of  those  who  form  the  judg- 
ments. Consequently,  if  against  the  method  of  egoistic 
hedonism  there  is  the  objection  that  a  man's  own  pleasures 
and  pains,  unlike  in  their  kinds,  intensities,  and  times  of 
occurrence,  are  incommensurable  ;  then  against  the  method 
of  universalistic  hedonism  it  may  be  urged  that  to  the  in- 
commensurability of  each  judge's  own  pleasures  and  pains 
(which  he  must  use  as  standards)  has  now  to  be  added  the 
much  more  decided  incommensurability  of  the  pleasures  and 
pains  which  he  conceives  to  be  experienced  by  innumerable 
other  persons,  all  differently  constituted  from  himself  and 
from  one  another. 

Nay  more — there  is  a  triple  set  of  difficulties  in  the  way 
of  universalistic  hedonism.  To  the  double  indeterminateness 
of  the  end  has  to  be  added  the  indeterminateness  of  the 
means.  If  hedonism,  egoistic  or  universalistic,  is  to  pass 
from  dead  theory  into  living  practice,  acts  of  one  or  other 
kind  must  be  decided  on  to  achieve  proposed  objects  ;  and 
in  estimating  the  two  methods  we  have  to  consider  how  far 
the  fitness  of  the  acts  respectively  required  can  be  judged. 
If,  in  pursuing  his  own  ends,  the  individual  is  liable  to 
be  led  by  erroneous  opinions  to  adjust  his  acts  wrongly, 
much  more  liable  is  he  to  be  led  by  erroneous  opinions  to 


CEITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  155 

adjust  wrongly  more  complex  acts  to  th^  more  complex  ends 
constituted  by  other  men's  welfares.  It  is  so  if  he  operates 
singly  to  benefit  a  few  others ;  and  it  is  still  more  so  if  he 
co-operates  with  many  to  benefit  all.  Making  general 
happiness  the  immediate  object  of  pursuit,  implies  numerous 
and  complicated  instrumentalities  officered  by  thousands  of 
unseen  and  unlike  persons,  and  working  on  millions  of 
other  persons  unseen  and  unlike.  Even  the  few  factors  in 
this  immense  aggregate  of  appliances  and  processes  which 
are  known,  are  very  imperfectly  known ;  and  the  great  mass 
of  them  are  unknown.  So  that  even  supposing  valuation 
of  pleasures  and  pains  for  the  community  at  large  is  more 
practicable  than,  or  even  as  practicable  as,  valuation  of  his 
own  pleasures  and  pains  by  the  individual ;  yet  the  ruling  of 
conduct  with  a  view  to  the  one  end  is  far  more  difficult  than 
the  ruling  of  it  with  a  view  to  the  other.  Hence  if  the 
method  of  egoistic  hedonism  is  unsatisfactory,  far  more  un- 
satisfactory for  the  same  and  kindred  reasons,  is  the  method 
of  universalistic  hedonism,  or  utilitarianism. 

And  here  we  come  in  sight  of  the  conclusion  which  it 
has  been  the  purpose  of  the  foregoing  criticism  to  bring 
into  view.  The  objection  made  to  the  hedonistic  method 
contains  a  truth,  but  includes  with  it  an  untruth.  For 
while  the  proposition  that  happiness,  whether  individual  or 
general,  is  the  end  of  action,  is  not  invalidated  by  proof  that 
it  cannot  under  either  form  be  estimated  by  measurement 
of  its  components ;  yet  it  may  be  admitted  that  guidance 
in  the  pursuit  of  happiness  by  a  mere  balancing  of  pleasures 
and  pains,  is,  if  partially  practicable  throughout  a  certain 
range  of  conduct,  futile  throughout  a  much  wider  range.  It 
is  quite  consistent  to  assert  that  happiness  is  the  ultimate 
aim  of  action,  and  at  the  same  time  to  deny  that  it  can 
be  reached  by  making  it  the  immediate  aim.  I  go  with 
Mr.  Sidgwick  as  far  as  the  conclusion  that  ^*'we  must  at  least 
admit  the  desirability  of  confirming  or  correcting  the  results 
of  such  comparisons  [of  pleasures  and  pains]  by  any  other 


156  THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

method  upon  whicli  we  may  find  reason  to  rely  /^  and  I  tlien 
go  further,  and  say  that  throughout  a  large  part  of  conduct 
guidance  by  such  comparisons  is  to  be  entirely  set  aside  and 
replaced  by  other  guidance. 

§  58.  The  antithesis  here  insisted  upon  between  the 
hedonistic  end  considered  in  the  abstract,  and  the  method 
which  current  hedonism,  whether  egoistic  or  universalistic, 
associates  with  that  end ;  and  the  joining  acceptance  of  the 
one  with  rejection  of  the  other;  commits  us  to  an  overt 
discussion  of  these  two  cardinal  elements  of  ethical  theory. 
I  may  conveniently  initiate  this  discussion  by  criticizing 
another  of  Mr.  Sidgwick's  criticisms  on  the  method  of 
hedonism. 

Though  we  can  give  no  account  of  those  simple  pleasures 
which  the  senses  yield,  because  they  are  undecomposable,  yet 
we  distinctly  know  their  characters  as  states  of  consciousness. 
Conversely,  the  complex  pleasures  formed  by  compounding 
and  re- compounding  the  ideas  of  simple  pleasures,  though 
theoretically  resolvable  into  their  components,  are  not  easy 
to  resolve ;  and  in  proportion  as  they  are  heterogeneous  in 
composition,  the  difficulty  of  framing  intelligible  conceptions 
of  them  increases.  This  is  especially  the  case  with  the 
pleasures  which  accompany  our  sports.  Treating  of  these, 
along  with  the  pleasures  of  pursuit  in  general,  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  that  ^^  in  order  to  get  them  one  must 
forget  them,^'  Mr.  Sidgwick  remarks  : — 

"A  man  who  maintains  throughout  an  epicurean  mood,  fixing  his  aim  on 
his  own  pleasure,  does  not  catch  the  full  spirit  of  the  chase  ;  his  eagerness 
never  gets  just  the  sharpness  of  edge  which  imparts  to  the  pleasure  its  highest 
zest  and  flavour.  Here  comes  into  view  what  we  may  call  the  fundamental 
paradox  of  Hedonism,  that  the  impulse  towards  pleasure,  if  too  predominant, 
defeats  its  own  aim.  This  effect  is  not  visible,  or  at  any  rate  is  scarcely  visible, 
in  the  case  of  passive  sensual  pleasures.  But  of  our  active  enjoyments  gene- 
rally, whether  the  activities  on  which  they  attend  are  classed  as  '  bodily'  or  as 
*  intellectual'  (as  well  as  of  many  emotional  pleasures),  it  may  certainly  be  said 
that  we  cannot  attain  them,  at  least  in  their  best  form,  so  long  as  we  concentrate 
our  aim  on  them." — Methods  of  Ethics,  2nd  ed.  p.  41. 

Now  I  think  we  shall  not  regard  this  truth  as  paradoxical 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPIANATIONS.  157 

after  we  have  duly  analyzed  the  pleasure  of  pursuit.  The 
chief  components  of  this  pleasure  are; — first,  a  renewed 
consciousness  of  personal  efficiency  (made  vivid  by  actual 
success  and  partially  excited  by  impending  success)  which 
consciousness  of  personal  efficiency,  connected  in  expe- 
rience with  achieved  ends  of  every  kind,  arouses  a  vague 
but  massive  consciousness  of  resulting  gratifications ;  and, 
second,  a  representation  of  the  applause  which  recognition 
of  this  efficiency  by  others  has  before  brought,  and  will 
again  bring.  Games  of  skill  show  us  this  clearly.  Con- 
sidered as  an  end  in  itself,  the  good  cannon  which  a  billiard 
player  makes  yields  no  pleasure.  Whence  then  does  the 
pleasure  of  making  it  arise  ?  Partly  from  the  fresh  proof 
of  capability  which  the  player  gives  to  himself,  and  partly 
from  the  imagined  admiration  of  those  who  witness  the 
proof  of  his  capability :  the  last  being  the  chief,  since  he 
soon  tires  of  making  cannons  in  the  absence  of  witnesses. 
When  from  games  which,  yielding  the  pleasures  of  success, 
yield  no  pleasure  derived  from  the  end  considered  intrinsi- 
cally, we  pass  to  sports  in  which  the  end  has  intrinsic 
value  as  a  source  of  pleasure,  we  see  substantially  the  same 
thing.  Though  the  bird  which  the  sportsman  brings  down 
is  useful  as  food,  yet  his  satisfaction  arises  mainly  from 
having  made  a  good  shot,  and  from  having  added  to  the 
bag  which  will  presently  bring  praise  of  his  skill.  The 
gratification  of  self-esteem  he  immediately  experiences ;  and 
the  gratification  of  receiving  applause  he  experiences,  if  not 
immediately  and  in  full  degree,  yet  by  representation  ;  for 
the  ideal  pleasure  is  nothing  else  than  a  faint  revival  of  the 
real  pleasure.  These  two  kinds  of  agreeable  excitement 
present  in  the  sportsman  during  the  chase,  constitute  the 
mass  of  the  desires  stimulating  him  to  continue  it ;  for  all 
desires  are  nascent  forms  of  the  feelings  to  be  obtained  by 
the  efibrts  they  prompt.  And  though  while  seeking  more 
birds  these  representative  feelings  are  not  so  vividly  excited 
as    by  success    just    achieved,  yet    they   are   excited   by 


158  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

imaginations  of  further  successes;  and  so  make  enjoyable 
tlie  activities  constituting  tlie  pursuit.  Kecognizing,  then^ 
the  truth  that  the  pleasures  of  pursuit  are  much  more  those 
derived  from  the  efficient  use  of  means  than  those  derived 
from  the  end  itself^  we  see  that  ''the  fundamental  paradox 
of  hedonism'^  disappears. 

These  remarks  concerning  end  and  means,  and  the  pleasure 
accompanying  use  of  the  means  as  added  to  the  pleasure 
derived  from  the  end,  I  have  made  for  the  purpose  of 
drawing  attention  to  a  fact  of  profound  significance.  During 
evolution  there  has  been  a  superposing  of  new  and  more 
complex  sets  of  means  upon  older  and  simpler  sets  of  means ; 
and  a  superposing  of  the  pleasures  accompanying  the 
uses  of  these  successive  sets  of  means ;  with  the  result  that 
each  of  these  pleasures  has  itself  eventually  become  an  end. 
We  begin  with  a  simple  animal  which,  without  ancillary 
appliances,  swallows  such  food  as  accident  brings  in  its  way ; 
and  so,  as  we  may  assume,  stills  some  kind  of  craving. 
Here  we  have  the  primary  end  of  nutrition  with  its  accom- 
panying satisfaction,  in  their  simple  forms.  We  pass  to 
higher  types  having  jaws  for  seizing  and  biting — jaws  which 
thus,  by  their  actions,  facilitate  achievement  of  the  primary 
end.  On  observing  animals  furnished  with  these  organs, 
we  get  evidence  that  the  use  of  them  becomes  in  itself 
pleasurable  irrespective  of  the  end:  instance  a  squirrel,  which, 
apart  from  food  to  be  so  obtained,  delights  in  nibbling  every- 
thing it  gets  hold  of.  Turning  from  jaws  to  limbs  we  see 
that  these,  serving  some  creatures  for  pursuit  and  others 
for  escape,  similarly  yield  gratification  by  their  exercise ;  as 
in  lambs  which  skip  and  horses  which  prance.  How  the 
combined  use  of  limbs  and  jaws,  originally  subserving  the 
satisfaction  of  appetite,  grows  to  be  in  itself  pleasurable,  is 
daily  illustrated  in  the  playing  of  dogs.  For  that  throwing 
down  and  worrying  which,  when  prey  is  caught,  precedes 
eating,  is,  in  their  mimic  fights,  carried  by  each  as  far  as  he 
dares.     Coming  to  means  still  more  remote  from  the  end. 


^  CRITICISMS  AND   EXPLANATIONS.  159 

namely,  those  by  whicli  creatures  chased  are  caught,  we 
are  again  shown  by  dogs  that  when  no  creature  is  caught 
there  is  still  a  gratification  in  the  act  of  catching.  The 
eagerness  with  which  a  dog  runs  after  stones,  or  dances 
and  barks  in  anticipation  of  jumping  into  the  water  after  a 
stick,  proves  that  apart  from  the  satisfaction  of  appetite,  and 
apart  even  from  the  satisfaction  of  killing  prey,  there  is 
a  satisfaction  in  the  successful  pursuit  of  a  moving 
object.  Throughout,  then,  we  see  that  the  pleasure  attend- 
ant on  the  use  of  means  to  achieve  an  end,  itself  becomes 
an  end. 

Now  if  we  contemplate  these  as  phenomena  of  conduct  in 
general,  some  facts  worthy  of  note  may  be  discerned — facts 
which,  if  we  appreciate  their  significance,  will  aid  us  in 
developing  our  ethical  conceptions.  One  of  them 

is  that  among  the  successive  sets  of  means,  the  later 
are  the  more  remote  from  the  primary  end ;  are,  as  co- 
ordinating earlier  and  simpler  means,  the  more  complex; 
and  are  accompanied  by  feelings  which  are  more  repre- 
sentative. Another  fact  is  that  each  set  of  means', 
with  its  accompanying  satisfactions,  eventually  becomes  in 
its  turn  dependent  on  one  originating  later  than  itself. 
Before  the  gullet  swallows,  the  jaws  must  lay  hold ;  before 
the  jaws  tear  out  and  bring  within  the  grasp  of  the  gullet  a 
piece  fit  for  swallowing,  there  must  be  that  co-operation  of 
limbs  and  senses  required  for  killing  the  prey ;  before  this 
co-operation  can  take  place,  there  needs  the  much  longer 
co-operation  constituting  the  chase ;  and  even  before  this 
there  must  be  persistent  activities  of  limbs,  eyes,  and 
nose,  in  seeking  prey.  The  pleasure  attending  each  set 
of  acts,  while  making  possible  the  pleasure  attending  the  set 
of  acts  which  follows,  is  joined  with  a  representation  of  this 
subsequent  set  of  acts  and  its  pleasure,  and  of  the  others 
which  succeed  in  order;  so  that  along  with  the  feelings 
accompanying  the  search  for  prey,  are  partially  aroused 
the  feelings  accompanying  the  actual  chase,  the  actual  do- 


160  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

struction,  tlie  actual  devouring,  and  the  eventual  satisfaction 
of  appetite.  A  tliird  fact  is  tliat  the  use  of  each  set  of 

means  in  due  order,  constitutes  an  obligation.  Mainte- 
nance of  its  life  being  regarded  as  the  end  of  its  conduct, 
the  creature  is  obliged  to  use  in  succession  the  means  of 
finding  prey,  the  means  of  catching  prey,  the  means  of 
killing  prey,  the  means  of  devouring  prey.  Lastly, 

it  follows  that  though  the  assuaging  of  hunger,  directly 
associated  with  sustentation,  remains  to  the  last  the 
ultimate  end ;  yet  the  successful  use  of  each  set  of  means 
in  its  turn  is  the  proximate  end — the  end  which  takes 
temporary  precedence  in  authoritativeness. 

§  59.  The  relations  between  means  and  ends  thus  traced 
throughout  the  earlier  stages  of  evolving  conduct,  are 
traceable  throughout  later  stages ;  and  hold  true  of  human 
conduct,  up  even  to  its  highest  forms.  As  fast  as,  for  the 
better  maintenance  of  life,  the  simpler  sets  of  means  and  the 
pleasures  accompanying  the  uses  of  them,  come  to  be 
supplemented  by  the  more  complex  sets  of  means  and  their 
pleasures,  these  begin  to  take  precedence  in  time  and  in 
imperativeness.  To  use  effectually  each  more  complex  set 
of  means  becomes  the  proximate  end,  and  the  accom- 
panying feeling  becomes  the  immediate  gratification  sought ; 
though  there  maybe,  and  habitually  is,  an  associated  conscious- 
ness of  the  remoter  ends  and  remoter  gratifications  to 
be  obtained.     An  example  will  make  clear  the  parallelism. 

Absorbed  in  his  business  the  trader,  if  asked  what  is  his 
main  end,  will  say — making  money.  He  readily  grants  that 
achievement  of  this  end  is  desired  by  him  in  furtherance  of 
ends  beyond  it.  He  knows  that  in  directly  seeking  money 
he  is  indirectly  seeking  food,  clothes,  house-room,  and  the 
comforts  of  life  for  self  and  family.  But  while  admitting  that 
money  is  but  a  means  to  these  ends,  he  urges  that  the  money- 
getting  actions  precede  in  order  of  time  and  obligation,  the 
various   actions   and   concomitant  pleasures   subserved  by 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  161 

them;  and  lie  testifies  to  the  fact  that  making  money  has 
become  itself  an  end,  and  success  in  it  a  source  of  satis- 
faction, apart  from  these  more  distant  ends.  Again, 
on  observing  more  closely  the  trader's  proceedings,  we  find 
that  though  to  the  end  of  living  comfortably  he  gets  money, 
and  though  to  the  end  of  getting  money  he  buys  and  sells 
at  a  profit,  which  so  becomes  a  means  more  immediately 
pursued,  yet  he  is  chiefly  occupied  with  means  still  more 
remote  from  ultimate  ends,  and  in  relation  to  which  even  the 
seUing  at  a  profit  becomes  an  end.  For  leaving  to  subor- 
dinates the  actual  measuring  out  of  goods  and  receiving  of 
proceeds,  he  busies  himself  mainly  with  his  general  afiairs — 
inquiries  concerning  markets,  judgments  of  future  prices, 
calculations,  negotiations,  coiTespondence  :  the  anxiety  from 
hour  to  hour  being  to  do  well  each  one  of  these  things 
indirectly  conducive  to  the  making  of  profits.  And  these 
ends  precede  in  time  and  obligation  the  efi'ecting  of  profitable 
sales,  just  as  the  efiecting  of  profitable  sales  precedes  the 
end  of  money-making,  and  just  as  the  end  of  money-making 
precedes  the  end  of  satisfactory  living.  His  book- 
keeping best  exemplifies  the  principle  at  large.  Entries 
to  the  debtor  or  creditor  sides  are  being  made  all  through 
the  day ;  the  items  are  classified  and  arranged  in  such  way 
that  at  a  moment's  notice  the  state  of  each  account  may  be 
ascertained ;  and  then,  from  time  to  time,  the  books  are 
balanced,  and  it  is  required  that  the  result  shall  come  right 
to  a  penny  :  satisfaction  following  proved  correctness,  and 
annoyance  being  caused  by  error.  If  you  ask  why  all  this 
elaborate  process,  so  remote  from  the  actual  getting  of 
money,  and  still  more  remote  from  the  enjoyments  of  life, 
the  answer  is  that  keeping  accounts  correctly  is  fulfilling  a 
condition  to  the  end  of  money-making,  and  becomes  in 
itself  a  proximate  end — a  duty  to  be  discharged,  that  there 
may  be  discharged  the  duty  of  getting  an  income,  that 
there  may  be  discharged  the  duty  of  maintaining  self,  wife, 
and  children. 


162  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

ApproacLing  as  we  here  do  to  moral  obligation,  are 
we  not  sliown  its  relations  to  conduct  at  large  ?  Is  it  not  / 
clear  that  observance  of  moral  principles  is  fulfilment  of 
certain  general  conditions  to  the  successful  carrying  on 
of  special  activities  ?  That  the  trader  may  prosper,  he 
must  not  only  keep  his  books  correctly,  but  must  pay  those 
he  employs  according  to  agreement,  and  must  meet  his 
engagements  with  creditors.  May  we  not  say,  then,  that! 
conformity  to  the  second  and  third  of  these  requirements  is, 
like  conformity  to  the  first,  an  indirect  means  to  effectual 
use  of  the  more  direct  means  of  achieving  welfare  ?  May 
we  not  say,  too,  that  as  the  use  of  each  more  indirect  means 
in  due  order  becomes  itself  an  end,  and  a  source  of  gratifica- 
tion ;  so,  eventually,  becomes  the  use  of  this  most  indirect 
means  ?  And  may  we  not  infer  that  though  conformity  to 
moral  requirements  precedes  in  imperativeness  conformity  ^ 
to  other  requirements ;  yet  that  this  imperativeness  arises 
from  the  fact  that  fulfilment  of  the  other  requirements,  by 
self  or  others  or  both,  is  thus  furthered  ? 

§  60.  This  question  brings  us  round  to  another  side  of  the 
issue  before  raised.  When  alleging  that  empirical  utili- 
tarianism is  but  introductory  to  rational  utilitarianism,  I 
pointed  out  that  the  last  does  not  take  welfare  for  its  im- 
mediate object  of  pursuit,  but  takes  for  its  immediate  object 
of  pursuit  conformity  to  certain  principles  which,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  causally  determine  welfare.  And  now  we  see  that 
this  amounts  to  recognition  of  that  law,  traceable  throughout 
the  evolution  of  conduct  in  general,  that  each  later  and 
higher  order  of  means  takes  precedence  in  time  and  authori- 
tativeness  of  each  earlier  and  lower  order  of  means.  The 
contrast  between  the  ethical  methods  thus  distinguished, 
made  tolerably  clear  by  the  above  illustrations,  will  be  made 
still  clearer  by  contemplating  the  two  as  put  in  opposition 
by  the  leading  exponent  of  empirical  utilitarianism.  Treat- 
ing of  legislative  aims,  Bentham  writes  : — 


CRITICISMS   AND    EXPLANATIONS.  163 

"  But  justice,  what  is  it  that  we  are  to  understand  by  justice  :  and  why  not 
happiness  but  justice  ?  What  happiness  is,  every  man  knows,  because,  what 
pleasure  is,  every  man  knows,  and  what  pain  is,  every  man  knows.  But  what 
justice  is, — this  is  what  on  every  occasion  is  the  subject-matter  of  dispute.  Be 
the  meaning  of  the  word  justice  what  it  will,  what  regard  is  it  entitled  to 
otherwise  than  as  a  means  of  happiness."* 

Let  US  first  consider  the  assertion  here  made  respecting 
the  relative  intelligibilities  of  these  two  ends ;  and  let 
us  afterwards  consider  what  is  implied  by  the  choice  of 
happiness  instead  of  justice. 

Bentham's  positive  assertion  that  "what  happiness  is 
every  man  knows,  because,  what  pleasure  is,  every  man 
knows,''  is  met  by  counter-assertions  equally  positive. 
"  Who  can  tell,''  asks  Plato,  ^'  what  pleasure  really  is,  or 
know  it  in  its  essence,  except  the  philosopher,  who  alone 
is  conversant  with  realities. "f  Aristotle,  too,  after  com- 
menting on  the  different  opinions  held  by  the  vulgar,  by 
the  political,  by  the  contemplative,  says  of  happiness  that 
"  to  some  it  seems  to  be  virtue,  to  others  prudence,  and 
to  others  a  kind  of  wisdom :  to  some  again,  these,  or  some 
one  of  these,  with  pleasure,  or  at  least,  not  without  pleasure; 
others  again,  include  external  prosperity." J  And  Aristotle, 
like  Plato,  comes  to  the  remarkable  conclusion  that  the 
pleasures  of  the  intellect,  reached  by  the  contemplative 
life,  constitute  the  highest  happiness  !  §  How 

disagreements  concerning  the  nature  of  happiness  and 
the  relative  values  of  pleasures,  thus  exhibited  in  ancient 
times,  continue  down  to  modern  times,  is  shown  in 
Mr.  Sidgwick's  discussion  of  egoistic  hedonism,  above 
commented  upon.  Further,  as  was  pointed  out  before,  the 
indefiniteness  attending  the  estimations  of  pleasures  and 
pains,  which  stands  in  the  way  of  egoistic  hedonism  as 
ordinarily  conceived,  is  immensely  increased  on  passing  to 
universalistio  hedonism  as  ordinarily  conceived;   since  its 

*  Constitutional  Code,  chap,  xvi,  Supreme  Legislative— Section  vi,  Omni- 
competence. 
t  Bepuhlic,  Bk.  ix.    J  Nicomachean  EtJiics,  Bk.  i.  chap.  8.    §  Bk.  x,  chap.  7. 


104  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

theory  implies  that  the  imagined  pleasures  and  pains  of 
others  are  to  be  estimated  by  the  help  of  these  pleasures 
and  pains  of  self,  already  so  difficult  to  estimate.  And  that 
anyone  after  observing  the  various  pursuits  into  which  some 
eagerly  enter  but  which  others  shun,  and  after  listening 
to  the  different  opinions  concerning  the  likeableness  of  this 
or  that  occupation  or  amusement,  expressed  at  every  table, 
should  assert  that  the  nature  of  happiness  can  be  fully 
agreed  upon,  so  as  to  render  it  a  fit  end  for  direct  legislative 
action,  is  surprising. 

The  accompanying  proposition  that  justice  is  unin- 
telligible as  an  end,  is  no  less  surprising.  Though  primitive 
men  have  no  words  for  either  happiness  or  justice;  yet 
even  among  them  an  approach  to  the  conception  of  justice 
is  traceable.  The  law  of  retaliation,  requiring  that  a 
death  inflicted  by  one  tribe  on  another,  shall  be  balanced 
by  the  death  either  of  the  murderer  or  some  member  of 
his  tribe,  shows  us  in  a  vague  shape  that  notion  of  equal- 
ness  of  treatment  which  forms  an  essential  element  in 
it.  When  we  come  to  early   races  who   have 

given  their  thoughts  and  feelings  literary  form,  we  find 
this  conception  of  justice,  as  involving  equalness  of  action, 
becoming  distinct.  Among  the  Jews,  David  expressed  in 
words  this  association  of  ideas  when,  praying  to  God  to  ''hear 
the  right,"  he  said — ''  Let  my  sentence  come  forth  from  thy 
presence  ;  let  thine  eyes  behold  the  things  that  are  equal  ;'^ 
as  also,  among  early  Christians,  did  Paul  when  to  the  Colos- 
sians  he  wrote — "  Masters,  give  unto  your  servants  that  which 
is  just  and  equal.''  Commenting  on  the  difi'erent  meanings 
of  justice,  Aristotle  concludes  that  ''  the  just  will  therefore 
be  the  lawful  and  the  equal ;  and  the  unjust  the  unlawful 
and  the  unequal.  But  since  the  unjust  man  is  also  one  who 
takes  more  than  his  share,''  &c.  And  that  justice  was  simi- 
larly conceived  by  the  Romans  they  proved  by  including 
under  it  such  meanings  as  exact,  proportionate,  impartial, 
severally  implying  fairness  of   division;    and    still   better 


CEITICISMS  AND    EXPLANATIONS.  165 

by  identification  of  it  with  equity,  wliicli  ia  a  derivative 
of  cequus:  the  word  cequus  itself  having  for  one  of  its 
meanings  just   or   impartial.  This  coincidence   of 

view  among  ancient  peoples  respecting  the  nature  of 
justice,  has  extended  to  modern  peoples  ;  who  by  a  general 
agreement  in  certain  cardinal  principles  which  their  systems 
of  law  embody,  forbidding  direct  aggressions,  which  are 
forms  of  unequal  actions,  and  forbidding  indirect  aggressions 
by  breaches  of  contract,  which  are  other  forms  of  unequal 
actions,  one  and  all  show  us  the  identification  of  justice 
with  equalness.  Bentham,  then,  is  wrong  when  he  says — 
*'But  what  justice  is, — this  is  what  on  every  occasion 
is  the  subject-matter  of  dispute."  He  is  more  wrong, 
indeed,  than  has  thus  far  appeared.  For,  in  the  first 
place,  he  misrepresents  utterly  by  ignoring  the  fact  that 
in  ninety-nine  out  of  every  hundred  daily  transactions 
between  men,  no  dispute  about  justice  arises;  but  the 
business  done  is  recognized  on  both  sides  as  justly  done. 
And  in  the  second  place  if,  with  respect  to  the  hundredth 
transaction  there  is  a  dispute,  the  subject  matter  of  it  is  not 
'^what  justice  is,"  for  it  is  admitted  to  be  equity  or 
equalness ;  but  the  subject  matter  of  dispute  always  is — 
what,  under  these  particular  circumstances,  constitutes 
equalness  ? — a  widely  different  question. 

It  is  not  then  self-evident,  as  Bentham  alleges,  that 
happiness  is  an  intelligible  end  while  justice  is  not ;  but, 
contrariwise,  examination  makes  evident  the  greater  in- 
telligibility of  justice  as  an  en  (J.  And  analysis  shows  why 
it  is  the  more  intelligible..  For  justice,  or  equity,  or  equal- 
ness, is  concerned  exclusively  with  quantihj  under  stated 
conditions;  whereas  happiness  is  concerned  with  both 
quantity  and  quality  under  conditions  not  stated.  When,  as 
in  case  of  theft,  a  benefit  is  taken  while  no  equivalent 
benefit  is  yielded — when,  as  in  case  of  adulterated  goods 
bought  or  base  coin  paid,  that  which  is  agreed  to  be 
given  in  exchange  as  of  equal  value  is  not  given^  but  some- 


166  THE   DATA  OF   ETHICS. 

thing  of  less  value — when,  as  in  case  of  broken  contract,  the 
obligation  on  one  side  has  been  discharged  while  there  has 
been  no  discharge,  or  incomplete  discharge,  of  the  obligation 
on  the  other ;  we  see  that,  the  circumstances  being  specified, 
the  injustice  complained  of  refers  to  the  relative  amounts 
of  actions,  or  products,  or  benefits,  the  natures  of  which 
are  recognized  only  so  far  as  is  needful  for  saying 
whether  as  much  has  been  given,  or  done,  or  allowed,  by 
each  concerned,  as  was  implied  by  tacit  or  overt  understand- 
ing to  be  an  equivalent.  But  when  the  end  proposed  is 
happiness,  the  circumstances  remaining  U7ispecified,  the 
problem  is  that  of  estimating  both  quantities  and  qualities, 
unhelped  by  any  such  definite  measures  as  acts  of  exchange 
imply,  or  as  contracts  imply,  or  as  are  implied  by  the 
difierences  between  the  doings  of  one  aggressing  and 
one  aggressed  upon.  The  mere  fact  that  Bentham  himself 
includes  as  elements  in  the  estimation  of  each  pleasure 
or  pain,  its  intensity,  duration,  certainty,  and  proximity, 
suffices  to  show  how  difficult  is  this  problem.  And  when 
it  is  remembered  that  all  pleasures  and  pains,  not  felt  in 
particular  cases  only  but  in  the  aggregate  of  cases,  and 
severally  regarded  under  these  four  aspects,  have  to  be 
compared  with  one  another  and  their  relative  values  deter- 
mined, simply  by  introspection ;  it  will  be  manifest  both 
that  the  problem  is  complicated  by  the  addition  of  indefinite 
judgments  of  qualities  to  indefinite  measures  of  quantities, 
and  that  it  is  further  complicated  by  the  multitudinous- 
ness  of  these  vague  estimations  to  be  gone  through  and 
summed  up. 

But  now  passing  over  this  assertion  of  Bentham  that 
happiness  is  a  more  intelligible  end  than  justice,  which  we 
find  to  be  the  reverse  of  truth,  let  us  note  the  several 
implications  of  the  doctrine  that  the  supreme  legislative 
body  ought  to  make  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest 
number  its  immediate  aim. 

It  implies,   in  the  first  place,   that  happiness  may  be 


CRITICISMS   AND    EXPLANATIONS.  167 

compassed  by  methods  framed  directly  for  tlie  purpose, 
without  any  previous  inquiry  respecting  the  conditions  that 
must  be  fulfilled ;  and  this  pre-supposes  a  belief  that  there 
are  no  such  conditions.  For  if  there  are  any  conditions 
without  fulfilment  of  which  happiness  cannot  be  compassed, 
then  the  first  step  must  be  to  ascertain  these  conditions 
with  a  view  to  fulfilling  them  ;  and  to  admit  this  is  to  admit 
that  not  happiness  itself  must  be  the  immediate  end,  but 
fulfilment  of  the  conditions  to  its  attainment  must  be  the 
immediate  end.  The  alternatives  are  simple  : — Either  the 
achievement  of  happiness  is  not  conditional,  in  which  case 
one  mode  of  action  is  as  good  as  another,  or  it  is  conditional, 
in  which  case  the  required  mode  of  action  must  be  the  direct 
aim  and  not  the  happiness  to  be  achieved  by  it. 

Assuming  it  conceded,  as  it  will  be,  that  there  exist 
conditions  which  must  be  fulfilled  before  happiness  can  be 
attained,  let  us  next  ask  what  is  implied  by  proposing 
modes  of  so  controlling  conduct  as  to  further  happiness, 
without  previously  inquiring  whether  any  such  modes  are 
already  known  ?  The  implication  is  that  human  intelligence 
throughout  the  past,  operating  on  experiences,  has  failed 
to  discover  any  such  modes ;  whereas  present  human 
intelligence  may  be  expected  forthwith  to  discover  them. 
Unless  this  be  asserted,  it  must  be  admitted  that  certain  con- 
ditions to  the  achievement  of  happiness  have  already  been 
partially,  if  not  wholly,  ascertained;  and  if  so,  om'  first 
business  should  be  to  look  for  them.  Having  found  them, 
our  rational  course  is  to  bring  existing  intelligence  to 
bear  on  these  products  of  past  intelligence,  with  the 
expectation  that  it  will  verify  the  substance  of  them  while 
possibly  correcting  the  form.  But  to  suppose  that  no 
regulative  principles  for  the  conduct  of  associated  human 
beings  have  thus  far  been  established,  and  that  they  are  now 
to  be  established  de  novo,  is  to  suppose  that  man  as  he  is 
differs  from  man  as  he  was  in  an  incredible  degree. 

Beyond  ignoring  the  probability,  or  rather  the  certainty. 


168  THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

that  past  experience  generalized  by  past  intelligence^  must 
by  this  time  have  disclosed  partially,  if  not  wholly,  some  of 
the  essential  conditions  to  the  achievement  of  happiness, 
Bentham's  proposition  ignores  the  formulated  knowledge 
of  them  actually  existing.  For  whence  come  the  conception 
of  justice  and  the  answering  sentiment.  He  will  scarcely 
say  that  they  are  meaningless,  although  his  proposition 
implies  as  much ;  and  if  he  admits  that  they  have  mean- 
ings, he  must  choose  between  two  alternatives  either  of 
which  is  fatal  to  his  hypothesis.  Are  they  super  naturally- 
caused  modes  of  thinking  and  feeling,  tending  to  make  men 
fulfil  the  conditions  to  happiness  ?  If  so  their  authority  is 
peremptory.  Are  they  modes  of  thinking  and  feeling 
naturally  caused  in  men  by  experience  of  these  condi- 
tions ?  If  so,  their  authority  is  no  less  peremptory.  Not 
only,  then,  does  Bentham  fail  to  infer  that  certain  prin- 
ciples of  guidance  must  by  this  time  have  been  ascertained, 
but  he  refuses  to  recognize  these  principles  as  actually 
reached  and  present  to  him. 

And  then  after  all,  he  tacitly  admits  that  which  he  overtly 
denies,  by  saying  that — "  Be  the  meaning  of  the  word 
justice  what  it  will,  what  regard  is  it  entitled  to  otherwise 
than  as  a  means  to  happiness  V  For  if  justice  is  a  means 
having  happiness  as  its  end,  then  justice  must  take  prece- 
dence of  happiness,  as  every  other  means  takes  precedence 
of  every  other  end.  Bentham' s  own  elaborate  polity  is  a 
means  having  happiness  as  its  end,  as  justice  is,  by  his 
own  admission,  a  means  having  happiness  as  an  end.  If, 
then,  we  may  properly  skip  justice,  and  go  directly  to 
the  end  happiness,  we  may  properly  skip  Bentham's  polity, 
and  go  directly  to  the  end  happiness.  In  short,  we  are 
led  to  the  remarkable  conclusion  that  in  all  cases  we 
must  contemplate  exclusively  the  end  and  must  disregard 
the  means. 

§  61  This  relation  of  ends  to  means,  underlying  all  ethical 


CRITICISMS   AND    EXPfljmftlONS.  169 

speculation,  will  be  further  elucida^3^g£^H3IW$  with, 
some  of  the  above  conclusions^  certain  conclusionsdrawn 
in  the  last  chapter.  We  shall  see  that  while  greatest  hap- 
piness may  vary  widely  in  societies  which_,  though  ideally 
constituted,  are  subject  to  unlike  physical  circumstances, 
certain  fundamental  conditions  to  the  achievement  of  this 
greatest  happiness,  are  common  to  all  such  societies. 

Given  a  people  inhabiting  a  tract  which  makes  nomadic 
habits  necessary,  and  the  happiness  of  each  individual  will 
be  greatest  when  his  nature  is  so  moulded  to  the  require- 
ments of  his  life,  that  all  his  faculties  find  their  due  activities 
in  daily  driving  and  tending  cattle,  milking,  migrating,  and 
so  forth.  The  members  of  a  community  otherwise  similar, 
which  is  permanently  settled,  will  severally  achieve  their 
greatest  happiness  when  their  natures  have  become  such  that 
a  fixed  habitat,  and  the  occupations  necessitated  by  it,  supply 
the  spheres  in  which  each  instinct  and  emotion  is  exercised 
and  brings  the  concomitant  pleasure.  The  citizens  of  a  large 
nation  industrially  organized,  have  reached  their  possible 
ideal  of  happiness,  when  the  producing,  distributing,  and 
other  activities,  are  such  in  their  kinds  and  amounts,  that  each 
citizen  finds  in  them  a  place  for  all  his  energies  and  aptitudes, 
while  he  obtains  the  means  of  satisfying  all  his  desires. 
Once  more  we  may  recognize  as  not  only  possible  but  pro- 
bable, the  eventual  existence  of  a  community,  also  industrial, ' 
the  members  of  which,  having  natures  similarly  responding 
to  these  requirements,  are  also  characterized  by  dominant 
aesthetic  faculties,  and  achieve  complete  happiness  only 
when  a  large  part  of  life  is  filled  with  aesthetic  activities. 
Evidently  these  difierent  types  of  men,  with  their  difi"erent 
standards  of  happiness,  each  finding  the  possibility  of  that 
happiness  in  his  own  society,  would  not  find  it  if  transferred 
to  any  of  the  other  societies.  Evidently  though  they  might 
have  in  common  such  kinds  of  happiness  as  accompany 
the  satisfaction  of  vital  needs,  they  would  not  have  in  common 
sundry  other  kinds  of  happiness. 


170  THE   DATA  OF   ETHICS. 

But  now  mark  that  while,  to  achieve  greatest  happiness 
in  each  of  such  societies,  the  special  conditions  to  be  fulfilled 
must  differ  from  those  to  be  fulfilled  in  the  other  societies, 
certain  general  conditions  must  be  fulfilled  in  all  the  societies. 
Harmonious  co-operation,  by  which  alone  in  any  of  them 
the  greatest  happiness  can  be  attained,  is,  as  we  saw, 
made  possible  only  by  respect  for  one  another's  claims : 
there  must  be  neither  those  direct  aggressions  which  we 
class  as  crimes  against  person  and  property,  nor  must  there 
be  those  indirect  aggressions  constituted  by  breaches  of  con- 
tracts. So  that  maintenance  of  equitable  relations  between 
men,  is  the  condition  to  attainment  of  greatest  happiness 
in  all  societies;  however  much  the  greatest  happiness 
attainable  in  each  may  differ  in  nature,  or  amount,  or  both. 

And  here  a  physical  analogy  may  fitly  be  used  to  give  the 
greatest  definiteness  to  this  cardinal  truth.  A  mass  of 
matter  of  whatever  kind,  maintains  its  state  of  internal 
equilibrium,  so  long  as  its  component  particles  severally  stand 
towards  their  neighbours  in  equi-distant  positions.  Accept- 
ing the  conclusions  of  modern  physicists,  which  imply 
that  each  molecule  moves  rhythmically,  then  a  balanced 
state  implies  that  each  performs  its  movements  within  a 
space  bounded  by  the  like  spaces  required  for  the  move- 
ments of  those  around.  If  the  molecules  have  been  so 
aggregated  that  the  oscillations  of  some  are  more  restrained 
than  the  oscillations  of  others,  there  is  a  proportionate  insta- 
bility. If  the  number  of  them  thus  unduly  restrained  is 
considerable,  the  instability  is  such  that  the  cohesion  in  some 
part  is  liable  to  fail,  and  a  crack  results.  If  the  excesses  of 
restraint  are  great  and  multitudinous,  a  trifling  disturbance 
causes  the  mass  to  break  up  into  small  fragments.  To 
which  add  that  the  recognized  remedy  for  this  unstable  state, 
is  an  exposure  to  such  physical  condition  (ordinarily  high 
temperature)  as  enables  the  molecules  so  to  change  their 
relative  positions  that  their  mutual  restraints  become 
equal  on  all  sides.     And  now  observe  that  this  holds  what- 


CRITICISMS   AND   EXPLANATIONS.  171 

ever  be  the  natures  of  the  molecules.  They  may  be  simple; 
they  may  be  compound ;  they  may  be  composed  of  this  or 
that  matter  in  this  or  that  way.  In  other  words,  the  special 
activities  of  each  molecule,  constituted  by  the  relative  move- 
ments of  its  units,  may  be  various  in  their  kinds  and  degrees ; 
and  yet,  be  they  what  they  may,  it  remains  true  that  to 
preserve  internal  equilibrium  throughout  the  mass  of  mole- 
cules, the  mutual  limitations  of  their  activities  must  be 
everywhere  alike. 

And  this  is  the  above-described  pre-requisite  to  social 
equilibrium,  whatever  the  special  natures  of  the  associated 
persons.  Assuming  that  within  each  society  such  persons  are 
of  the  same  type,  needing  for  the  fulfilment  of  their  several 
lives  kindred  activities,  and  though  these  activities  may  be 
of  one  kind  in  one  society  and  of  another  kind  in  another,  so 
admitting  of  indefinite  variation,  this  condition  to  social 
equiUbrium  does  not  admit  of  variation.  It  must  be  fulfilled 
before  complete  life,  tliat  is  greatest  happiness,  can  be 
attained  in  any  society ;  be  the  particular  quahty  of  that  life, 
or  that  happiness,  what  it  may.  * 

§  62.  After  thus  observing  how  means  and  ends  in  conduct 
stand  to  one  another,  and  how  there  emerge  certain  con- 
clusions respecting  their  relative  claims,  we  may  see  a  way 
to  reconcile  sundry  conflicting  ethical  theories.  These 
severally  embody  portions  of  the  truth ;  and  simply  require 
combining  in  proper  order  to  embody  the  whole  truth. 

The  theological  theory  contains  a  part.  If  for  the  divine 
will,  supposed  to  be  supernaturally  revealed,  we  substitute 
the  naturally -revealed  end  towards  which  the  Power  mani- 
fested throughout  Evolution  works ;  then,  since  Evolution 
has  been,  and  is  still,  working  towards  the  highest  life,  it 
follows  that  conforming  to  those  principles  by  which  the 
highest  life  is  achieved,  is  furthering  that  end.    The  doctrine 

*  This  universal  requirement  it  was  which  I  had  in  view  when,  choosing  for 
my  first  work,  published  in  1850,  the  title  Social  Statics. 


172  THE    DATA   OP    ETHICS. 

that  perfection  or  excellence  of  nature  should  be  the  object 
of  pursuit,  is  in  one  sense  true ;  for  it  tacitly  recognizes 
that  ideal  form  of  being  which  the  highest  life  implies,  and 
to  which  Evolution  tends.  There  is  a  truth,  also,  in  the  doc- 
trine that  virtue  must  be  the  aim ;  for  this  is  another  form 
of  the  doctrine  that  the  aim  must  be  to  fulfil  the  conditions 
to  achievement  of  the  highest  life.  That  the  intuitions  of  a 
moral  faculty  should  guide  our  conduct,  is  a  proposition  in 
which  a  truth  is  contained ;  for  these  intuitions  are  the  slowly 
organized  results  of  experiences  received  by  the  race  while  . 
living  in  presence  of  these  conditions.  And  that  happiness  is 
the  supreme  end  is  beyond  question  true ;  for  this  is  the 
concomitant  of  that  highest  life  which  every  theory  of 
moral  guidance  has  distinctly  or  vaguely  in  view. 

So  understanding  their  relative  positions,  those  ethical 
systems  which  make  virtue,  right,  obligation,  tbe  cardinal 
aims,  are  seen  to  be  complementary  to  those  ethical  systems 
which  make  welfare,  pleasure,  happiness,  the  cardinal  aims. 
Though  the  moral  sentiments  generated  in  civilized  men  by 
daily  contact  with  social  conditions  and  gradual  adaptation 
to  them,  are  indispensable  as  incentives  and  deterrents; 
and  though  the  intuitions  corresponding  to  these  senti- 
ments, have,  in  virtue  of  their  origin,  a  general  authority  to 
be  reverently  recognized ;  yet  the  sympathies  and  antipathies 
hence  originating,  together  with  the  intellectual  expressions 
of  them,  are,  in^  their  primitive  forms,  necessarily  vague. 
To  make  guidance  by  them  adequate  to  all  requirements, 
their  dictates  have  to  be  interpreted  and  made  definite  by 
science ;  to  which  end  there  must  be  analysis  of  those 
conditions  to  complete  living  which  they  respond  to,  and 
from  converse  with  which  they  have  arisen.  And  such 
analysis  necessitates  the  recognition  of  happiness  for  each 
and  all,  as  the  end  to  be  achieved  by  fulfilment  of  these, 
conditions. 

Hence,  recognizing  in  due  degrees  all  the  various  ethical 
theories,  conduct  in   its  highest  form  will  take  as  guides. 


CRITICISMS   AND  EXPLANATIONS.  173 

innate  perceptions  of  right  duly  enlightened  and  made 
precise  by  an  analytic  intelligence  ;  while  conscious  that 
these  guides  are  proximately  supreme  solely  because  they 
lead  to  the  ultimately  supreme  end,  happiness  special  and 
general. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  RELATIVITY  OF  PAINS  AND  PLEASURES. 

§  63.  A  truth  of  cardinal  importance  as  a  datum  of 
Ethics,  whicli  was  incidentally  referred  to  in  the  last 
chapter,  must  here  be  set  forth  at  full  length.  I  mean 
the  truth  that  not  only  men  of  different  races,  but  also 
different  men  -of  the  same  race,  and  even  the  same  men 
at  different  periods  of  life,  have  different  standards  of 
happiness.  Though  there  is  some  recognition  of  this  by 
moralists,  the  recognition  is  inadequate ;  and  the  far- 
reaching  conclusions  to  be  drawn  when  the  relativity  of 
happiness  is  fully  recognized,  are  scarcely  suspected. 

It  is  a  belief  universal  in  early  life — ^a-  belief  which  in 
most  people  is  but  partially  corrected  in  later  life,  and  in 
very  few  wholly  dissipated — that  there  is  something 
intrinsic  in  the  pleasantness  of  certain  things,  while 
other  things  are  intrinsically  unpleasant.  The  error  is 
analogous  to,  and  closely  allied  with,  the  error  crude  reahsm 
makes.  Just  as  to  the  uncultured  mind  it  appears  self- 
evident  that  the  sweetness  of  sugar  is  inherent  in  sugar, 
that  sound  as  we  perceive  it  is  sound  as  it  exists  in  the 
external  world,  and  that  the  warmth  from  a  fire  is  in 
itself  what  it  seems;  so  does  it  appear  self-evident  that 
the  sweetness  of  sugar  is  necessarily  grateful,  that  there 
is  in  a  beautiful  sound  something  that  must  be  beautiful 
to  all  creatures,  and   that  the  agreeable  feeling  produced 


THE    RELATIVITY   OP   PAINS   AND    PLEASURES.  175 

by  warm  til  is   a  feeling  which  every  other  consciousness 
must  find  agreeable. 

But  as  criticism  proves  the  one  set  of  conclusions  to 
be  wrong,  so  does  it  prove  to  be  wrong  the  other  set. 
Not  only  are  the  qualities  of  external  things  as  intel^^  - 
lectually  apprehended  by  us,  relative  to  our  own  organisms ; 
but  the  pleasurableness  or  painfulness  of  the  feelings  which 
we  associate  with  such  qualities,  are  also  relative  to  our  own 
organisms.  They  are  so  in  a  double  sense-— they  are  rela- 
tive to  its  structures,  and  they  are  relative  to  the  states  of 
its  structures. 

That  we  may  not  rest  in  a  mere  nominal  acceptance  of 
these  general  truths,  but  may  so  appreciate  them  as  to 
see  their  full  bearings  on  ethical  theory,  we  must  here 
glance  at  them  as  exemplified  by  animate  creatures  at 
large.  For  after  contemplating  the  wide  divergences  of 
sentiency  accompanying  the  wide  divergences  of  organiza- 
tion which  evolution  in  general  has  brought  about,  we  shall 
be  enabled  the  better  to  see  the  divergences  of  sentiency  to 
be  expected  from  the  further  evolution  of  humanity. 

§  64.  Because  they  can  be  most  quickly  disposed  of,  let  us 
first  deal  with  pains  :  a  further  reason  for  first  deahng  with 
pains  being  that  we  may  thus  forthwith  recognize,  and  then 
leave  out  of  consideration,  those  sentient  states  the  qualities 
of  which  may  be  regarded  as  absolute  rather  than  relative. 

The  painfulness  of  the  feelings  produced  by  forces  which 
tend  to  destroy  organic  structures,  wholly  or  in  part,  is  of 
course  common  to  all  creatures  capable  of  feeling.  We  saw 
it  to  be  inevitable  that  during  evolution  there  must  every- 
where be  established  such  connexions  between  external 
actions  and  the  modes  of  consciousness  they  cause,  that  the 
injurious  ones  are  accompanied  by  disagreeable  feelings 
and  the  beneficial  ones  by  agreeable  feelings.  Consequently, 
pressures  or  strains  which  tear  or  bruise,  and  heats  which 
burn  or  scald,  being  in  all  cases  partially  or  wholly  destruc- 


Ii76  THE   DATA   01?  ETHICS. 

tive,   are  in  all  cases  painful.  But  even  here  the 

relativity  of  the  feelings  may  in  one  sense  be  asserted.  For 
tlie  effect  of  a  force  of  given  quantity  or  intensity,  varies 
partly  v^ith  tlie  size  and  partly  with  the  structure  of  the 
creature  exposed  to  it.  The  weight  which  is  scarcely  felt 
by  a  large  animal  crushes  a  small  one ;  the  blow  which 
breaks  the  limb  of  a  mouse  produces  little  effect  on  a  horse; 
the  weapon  which  lacerates  a  horse  leaves  a  rhinoceros 
uninjured.  And  with  these  differences  of  injuriousness  doubt- 
less go  differences  of  feeling.  Merely  glancing  at  the 
illustrations  of  this  truth  furnished  by  sentient  beings  in 
general,  let  us  consider  the  illustrations  mankind  furnish. 

Comparisons  of  robust  labouring  men  with  women  or 
children,  show  us  that  degrees  of  mechanical  stress  which 
the  first  bear  with  impunity,  produce  on  the  others 
injuries  and  accompanying  pains.  The  blistering  of  'a 
tender  skin  by  an  amount  of  friction  which  does  not  even 
redden  a  coarse  one,  or  the  bursting  of  superficial  blood- 
vessels, and  consequent  discolouration,  caused  in  a  person  of 
lax  tissues  by  a  blow  which  leaves  in  well-toned  tissues  no 
trace,  will   sufficiently  exemplify  this  contrast.  Not 

only,  however,  are  the  pains  due  to  violent  incident  forces, 
relative  to  the  characters  or  constitutional  qualities  of  the 
parts  directly  affected,  but  they  are  relative  in  equally  marked 
ways,  or  even  in  more  marked  ways,  to  the  characters  of 
the  nervous  structures.  The  common  assumption  is  that  equal 
bodily  injuries  excite  equal  pains.  But  this  is  a  mistake. 
Pulling  out  a  tooth  or  cutting  off  a  limb,  gives  to  different 
persons  widely  different  amounts  of  suffering:  not  the 
endurance  only,  but  the  feeling  to  be  endured,  varies  greatly; 
and  the  variation  largely  depends  on  the  degree  of  nervous 
development.  This  is  well  shown  by  the  great  insensi- 
bility of  idiots — blows,  cuts,  and  extremes  of  heat  and  cold, 
being  borne  by  them  with  indifference.*  The  relation  thus 
shown  in  the  most  marked  manner  where  the  development 

*  On  Idiocy  and  Irtibecilityjhy  William  W.  Ireland,  m.d.,  p.  255-6. 


THE    RELATIVITY   OF   PAINS   AND   PLEASURES.  177 

of  the  central  nervous  system  is  abnormally  low,  is  shown 
in  a  less  marked  manner  where  the  development  of  the 
central  nervous  system  is  normally  low;  namely,  among 
inferior  races  of  men.  Many  travellers  have  commented 
on  the  strange  callousness  shown  by  savages  who  have 
been  mangled  in  battle  or  by  accident;  and  surgeons  in 
India  say  that  wounds  and  operations  are  better  borne  by 
natives  than  by  Europeans.  Further,  there  comes  the 
converse  fact  that  among  the  higher  types  of  men,  larger- 
brained  and  more  sensitive  to  pain  than  the  lower,  the  most 
sensitive  are  those  whose  nervous  developments,  as  shown 
by  their  mental  powers,  are  the  highest:  part  of  the  evidence 
being  the  relative  intolerance  of  disagreeable  sensations 
common  among  men  of  genius,*  and  the  general  irritability 
characteristic  of  them. 

That  pain  is  relative  not  to  structures  only,  but  to  their 
states  as  well,  is  also  manifest— more  manifest  indeed. 
The  sensibility  of  an  external  part  depends  on  its  tem- 
perature. Cool  it  below  a  certain  point  and  it  becomes,  as 
we  say,  numb ;  and  if  by  ether-spray  it  is  made  very  cold, 
it  may  be  cut  without  any  feeling  being  produced.  Con- 
versely, heat  the  part  so  that  its  blood-vessels  dilate,  and 
the  pain  which  any  injury  or  irritation  causes  is  greater  than 
usual.  How  largely  the  production  of  pain  depends  on  the 
condition  of  the  part  affected,  we  see  in  the  extreme 
tenderness  of  an  inflamed  surface — a  tenderness  such  that 
a  slight  touch  causes  shrinking,  and  such  that  rays  from 
the  fire  which  ordinarily  would  be  indifferent  become 
intolerable.  Similarly  with  the  special  senses.     A 

light  which  eyes  that  are  in  good  order  bear  without  dis- 
agreeable feeling,  cannot  be  borne  by  inflamed  eyes.  And 
beyond  the  local  state,  the  state  of  the  system  as  a  whole, 
and  the  state  of  the  nervous  centres,  are  both  factors. 
Those  enfeebled  by  illness  are  distressed  by  noises  which 
those  in  health  bear  with  equanimity ;  and  men  with  over- 
*  For  instances  see  Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.  XXIV  (New  Series),  p.  712. 


178  THE   DATA  OF  ETHICS. 

wrought  brains  are  irritated  in  unusual  degrees  by  annoyances, 
both  physical  and  moral.  Further,  the  temporary 

condition  known  as  exhaustion  enters  into  the  relation. 
Limbs  over-worn  by  prolonged  exertion,  cannot  without 
aching  perform  acts  which  would  at  other  times  cause  no 
appreciable  feeling.  After  reading  continuously  for  very 
many  hours,  even  strong  eyes  begin  to  smart.  And  noises 
that  can  be  listened  to  for  a  short  time  with  indifference, 
become,  if  there  is  no  cessation,  causes  of  suffering. 

So  that  though  there  is  absoluteness  in  the  relation 
between  positive  pains  and  actions  that  are  positively  in- 
jurious, in  so  far  that  wherever  there  is  sentiency  it  exists ; 
yet  even  here  partial  relativity  may  be  asserted.  For  there 
is  no  fixed  relation  between  the  acting  force  and  the  pro- 
duced feeling.  The  amount  of  feeling  varies  with  the  size  j 
of  the  organism,  with  the  character  of  its  outer  structures, 
with  the  character  of  its  nervous  system  ;  and  also  with  the 
temporary  states  of  the  part  affected,  of  the  body  at  large, 
and  of  the  nervous  centres. 

§  65.  The  relativity  of  pleasures  is  far  more  conspicuous ; 
and  the  illustrations  of  it  furnished  by  the  sentient  world  at 
large  are  innumerable. 

It  needs  but  to  glance  round  at  the  various  things  which 
different  creatures  are  prompted  by  their  desires  to  eat  and 
are  gratified  in  eating — fiesh  for  predaceous  animals,  grass 
for  the  herbivora,  worms  for  the  mole,  flies  for  the  swallow, 
seeds  for  the  finch,  honey  for  the  bee,  a  decaying  car- 
case .for  the  maggot — to  be  reminded  that  the  tastes  for 
foods  are  relative  to  the  structures  of  the  creatures.  And 
this  truth,  made  conspicuous  by  a  survey  of  animals  in 
general,  is  forced  on  Qur  attention  even  by  a  survey  of 
different  races  of  men.  Here  human  flesh  is  abhorred,  and 
there  regarded  as  the  greatest  delicacy;  in  this  country 
roots  are  allowed  to  putrefy  before  they  are  eaten,  and  in 
that  the  taint   of    decay  produces   disgust  j    the  whale's 


THE   RELATIVITY  OF   PAINS  AND   PLEASURES,  179 

blubber  which  one  race  devours  with  avidity,  will  in  another 
by  its  very  odour  produce  nausea.  Nay,  without  looking 
abroad  we  may,  in  the  common  saying  that  ^'one  man's 
meat  is  another  man's  poison,^'  see  the  general  admission 
that  members  of  the  same  society  so  far  differ,  that  a  taste 
which  is  to  these  pleasurable  is  to  those  displeasurable.  So 
is  it  with  the  other  senses.  Assafoetida  which  by  us  is 
singled  out  as  typical  of  the  disgusting  in  odour,  ranks 
among  the  Esthonians  as  a  favourite  perfume;  and  even 
those  around  us  vary  so  far  in  their  likings  that  the  scents 
of  flowers  grateful  to  some  are  repugnant  to  others. 
Analogous  differences  in  the  preferences  for  colours,  we 
daily  hear  expressed.  And  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  the 
like  holds  with  all  sensations,  down  even  to  those  of  touch : 
the  feeling  yielded  by  velvet,  which  is  to  most  agreeable, 
setting  the  teeth  on  edge  in  some. 

It  needs  but  to  name  appetite  and  satiety  to  suggest 
multitudinous  facts  showing  that  pleasures  are  relative  not 
only  to  the  organic  structures  but  also  to  their  states.  The 
food  which  yields  keen  gratification  when  there  is  great 
hunger  ceases  to  be  grateful  when  hunger  is  satisfied;  and 
if  then  forced  on  the  eater  is  rejected  with  aversion.  So, 
too,  a  particular  kind  of  food,  seeming  when  first  tasted  so 
delicious  that  daily  repetition  would  bs  a  source  of  endless 
enjoyment,  becomes,  in  a  few  days,  not  only  unenjoyable  but 
repugnant.  Brilliant  colours  which,  falling  on  unaccustomed 
eyes  give  delight,  pall  on  the  sense  if  long  looked  at ;  and 
there  is  relief  in  getting  away  from  the  impressions  they 
yield.  Sounds  sweet  in  themselves  and  sweet  in  their  com- 
binations, which  yield  to  unfatigued  ears  intense  pleasure, 
become,  at  the  end  of  a  long  concert,  not  only  wearisome 
but,  if  there  is  no  escape  from  them,  causes  of  irritation. 
The  like  holds  down  even  to  such  simple  sensations  as  those 
of  heat  and  cold.  The  fire  so  delightful  on  a  winter^s  day 
is,  in  hot  weather,  oppressive ;  and  pleasure  is  then  taken  in 
the  cold    water    from    which,  in  winter,  there  would    be 


180  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

shrinking.  Indeed^  experiences  lasting  over  but  a  few 
moments  suffice  to  show  how  relative  to  the  states  of  the 
structures  are  pleasurable  sensations  of  these  kinds ;  for  it 
is  observable  that  on  dipping  the  cold  hand  into  hot  water, 
the  agreeable  feeling  gradually  diminishes  as  the  hand 
warms. 

These  few  instances  will  carry  home  the  truth,  manifest 
enough  to  all  who  observe,  that  the  receipt  of  each  agreeable 
sensation  depends  primarily  on  the  existence  of  a  structure 
which  is  called  into  play;  and,  secondarily,  on  the  condition 
of  that  structure,  as  fitting  it  or  unfitting  it  for  activity. 

§  66.  The  truth  that  emotional  pleasures  are  made  possible, 
partly  by  the  existence  of  correlative  structures  and  partly 
by  the  states  of  those  structures,  is  equally  undeniable. 

Observe  the  animal  which,  leading  a  life  demanding  soli- 
tary habits,  has  an  adapted  organization,  and  it  gives  no 
sign  of  need  for  the  presence  of  its  kind.  Observe,  con- 
versely, a  gregarious  animal  separated  from  the  herd,  and 
you  see  marks  of  unhappiness  while  the  separation  continues, 
and  equally  distinct  marks  of  joy  on  joining  its  com- 
panions. In  the  one  case  there  is  no  nervous  structure 
which  finds  its  sphere  of  action  in  the  gregarious  state; 
and  in  the  other  case  such  a  structure  exists.  As  was 
implied  by  instances  cited  in  the  last  chapter  for  another 
purpose,  animals  leading  lives  involving  particular  kinds 
of  activities,  have  become  so  constituted  that  pursuance 
of  those  activities,  exercising  the  correlative  structures, 
yields  the  associated  pleasures.  Beasts  of  prey  confined 
in  dens,  show  us  by  their  pacings  from  side  to  side  the 
endeavour  to  obtain,  as  well  as  they  can,  the  satisfactions 
that  accompany  roaming  about  in  their  natural  habitats ; 
and  that  gratification  in  the  expenditure  of  their  loco- 
motive energies  shown  us  by  porpoises  playing  round  a 
vessel,  is  shown  us  by  the  similarly-unceasing  excursions 
from   end    to  end  of  its  cell  which  a  captured  porpoise 


L 


THE    RELATIVITY   OP   PAINS   AND    PLEASURES.  181 

makes.  The  perpetual  hoppings  of  the  canary  from  bar  to 
bar  of  its  cage,  and  the  ceaseless  use  of  claws  and  bill  in 
climbing  about  its  perch  by  the  parrot,  are  other  activities 
which,  severally  related  to  the  needs  of  the  species,  have 
severally  themselves  become  sources  of  agreeable  feelings. 
Still  more  clearly  are  we  shown  by  the  efforts  which  a 
caged  beaver  makes  to  build  with  such  sticks  and  pieces 
of  wood  as  are  at  hand,  how  dominant  in  its  nature 
has  become  the  building  instinct;  and  how,  apart  from  any 
advantage  gained,  its  gets  gratification  by  repeating,  as  well 
as  it  can,  the  processes  of  construction  it  is  organized  to 
carry  on.  The  cat  which,  lacking  something  to  tear  with 
her  claws,  pulls  at  the  mat  with  them,  the  confined  giraffe 
which,  in  default  of  branches  to  lay  hold  of  wears  out 
the  upper  angles  of  the  doors  to  its  house  by  continually 
grasping  them  with  its  prehensile  tongue,  the  rhinoceros 
which,  having  no  enemy  to  fight,  ploughs  up  the  ground 
with  his  horn,  all  yield  us  analogous  evidence.  Clearly, 
these  various  actions  performed  by  these  various  creatures 
are  not  intrinsically  pleasurable;  for  they  differ  more  or 
less  in  each  species  and  are  often  utterly  unlike.  The" 
pleasurableness  is  simply  in  the  exercise  of  nervo -muscular 
structures  adapted  to  the  performance  of  the  actions. 

Though  races  of  men  are  contrasted  with  one  another  so 
much  less  than  genera  and  orders  of  animals  are,  yet,  as  we 
saw  in  the  last  chapter,  along  with  visible  differences  there 
go  invisible  differences,  with  accompanying  likings  for 
different  modes  of  life.  Among  some,  as  the  Mantras,  the 
love  of  unrestrained  action  and  the  disregard  of  companion- 
ship, are  such  that  they  separate  if  they  quarrel,  and  hence 
live  scattered;  while  among  others,  as  the  Damaras,  there 
is  little  tendency  to  resist,  but  instead,  an  admiration  for 
any  one  who  assumes  power  over  them.  Already  when 
exemplifying  the  indefiniteness  of  happiness  as  an  end  or 
action,  I  have  referred  to  the  unlike  ideals  of  life  pursued 
by  the  nomadic  and  the  settled,  the  warlike  and  the  peaceful, 


182  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

—  unlike  ideals  wMcli  imply  unlikenesses  of  nervous 
structures  caused  by  tlie  inherited  effects  of  unlike  habits 
accumulating  tbrougb  generations.  These  contrasts,  various 
in  their  kinds  and  degrees  among  the  various  types  o'f 
mankind,  everyone  can  supplement  by  analogous  contrasts 
observable  among  those  around.  The  occupations  some 
delight  in  are  to  those  otherwise  constituted  intolerable; 
and  men's  hobbies,  severally  appearing  to  themselves  quite 
natural,  often  appear  to  their  friends  ludicrous  and  almost 
insane  :  facts  which  alone  might  make  us  see  that  the 
pleasurableness  of  actions  of  this  or  that  kind,  is  due  not  to 
anything  in  the  natures  of  the  actions  but  to  the  existence 
of  faculties  which  find  exercise  in  them. 

It  must  be  added  that  each  pleasurable  emotion,  like  each 
pleasurable  sensation,  is  relative  not  only  to  a  certain 
structure  but*also  to  the  state  of  that  structure.  The  parts 
called  into  action  must  have  had  proper  rest — must  be  in  a 
condition  fit  for  action;  not  in  the  condition  which  prolonged 
action  produces.  Be  the  order  of  emotion  what  it  may,  an 
unbroken  continuity  in  the  receipt  of  it  eventually  brings 
satiety.  The  pleasurable  consciousness  becomes  less  and 
less  vivid,  and  there  arises  the  need  for  a  temporary  cessation 
during  which  the  parts  that  have  been  active  may  recover 
their  fitness  for  activity ;  and  during  which  also,  the  activities 
of  other  parts  and  receipt  of  the  accompanying  emotions 
may  find  due  place. 

§67.  I  have  insisted  on  these  general  truths  with 
perhaps  needless  iteration,  to  prepare  the  reader  for  more 
fully  recognizing  a  corollary  that  is  practically  ignored. 
Abundant  and  clear  as  is  the  evidence,  and  forced  though  it 
is  daily  on  everyone's  attention,  the  conclusions  respecting 
life  and  conduct  which  should  be  drawn,  are  not  drawn ; 
and  so  much  at  variance  are  these  conclusions  with  current 
beliefs,  that  enunciation  of  them  causes  a  stare  of  incre- 
dulity.    Pervaded  as   all  past   thinking  has  been,  and  as 


THE    KELATIVITY   OP   PAINS   AND   PLEASURES.  183 

most  present  thinking- is,  by  the  assumption  that  the  nature 
of  every  creature  has  been  specially  created  for  it,  and  that 
human  nature,  also  specially  created,  is,  like  other  natures, 
fixed — ^pervaded  too  as  this  thinking  has  been,  and  is,  by 
the  allied  assumption  that  the  agreeableness  of  certain 
actions  depends  on  their  essential  qualities,  while  other 
actions  are  by  their  essential  qualities  made  disagreeable ; 
it  is  difficult  to  obtain  a  hearing  for  the  doctrine  that  the 
kinds  of  action  which  are  now  pleasurable  will,  under 
conditions  requiring  the  change,  cease  to  be  pleasurable, 
while  other  kinds  of  action  will  become  pleasurable.  Even 
those  who  accept  the  doctrine  of  Evolution  mostly  hear 
with  scepticism,  or  at  best  with  nominal  faith,  the  in- 
ferences to  be  drawn  from  it  respecting  the  humanity  of 
the  future. 

And  yet  as  shown  in  myriads  of  instances  indicated 
by  the  few  above  given,  those  natural  processes  which 
have  produced  multitudinous  forms  of  structure  adapted  to 
multitudinous  forms  of  activity,  have  simultaneously  made 
these  forms  of  activity  pleasurable.  And  the  inevitable 
implication  is  that  within  the  limits  imposed  by  physical 
laws,  there  will  be  evolved,  in  adaptation  to  any  new 
sets  of  conditions  that  may  be  established,  appropriate 
structures  of  which  the  functions  will  yield  their  respective 
gratifications. 

When  we  have  got  rid  of  the  tendency  to  think  that 
certain  modes  of  activity  are  necessarily  pleasurable  because 
they  give  us  pleasure,  and  that  other  modes  which  do  not 
please  us  are  necessarily  unpleasing ;  we  shall  see  that  the 
re-moulding  of  human  nature  into  fitness  for  the  require- 
ments of  social  life,  must  eventually  make  all  needful 
activities  pleasurable,  while  it  makes  displeasurable  all 
activities  at  variance  with  these  requirements.  When  we 
have  come  fully  to  recognize  the  truth  that  there  is  nothing 
intrinsically  more  gratifying  in  the  efforts  by  which  wild 
animals  are  caught,  than  in  the  efforts  expended  iu  rearing 


184  THE    DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

plants,  and  that  the  combined  actions  of  muscles  and 
senses  in  rowing  a  boat  are  not  by  their  essential  natures 
more  productive  of  agreeable  feeling  than  those  gone 
^^  through  in  reaping  corn,  but  that  everything  depends  on 
\the  co-operating  emotions,  which  at  present  are  more  in 
accordance  with  the  one  than  with  the  other;  we  shall  infer 
that  along  with  decrease  of  those  emotions  for  which  the 
social  state  affords  little  or  no  scope,  and  increase  of  those 
which  it  persistently  exercises,  the  things  now  done  with 
dislike  from  a  sense  of  obligation  will  be  done  with  imme- 
diate liking,  and  the  things  desisted  from  as  a  matter  of 
duty  will  be  desisted  from  because  they  are  repugnant. 

This  conclusion,  alien  to  popular  beliefs  and  in  ethical 
speculation  habitually  ignored,  or  at  most  recognized  but 
partially  and  occasionally,  will  be.  thought  by  the  majority 
so  improbable  that  I  must  give  further  justification  of  it : 
enforcing  the  a  jpriori  argument  by  an  a  posteriori  one. 
Small  as  is  the  attention  given  to  the  fact,  yet  is  the  fact 
conspicuous  that  the  corollary  above  drawn  from  the  doctrine 
of  Evolution  at  large,  coincides  with  the  corollary  which 
past  and  present  changes  in  human  nature  force  on  us.  The 
leading  contrasts  of  character  between  savage  and  civilized, 
are  just  those  contrasts  to  be  expected  from  the  process  of 
adaptation. 

The  life  of  the  primitive  man  is  passed  mainly  in  the 
pursuit  of  beasts,  birds,  and  fish,  which  yields  him  a 
gratifying  excitement ;  but  though  to  the  civilized  man  the 
chase  gives  gratification,  this  is  neither  so  persistent  nor  so 
general.  There  are  among  us  keen  sportsmen;  but  there 
are  many  to  whom  shooting  and  fishing  soon  become  weari- 
some; and  there  are  not  a  few  to  whom  they  are  altogether 
indifferent  or  even  distasteful.  Conversely,  the  power 

of  continued  application  which  in  the  primitive  man  is  very 
small,  has  among  ourselves  become  considerable.  It  is 
true  that  most  are  coerced  into  industry  by  necessity  ; 
but  there  are  sprinkled  throughout  society  men  to  whom 


THE    RELATIVITY   OP   PAINS   AND   PLEASURES.  185 

active  occupation  is  a  need — men  who  are  restless  when 
away  from  business  and  miserable  when  they  eventually 
give  it  up ;  men  to  whom  this  or  that  line  of  investigation 
is  so  attractive,  that  they  devote  themselves  to  it  day  after 
day,  year  after  year ;  men  who  are  so  deeply  interested  in 
public  affairs  that  they  pass  lives  of  labour  in  achieving 
political  ends  they  think  advantageous,,  hardly  giving  them- 
selves the  rest  necessary  for  health.  Yet  again,  and 
still  more  strikingly,  does  the  change  become  manifest  when 
we  compare  undeveloped  with  developed  humanity  in  respect 
of  the  conduct  prompted  by  fellow  feeling.  Cruelty  rather 
than  kindness  is  characteristic  of  the  savage,  and  is  in  many 
cases  a  source  of  marked  gratification  to  him ;  but  though 
among  the  civilized  are  some  in  whom  this  trait  of  the 
savage  survives,  yet  a  love  of  inflicting  pain  is  not  general, 
and  besides  numbers  who  show  benevolence,  there  are  those 
who  devote  their  whole  time  and  much  of  their  money  to 
philanthropic  ends,  without  thought  of  reward  either  here 
or  hereafter.  Clearly  these  major,  along  with  many 
minor,  changes  of  nature,  conform  to  the  law  set  forth. 
Activities  appropriate  to  their  needs  which  give  pleasures  to 
savages  have  ceased  to  be  pleasurable  to  many  of  the 
civilized;  while  the  civilized  have  acquired  capacities  for 
other  appropriate  activities  and  accompanying  pleasures 
which  savages  had  no  capacities  for. 

Now,  not  only  is  it  rational  to  infer  that  changes  like  those 
which  have  been  going  on  during  civilization,  will  continue 
to  go  on,  but  it  is  irrational  to  do  otherwise.  Not  he  who 
believes  that  adaptation  will  increase  is  absurd,  but  he  who 
doubts  that  it  will  increase  is  absurd.  Lack  of  faith  in  such 
further  evolution  of  humanity  as  shall  harmonize  its  nature 
with  its  conditions,  adds  but  another  to  the  countless  illus- 
trations of  inadequate  consciousness  of  causation.  One  who, 
leaving  behind  both  primitive  dogmas  and  primitive  ways 
of  looking  at  things,  has,  while  accepting  scientific  conclu- 
sions  acquired    those    habits    of    thought    which    science 


186  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

generates,  will  regard  the  conclusion  above  drawn  as 
inevitable.  He  will  find  it  impossible  to  believe  that  tbe 
processes  wMcli  have  heretofore  so  moulded  all  beings  to 
the  requirements  of  their  lives  that  they  get  satisfactions  in 
fulfilling  them^  will  not  hereafter  continue  so  moulding 
them.  He  will  infer  that  the  type  of  nature  to  which  the 
highest  social  life  affords  a  sphere  such  that  every  faculty 
has  its  due  amount,  and  no  more  than  the  due  amount, 
of  function  and  accompanying  gratification,  is  the  type 
of  nature  towards  which  progress  cannot  cease  till  it 
is  reached.  Pleasure  being  producible  by  the  exercise  of 
any  structure  which  is  adjusted  to  its  special  end,  he  will 
see  the  necessary  implication  to  be  that,  supposing  it  con- 
sistent with  maintenance  of  life,  there  is  no  kind  of  activity 
which  will  not  become  a  source  of  pleasure  if  continued ; 
and  that  therefore  pleasure  will  eventually  accompany  every 
mode  of  action  demanded  by  social  conditions. 

This  corollary  I  here  emphasize  because  it  will  presently 
play  an  important  part  in  the  argument. 


CHAPTER  XL 

EGOISM  VERSUS  ALTKUISM. 

§  68.  If  insistence  on  them  tends  to  unsettle  establislied 
systems  of  belief,  self-evident  truths  are  by  most  people 
silently  passed  over  ;  or  else  there  is  a  tacit  refusal  to  draw 
from  them  the  most  obvious  inferences. 

Of  self-evident  truths  so  dealt  with,  the  one  which 
here  concerns  us  is  that  a  creature  must_  live_b^Qre  it  can_ 
a^t.  From  this  it  is  a  corollary  that  the  acts  by  which  each 
maintains  his  own  life  must,  speaking  generally,  precede 
in  imperativeness  all  other  acts  of  which  he  is  capable.  For  * 
if  it  be  asserted  that  these  other  acts  must  precede  in 
imperativeness  the  acts  which  maintain  life;  and  if  this, 
accepted  as  a  general  law  of  conduct,  is  conformed  to 
by  all;  then  by  postp^oning  the  acts  which  maintain  life 
to  the  other  acts  which  life  makes  possible,  all  must  lose 
their  lives.  That  is.to  say.  Ethics  has  to  recognize  the  truth, 
recognized  in  unethical  thought,  that  egoism  comes  befordTl) 
altruism^  The  acts  required  for  continued  self-preservation, 
including  the  enjoyment  of  benefits  achieved  by  such  acts, 
are  the  first  requisites  to  universal  welfare.  Unless  eacli 
duly  cares  for  himself,  his  care  for  all  others  is  ended  by 
death ;  and  if  each  thus  dies,  there  remain  no  others  to 
be  cared  for. 

This  permanent  supremacy  of  egoism  over  altruism,  made 


188  THE   DATA   OF  ETHICS. 

manifest  by  contemplating  existing   life^    is    further  made 
manifest  by  contemplating  life  in  course  of  evgLation. 

§  69.  Those  wbo  bave  followed  witb  assent  tbe  recent 
course  of  thought,  do  not  need  telling  that  throughout  past 
eras,  the  life,  vast  in  amount  and  varied  in  kind,  which  has 
overspread  the  Earth,  has  progressed  in  subordination  to 
the  law  that  every  individual  shall  gain  by  whatever  aptitude 
it  has  for  fulfilling  the  conditions  to  its  existence.  The 
uniform  principle  has  been  that  better  adaptation  shall  bring 
greater  benefit ;  which  greater  benefit,  while  increasing  the 
prosperity  of  the  better  adapted,  shall  increase  also  its  ability 
to  leave  offspring  inheriting  more  or  less  its  better  adapta- 
tion. And,  by  implication,  the  uniform  principle  has  been 
that  the  ill-adapted,  disadvantaged  in  the  struggle  for 
existence,  shall  bear  the  consequent  evils  :  either  dis- 
appearing when  its  imperfections  are  extreme,  or  else 
rearing  fewer  offspring,  which,  inheriting  its  imperfections, 
tend  to  dwindle  away  in  posterity. 

It  has  been  thus  with  innate  superiorities ;  it  has  been 
thus  also  with  acquired  ones.  All  along  the  law  has  been  that 
increased  function  brings  increased  power ;  and  that  there- 
fore such  extra  activities  as  aid  welfare  in  any  member  of 
a  race,  produce  in  its  structures  greater  ability  to  carry  on 
such  extra  activities  :  the  derived  advantages  being  enjoyed 
by  it  to  the  heightening  and  lengthening  of  its  life.  Con- 
versely, as  lessened  function  ends  in  lessened  structure,  the 
dwindling  of  unused  faculties  has  ever  entailed  loss  of 
power  to  achieve  the  correlative  ends  :  the  result  of  inade- 
quate fulfilment  of  the  ends  being  diminished  ability  to 
maintain  life.'  And  by  inheritance,  such  functionally-pro- 
duced modifications  have  respectively  furthered  or  hindered 
survival  in  posterity. 

As  already  said,  the  law  that  each  creature  shall  take  the 
benefits  and  the  evils  of  its  own  nature,  be  they  those 
derived    from    ancestry    or   those    due    to    self-produced 


EGOISM   VERSUS   ALTRUISM.  189 

modifications,  has  been  the  law  under  which  life  has  evolved 
thus  far ;  and  it  must  continue  to  be  the  law  however  much 
farther  life  may  evolve.  Whatever  qualifications  this 
natural  course  of  action  may  now  or  hereafter  undergo,  are 
qualifications  that  cannot,  without  fatal  results,  essentially 
change  it.  Any  arrangements  which  in  a  considerable 
degree  prevent  superiority  from  profiting  by  the  rewards 
of  superiority,  or  shield  inferiority  from  the  evils 
it  entails — any  arrangements  which  tend  to  make  it  as 
well  to  be  inferior  as  to  be  superior;  are  arrangements 
diametrically  opposed  to  the  progress  of  organization  and 
the  reaching  of  a  higher  life. 

But  to  say  that  each  individual  shall  reap  the  benefits 
brought  to  him  by  his  own  powers,  inherited  and  acquired, 
is  to  enunciate  egoism  as  an  ultimate  principle  of  conduct. 
It  is  to  say  that  egoistic  claims  must  take  precedence  of 
altruistic  claims. 

§  70.  Under  its  biological  aspect  this  proposition  cannot 
be  contested  by  those  who  agree  in  the  doctrine  of  Evolution; 
but  probably  they  will  not  at  once  allow  that  admission  of 
it  under  its  ethical  aspect  is  equally  unavoidable.  While,  as 
respects  development  of  life,  the  well-working  of  the 
universal  principle  described  is  sufficiently  manifest;  the 
well-working  of  it  as  respects  increase  of  happiness  may 
not  be  seen  at  once.     But  the  two  cannot  be  disjoined. 

Incapacity  of  every  kind  and  of  whatever  degree,  causes 
unhappiness  directly  and  indirectly — directly  by  the  pain 
consequent  on  the  over-taxing  of  inadequate  faculty,  and 
indirectly  by  the  non-fulfilment,  or  imperfect  fulfilment, 
of  certain  conditions  to  welfare.  Conversely,  xapacity^-e^ 
every__kind  snffirif^nt  for  the — requirement,  conduces  to 
happiness  immediately  and  remotely — immediately  by  the 
pleasure  accompanying  the  normal  exercise  of  each  power 
that  is  up  to  its  work,  and  remotely  by  the  pleasures  which 
are   furthered  by  the   ends  achieved.     A  creature  that  is 


190  THE   DATA  OP   ETHICS. 

weak  or  slow  of  foot,  and  so  gets  food  only  by  exhausting 
efforts  or  escapes  enemies  with  difficulty,  suffers  fclie  pains  of 
over-strained  powers,  of  unsatisfied  appetites,  of  distressed 
emotions ;  while  the  strong  and  swift  creature  of  the  same 
species  delights  in  its  efficient  activities,  gains  more  fully 
the  satisfactions  yielded  by  food  as  well  as  the  renewed 
vivacity  this  gives,  and  has  to  bear  fewer  and  smaller  pains 
in  defending  itself  against  foes  or  escaping  from  them. 
Similarly  with  duller  and  keener  senses,  or  higher  and 
lower  degrees  of  sagacity.  The  mentally -inferior  individual 
of  any  race  suffers  negative  and  positive  miseries ;  while  the 
mentally-superior  individual  receives  negative  and  positive 
gratifications.  Inevitably,  then,  this  law  in  conformity  with 
which  each  member  of  a  species  takes  the  consequences  of 
its  own  nature  ;  and  in  virtue  of  which  the  progeny  of  each 
member,  participating  in  its  nature,  also  takes  such  con- 
sequences j  is  one  that  tends  ever  to  raise  the  aggregate 
happiness  of  the  species,  by  furthering  the  multiplication  of 
the  happier  and  hindering  that  of  the  less  happy. 

All  this  is  true  of  human  beings  as  of  other  beings.     The. 
conclusion  forced  on  us  is  that  the  pursuit    of  individual! 
happiness  within  those  limits  prescribed  by  social  conditions,  I 
is  the  first  requisite  to  the  attainment  of  the  greatest  general  \ 
happiness.     To  see  this  it  needs  but  to  contrast  one  whose 
self-regard   has   maintained   bodily    well-being,   with    one 
whose  regardlessness  of  self  has  brought  its  natural  results; 
and  then  to  ask  what  must  be  the  contrast  between  two 
societies  formed  of  two  such  kinds  of  individuals. 

Bounding  out  of  bed  after  an  unbroken  sleep,  singing  or 
whistling  as  he  dresses,  coming  down  with  beaming  face 
ready  to  laugh  on  the  smallest  provocation,  the  healthy  man 
of  high  powers,  conscious  of  past  successes  and  by  his 
energy,  quickness,  resource,  made  confident  of  the  future, 
enters  on  the  day's  business  not  with  repugnance  but  with 
gladness;  and  from  hour  to  hour  experiencing  satisfac- 
tions from    work    effectually   done,    comes  home  with   an 


EGOISM   VERSUS   ALTRUISM.  191 

abundant  surplus  of  energy  remaining  for  hours  of  relaxa- 
tion. Far  otherwise  is  it  with  one  who  is  enfeebled  by 
great  neglect  of  self.  Already  deficient,  his  energies 
are  made  more  deficient  by  constant  endeavours  to  execute 
tasks  that  prove  beyond  his  strength,  and  by  the  resulting 
discouragement.  Besides  the  depressing  consciousness 
of  the  immediate  future,  there  is  the  depressing  con- 
sciousness of  the  remoter  future,  with  its  probability  of 
accumulated  diflSculties  and  diminished  ability  to  meet 
them.  Hours  of  leisure  which,  rightly  passed,  bring 
pleasures  that  raise  the  tide  of  life  and  renew  the 
powers  of  work,  cannot  be  utilized :  .  there  is  not  vigour 
enough  for  enjoyments  involving  action,  and  lack  of  spirits 
prevents  passive  enjoyments  from  being  entered  upon  with 
zest.  In  brief,  life  becomes  a  burden.  Now  if,  as  musti 
be  admitted,  in  a  community  composed  of  individuals  like 
the  first  the  happiness  will  be  relatively  great,  while  in 
one  composed  of  individuals  like  the  last  there  will  be 
relatively  little  happiness,  or  rather  much  misery ;  it  must 
be  admitted  that  conduct  causing  the  one  result  is  good 
and  conduct  causing  the  other"  is  bad. 

But  diminutions  of  general  happiness  are  produced  by 
inadequate  egoism  in  several  other  ways.  These  we  will 
successively  glance  ai^ 

§  71.  If  there  were  no  proofs  of  heredity — if  it  were 
the  rule  that  the  strong  are  usually  begotten  by  the  weak 
while  the  weak  usually  descend  from  the  strong,  that  viva- 
cious children  form  the  families  of  melancholy  parents  while 
fathers  and  mothers  with  overflowing  spirits  mostly  have 
dull  progeny,  that  from  stolid  peasants  there  ordinarily 
come  sons  of  high  intelligence  while  the  sons  of  the 
cultured  are  commonly  fit  for  nothing  but  following  the 
plough — if  there  were  no  transmission  of  gout,  scrofula, 
insanity,  and  did  the  diseased  habitually  give  birth  to  the 
healthy  and  the  healthy  to  the  diseased,  writers  on  Ethics 


192  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

might  be  justified  in  ignoring  tliose  effects  of  conduct  wMcli 
are  felt  by  posterity  tlirougli  the  natures  they  inherit. 

As  it  is,  however,  the  current  ideas  concerning  the 
relative  claims  of  egoism  and  altruism  are  vitiated  by  the 
omission  of  this  all-important  factor.  For  if  health,  strength 
and  capacity,  are  usually  transmitted ;  and  if  disease, 
feebleness,  stupidity,  generally  reappear  in  descendants; 
then  a  rational  altruism  requires  insistance  on  that  egoism 
which  is  shown  by  receipt  of  the  satisfactions  accompanying 
preservation  of  body  and  mind  in  the  best  state.  The 
necessary  implication  is  that  blessings  are  provided  for 
offspring  by  due  self-regard,  while  disregard  of  self  carried 
too  far  provides  curses.  When,  indeed,  we  remember  how 
commonly  it  is  remarked  that  high  health  and  oversowing 
spirits  render  any  lot  in  life  tolerable,  while  chronic 
ailments  make  gloomy  a  life  most  favourably  circum- 
stanced, it  becomes  amazing  that  both  the  world  at  large 
and  writers  who  make  conduct  their  study,  should 
ignore  the  terrible  evils  which  disregard  of  personal  well- 
being  inflicts  on  the  unborn,  and  the  incalculable  good 
laid  up  for  the  unborn  by  attention  to  personal  well- 
being.  Of  all  bequests  of  parents,  to  children  the  most 
valuable  is  a  sound  constitution.  Though  a  man's  body  is 
not  a  property  that  can  be  inherited,  yet  his  constitution 
may  fitly  be  compared  to  an  entailed  estate ;  and  if  he  rightly 
understands  his  duty  to  posterity,  he  will  see  that  he  is 
bound  to  pass  on  that  estate  uninjured  if  not  improved. 
To  say  this  is  to  say  that  he  must  be  egoistic  to  the 
extent  of  satisfying  all  those  desires  associated  with  the 
due  performance  of  functions.  Nay,  it  is  to  say  more.  It 
lis  to  say  that  he  must  seek  in  due  amounts  the  various 
'pleasures  which  life  offers.  For  beyond  the  effect  these 
have  in  raising  the  tide  of  life  and  maintaining  constitu- 
jtional  vigour,  there  is  the  effect  they  have  in  preserving  and 
increasing  a  capacity  for  receiving  enjoyment.  Endowed 
with  abundant  energies  and  various  tastes,  some  can  get 


EGOISM   VERSUS    ALTRUISM.  193 

gratifications  of  many  kinds  on  opportunities  hourly  occur- 
ring; wliile  others  are  so  inert^  and  so  uninterested  in  things 
around,  that  they  cannot  even  take  the  trouble  to  amuse  them- 
selves. And  unless  heredity  be  denied,  the  inference  must  be 
that  due  acceptance  of  the  miscellaneous  pleasures  life  offers, 
conduces  to  the  capacity  for  enjoyment  in  posterity ;  and\ 
that  persistence  in  dull  monotonous  lives  by  parents,  I 
diminishes  the  ability  of  their  descendants  to  make  the 
best  of  what  gratifications  fall  to  them. 

§  72.  Beyond  the  decrease^  of^^aeral  happiness  which  i 
results  in  this  indirect  way  if  egoism  is  unduly  subordinated,  \ 
there  is  a  decrease  of  general  happiness  which  results  in  a 
direct  way.  He  who  carries  self-regard  far  enough  to  keep  ( 
himself  in  good  health  and  high  spirits,  in  the  first  place 
thereby  becomes  an  immediate  source  of  happiness  to 
those  around,  and  in  the  second  place  maintains  the 
ability  to  increase  their  happiness  by  altruistic  actions. 
But  one  whose  bodily  vigour  and  mental  health  are  under- 
mined by  self-sacrifice  carried  too  far,  in  the  first  place 
becomes  to  those  around  a  cause  of  depression,  and  in  the 
second  place  renders  himself  incapable,  or  less  capable,  of 
actively  furthering  their  welfare. 

In  estimating  conduct  we  must  remember  that  there 
are  those  who  by  their  joyousness  beget  joy  in  others, 
and  that  there  are  those  who  by  their  melancholy  cast  a 
gloom  on  every  circle  they  enter.  And  we  must  remember 
that  by  display  of  overflowing  happiness  a  man  of  the  one 
kind  may  add  to  the  happiness  of  others  more  than  by 
positive  efforts  to  benefit  them ;  and  that  a  man  of  the  other 
kind  may  decrease  their  happiness  more  by  his  presence 
than  he  increases  it  by  his  actions.  Full  of  vivacity,  the  one 
is  ever  welcome.  For  his  wife  he  has  smiles  and  jocose 
speeches ;  for  his  children  stores  of  fun  and  play ;  for  his 
friends  pleasant  talk  interspersed  with  the  sallies  of  wit  that 
come  from  buoyancy.     Contrariwise,  the  other  is  shunned. 


194  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

The  irritability  resulting  now  from  ailments,  now  from 
failures  caused  by  feebleness,  his  family  has  daily  to  bear. 
Lacking  adequate  energy  for  joining  in  them,  he  has  at 
best  but  a  tepid  interest  in  the  amusements  of  his  children ; 
and  he  is  called  a  wet  blanket  by  his  friends.  Little 
account  as  our  ethical  reasonings  take  note  of  it,  yet  is  the 
fact  obvious  that  since  happiness  and  misery  are  infectious, 
such  regard  for  self  as  conduces  to  health  and  high  spirits 
is  a  benefaction  to  others,  and  such  disregard  of  self  as 
brings  on  suffering,  bodily  or  mental,  is  a  malefaction  to 
others.  The  duty  of  making  one's  self  agreeable  by 

seeming  to  be  pleased,  is,  indeed,  often  urged ;  and  thus 
to  gratify  friends  is  applauded  so  long  as  self-sacrificing 
effort  is  implied.  But  though  display  of  real  happiness 
gratifies  friends  far  more  than  display  of  sham  happiness, 
and  has  no  drawback  in  the  shape  either  of  hypocrisy  or 
strain,  yet  it  is  not  thought  a  duty  to  fulfil  the  conditions 
which  favour  the  display  of  real  happiness.  Nevertheless,  if 
quantity  of  happiness  produced  is  to  be  the  measure,  the 
last  is  more  imperative  than  the  first. 

And  then,  as  above  indicated,  beyond  this  primary  series  \ 
of  effects  produced  on  others  there  is  a  secondary  series  of^ 
effects.     The  adequately  egoistic  individual   retains   those  1 
powers  which  make  altruistic  activities  possible.     The  indi-  \ 
vidual  who  is  inadequately  egoistic,  loses  more  or  less  of  his 
ability  to  be  altruistic.     The  truth  of  the  one  proposition  is 
self-evident ;  and  the  truth  of  the  other  is  daily  forced  on  us 
by  examples.     Note  a  few  of  them.  Here  is  a  mother 

who,  brought  up  in  the  insane  fashion  usual  among  the 
cultivated,  has  a  physique  not  strong  enough  for  suckling  her 
infant,  but  who,  knowing  that  its  natural  food  is  the  best, 
and  anxious  for  its  welfare,  continues  to  give  it  milk  for  a 
longer  time  than  her  system  will  bear.  Eventually  the  accu- 
mulating reaction  tells.  There  comes  exhaustion  running, 
it  may  be,  into  illness  caused  by  depletion  ;  occasionally  end- 
ing in  death,  and  often  entailing  chronic  weakness.      She 


EGOISM    VERSUS   ALTRUISM.  195 

becomes,  perhaps  for  a  time,  perhaps  permanently,  incapable 
of  carrying  on  household  affairs ;  her  other  children  suffer 
from  the  loss  of  maternal  attention ;  and  where  the  income 
is  small,  payments  for  nurse  and  doctor  tell  injuriously  on 
the  whole  family.  Instance,  again,  what  not  unfre- 

quently  happens  with  the  father.  Similarly  prompted  by 
a  high  sense  of  obligation,  and  misled  by  current  moral 
theories  into  the  notion  that  self-denial  may  rightly  be 
carried  to  any  extent,  he  daily  continues  his  office-work  for 
long  hours  regardless  of  hot  head  and  cold  feet ;  and  debars 
himself  from  social  pleasures,  for  which  he  thinks  he  can 
afford  neither  time  nor  money.  What  comes  of  this  entirely 
unegoistic  course  ?  Eventually  a  sudden  collapse,  sleepless- 
ness, inability  to  work.  That  rest  which  he  would  not  give 
himself  when  his  sensations  prompted,  he  has  now  to  take 
in  long  measure.  The  extra  earnings  laid  by  for  the  benefit 
of  his  family,  are  quickly  swept  away  by  costly  journeys  in 
aid  of  recovery,  and  by  the  many  expenses  which  illness 
entails.  Instead  of  increased  ability  to  do  his  duty  by 
his  offspring,  there  comes  now  inability.  Life-long  evils 
on  them  replace  hoped-for  goods.  And  so  is  it,  too, 

with  the  social  effects  of  inadequate  egoism.  All  grades 
furnish  examples  of  the  mischiefs,  positive  and  negative, 
inflicted  on  society  by  excessive  neglect  of  self.  Now  the 
case  is  that  of  a  labourer  who,  conscientiously  continuing 
his  work  under  a  broiling  sun,  spite  of  violent  protest  from 
his  feelings,  dies  of  sunstroke ;  and  leaves  his  family  a  burden 
to  the  parish.  Now  the  case  is  that  of  a  clerk  whose  eyes 
permanently  fail  from  over- straining,  or  who,  daily  writing 
for  hours  after  his  ficgers  are  painfully  cramped,  is  attacked 
with  ^'  scrivener's  palsy,''  and,  unable  to  write  at  all,  sinks 
with  aged  parents  into  poverty  which  friends  are  called  on 
to  mitigate.  And  now  the  case  is  that  of  a  man  devoted 
to  public  ends  who,  shattering  his  health  by  ceaseless  appli- 
cation, fails  to  achieve  all  he  might  have  achieved  by  a  more 


196  .  THE    DATA    OP   ETHICS. 

reasonable  apporfcionment  of  his  time  between  labour  on 
behalf  of  others  and  ministration  to  his  own  needs. 

§  73.  In  one  further  way  is  the  undue  subordination  of 
egoism  to  altruism  injurious.  Both  directly  and  indirectly 
unselfishness  pushed  to  excess  generates  selfishness. 

Consider  first  the  immediate  effects.  That  one  man  may 
yield  up  to  another  a  gratification,  it  is  needful  that  the 
other  shall  accept  it ;  and  where  the  gratification  is  of  a 
kind  to  which  their  respective  claims  are  equal,  or  which  is 
no  more  required  by  the  one  than  by  the  other,  acceptance 
implies  a  readiness  to  get  gratification  at  another's  cost. 
The  circumstances  and  needs  of  the  two  being  alike,  the 
transaction  involves  as  much  culture  of  egoism  in  the 
last  as  it  involves  culture  of  altruism  in  the  first.  It  is  true 
that  not  unfrequently,  difference  between  their  means  or 
difierence  between  their  appetites  for  a  pleasure  which  the 
one  has  had  often  and  the  other  rarely,  divests  the  accept- 
ance of  this  character ;  and  it  is  true  that  in  other  cases 
the  benefactor  manifestly  takes  so  much  pleasure  in  giving 
pleasure,  that  the  sacrifice  is  partial,  and  the  reception  of  it 
not  wholly  selfish.  But  to  see  the  effect  above  indicated  we 
must  exclude  such  inequalities,  and  consider  what  happens 
where  wants  are  approximately  alike  and  where  the  sacri- 
fices, not  reciprocated  at  intervals,  are  perpetually  on  one 
side.  So  restricting  the  inquiry  all  can  name  instances 
verifying  the  alleged  result.  Everyone  can  remember 
circles  in  which  the  daily  surrender  of  benefits  by  the  gene- 
rous to  the  greedy,  has  caused  increase  of  greediness ;  until 
there  has  been  produced  an  unscrupulous  egoism  intolerable 
to  all  around.  There  are  obvious  social  effects  of  kindred 
natute.  Most  thinking  people  now  recognize  the  demorali- 
zation caused  by  indiscriminate  charity.  They  see  how  in 
the  mendicant  there  is,  besides  destruction  of  the  normal 
relation  between  labour   expended   aud  benefit    obtained. 


EGOISM   VERSUS   ALTRUISM.  197 

a  genesis  of  tlie  expectation  that  others  shall  minister 
to  his  needs;  showing  itself  sometimes  in  the  venting 
of  curses  on  those  who  refuse. 

Next  consider  the  remote  results.  When  the  egoistic 
claims  are  so  much  subordinated  to  the  altruistic  as  to 
produce  physical  mischief,  the  tendency  is  towards  a  relative 
decrease  in  the  number  of  the  altruistic,  and  therefore  an 
increased  predominance  of  the  egoistic.  •  Pushed  to  extremes, 
sacrifice  of  self  for  the  benefit  of  others,  leads  occasionally 
to  death  before  the  ordinary  pQriod  of  marriage;  leads 
sometimes  to  abstention  from  marriage,  as  in  sisters  of 
charity ;  leads  sometimes  to  an  ill-health  or  a  loss  of  attrac- 
tiveness which  prevents  marriage ;  leads  sometimes  to  non- 
acquirement  of  the  pecuniary  means  needed  for  marriage ; 
and  in  all  these  cases,  therefore,  the  unusually  altruistic  leave 
no  descendants.  Where  the  postponement  of  personal 
welfare  to  the  welfare  of  others  has  not  been  carried  so  far 
as  to  prevent  marriage,  it  yet  not  unfrequently  occurs  that 
the  physical  degradation  resulting  from  years  of  self-neglect 
causes  infertility;  so  that  again  the  most  altruistically- 
natured  leave  no  like-natured  posterity.  And  then  in  less 
marked  and  more  numerous  cases,  the  resulting  enfeeble- 
ment  shows  itself  by  the  production  of  relatively  weak  off- 
spring; of  whom  some  die  early,  while  the  rest  are  less 
likely  than  usual  to  transmit  the  parental  type  to  future" 
generations.  Inevitably,  then,  by  this  dying  out  of  the 
especially  unegoistic,  there  is  prevented  that  desirable  mitiga- 
tion of  egoism  in  the  average  nature  which  would  else  have 
taken  place.  Such  disregard  of  self  as  brings  down  bodily 
vigour  below  the  normal  level,  eventually  produces  in  the 
society  a  counterbalancing  excess  of  regard  for  self. 

§  74.  That  egoism  precedes  altruism  in  order  of  impera- 
tiveness, is  thus  clearly  shown.  The  acts  which  make 
continued  life  possible,  must,  on  the  average,  be  more 
peremptory   than   all  those   other    acts   which    life   makes 


198  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

possible ;  inclading  the  acts  which  benefit  others.     Turning 
from  life  as  existing  to  life  as  evolving,  we  are  equally  shown 
this.     Sentient  beings  have   progressed  from  low  to  high  \ 
,  types,  under  the  law  that  the  superior  shall  profit  by  their  J 
^    superiority  and  the  inferior  shall  suffer  from  their  inferiority.^ ' 
Conformity  to   this  law  has  been,  and  is  still,  needful,  not 
only  for  the  continuance  of  life  but  for  the  increase  of  happi- 
ness j  since  the  superior  are  those  having  faculties  better 
adjusted   to   the  requirements — faculties,   therefore,  which 
bring  in  their  exercise  greater  pleasure  and  less  pain. 

More  special  considerations  join  these  more  general  i 
ones  in  showing  us  this  truth.  Such  egoism  as  preserves  a 
vivacious  mind  in  a  vigorous  body  furthers  the  happiness 
of  descendants,  whose  inherited'  constitutions  make  the 
labours  of  life  easy  and  its  pleasures  keen  ;  while,  conversely, 
unhappiness  is  entailed  on  posterity  by  those  who  bequeath 
them  constitutions    injured    by  self-neglect.      Again,   the 

individual  whose  well-conserved  life  shows  itself  in  over-  , 

I' 
flowing  spirits,  becomes,  by  his  mere  existence,  a  source  of 

pleasure  to  all  around ;  while  the  depression  which  com- 
monly accompanies  ill-health  diffuses  itself  through  family 
and  among  friends.  A  further  contrast  is  that  whereas  one 
who  has  been  duly  regardful  of  self  retains  the  power  of 
being  helpful  to  others,  there  results  from  self-abnegation 
in  excess,  not  only  an  inability  to  help  others  but  the  inflic- 
tion of  positive  burdens  on  them.  Lastly,  we  come  upon  a 
the  truth  that  undue  altruism  increases  egoism ;  both  directly 
in  contemporaries  and  indirectly  in  posterity. 

And  now   observe   that    though  the  general  conclusion  i 
enforced  by  these  special   conclusions,   is  at  variance  with/ 
nominally-accepted  beliefs,  it  is  not  at  variance  with  actually^ 
accepted  beliefs.     While  opposed  to  the  doctrine  which  men 
are  taught  should  be  acted  upon,  it  is  in  harmony  with  the 
doctrine  which  they  do   act  upon  and   dimly  see  must  be 
acted  upon.     For  omitting  such  abnormalities  of  conduct  as 
are  instanced   above,    everyone,  alike   by   deed  and  word. 


/ 


EGOISM   VERSUS   ALTRUISM.  199 

implies  that  in  the  business  of  life  personal  welfare  is  the 
primary  consideration.  The  labourer  looking  for  wages  in 
return  for  work  done,  no  less  than  the  merchant  who  sells 
goods  at  a  profit,  the  doctor  who  expects  fees  for  advice, 
the  priest  who  calls  the  scene  of  his  ministrations  ^'  a  living/-* 
assumes  as  beyond  question  the  truth  that  selfishness, 
carried  to  the  extent  of  enforciug  his  claims  and  enjoying 
the  returns  his  efibrts  bring,  is  not  only  legitimate  but 
essential.  Even  persons  who  avow  a  contrary  conviction  prove 
by  their  acts  that  it  is  inoperative.  Those  who  repeat  with 
emphasis  the  maxim — "  Love  your  neighbour  as  yourself,^^ 
do  not  render  up  what  they  possess  so  as  to  satisfy  the 
desires  of  all  as  much  as  they  satisfy  their  own  desires. 
Nor  do  those  whose  extreme  maxim  is — "  Live  for  others,'^ 
diff'er  appreciably  from  people  around  in  their  regards 
for  personal  welfare,  or  fail  to  appropriate  their  shares 
of  life's  pleasures.  In  short,  that  which  is  above  set  forth 
as  the  belief  to  which  scientific  ethics  leads  us,  is  that 
which  men  do  really  believe,  as  distinguished  from  that  which 
they  believe  they  believe. 

Finally  it  may  be  remarked  that  a  rational  egoism,  so  far 
from  implying  a  more  egoistic  human  nature,  is  consistent 
with  a  human  nature  that  is  less  egoistic.  For  excesses  in 
one  direction  do  not  prevent  excesses  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion ;  but  rather,  extreme  deviations  from  the  mean  on  one 
side  lead  to  extreme  deviations  on  the  other  side.  A  society 
in  which  the  most  exalted  principles  of  self-sacrifice  for  the 
benefit  of  neighbours  are  enunciated,  may  be  a  society 
in  which  unscrupulous  sacrifice  of  alien  fellow- creatures  is 
not  only  tolerated  but  applauded.  Along  with  professed 
anxiety  to  spread  these  exalted  principles  among  heathens, 
there  may  go  the  deliberate  fastening  of  a  quarrel  upon 
them  with  a  view  to  annexing  their  territory.  Men 
who  every  Sunday  have  listened  approvingly  to  injunctions 
carrying  the  regard  for  other  men  to  an  impracticable 
extent,  may  yet  hire  themselves  out  to  slay,  at  the  word 


200  THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

of  command^  any  people  in  any  part  of  the  world,  utterly 
indifferent  to  the  right  or  wrong  of  the  matter  fought  about. 
And  as  in  these  cases  transcendent  altruism  in  theory  co- 
exists with  brutal  egoism  in  practice,  so,  conversely,  a 
more  qualified  altruism  may  have  for  its  concomitant  a 
greatly  moderated  egoism.  For  asserting  the  due  claims  of 
self,  is,  by  implication,  drawing  a  limit  beyond  which  the 
claims  are  undue ;  and  is,  by  consequence,  bringing  into 
greater  clearness  the  claims  of  others. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

ALTRUISM  VERSUS  EGOISM. 

§  75.  If  wo  define  altruism  as  being    all   action    wliich, 
in  the  normal  course  of  things,  benefits  others  instead  of  | 
benefiting    self,    then,    from    the    dawn   of    life,    altruism 
has  been  no  less  essential  than  egoism.     Though  primarily 
it    is   dependent  on    egoism,    yet    secondarily    egoism    is^ 
dependent  on  it. 

Under  altruism  in  this  comprehensive  sense,  I  take  in  the 
acts  by  which  offspring  are  preserved  and  the  species  '  j/ 
maintained.  Moreover,  among  these  acts  must  be  included 
not  such  only  as  are  accompanied  by  consciousness,  but  also 
such  as  conduce  to  the  welfare  of  offspring  without  mental 
representation  of  the  welfare — acts  of  automatic  altruism 
as  we  may  call  them.  Nor  must  there  be  left  out 
those  lowest  altruistic  acts  which  subserve  race-mainten- 
ance without  implying  even  automatic  nervous  processes 
— acts  not  in  the  remotest  sense  psychical,  but  in  a 
literal  sense  physical.  Whatever  action,  unconscious  or 
conscious,  involves  expenditure  of  individual  life  to  the 
end  of  increasing  life  in  other  individuals,  is  unquestionably 
altruistic  in  a  sense,  if  not  in  the  usual  sense ;  and  it  is  here 
needful  to  understand  it  in  this  sense  that  we  may  see  how 
conscious  altruism  grows  out  of  unconscious  altruism. 

The  simplest  beings  habitually  multiply  by  spontaneous  1 


202  THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

fission.  Physical  altruism  of  the  lowest  kind,  differentiating 
from  physical  egoism,  may  in  this  case  be  considered  as  not 
yet  independent  of  it.  For  since  the  two  halves  which 
before  fission  constituted  the  individual,  do  not  on  dividing 
disappear,  we  must  say  that  though  the  individuality  of  the 
parent  infusorium  or  other  protozoon  is  lost  in  ceasing 
to  be  single,  yet  the  old  individual  continues  to  exist  in 
each  of  the  new  individuals.  When,  however,  as  happens 
generally  with  these  smallest  animals,  an  interval  of  quies- 
cence ends  in  the  breaking  up  of  the  whole  body  into  minute 
parts,  each  of  which  is  the  germ  of  a  young  one,  we  see  the 
parent  entirely  sacrificed  in  forming  progeny. 

Here  might  be  described  how  among  creatures  of  higher 
grades,  by  fission  or  gemmation,  parents  bequeath  parts  of 
their  bodies,  more  or  less  organized,  to  form  offspring  at 
the  cost  of  their  own  individualities.  Numerous  examples 
might  also  be  given  of  the  ways  in  which  the  development 
of  ova  is  carried  to  the  extent  of  making  the  parental  body 
little  more  than  a  receptacle  for  them  ;  the  implication  being 
that  the  accumulations  of  nutriment  which  parental  activities 
have  laid  up,  are  disposed  of  for  the  benefit  of  posterity. 
And  then  might  be  dwelt  on  the  multitudinous  cases  where, 
as  generally  throughout  the  insect-world,  maturity  having 
been  reached  and  a  new  generation  provided  for,  life  ends  : 
death  follows  the  sacrifices  made  for  progeny. 

But  leaving  these  lower  types  in  which  the  altruism  is 
physical  only,  or  in  which  it  is  physical  and  automatically- 
psychical  only,  let  us  ascend  to  those  in  which  it  is  also,  to 
•a  considerable  degree,  conscious.  Though  in  birds  and 
mammals  such  parental  activities  as  are  guided  by  instinct, 
are  accompanied  by  either  no  representations  or  but  vague 
representations  of  the  benefits  which  the  young  receive; 
yet  there  are  also  in  them  actions  which  we  may  class  as 
altruistic  in  the  higher  sense.  The  agitation  which  creatures 
of  these  classes  show  when  their  young  are  in  danger,  joined 
often  with  efforts  on  their  behalf,  as  well  as  the  grief  dis- 


ALTRUISM   VERSUS    EGOISM.  203 

played  after  loss  of  their  young,  make  it  manifest  tliat  in 
th em^parental  altruism  has  a  concomitant  of  emotion^ 

Those  who  understand  by  altruism  only  the  conscious 
sacrifice  of  self  to  others  among  human  beings,  will  think  it 
strange,  or  even  absurd,  to  extend  its  meaning  so  widely. 
But  the  justification  for  doing  this  is  greater  than  has  thus 
far  appeared.  I  do  not  mean  merely  that  in  the  course  of 
evolution,  there  has  been  a  progress  through  infinitesimal 
gradations  from  purely  physical  and  unconscious  sacrifices  of 
the  individual  for  the  welfare  of  the  species,  up  to  sacrifices 
consciously  made.  I  mean  that  from  first  to  last  the  sacri- 
fices are,  when  reduced  to  their  lowest  terms,  of  the  same 
essential  nature  :  to  the  last,  as  at  first,  there  is  involved  a 
loss  of  bodily  substance.  When  a  part  of  the  parental 
body  is  detached  in  the  shape  of  gemmule,  or  egg,  or  foetus, 
the  material  sacrifice  is  conspicuous ;  and  when  the  mother 
yields  milk  by  absorbing  which  the  young  one  grows,  it 
cannot  be  questioned  that  there  is  also  a  material  sacrifice. 
But  though  a  material  sacrifice  is  not  manifest  when  the 
young  are  benefited  by  activities  on  their  behalf ;  yet,  as 
no  effort  can  be  made  without  an  equivalent  waste  of  tissue, 
and  as  the  bodily  loss  is  proportionate  to  the  expenditure 
that  takes  place  without  reimbursement  in  food  consumed, 
it  follows  that  efforts  made  in  fostering  offspring  do 
really  represent  a  part  of  the  parental  substance ;  which  is 
now  given  indirectly  instead  of  directly. 

Self-sacrifice,  then,  is  no  less  primordial  than  self-preser-  i 
vation.  Being  in  its  simple  physical  form  absolutely  neces-  ' 
sary  for  the  continuance  of  life  from  the  beginning ;  and 
being  extended  under  its  automatic  form,  as  indispensable 
to  maintenance  of  race  in  types  considerably  advanced ;  and 
being  developed  to  its  semi-conscious  and  conscious  forms, 
along  with  the  continued  and  complicated  attendance  by 
which  the  offspring  of  superior  creatures  are  brought  to 
maturity;  altruism  has  been  evolving  simultaneously  withj 
egoism.      As   was  pointed    out    in    an   early  chapter,  the 


204  THE    DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

isame  superiorities  wliicli  have  enabled  the  individual  to 
preserve  itself  better,  have  enabled  it  better  to  preserve  the 
individuals  derived  from  it ;  and  each  higher  species,  using 
its  improved  faculties  primarily  for  egoistic  benefit,  has 
spread  in  proportion  as  it  has  used  them  secondarily  for 
altruistic  benefit. 

The  imperativeness  of  altruism  as  thus  understood,  is, 
indeed,  no  less  than  the  imperativeness  of  egoism  was  shown 
to  be  in  the  last  chapter.  For  while,  on  the  one  hand,  a 
falling  short  of  normal  egoistic  acts  entails  enfeeblement 
or  loss  of  life,  and  therefore  loss  of  ability  to  perform  altru- 
istic acts ;  on  the  other  hand,  such  defect  of  altruistic  acts  ' 
as  causes  death  of  offspring  or  inadequate  development  of 
them,  involves  disappearance  from  future  generations  of  the 
nature  that  is  not  altruistic  enough — so  decreasing  the 
average  egoism.  In  short,  every  species  is  continually 
purifying  itself  from  the  unduly  egoistic  individuals^  while 
there  are  being  lost  to  it  the  unduly  altruistic  individuals. 

§  76.  As  there  has  been  an  advance   by  degrees  from 
unconscious  parental  altruism  to  conscious  parental  altruism  ) 
of   the   highest   kind,    so   has   there  been  an   advance   by  J 
degrees  from  the  altruism  of  the  family  to  social  altruism. 

A  fact  to  be  first  noted  is  that  only  where  altruistic  rela- 
tions in  the  domestic  group  have  reached  highly-developed 
forms,  do  there  arise  conditions  making  possible  full  deve- 
lopment of  altruistic  relations  in  the  political  group. 
Tribes  in  which  promiscuity  prevails  or  in  which  the 
marital  relations  are  transitory,  and  tribes  in  which  poly- 
andry entails  in  another  way  indefinite  relationships,  are 
incapable  of  i»uch  organization.  Nor  do  peoples  who  are 
habitually  polvgamous,  show  themselves  able  to  take  on 
those  high  forms  of  social  co-operation  which  demand  due 
subordination  of  self  to  others.  Only  where  monogamic 
marriage  has  become  general  and  eventually  universal — 
only  where  there  have  consequently  been  established  tho 


ALTRUISM    VERSUS    EGOISM.  205 

closest  ties  of  blood — only  where  family  altruism  has  been 
most  fosteredj  has  social  altruism  become  conspicuous.  It 
needs  but  to  recall  the  compound  forms  of  the  Aryan  family 
as  described  by  Sir  Henry  Maine  and  others,  to  see  that 
family  feeling,  first  extending  itself  to  the  gens  and  the 
tribe,  and  afterwards  to  the  society  formed  of  related  tribes, 
prepared  the  way  for  fellow  feeling  among  citizens  not 
of  the  same  stock. 

Recognizing  this  natural  transition,  we  are  here  chiefly 
concerned  to  observe  that  throughout  the  latter  stages  of 
the  progress,  as  throughout  the  former,  increase  of  egoistic 
satisfactions  has  depended  on  growth  of  regard  for  the 
satisfactions  of  others.  On  contemplating  a  line  of  succes- 
sive parents  and  off*spring,  we  see  that  each,  enabled  while 
young  to  live  by  the  sacrifices  predecessors  make  for  it,  itself 
makes,  when  adult,  equivalent  sacrifices  for  successors;  and 
that  in  default  of  this  general  balancing  of  benefits  received 
by  benefits  given,  the  line  dies  out.  Similarly,  it  is  manifest 
that  in  a  society  each  generation  of  members,  indebted  for 
such  benefits  as  social  organization  yields  them  to  pre- 
ceding generations,  who  have  by  their  sacrifices  elaborated 
this  organization,  are  called  on  to  make  for  succeeding 
generations  such  kindred  sacrifices  as  shall  at  least  main- 
tain this  organization,  if  they  do  not  improve  it :  the  alter- 
native being  decay  and  eventual  dissolution  of  the  society, 
implying  gradual  decrease  in  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  its 
members. 

And  now  we  are  prepared  to  consider  the  several  ways  in 
which,  under  social  conditions,  personal  welfare  depends  on  I 
due  regard  for  the  welfare  of  others.  Already  the  conclu- 
sions to  be  drawn  have  been  foreshadowed.  As  in  the 
chapter  on  the  biological  view  were  implied  the  inferences 
definitely  set  forth  in  the  last  chapter ;  so  in  the  chapter  on 
the  sociological  view  were  implied  the  inferences  to  be 
definitely  set  forth  here.     Sundry  of  these  are  trite  enough; 


206  THE    DATA   OP    ETHICS. 

but  they  must  nevertheless  be  specified,  since  the  statement 
would  be  incomplete  without  them. 

§  77.  First  to  be  dealt  with  comes  that  negative  ?^l<;.r"isLm 
implied  by  such  curbing  of  the  egoistic  impulses  as  prevents 
direct  aggression. 

As  before  shown,  if  men  instead  of  living  separately  are 
to  unite  for  defence  or  for  other  purposes,  they  must  seve- 
rally reap  more  good  than  evil  from  the  union.  On  the 
average,  each  must  lose  less  from  the  antagonisms  of  those 
with  whom  he  is  associated,  than  he  gains  by  the  association. 
At  the  outset,  therefore,  that  increase  of  egoistic  satisfactions 
which  the  social  state  brings,  can  be  purchased  only  by 
altruism  sufficient  to  cause  some  recognition  of  others' 
claims :  if  not  a  voluntary  recognition,  still,  a  compulsory 
recognition. 

While  the  recognition  is  but  of  that  lowest  kind  due  to 
dread  of  retaliation,  or  of  prescribed  punishment,  the 
egoistic  gain  from  association  is  small;  and  it  becomes 
considerable  only  as  the  recognition  becomes  voluntary — 
that  is,  more  altruistic.  Where,  as  among  some  of  the 
wild  Australians,  there  exists  no  limit  to  the  right  of  the 
strongest,  and  the  men  fight  to  get  possession' of  women 
while  the  wives  of  one  man  fight  among  themselves  about 
him,  the  pursuit  of  egoistic  satisfactions  is  greatly  impeded. 
Besides  the  bodily  pain  occasionally  given  to  each  by  conflict, 
and  the  more  or  less  of  subsequent  inability  to  achieve 
personal  ends,  there  is  the  waste  of  energy  entailed  in 
maintaining  readiness  for  self-defence,  and  there  is  the 
accompanying  occupation  of  consciousness  by  emotions  that 
are  on  the  average  of  cases  disagreeable.  Moreover,  the 
primary  end  of  safety  in  presence  of  external  foes  is  ill- 
attained  in  proportion  as  there  are  internal  animosities ; 
such  furtherance  of  satisfactions  as  industrial  co-operation 
brings  cannot  be  had ;  and  there  is  little  motive  to  labour 


ALTHUISM   VERSUS    EGOISM.  207 

for  extra  benefits  when  the  products  of  labour  are  insecure. 
And  from  this  early  stage  to  comparatively  late  stages^  we 
may  trace  in  the  wearing  of  arms,  in  the  carrying  on  of 
family  feuds,  and  in  the  taking  of  daily  precautions  for  safety, 
the  ways  in  which  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  each  are  ' 
diminished  by  deficiency  of  that  altruism  which  checks 
overt  injury  of  others. 

The  private  interests  of  the  individual  are  on  the  average 
better  subserved,  not  only  in  proportion  as  he  -himself 
refrains  from  direct  aggression,  but  also,  on  the  average,  in 
proportion  as  he  succeeds  in  "  diminishing  the  aggressions  of 
his  fellows  on  one  another.  The  pre  valance  of  antagonisms 
among  those  around,  impedes  the  activities  carried  on  by 
each  in  pursuit  of  satisfactions ;  and  by  causing  disorder 
makes  the  beneficial  results  of  activities  more  doubtful. 
Hence,  each  profits  egoistically  from  the  growth  of  an 
altruism  which  leads  each  to  aid  in  preventing  or  diminishing 
others'  violence. 

The  hke.  holds  when  we  pass  to  that  altruism  which 
restrains  the  undue  egoism  displayed  in  breaches  of 
contract.  General  acceptance  of  the  maxim  that  honesty/ 
is  the  best  policy,  implies  general  experience  that  grati- 
fication of  the  self-regarding  feelings  is  eventually  fur- 
thered by  such  checking  of  them  as  maintains  equitable 
dealings.  And  here,  as  before,  each  is  personally  interested 
in  securing  good  treatment  of  his  fellows  by  one  another. 
For  in  countless  ways  evils  are  entailed  on  each  by 
the  prevalence  of  fraudulent  transactions.  As  everyone 
knows,  the  larger  the  number  of  a  shopkeeper's  bills  left 
unpaid  by  some  customers,  the  higher  must  be  the  prices 
which  other  customers  pay.  The  more  manufacturers  lose 
by  defective  raw  materials  or  by  carelessness  of  workmen, 
the  more  must  they  charge  for  their  fabrics  to  buyers.  The 
less  trustworthy  people  are,  the  higher  rises  the  rate  of 
interest,  the  larger  becomes  the  amount  of  capital  hoarded, 
the  greater  are  the  impediments  to  industry.      The  further 


208  THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

traders  and  people  in  general  go  beyond  tlieir  means,  and 
hypothecate  the  property  of  others  in  speculation,  the  more 
serious  are  those  commercial  panics^  which  bring  disasters 
on  multitudes  and  injuriously  affect  all. 

This  introduces  us  to  yet  a  third  way  in  which  such  per- 
sonal welfare  as  results  from  the  proportioning  of  benefits 
gained  to  labours  given,  depends  on  the  making  of  certain 
sacrifices  for  social  welfare.  The  man  who,  expending  his 
energies,  wholly  on  private  affairs  refuses  to  take  trouble 
about  public  affairs,  pluming  himself  on  his  wisdom  in 
minding  his  own  business,  is  blind  to  the  fact  that  his 
own  business  is  made  possible  only  by  maintenance  of  a 
healthy  social  state,  and  that  he  loses  all  round  by  defective 
governmental  arrangements.  Where  there  are  many  like- 
minded  with  himself — where,  as  a  consequence,  offices  come 
to  be  filled  by  political  adventurers  and  opinion  is  swayed 
by  demagogues — where  bribery  vitiates  the  administration 
of  the  law  and  makes  fraudulent  State-transactions  habitual; 
heavy  penalties  fall  on  the  community  at  large,  and,  among 
others,  on  those  who  have  thus  done  everything  for  self 
and  nothing  for  society.  Their  investments  are  insecure  ; 
recovery  of  their  debts  is  difficult ;  and  even  their  lives 
are  less  safe  than  they  would  otherwise  have  been. 

So  that  on  such  altruistic  actions  as  are  implied,  firstly  in 

y  being  just,  secondly  in  seeing  justice  done  between  others, 
and  thirdly  in  upholding  and  improving  the  agencies  by 
which  justice  is  administered,  depend,  in  large  measure, 
the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  each. 

§  78.  But  the  identification  of  personal  advantage  with 
the  advantage  of  fellow-citizens  is  much  wider  than  this. 
In  various  other  ways  the  well-being  of  each  rises  and  falls 
with  the  well-being  of  all. 

A  weak  man  left  to  provide  for  his  own  wants,  suffers  by 
getting  smaller  amounts  of  food  and  other  necessaries  than 
he  might  get  were  he  stronger.    In  a  community  formed  of 


ALTRUISM   VERSUS   EGOISM.  209 

weak  men,  wlio  divide  tlieir  labours  and  excliange  the  pro- 
ducts, all  suffer  evils  from  tlie  weakness  of  tlieir  fellows. 
The  quantity  of  each  kind  of  product  is  made  deficient  by 
the  deficiency  of  labouring  power;  and  the  share  each 
gets  for  such  share  of  his  own  product  as  he  can  afford 
to  give,  is  relatively  small.  Just  as  the  maintenance  of 
paupers,  hospital  patients,  inmates  of  asylums,  and  others 
who  consume  but  do  not  produce,  leaves  to  be  divided 
among  producers  a  smaller  stock  of  commodities  than  would 
exist  were  there  no  incapables;  so  must  there  be  left  a 
smaller  stock  of  commodities  to  be  divided,  the  greater  the 
number  of  inefficient  producers,  or  the  greater  the  average 
deficiency  of  producing  power.  Hence,  whatever  decreases 
the  strength  of  men  in  general  restricts  the  gratifications  of 
each  by  making  the  means  to  them  dearer^ 

More  directly,  and  more  obviously,  does  the  bodily  well- 
being  of  his  fellows  concern  him ;  for  their  bodily  ill-being, 
when  it  takes  certain  shapes,  is  apt  to  bring  similar  bodily 
ill-being  on  him.  If  he  is  not  himself  attacked  by  cholera, 
or  small-pox,  or  typhus,  when  it  invades  his  neighbourhood, 
he  often  suffers  a  penalty  through  his  belongings.  Under 
conditions  spreading  it,  his  wife  catches  diphtheria,  or  his 
servant  is  laid  up  with  scarlet  fever,  or  his  children  take  now 
this  and  now  that  infectious  disorder.  Add  together  the 
immediate  and  remote  evils  brought  on  him  year  after  year 
by  epidemics,  and  it  becomes  manifest  that  his  egoistic 
satisfactions  are  greatly  furthered  by  such  altruistic  activities 
as  render  disease  less  prevalent. 

With  the  mental,  as  well  as  with  the  bodily,  states  of  fellow- 
citizens,  his  enjoyments  are  in  multitudinous  ways  bound  up. 
Stupidity  like  weakness  raises  the  cost  of  commodities. 
Where  farming  is  unimproved,  the  prices  of  food  are  higher 
than  they  would  else  be  ;  where  antiquated  routine  maintains 
itself  in  trade,  the  needless  expense  of  distribution  weighs  on 
all ;  where  there  is  no  inventiveness,  everyone  loses  the  bene- 
fits which  improved  appliances  diffuse.    Other  than  economic 


210  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

evils  come  from  the  average  unintelligence — periodically 
tlirougli  tlie  manias  and  panics  that  arise  because  traders 
rush  in  herds  all  to  buy  or  all  to  sell ;  and  habitually  through 
the  mal-administration  of  justice,  which  people  and  rulers 
alike  disregard  while  pursuing  this  or  that  legislative  will-o'- 
the-wisp.  Closer  and  clearer  is  the  dependence  of  his  personal 
satisfactions  on  others'  mental  states^  which  each  experiences 
in  his  household.  Unpunctuality  and  want  of  system  are 
perpetual  sources  of  annoyance.  The  unskilfulness  of  the 
cook  causes  frequent  vexation  and  occasional  indigestion. 
Lack  of  forethought  in  the  housemaid  leads  to  a  fall  over  a 
bucket  in  a  dark  passage.  And  inattention  to  a  message 
or  forgetfulness  in  delivering  it,  entails  failure  in  an 
important  engagement.  Each,  therefore,  benefits  egoistically 
by  such  altruism  as  aids  in  raising  the  average  intelligence. 
I  do  not  mean  such  altruism  as  taxes  ratepayers  that 
children's  minds  may  be  filled  with  dates,  and  names,  and 
gossip  about  kings,  and  narratives  of  battles,  and  other 
useless  informatiop,  no  amount  of  which  will  make  them 
capable  workers  or  good  citizens ;  but  I  mean  such  altruism 
as  helps  to  spread  a  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things  and 
to  cultivate  the  power  of  applying  that  knowledge. 

Yet  again,  each  has  a  private  interest  in  public  morals 
and  profits- by  improving  them.  Not  in  large  ways  only, 
by  aggressions  and  breaches  of  contract,  by  adulterations 
and  short  measures,  does  each  suffer  from  the  general 
unconscientiousness ;  but  in  more  numerous  small  ways. 
Now  it  is  through  the  untruthfulness  of  one  who  gives  a 
good  character  to  a  bad  servant ;  now  it  is  by  the  reckless- 
ness of  a  laundress  who,  using  bleaching  agents  to  save 
trouble  in  washing,  destroys  his  linen  ;  now  it  is  by  the 
acted  falsehood  of  railway  passengers  who,  by  dispersed 
coats,  make  him  believe  that  all  the  seats  in  a  compart- 
ment are  taken  when  they  are  not.  Yesterday  the 
illness  of  his  child  due  to  foul  gases,  led  to  the  discovery 
of  a  drain  that  had  become  choked  because  it  was  ill-made 


ALTRUISM   VERSUS    EGOISM.  211 

by  a  dishonest  builder  under  supervision  of  a  careless  or 
bribed  surveyor.  To-day  workmen  employed  to  rectify  it 
bring  on  him  cost  and  inconvenience  by  dawdling;  and 
their  low  standard  of  work^  determined  by  the  unionist 
principle  that  the  better  workers  must  not  discredit  the 
worse  by  exceeding  them  in  eflSciency,  he  may  trace  to 
the  immoral  belief  that  the  unworthy  should  fare  as 
well  as  the  worthy.  To-morrow  it  turns  oat  that  business 
for  the  plumber  has  been  provided  by  damage  which  the 
bricklayers  have  done. 

Thus  the  improvement  of  others^  physically,  intellectually, 
and  morally,  personally  concerns  each ;  since  their  imper-  ^ 
fections  tell  in  raising  the  cost  of  all  the  commodities  he 
buys,  in  increasing  the  taxes  and  rates  he  pays,  and  in  the 
losses  of  time,  trouble,  and  money,  daily  brought  on  him  by 
ethers'  carelessness,  stupidity,  or  unconscientiousness. 

§  79.  Very  obvious  are  certain  more  immediate  connexions 
between  personal  welfare  and  ministration  to  the  welfare  of 
those  around.  The  evils  suffered  by  those  whose  behaviour] 
is  unsympathetic,  and  the  benefits  to  self  which  unselfish 
conduct  brings,  show  these. 

That  anyone  should  have  formulated  his  experience  by 
saying  that  the  conditions  to  success  are  a  hard  heart  and  a 
sound  digestion,  is  marvellous  considering  the  many  proofs 
that  success,  even  of  a  material  kind,  greatly  depending  as  it 
does  on  the  good  offices  of  others,  is  furthered  by  whatever 
creates  goodwill  in  others.  The  contrast  between  the  pros- 
perity of  those  who  to  but  moderate  abilities  join  natures 
which  beget  friendships  by  their  kindliness,  and  the  adver- 
sity of  those  who,  though  possessed  of  superior  faculties  and 
greater  acquirements,  arouse  dislikes  by  their  hardness  or 
indifference,  should  force  upon  all  the  truth  that  egoistic 
enjoyments  are  aided  by  altruistic  actions. 

This  increase  of  personal  benefit  achieved  by  benefiting 
others,  is  but  partially   achieved  where   a  selfish   motive 


212  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

prompts  tLe  seeioi'Bgiy-unselfisli  act :  it  is  fully  achieved 
only  where  the  act  is  really  unselfish.  Though  services 
rendered  with  the  view  of  some  time  profiting  by  recipro- 
cated services,  answer  to  a  certain  extent;  yet,  ordinarily, 
they  answer  only  to  the  extent  of  bringing  equivalents  of 
reciprocated  services.  Those  which  bring  more  than  equi- 
valents are  those  not  prompted  by  any  thoughts  of 
equivalents.  For  obviously  it  is  the  spontaneous  outflow  of 
good  nature,  not  in  the  larger  acts  of  life  only  but  in  all  its 
details,  which  generates  in  those  around  the  attachments 
prompting  unstinted  benevolence. 

Besides  furthering  prosperity,  other-regarding  actions 
conduce  to  self-regarding  gratifications  by  generating  a 
genial  environment.  With  the  sympathetic  being  everyone 
feels  more  sympathy  than  with  others.  All  conduct  them- 
selves with  more  than  usual  amiability  to  a  person  who 
hourly  discloses  a  lovable  nature.  Such  a  one  is  practically 
surrounded  by  a  world  of  better  people  than  one  who 
is  less  attractive.  If  we  contrast  the  state  of  a  man 
possessing  all  the  material  means  to  happiness,  but  isolated 
by  his  absolute  egoism,  with  the  state  of  an  altruistic 
man  relatively  poor  in  means  but  rich  in  friend s^  we  may 
see  that  various  gratifications  not  to  be  purchased  by 
money,  come  in  abundance  to  the  last  and  are  inaccessible  to 
the  first. 

While,  then,  there  is  one  kind  of  other-regarding  action, 
furthering  the  prosperity  of  fellow- citizens  at  large,  which 
admits  of  being  deliberately  pursued  from  motives  that  are 
remotely  self -regarding — the  conviction  being  that  personal 
well-being  depends  in  large  measure  on  the  well-being  of 
society — there  is  an  additional  kind  of  other-regarding  action 
having  in  it  no  element  of  conscious  self-regard,  which 
nevertheless  conduces  greatly  to  egoistic  satisfactions. 

§  80.  Yet  other  modes  exist  in  which  egoism  unqualified  by 
altruism  habitually  fails.    It  diminishes  the  totality  of  egoistic 


ALTRUISM   VERS 

pleasure  by  diminisliing  in  several 
for  pleasure. 

Self-gratifications,  considered  separately  or  in  the  aggre- 
gate, lose  their  intensities  by  that  too  great  persistence  in 
them  which  results  if  they  are  made  the  exclusive  objects  of 
pursuit.  The  law  that  function  entails  waste,  and  that 
faculties  yielding  pleasure  by  their  action  cannot  act  inces- 
santly without  exhaustion  and  accompanying  satiety,  has 
the  implication  that  intervals  during  which  altruistic  acti- 
vities absorb  the  energies,  are  intervals  during  which  the 
capacity  for  egoistic  pleasure  is  recovering  its  full  degree. 
The  sensitiveness  to  purely  personal  enjoyments  is  main- 
tained at  a  higher  pitch  by  those  who  minister  to  the  enjoy- 
ments of  others,  than  it  is  by  those  who  devote  themselves 
wholly  to  personal  enjoyments. 

This  which  is  manifest  even  while  the  tide  of  life  is  high, 
becomes  still  more  manifest  as  life  ebbs.  It  is  in  maturity 
and  old  age  that  we  especially  see  how,  as  egoistic  plea- 
sures grow  faint,  altruistic  actions  come  in  to  revive  them  in 
new  forms.  The  contrast  between  the  child's  delight  in 
the  novelties  daily  revealed,  and  the  indifference  which 
comes  as  the  world  around  grows  familiar,  until  in  adult  life 
there  remain  comparatively  few  things  that  are  greatly 
enjoyed,  draws  from  all  the  reflection  that  as  years  go  by 
pleasures  pall.  And  to  those  who  think,  it  becomes  clear 
that  only  through  sympathy  can  pleasures  be  indirectly 
gained  from  things  that  have  ceased  to  yield  pleasures 
directly.  In  the  gratifications  derived  by  parents  from  the 
gratifications  of  their  offspring,  this  is  conspicuously  shown. 
Trite  as  is  the  remark  that  men  live  afresh  in  their  children, 
it  is  needful  here  to  set  it  down  as  reminding  us  of  the  way 
in  which,  as  the  egoistic  satisfactions  in  life  fade,  altruism 
renews  them  while  it  transfigures  them. 

We  are  thus  introduced  to  a  more  general  consideration  ) 
— the  egoistic  aspect  of  altruistic  pleasure.     Not,  indeed. 


214  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

that  this  is  the  place  for  discussing  the  question  whether 
the  egoistic  element  can  be  excluded  from  altruism  ;  nor 
is  it  the  place  for  distingushing  between  the  altruism 
which  is  pursued  with  a  foresight  of  the  pleasurable 
feeling  to  be  achieved  through  it,  and  the  altruism  which, 
though  it  achieves  this  pleasurable  feeling,  does  not  make 
pursuit  of  it  a  motive.  Here  we  are  concerned  with  the  fact 
that,  whether  knowingly  or  unknowingly  gained,  the  state 
of  mind  accompanying  altruistic  action,  being  a  pleasurable 
state,  is  to  be  counted  in  the  sum  of  pleasures  which  the 
individual  can  receive;  and  in  this  sense  cannot  be  other  than 
egoistic.  That  we  must  so  regard  it  is  proved  on  observing 
that  this  pleasure,  like  pleasures  in  general,  conduces  to  the 
physical  prosperity  of  the  ego.  As  every  other  agreeable 
emotion  raises  the  tide  of  life,  so  does  the  agreeable  emotion 
which  accompanies  a  benevolent  deed.  As  it  cannot  be 
denied  that  the  pain  caused  by  the  sight  of  suffering, 
depresses  the  vital  functions — sometimes  even  to  the  extent 
of  arresting  the  heart's  action,  as  in  one  who  faints  on 
seeing  a  surgical  operation;  so  neither  can  it  be  denied 
that  the  joy  felt  in  witnessing  others'  joy  exalts  the  vital 
functions.  Hence,  however  much  we  may  hesitate  to  class 
altruistic  pleasure  as  a  higher  kind  of  egoistic  pleasure,  we 
are  obliged  to  recognize  the  fact  that  its  immediate  effects 
in  augmenting  life  and  so  furthering  personal  well-being, 
are  like  those  of  pleasures  that  are  directly  egoistic.  And 
the  corollary  drawn  must  be  that  pure  egoism  is,  even  in  its 
immediate  results,  less  successfully  egoistic  than  is  the 
egoism  duly  qualified  by  altruism,  which,  besides  achieving 
additional  pleasures,  achieves  also,  through  raised  vitality, 
a  greater  capacity  for  pleasures  in  general. 

That  the  range  of  aesthetic  gratifications  is  wider  for  the 
altruistic  nature  than  for  the  egoistic  nature,  is  also  a  truth 
not  to  be  overlooked.  The  joys  and  sorrows  of  human 
beings  form  a  chief  element  in  the  subject-iuatter  of  art ; 


ALTEOISM   VERSUS   EGOISM.  215 

and  evidently  tlie  pleasures  wHcli  art  gives  increase  as 
the  fellow-feeling  with  these  joys  and  sorrows  strengthens.  J 
If  we  contrast  early  poetry  occupied  mainly  with  war  and' 
gratifying  the  savage  instincts  by  descriptions  of  bloody 
victories,  with  the  poetry  of  modern  times,  in  which  the 
sanguinary  forms  but  a  small  part  while  a  large  part, 
dealing  with  the  gentler  affections,  enHsts  the  feelings  of 
readers  on  behalf  of  the  weak ;  we  are  shown  that  with  the 
development  of  a  more  altruistic  nature,  there  has  been 
opened  a  sphere  of  enjoyment  inaccessible  to  the  callous 
egoism  of  barbarous  times.  So,  too,  between  the  fiction  of 
the  past  and  the  fiction  of  the  present,  there  is  the  difference 
that  while  the  one  was  almost  exclusively  occupied  with  the 
doings  of  the  ruling  classes,  and  found  its  plots  in  their 
antagonisms  and  deeds  of  violence,  the  other,  chiefly  taking 
stories  of  peaceful  life  for  its  subjects,  and  to  a  considerable 
extent  the  Hfe  of  the  humbler  classes,  discloses  a  new  world 
of  interest  in  the  every-day  pleasures  and  pains  of  ordinary 
people.  A  like  contrast  exists  between  early  and  late  forms 
of  plastic  art.  When  not  representing  acts  of  worship, 
the  wall-sculptures  and  wall-paintings  of  the  Assyrians 
and  Egyptians,  or  the  decorations  of  temples  among  the 
Greeks,  represented  deeds  of  conquest ;  whereas  in  modern 
times,  while  the  works  which  glorify  destructive  activities 
are  less  numerous,  there  are  an  increasing  number  of  works 
gratifying  to  the  kindlier  sentiments  of  spectators.  To 
see  that  those  who  care  nothing  about  the  feelings  of 
other  beings  are,  by  implication,  shut  out  from  a  wide 
range  of  aBsthetic  pleasures,  it  needs  but  to  ask  whether  men 
who  delight  in  dog-fights  may  be  expected  to  appreciate 
Beethoven's  Adelaida,  or  whether  Tennyson's  In  Memoriam 
would  greatly  move  a  gang  of  convicts. 

§  81.     From  the   dawn  of  life,   then,  egoism  has  been 
dependent  upon  altruism  as  altruism  has  been  dependent 


216  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

upon  egoism ;  and  in  the  course  of  evolution  tlie  reciprocal 
services  of  the  two  have  been  increasing. 

The  physical  and  unconscious  self-sacrifice  of  parents  to 
form  ojffspring,  which  the  lowest  living  things  display  from 
hour  to  hour,  shows  us  in  its  primitive  form  the  altruism 
which  makes  possible  the  egoism  of  .individual  life  and 
growth.  As  we  ascend  to  higher  grades  of  creatures,  this 
parental  altruism  becomes  a  direct  yielding  up  of  only  part 
of  the  body,  joined  with  an  increasing  contribution  from  the 
remainder  in  the  shape  of  tissue  wasted  in  efforts  made  on 
behalf  of  progeny.  This  indirect  sacrifice  of  substance, 
replacing  more  and  more  the  direct  sacrifice  as  parental 
altruism  becomes  higher,  continues  to  the  last  to  represent 
also  altruism  which  is  other  than  parental ;  since  this,  too, 
implies  loss  of  substance  in  making  efforts  that  do  not  bring 
their  return  in  personal  aggrandisement. 

After  noting  how  among  mankind  parental  altruism  and 
family  altruism  pass  into  social  altruism,  we  observed  that  a 
society,  like  a  species,  survives  only  on  condition  that  each 
generation  of  its  members  shall  yield  to  the  next,  benefits 
equivalent  to  those  it  has  received  from  the  last.  And  this 
implies  that  care  for  the  family  must  be  supplemented  by 
care  for  the  society. 

Fulness  of  egoistic  satisfactions  in  the  associated  state, 
depending  primarily  on  maintenance  of  the  normal  relation 
between  efforts  expended  and  benefits  obtained,  which 
underlies  all  life,  implies  an  altruism  which  both  prompts 
equitable  conduct  and  prompts  the  enforcing  of  equity-  The 
well-being  of  each  is  involved  with  the  well-being  of  all  in 
sundry  other  ways.  Whatever  conduces  to  their  vigour 
concerns  him  ;  for  it  diminishes  the  cost  of  everything  he 
buys.  Whatever  conduces  to  their  freedom  from  disease 
concerns  him ;  for  it  diminishes  his  own  liability  to  disease. 
Whatever  raises  their  intelligence  concerns  him  ;  for  incon- 
veniences are  daily  entailed  on  him  by  others'  ignorance  or 


ALTRUISM   VERSUS   EGOISM.  217 

folly.  Whatever  raises  their  moral  characters  concerns  him;  / 
for  at  every  turn  he  suffers  from  the  average  uncoR-  / 
scientiousness. 

Much  more  directly  do  his  egoistic  satisfactions  depend 
on  those  altruistic  activities  which  enlist  the  sympathies  of 
others.  By  alienating  those  around,  selfishnesses  loses  the 
unbought  aid  they  can  render ;  shuts  out  a  wide  range  of  I 
social  enjoyments ;  and  fails  to  receive  those  exaltations  of 
pleasure  and  mitigations  of  pain,  which  come  from  men's 
fellow-feeling  with  those  they  like. 

Lastly,  undue  egoism  defeats  itself  by  bringing  on  an 
incapacity  for  happiness.  Purely  egoistic  gratifications  are 
rendered  less  keen  by  satiety,  even  in  the  earlier  part  oi 
life,  and  almost  disappear  in  the  later;  the  less  satiating 
gratifications  of  altruism  are  missed  throughout  life,  and 
especially  in  that  latter  part  when  they  largely  replace 
egoistic  gratifications  ;  and  there  is  a  lack  of  susceptibility 
to  aesthetic  pleasures  of  the  higher  orders. 

An  indication  must  be  added  of  the  truth,  scarcely  at  all 
recognized,  that  this  dependence  of  egoism  upon  altruism 
ranges  beyqnd  the  limits  of  each  society,  and  tends  ever 
towards  universality.  That  within  each  society  it  becomes 
greater  as  social  evolution,  implying  increase  of  mutual 
dependence,  progresses,  needs  not  be  shown ;  and  it  is  a 
corollary  that  as  fast  as  the  dependence  of  societies  on  one 
another  is  increased  by  commercial  intercourse,  the  internal 
welfare  of  each  becomes  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  otherst. 
That  the  impoverishment  of  any  country,  diminishing  both 
its  producing  and  consuming  powers,  tells  detrimentally  on 
the  people  of  countries  trading  with  it,  is  a  commonplace 
of  political  economy.  Moreover,  we  have  had  of  late  years, 
abundant  experience  of  the  industrial  derangements  through 
which  distress  is  brought  on  nations  not  immediately  con- 
cerned, by  wars  between  other  nations.  And  if  each 
community  has  the  egoistic  satisfactions   of   its   members 


218  THE   DATA  OP  ETHICS. 

diminished  by  aggressions  of  neighbouring  communities  on 
one  another,  still  more  does  it  have  them  diminished  by  its 
own  aggressions.  One  who  marks  how,  in  various  parts  of 
the  world,  the  unscrupulous  greed  of  conquest  cloaked  by 
pretences  of  spreading  the  blessings  of  British  rule  and 
British  religion,  is  now  reacting  to  the  immense  detriment  of 
the  industrial  classes  at  home,  alike  by  increasing  expendi- 
ture and  paralyzing  trade,  may  see  that  these  industrial 
classes,  absorbed  in  questions  about  capital  and  labour,  and 
thinking  themselves  unconcerned  in  our  doings  abroad,  are 
suffering  from  lack  of  that  wide-reaching  altruism  which 
should  insist  on  just  dealings  with  other  peoples,  civilized  or 
savage.  And  he  may  also  see  that  beyond  these  immediate 
evils,  they  will  for  a  generation  to  come  suffer  the  evils  that 
must  flow  from  resuscitating  the  type  of  social  organization 
which  aggressive  activities  produce,  and  from  the  lowered 
moral  tone  which  is  its  accompaniment. 


^l;^ 

"> 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

TRIAL    AND    COMPROMISE. 

§  82.  In  the  foregoing  two  chapters  the  case  on  behalf 
of  Egoism  and  the  case  on  behalf  of  Altruism  have  been 
stated.  The  two  conflict ; ,  and  we  have  now  to  consider 
what  verdict  ought  to  be  given. 

If  the  opposed  statements  are  severally  valid,  or  even 
if  each  of  them  is  valid  in  part,  the  inference  must  be  that 
pure  egoism  and  pure  altruism  are  both  illegitimate.  If  the 
maxim — '*  Live  for  self,''  is  wrong,  so  also  is  the  maxim — 
''Live  for  others.''  Hence  a  compromise  is  the  only- 
possibility. 

This  conclusion,  though  already  seeming  unavoidable,  I  do 
not  here  set  down  as  proved.  The  purpose  of  this  chapter 
is  to  justify  it  in  full ;  and  I  enunciate  it  at  the  outset 
because  the  arguments  used  will  be  better  understood,  if 
the  conclusion  to  which  they  converge  is  in  the  reader's  view. 

How  shall  we  so  conduct  the  discussion  as  most  clearly 

to    bring  out  this  necessity  for  a  compromise  ?      Perhaps 

the  best  way  will  be  that  of  stating  one  of  the  two  claims 

in  its  extreme  form,  and  observing  the  implied  absurdities. 

To  deal  thus  with  the  principle  of  pure  selfishness,  would 

be  to  waste  space.      Every  one   sees   that    an   unchecked 

satisfaction  of  personal  desires  from  moment  to  moment,  in  I 

absolute  disregard  of  all  other  beings,  would  cause  universal  I 

conflict  and  social  dissolution.     The  principle  of  pure  unsel- 
10 


220  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

fishness^  less  obviously  miscliievous,  may  therefore  better  be 
chosen. 

There  are  two  aspects  under  which  the  doctrine  that 
others'  happiness  is  the  true  ethical  aim  presents  itself. 
The  ^'  others"  may  be  conceived  personally,  as  individuals 
with  whom  we  stand  in  direct  relations ;  or  they  may 
be  conceived  impersonally,  as  constituting  the  community. 
In  so  far  as  the  self-abnegation  implied  by  pure  altruism 
is  concerned,  it  matters  not  in  which  sense  ^'  others  "  is  used. 
But  criticism  will  be  facilitated  by  distinguishing  between 
these  two  forms  of  it,     "We  will  take  the  last  form  first. 

§  83.  This  commits  us  to  an  examination  of  ^Hhe  greatest 
happiness  princiBJe/^  as  enunciated  by  Bentham  and  his 
followers.  The  doctrine  that ''  the  general  happiness''  ought 
to  be  the  object  of  pursuit,  is  not,  indeed,  overtly  iden- 
tified with  pure  altruism.  But  as,  if  general  happiness 
is  the  proper  end  of  action,  the  individual  actor  must  regard 
his  own  share  of  it  simply  as  a  unit  in  the  aggregate,  no 
more  to  be  valued  by  him  than  any  other  unit,  it  results 
that  since  this  unit  is  almost  infinitesimal  in  comparison 
with  the  aggregate,  his  action,  if  directed  exclusively 
to  achievement  of  general  happiness,  is,  if  not  absolutely 
altruistic,  as  nearly  so  as  may  be.  Hence  the  theory  which 
makes  general  happiness  the  immediate  object  of  pursuit, 
may  rightly  be  taken  as  one  form_of_the  pure  ^-aitcuisuL-tfi^ 
be  here  criticized. 

Both  as  justifying  this  interpretation  and  as  furnishing  a 
definite  proposition  with  which  to  deal,  let  me  set  out  by 
quoting  a  passage  from  Mr,  Mill's  Utilitarianism. 

"  The  Greatest-Happiness  Principle,"  he  says,  "  is  a  mere  form  of  words 
without  rational  signification,  unless  one  person's  happiness,  supposed  equal  in 
degree  (with  the  proper  allowance  made  for  kind),  is  counted  for  exactly  as 
much  as  another's.  Those  conditions  being  supplied,  Bentham's  dictum, 
'everybody  to  count  for  one,  nobody  for  more  than  one,'  might  be  written  under 
the  principle  of  utility  as  an  explanatory  commentary"     (p.  91.) 

Now  though  the  meaning  of  "  greatest  happiness  "  as  an 


TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  221 

end,  is  here  to  a  certain  degree  defined,  the  need  for 
further  definition  is  felt  the  moment  we  attempt  to  decide 
on  ways  of  regulating  conduct  so  as  to  attain  the  end.  The 
first  question  which  arises  is — Must  we  regard  this  "greatest 
happiness  principle '^  as  a  principle  of  guidance  for  the 
community  in  its  corporate  capacity,  or  as  a  principle  of 
guidance  for  its  members  separately  considered,  or  both  ? 
If  the  reply  is  that  the  principle  must  be  taken  as  a  guide 
for  governmental  action  rather  than  for  individual  action, 
we  are  at  once  met  by  the  inquiry, — ^What  is  to  be  the 
guide  for  individual  action?  If  individual  action  is  not 
to  be  regulated  solely  for  the  purpose  of  achieving  ''the 
greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number,^^  some  other 
principle  of  regulation  for  individual  action  is  required; 
and  "  the  greatest  happiness  principle'^  fails  to  furnish  the 
needful  ethical  standard.  Should  it  be  rejoined  that  the 
individual  in  his  capacity  of  political  unit,  is  to  take  further- 
ance of  general  happiness  as  his  end,  giving  his  vote  or 
otherwise  acting  on  the  legislature  with  a  view  to  this  end, 
and  that  in  so  far  guidance  is  supplied  to  him,  there  comes 
the  further  inquiry* — Whence  is  to  come  guidance  for 
the  remainder  of  individual  conduct,  constituting  by  far 
the  greater  part  of  it  ?  If  this  private  part  of  individual 
conduct  is  not  to  have  general  happiness  as  its  direct  aim, 
then  an  ethical  standard  other  than  that  offered  has  still  to 
be  found. 

Hence,  unless  pure  altruism  as  thus  formulated  confesses 
its  inadequacy,  it  must  justify  itself  as  a  sufficient  rule 
for  all  conduct,  individual  and  social.  We  will  first  deal 
with  it  as  the  alleged  right  principle  of  public  policy ;  and 
then  as  the  alleged  right  principle  of  private  action. 

§  84.  On  trying  to  understand  precisely  the  statement 
that  when  taking  general  happiness  as  an  end,  the  rule 
must  be — "everybody  to  count  for  one,  nobody  for  more  than 
one,''  there  arises  the  idea  of  distribution.     We  can  form 


222  THE    DATA   OF    ETHICS. 

no  idea  of  distribution  without  thinking  of  something 
distributed  and  recipients  of  this  something.  That  we 
may  clearly  conceive  the  proposition  we  must  clearly 
conceive  both  these  elements  of  it.  Let  us  take  first  the 
recipients. 

"  Everybody  to  count  for  one^  nobody  for  more  than  one.'^ 
Does  this  mean  that,  in  respect  of  whatever  is  portioned 
out,  each  is  to  have  the  same  share  whatever  his  character, 
whatever  his  conduct  ?  Shall  he  if  passive  have  as  much 
as  if  active  ?  Shall  he  if  useless  have  as  much  as  if  useful  ? 
Shall  he  if  criminal  have  as  much  as  if  virtuous  ?  If  the 
distribution  is  to  be  made  without  reference  to  the  natures 
and  deeds  of  the  recipients,  then  it  must  be  shown  that  a 
system  which  equalizes,  as  far  as  it  can,  the  treatment  of  good 
and  bad,  will  be  beneficial.  If  the  distribution  is  not 
to  be  indiscriminate,  then  the  formula  disappears.  The  some- 
thing distributed  must  be  apportioned  otherwise  than  by 
equal  division.  There  must  be  adjustment  of  amounts  to 
deserts ;  and  we  are  left  in  the  dark  as  to  the  mode  of 
adjustment — we  have  to  find  other  guidance. 

Let  us  next  ask  what  is  the  something  to  be  distributed  ? 
The  first  idea  which  occurs  is  that  happiness  itself  must  be 
divided  out  among  all.  Taken  literally,  the  notions  that 
the  greatest  happiness  should  be  the  end  sought,  and  that  in 
apportioning  it  everybody  should  count  for  one  and  nobody 
for  more  than  one,  imply  that  happiness  is  something 
that  can  be  cut  up  itito  parts  and  handed  round.  This, 
however,  is  an  impossible  interpretation.  But  after 
recognizing  the  impossibilijiy  of  it,  there  returns  the 
question — ^What  is  it  in  respect  of  which  everybody  is  to 
count  for  one  and  nobody  for  more  than  one  ? 

Shall  the  interprej;ation  be  that  the  concrete  means  to 
happiness  are  to  beequally  divided  ?  Is  it  intended  that  there 
shall  be  distributed  to  all  in  equal  portions  the  necessaries 
of  life,  the  appliances  to  comfort,  the  facilities  for  amuse- 
me^t  ?     4"'S  a  conception  simply,  this  is  more  defensible. 


/ 


TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  223 

But  passing  over  tlie  question  of  policy — ^passing'  over  the 
question  whether  greatest  happiness  would  ultimately  be 
secured  by  such  a  process  (which  it  obviously  would  not) 
it  turns  out  on  examination  that  greatest  happiness  could 
not  even  proximately  be  so  secured.  Differences  of  age_,  of 
growth,  of  constitutional  need,  differences  of  activity  and 
consequent  expenditure,  differences  of  desires  and  tastes, 
would  entail  the  inevitable  result  that  the  material  aids  to 
happiness  which  each  received  would  be  more  or  less  un- 
adapted  to  his  requirements.  Even  if  purchasing  power  were 
equally  divided,  the  greatest  happiness  would  not  be  achieved 
if  everybody  counted  for  one  and  nobody  for  more  than 
one;  since,  as  the  capacities  for  utilizing  the  purchased 
means  to  happiness  would  vary  both  with  the  constitution 
and  the  stage  of  life,  the  means  which  would  approximately 
suffice  to  satisfy  the  wants  of  one  would  be  extremely 
insufficient  to  satisfy  the  wants  of  another,  and  so  the| 
greatest  total  of  happiness  would  not  be  obtained  :  means  I 
might  be  unequally  apportioned  in  a  way  that  would  produce' 
a  greater  total. 

But  now  if  happiness  itself  cannot  be  cut  up  and 
distributed  equally,  and  if  equal  division  of  the  material 
aids  to  happiness  would  not  produce  greatest  happiness, 
what  is  the  thing  to  be  thus  apportioned  ? — what  is  it  in 
respect  of  which  everybody  is  to  count  for  one  and  nobody 
for  more  than  one  ?  There  seems  but  a  single  possibility.  / 
There  remain  to  be  equally  distributed  nothing  but  the/ 
conditions  under  which  each  may  pursue  happiness.  The' 
limitations  to  action — the  degrees  of  freedom  and  restraint, 
shall  be  alike  for  all.  Each  shall  have  as  much  liberty  to 
pursue  his  ends  as  consists  with  maintaining  like  liberties  to 
pursue  their  ends  by  others ;  and  one  as  much  as  another 
shall  have  the  enjoyment  of  that  which  his  efforts,  carried  on 
within  these  limits,  obtain.  But  to  say  that  in  respect  of 
these  conditions  everybody  shall  count  for  one  and  nobody 
for  more  than  one,  is  simply  to  say  that  equity  shall  be 
enforced. 


224  THE    DATA   OP    ETHICS. 

Thus,  considered  as  a  principle  of  public  policy,  Bentham's 
principle,  when  analyzed,  transforms  itself  into  the  principle 
he   slights.      Not  general   happiness  becomes  the    ethical  <, 
standard  by  which  legislative  action  is  to  be  guided,  but   '> 
universal  justice.     And  so  the  altruistic  theory  under  this^ 
form  collapses. 

§  85.  From  examining  the  doctrine  that  general  happiness  i 
should  be  the  end  of  public  action,  we  pass  now  to  examine  I 
the  doctrine  that  it  should  be  the  end  of  private  action. 

It  is  contended  that  from  the  stand-point  of  pure  reason, 
the  happiness  of  others  has  no  less  a  claim  as  an  object  of 
pursuit  for  each  than  personal  happiness.  Considered  as 
parts  of  a  total,  happiness  felt  by  self  and  like  happiness  felt 
by  another,  are  of  equal  values  ;  and  hence  it  is  inferred  that, 
rationally  estimated,  the  obligation  to  expend  effort  for 
others'  benefit,  is  as  great  as  the  obligation  to  expend  effort 
for  one's  own  benefit.  Holding  that  the  utilitarian  system 
of  morals,  rightly  understood,  harmonizes  with  the  Christian 
maxim — "  Love  your  neighbour  as  j- ourself,''  Mr.  Mill  says 
that  ''  as  between  his  own  happiness  and  that  of  others, 
utilitarianism  requires  him  to  be  as  strictly  impartial  as  a 
disinterested  and  benevolent  spectator.''  (p.  24)  Let  us 
consider  the  alternative  interpretations  which  may  be  given 
to  this  statement. 

Suppose,  first,  tbat  a  certain  quantum  of  happiness  has  in 
some  way  become  available,  without  the  special  instrumen- 
tality of  A,  B,  C,  or  D,  constituting  the  group  concerned. 
Then  the  proposition  is  that  each  shall  be  ready  to  have  this 
quantum  of  happiness  as  much  enjoyed  by  one  or  more  of 
tbe  others  as  by  himself.  The  disinterested  and  benevolent 
spectator  would  clearly,  in  such  a  case,  rule  that  no  one 
ought  to  have  more  of  the  happiness  than  another.  But 
here,  assuming  as  we  do  that  the  quantum  of  happine 
has  become  available  without  the  agency  of  any 
among  the  group,  simple  equity  dictates  as  much.  No 
£>ne  having  in  any  way  established  a  claim  different  from 


TRIAL  AND   COMPIJOMISE.  225 

the  claims  of  otliers^  their  claims  are  equal ;  and  due  regard 
for  justice  by  each,  will  not  permit  him  to  monopolize  the 
happiness. 

Now  suppose  a  different  case.  Suppose  that  the  quantum 
of  happiness  has  been  made  available  by  the  efforts  of  one 
member  of  the  group.  Suppose  that  A  has  acquired  by 
labour  some  material  aid  to  happiness.  He  decides  to  act 
as  the  disinterested  and  benevolent  spectator  would  direct. 
What  will  he  decide  ? — what  would  the  spectator  direct  ? 
Let  us  consider  the  possible  suppositions ;  taking  first  the 
least  reasonable. 

The  spectator  may  be  conceived  as  deciding  that  the 
labour  expended  by  A  in  acquiring  this  material  aid  to 
happiness,  originates  no  claim  to  special  use  of  it ;  but 
that  it  ought  to  be  given  to  B^  C,  or  D,  or  that  it  ought 
to  be  divided  equally  among  B,  C,  and  D,  or  that  it  ought 
to  be  divided  equally  among  all  members  of  the  group, 
including  A  who  has  laboured  for  it.  And  if  the  spec- 
tator is  conceived  as  deciding  thus  to-day,  he  must  be  con- 
ceived as  deciding  thus  day  after  day ;  with  the  result  that 
one  of  the  group  expends  all  the  effort,  getting  either  none 
of  the  benefit  or  only  his  numerical  share,  while  the  others 
get  their  shares  of  the  benefit  without  expending  any  efforts. 
That  A  might  conceive  the  disinterested  and  benevolent 
spectator  to  decide  in  this  way,  and  might  feel  bound  to 
act  in  conformity  with  the  imagined  decision,  is  a  strong 
juppt5sition ;  and  probably  it  will  be  admitted  that  such 
kind  of  impartiality,  so  far  from  being  conducive  to  the 
general  happiness,  would  quickly  be  fatal  to  everyone.  But 
this  is  not  all.  Action  in  pursuance  of  such  a  decision 
would  in  reality  be  negatived  by  the  very  principle  enun- 
ciated. For  not  only  A,  but  also  B,  0,  and  D,  have  to  act 
on  this  principle.  Each  of  them  must  behave  as  he  con- 
ceives an  impartial  spectator  would  decide.  Does  B  con- 
ceive the  impartial  spectator  as  awarding  to  him,  B,  the 
product  of  A^s  labour?      Then  the  assumption  is  that  B 


226  THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

conceives  the  impartial  spectator  as  favouring  himself,  B, 
more  than  A  conceives  him  as  favouring  himself.  A; 
which  is  inconsistent  with  the  hypothesis.  Does  B,  in  con- 
ceiving the  impartial  spectator,  exclude  his  own  interests  as 
completely  as  A  does  ?  Then  how  can  he  decide  so  much  to 
his  own  advantage,  so  partially,  as  to  allow  him  to  take  from 
A  an  equal  share  of  the  benefit  gained  by  A's  labour,  towards 
which  he  and  the  rest  have  done  nothing  ? 

Passing  from  this  conceivable,  though  not  credible,  deci- 
sion of  the  spectator,  here  noted  for  the  purpose  of  observ- 
ing that  habitual  conformity  to  it  would  be  impossible,  there 
remains  to  be  considered  the  decision  which  a  spectator 
really  impartial  would  give.  He  would  say  that  the  happi- 
ness, or  material  aid  to  happiness,  which  had  been  purchased 
by  A^s  labour,  was  to  be  taken  by  A.  He  would  say 
that  B,  C,  and  D  had  no  claims  to  it,  but  only  to  such  happi- 
ness, or  aids  to  happiness,  as  their  respective  labours  had 
purchased.  Consequently,  A,  acting  as  the  imaginary  im- 
partial spectator  would  direct,  is,  by  this  test,  justified  in 
appropriating  such  happiness  or  aid  to  happiness  as  his  own 
efforts  have  achieved. 

And  so  under  its  special  form  as .  under  its  general  form,  \ 
the  principle  is  true  only  in  so  far  as  it  embodies  a  dis-  I 
guised  justice.  Analysis  again  brings  out  the  result  that 
making  '* general  happiness^'  the  end  of  action,  really  means 
maintaining  what  we  call  equitable  relations  among  indi- 
viduals. Decline  to  accept  in  its  vague  form  "the  greatest- 
happiness  principle,'^  and  insist  on  knowing  what  is  the  im- 
plied conduct,  public  or  private,  and  it  turns  out  that  the 
principle  is  meaningless  save  as  indirectly  asserting  that 
the  claims  of  each  should  be  duly  regarded  by  all.  The 
utilitarian  altruism  becomes  a  duly  qualified  egoism. 

§  86.  Another  point  of  view  from  which  to  judge  tho 
altruistic  theory  may  now  be  taken.  If,  assuming  the 
proper  object  of  pursuit  to  be  general  happiness,  we  proceed 


TRIAL   AND    COMPROMISE.  227 

rationally^  we  must  ask  in  what  different  ways  the  aggregate, 
general  happiness,  may  be  composed  ;  and  must  then  ask 
what  composition  of  it  will  yield  the  largest  sum. 

Suppose  that  each  citizen  pursues  his  own  happiness 
independently,  not  to  the  detriment  of  others  but  without 
active  concern  for  others  j  then  their  united  happinesses 
constitute  a  certain  sum — a  certain  general  happiness.  Now 
suppose  that  each,  instead  of  making  his  own  happiness 
the  object  of  pursuit,  makes  the  happiness  of  others  the 
object  of  pursuit;  then,  again,  there  results  a  certain 
sum  of  happiness.  This  sum  must  be  less  than,  or  equal 
to,  or  greater  than,  the  first.  If  it  is  admitted  that  this 
sum  is  either  less  than  the  first  or  only  equal  to  it,  the 
altruistic  course  of  action  is  confessedly  either  worse  than, 
or  no  better  than,  the  egoistic.  The  assumption  must  be 
that  the  sum  of  happiness  obtained  is  greater.  Let  us 
observe  what  is  involved  in  this  assumption. 

If  each  pursues  exclusively  the  happiness  of  others  ;  and 
if  each  is  also  a  recipient  of  happiness  (which  he  must  be, 
for  otherwise  no  aggregate  happiness  can  be  formed  out  of 
their  individual  happinesses) ;  then  the  implication  is  that 
each  gains  the  happiness  due  to  altruistic  action  exclusively ; 
and  that  in  each  this  is  greater  in  amount  than  the  egoistic 
happiness  obtainable  by  him,  if  he  devoted  himself  to  pursuit 
of  it.  Leaving  out  of  consideration  for  a  moment  these 
relative  amounts  of  the  two,  let  us  note  the  conditions  to 
the  receipt  of  altruistic  happiness  by  each.  The  sympathetic 
nature  gets  pleasure  by  giving  pleasure ;  and  the  proposition 
is  that  if  the  general  happiness  is  the  object  of  pursuit,  each 
will  be  made  happy  by  witnessing  others'*  happiness.  But 
what  in  such  case  constitutes  the  happiness  of  others  ?  These 
others  are  also,  by  the  hypothesis,  pursuers  and  receivers  of 
altruistic  pleasure.  The  genesis  of  altruistic  pleasure  in 
each  is  to  depend  on  the  display  of  pleasures  by  others ; 
wh  ich  is  again  to  depend  on  the  display  of  pleasures  by 
others ;  and  so  on  perpetually.     Where,  then,  is  the  pleasure 


228  THE    DATA    OF    ETHICS. 

to  begin  ?  Obviously  there  must  be  egoistic  pleasure  some- 
wliere,  before  there  can  be  the  altruistic  pleasure  caused 
by  sympathy  with  it.  Obviously,  therefore,  each  must  be 
egoistic  in  due  amount,  even  if  only  with  the  view  of  giving 
others  the  possibility  of  being  altruistic.  So  far  from  the 
sum  of  happiness  being  made  greater  if  all  make  greatest 
happiness  the  exclusive  end,  the  sum  disappears  entirely. 

How  absurd  is  the  supposition  that  the  happiness  of  all 
can  be  achieved  without  each  pursuing  his  own  happiness, 
will  be  best  shown  by  a  physical  simile.  Suppose  a  cluster 
of  bodies,  each  of  which  generates  heat ;  and  each  of  which 
is,  therefore,  while  a  radiator  of  heat  to  those  around,  also  a 
receiver  of  heat  from  them.  Manifestly  each  will  have  a 
certain  proper  heat  irrespective  of  that  which  it  gains  from 
the  rest;  and,  each  will  have  a  certain  heat  gained  from 
the  rest  irrespective  of  its  proper  heat.  What  will  happen? 
So  long  as  each  of  the  bodies  continues  to  be  a  generator  of 
heat,  each  continues  to  maintain  a  temperature  partly  derived 
from  itself  and  partly  derived  from  others.  But  if  each  ceases 
to  generate  heat  for  itself  and  depends  on  the  heat  radiated 
to  it  by  the  rest,  the  entire  cluster  becomes  cold.  Well,  the 
self-generated  heat  stands  for  egoistic  pleasure ;  the  heat 
radiated  and  received  stands  for  sympathetic  pleasure;  and 
the  disappearance  of  all  heat  if  each  ceases  to  be  an  originator 
of  it,  corresponds  to  the  disappearance  of  all  pleasure  if  each 
ceases  to  originate  it  egoistically. 

A  further  conclusion  may  be  drawn.  Besides  the  im- 
plication that  before  altruistic  pleasure  can  exist,  egoistic 
pleasure  must  exist,  and  that  if  the  rule  of  conduct  is  to  be 
the  same  for  all,  each  must  be  egoistic  in  due  degree ;  there 
is  the  implication  that,  to  achieve  the  greatest  sum  of 
happiness,  each  must  be  more  egoistic  than  altruistic.  For, 
speaking  generally,  sympathetic  pleasures  must  ever  con- 
tinue less  intense  than  the  pleasures  with  which  there  is 
sympathy.  Other  things  equal,  ideal  feelings  cannot  be 
as  vivid  as  real  feelings.     It  is  true  that  those  having  strong 


TRIAL  AND   COMPROMISE.  229 

imaginations  may,  especially  in  cases  where  the  affections 
are  engaged,  feel  the  moral  pain  if  not  the  physical 
pain  of  another,  as  keenly  as  the  actual  sufferer  of  it, 
and  may  participate  with  like  intensity  in  another's  plea- 
sure :  sometimes  even  mentally  representing  the  received 
pleasure  as  greater  than  it  really  is,  and  so  getting 
reflex  pleasure  greater  tUan  the  recipients'  direct  pleasure. 
Such  cases,  however,  and  cases  in  which  even  apart 
from  exaltation  of  sympathy  caused  by  attachment,  there  is 
a  body  of  feeling  sympathetically  aroused  equal  in  amount 
to  the  original  feeling,  if  not  greater,  are  necessarily  excep- 
tional. For  in  such  cases  the  total  consciousness  includes 
many  other  elements  besides  the  mentally-represented 
pleasure  or  pain — notably  the  luxury  of  pity  and  the  luxury 
of  goodness ;  and  genesis  of  these  can  occur  but  occasion- 
ally :  they  could  not  be  habitual  concomitants  of  sympathetic 
pleasures  if  all  pursued  these  from  moment  to  moment. 
In  estimating  the  possible  totality  of  sympathetic  pleasures, 
we  must  include  nothing  beyond  the  representations  of  the 
pleasures  others  experience.  And  unless  it  be  asserted 
that  we  can  have  other's  states  of  consciousness  perpetually 
re-produced  in  us  more  vividly  than  the  kindred  states  of 
consciousness  are  aroused  in  ourselves  by  their  proper 
personal  causes,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  totality  of 
altruistic  pleasures  cannot  become  equal  to  the  totality  of 
egoistic  pleasures.  Hence,  beyond  the  truth  that  before 
there  can  be  altruistic  pleasures  there  must  be  the  egoistic 
pleasures  from  sympathy  with  which  they  arise,  there  is  the 
truth  that,  to  obtain  the  greatest  sum  of  altruistic  pleasures, 
there  must  be  a  greater  sum  of  egoistic  pleasures. 

§  87.  That  pure  altruism  is  suicidal  may  be  yet  other-  ^ 
wise  demonstrated.     A  perfectly   moral    law  must    be  one 
which  becomes  perfectly  practicable  as  human  nature  be- 
comes perfect.     If  its  practicableness  decreases  as  human 


230  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

nature  improves;  and  if  an  ideal  human  nature  neces- 
sitates its  impracticability;  it  cannot  be  the  moral  law- 
sought. 

Now  opportunities  for  practising  altruism  are  numerous 
and  great  in  proportion  as  there  is  weakness,  or  incapacity, 
or  imperfection.  If  we  pass  beyond  the  limits  of  the  family, 
in  which  a  sphere  for  self-sacrificing  activities  must  be  pre- 
served as  long  as  ofi'spring  have  to  be  reared ;  and  if  we  ask 
how  there  can  continue  a  social  sphere  for  self-sacrificing 
activities ;  it  becomes  obvious  that  the  continued  existence 
of  serious  evils,  caused  by  prevalent  defects  of  nature,  is 
implied.  As  fast  as  men  adapt  themselves  to  the  require- 
ments of  social  life,  so  fast  will  the  demands  for  efibrts 
on  their  behalf  diminish.  And  with  arrival  at  finished 
adaptation,  when  all  persons  are  at  once  completely  self-con- 
served and  completely  able  to  fulfil  the  obligations  which 
society  imposes  on  them,  those  occasions  for  postponement  of 
self  to  others  which  pure  altruism  contemplates,  disappear. 

Such  self-sacrifices  become,  indeed,  doubly  impracticable. 
Carrying  on  successfully  their  several  lives,  men  not  only  can- 
not yield  to  those  around  the  opportunities  for  giving  aid,  but 
aid  cannot  ordinarily  be  given  them  without  interfering  with 
their  normal  activities,  and  so  diminishing  their  pleasures. 
Like  every  inferior  creature,  led  by  its  innate  desires 
spontaneously  to  do  all  that  its  life  requires,  man,  when 
completely  moulded  to  the  social  state,  must  have  desires 
so  adjusted  to  his  needs  that  he  fulfils  the  needs  in 
gratifying  the  desires.  And  if  his  desires  are  severally 
gratified  by  the  performance  of  required  acts,  none  of  these 
can  be  performed  for  him  without  balking  his  desires. 
Acceptance  from  others  of  the  results  of  their  activities  can 
take  place  only  on  condition  of  relinquishing  the  pleasures 
derived  from  his  own  activities.  Diminution  rather  than  . 
increase  of  happiness  would  result,  could  altruistic  action  | 
in  such  case  be  enforced. 


TRIAL  AND    COMPROMISE.  231 

And  here,  indeed,  we  are  introduced  to  another  baseless 
assumption  which,  the  theory  makes. 

§  88.  The  postulate  of  utilitarianism  as  formulated  in  the 
statements  above  quoted,  and  of  pure  altruism  as  otherwise 
expressed,  involves  the  belief  that  it  is  possible  for 
happiness,  or  the  means  to  happiness,  or  the  conditions  to 
happiness,  to  be  transferred.  Without  any  specified  limita- 
tion the  proposition  taken  for  granted  is,  that  happiness  in 
general  admits  of  detachment  from  one  and  attachment  to 
another — that  surrender  to  any  extent  is  possible  by  one 
and  appropriation  to  any  extent  is  possible  by  another. 
But  a  moment^s  thought  shows  this  to  be  far  from  the  truth. 
On  the  one  hand,  surrender  carried  to  a  certain  point  is 
extremely  misch.ievous  and  to  a  further  point  fatal ;  and  on 
the  other  hand,  much  of  the  happiness  eacb  enjoys  is  self- 
generated  and  can  neither  be  given  nor  received. 

To  assume  that  egoistic  pleasures  may  be  relinquished  to 
any  extent,  is  to  fall  into  one  of  those  many  errors  of  ethical 
speculation  which  result  from  ignoring  the  truths  of  biology. 
When  taking  the  biological  view  of  ethics  we  saw  that  plea- 
sures accompany  normal  amounts  of  functions,  while  pains 
accompany  defects   or  excesses  of  functions ;    further,  that 
complete  life  depends  on  complete  discharge  of  functions, 
and  therefore  on  receipt  of  the  correlative  pleasures.     Hence, . 
to  yield  up  normal  pleasures  is  to  yield  up  so  much  life  ;  and 
there  arises  the  question — to  what  extent  may  this  be  done  ?  ' 
If  he  is  to  continue  living,  the  individual  must  take  certain 
amounts  of  those  pleasures  which,  go  along  with  fulfilment! 
of  the  bodily  functions,  and  must  avoid   the  pains  which) 
entire  non-fulfilment  of  them  entails.     Complete  abnegatioi^ 
means  death ;  excessive  abnegation  means  illness ;  abnega-, 
tion  less  excessive  means  physical  degradation  and  consequent^ 
loss   of    power   to   fulfil   obligations,    personal   and   other. 
When,  therefore,  we  attempt  to  specialize  the  proposal  to  live 
not  for  self-satisfaction  but  for  the  satisfaction  of  others,  we 


232  THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

meet  with  the  difficulty  that  beyond  a  certain  limit  this 
cannot  be  done.  And  when  we  have  decided  what  decrease 
of  bodily  welfare^  caused  by  sacrifice  of  pleasures  and 
acceptance  of  pains^  it  is  proper  for  the  individual  to  make, 
there  is  forced  on  us  the  fact  that  the  portion  of  happiness, 
or  means  to  happiness,  which  it  is  possible  for  him  to  yield 
up  for  redistribution,  is  a  limited  portion. 

Even  more  rigorous  on  another  side  is  the  restriction  put 
upon  the  transfer  of  happiness,  or  the  means  to  happiness. 
The  pleasures  gained  by  efficient  action — by  successful 
pursuit  of  ends,  cannot  by  any  process  be  parted  with,  and 
cannot  in  any  way  be  appropriated  by  another.  The  habit 
of  arguing  about  general  happiness  sometimes  as  though  it 
were  a  concrete  product  to  be  portioned  out,  and  sometimBs 
as  though  it  were  co-extensive  with  the  use  of  those  material 
aids  to  pleasure  which  may  be  given  and  received,  has 
caused  inattention  to  the  truth  that  the  pleasures  of  achieve- 
ment are  not  transferable.  Alike  in  the  boy  who  has  won  a 
game  of  marbles,  the  athlete  who  has  performed  a  feat,  the 
statesman  who  has  gained  a  party  triumph,  the  inventor  who 
has  devised  a  new  machine,  the  man  of  science  who  has 
discovered,  a  truth,  the  novelist  who  has  well  delineated 
a  character,  the  poet  who  has  finely  rendered  an  emotion, 
we  see^pleasures  which  must,  in  the  nature  of  ^things,  be 
enjoyed  exclusively  by  those  to  whom_they_come.  And 
if  welooFat  all  such  occupations  as  men  are  not  impelled  to 
by  their  necessities — if  we  contemplate  the  various  ambitions 
which  play  so  large  a  part  in  life ;  we  are  reminded  that  so 
long  as  the  consciousness  of  efficiency  remains  a  dominant 
pleasure,  there  will  remain  a  dominant  pleasure  which  • 
cannot  be  pursued  altruistically  but  must  be  pursued  ) 
egoistically. 

Cutting  off,  then,  at  the  one  end,  those  pleasures  which 
are  inseparable  from  maintenance  of  the  physique  in 
an  uninjured  state ;  and  cutting  off  at  the  other  end  the 
pleasures  of  successful  action;  the  amount  that  remains  is  so 


TRIAL   AND    COMPROMISE.  233 

greatly  diminislied,  as  to  make  untenable  the  assumption  that 
happiness  at  large  admits  of  distribution  after  the  manner 
which  utilitarianism  assumes. 

•>. 

§  89.  In  yet  one  more  way  may  be  shown  the  inconsistency  . 
of  this  transfigured  utiHtarianism  which  regards  its  doctrine 
as   embodying  the   Christian  maxim — ''  Love  your  neigh- 
bour as  yourself/'  and  of  that  altruism  which,  going  still 
further^  enunciates  the  maxim — ^'  Live  for  others/' 

A  right  rule  of  conduct  must  be  one  which  may  with 
advantage   be   adopted   by   all.     '^  Act   according   to   that 
maxim    only,  which   you    can  wish,  at  the   same  time,  to 
become  a  universal  law,''  says  Kant.     And  clearly,  passing 
over     needful     qualifications     of     this    maxim,    we    miy 
accept  it  to  the  extent  of  admitting  that  a  mode  of  action  \ 
which  becomes  impracticable  as  it  approaches  universality,   ] 
must  be  wrong.  .  Hence,  if  the  theory  of   pure  altruism,    I 
implying  that  effort  should  be  expended  for  the  benefit  of  ! 
others  and  not  for  personal  benefit,  is  defensible,  it  must  be 
shown  that  it  will  produce  good  results  when  acted  upon  by 
all.     Mark  the  consequences  if  all  are  purely  altruistic. 

First,  an  impossible  combination  of  moral  attributes  is 
implied.  Each  is  supposed  by  the  hypothesis  to  regar(^ 
self  so  little  and  others  so  much,  that  he  willingly  sacri- 
fices his  own  pleasures  to  give  pleasures  to  them.  But  it 
this  is  a  universal  trait,  and  if  action  is  universally  con- 
gruous with  it,  we  have  to  conceive  each  as  being  not  only 
a  sacrificer  but  also  one  who  accepts  sacrifices.  While  he 
is  so  unselfish  as  willingly  to  yield  up  the  benefit  for 
which  he  has  laboured,  he  is  so  selfish  as  willingly  to  let 
others  yield  up  to  him  the  benefits  they  have  laboured  for. 
To  make  pure  altruism  possible  for  all,  each  must  be  at  once 
extremely  unegoistic  and  extremely  egoistic.  As  a  giver, 
he  must  have  no  thought  for  self;  as  a  receiver,  no  thought 
for  others.  Evidently,  this  implies  an  inconceivable  mental 
constitution.    The  sympathy  which  is  so  solicitous  for  others 


234  THE    DATA    OF    ETHICS. 

as  willingly  to  injure  self  in  benefiting  them^  cannot  at  tlie 
same  time  be  so  regardless  of  others  as  to  accept  benefits 
which  they  injure  themselves  in  giving. 

The  incongruities  that  emerge  if  we  assume  pure  altruism 
to  be  universally  practised,  may  be  otherwise  exhibited 
thus.  Suppose  that  each,  instead  of  enjoying  such  pleasures 
as  come  to  him,  or  such  consumable  appliances  to  pleasure  as 
he  has  worked  for,  or  such  occasions  for  pleasure  as  reward 
his  efi'orts,  relinquishes  these  to  a  single  other,  or  adds  them 
to  a  common  stock  from  which  others  benefit;  what  will 
result  ?  Different  answers  may  be  given  according  as  we 
assume  that  there  are,  or  are  not,  additional  influences 
brought  into  play.  Suppose  there  are  no  additional 

influences.  Then,  if  each  transfers  to  another  his  happiness, 
or  means  to  happiness,  or  occasions  for  happiness,  while  some 
one  else  does  the  like  to  him,  the  distribution  of  happiness 
is,  on  the  average,  unchanged ;  or  if  each  adds  to  a  common 
stock  his  happiness,  or  means  to  happiness,  or  occasions  for 
happiness,  from  which  common  stock  each  appropriates  his 
portion,  the  average  state  is  still,  as  before,  unchanged. 
The  only  obvious  effect  is  that  transactions  must  be  gone 
through  in  the  redistribution ;  and  loss  of  time  and  labour 
must  result.  Now  suppose  some  additional  influence 

which  makes  the  process  beneficial ;  what  must  it  be  ?  The 
totality  can  be  increased  only  if  the  acts  of  transfer 
increase  the  quantity  of  that  which  is  transferred.  The^ 
happiness,  or  that  which  brings  it,  must  be  greater  to  one 
who  derives  it  from  another's  efforts,  than  it  would  have 
been  had  his  own  efforts  procured  it;  or  otherwise,  sup- 
posing a  fund  of  happiness,  or  of  that  which  brings  it,  has 
been  formed  by  contributions  from  each,  then  each,  in 
appropriating  his  share,  must  find  it  larger  than  it  would 
have  been  had  no  such  aggregation  and  dispersion  taken 
place.  To  justify  belief  in  such  increase  two  conceivable 
assumptions  may  be  made.  One  is  that  though  the  sum  of 
pleasures,  or  of  pleasure-yielding  things,  remains  the  same 


TRIAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  Z6b 

yet  tlie  kind  of  pleasure,  or  of  pleasure-yielding  tilings,  which 
each  receives  in  exchange  from  another,  or  from  the  aggre- 
gate of  others,  is  one  which  he  appreciates  more  than  that 
for  which  he  laboured.  But  to  assume  this  is  to  assume 
that  each  labours  directly  for  the  thing  which  he  enjoys  less, 
rather  than  for  the  thing  which  he  enjoys  more,  which  is 
absurd.  The  other  assumption  is  that  while  the  exchanged 
or  redistributed  pleasure  of  the  egoistic  kind,  remains  the 
same  in  amount  for  each,  there  is  added  to  it  the  altruistic 
pleasure  accompanying  the  exchange.  But  this  assumption 
is  clearly  inadmissible  if,  as  is  implied,  the  transaction  is 
universal — is  one  through  which  each  becomes  giver  and 
receiver  to  equal  extents.  For  if  the  transfer  of  pleasures, 
or  of  pleasure-yielding  things,  from  one  to  another  or  others, 
is  always  accompanied  by  the  consciousness  that  there  will 
be  received  from  him  or  them  an  equivalent ;  there  results 
merely  a  tacit  exchange,  either  direct  or  roundabout.  Each 
becomes  altruistic  in  no  greater  degree  than  is  implied  by 
being  equitable ;  and  each,  having  nothing  to  exalt  his 
happiness,  sympathetically  or  otherwise,  cannot  be  a  source 
of  sympathetic  happiness  to  others. 

§  90.  Thus,  when  the  meanings  of  its  words  are  inquired 
into,  or  when  the  necessary  implications  of  its  theory  are 
examined,  pure  altruism,  in  whatever  form  expressed, 
commits  its  adherents  to  various  absurdities. 

If  "  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number,"  or 
in  other  words,  "  the  general  happiness,"  is  the  proper  end 
of  action,  then  not  only  for  all  public  action  but  for  all 
private  action,  it  must  be  the  end ;  because,  otherwise,  the 
greater  part  of  action  remains  unguided.  Consider  its 
fitness  for  each.  If  corporate  action  is  to  be  guided 
by  the  principle,  with  its  interpreting  comment — '^  every- 
body to  count  for  one,  nobody  for  more  than  one" — 
there  must  be  an  ignoring  of  all  differences  of  character 
and   conduct,  merits   and   demerits,  among  citizens,  since 


236  THE   DATA   OF    ETHICS. 

no   discrimination  is  provided  for ;    and    moreover,    since 
tliat  in  respect  of  which  all  are  to  count  alike  cannot  be 
happiness  itself,  which  is  indistributable,  and  since  equal 
sharing  of  the  concrete  means  to  happiness,  besides  failing 
ultimately  would  fail  proximately  to  produce  the  greatest 
happiness;  it  results  that  equal  distribution  of  the  conditions 
under  which  happiness  may  be  pursued  is  the  only  tenable 
meaning  :  we  discover  in  the  principle  nothing  but  a  round- 
about insi.stance  on  equity.     If,  taking  happiness  at  large  as 
the  aim  of  private  action,  the  individual  is  required  to  judge 
between  his  own  happiness  and  that  of  others  as  an  impar- 
tial spectator  would  do,  we  see  that  no  supposition  concern- 
ing the  spectator  save  one  which  suicidally  ascribes  partiality 
to  him,  can  bring  out  any  other  result  than  that  each  shall 
enjoy  such  happiness,  or  appropriate  such  means  to  happi- 
ness, as  his   own  efforts   gain:   equity   is    again   the   sole 
content.      When,   adopting   another   method,   we  consider 
how  the  greatest  sum  of  happiness  may  be  composed,  and, 
recognizing  the  fact  that  equitable  egoism  will  produce  a 
certain  sum,  ask  how  pure  altruism  is  to  produce  a  greater 
sum  j  we  are  shown  that  if  all,  exclusively  pursuing  altruistic 
pleasures,  are  so  to  produce  a  greater  sum  of  pleasures, 
the    implication   is   that   altruistic  pleasures,   which    arise 
from  sympathy,  can  exist  in  the  absence  of  egoistic  plea- 
sures with  which  there  may  be  sympathy — an  impossibility ; 
and  another  implication  is  that  if,  the  necessity  for  egoistic 
pleasures  being  admitted,  it  is  said  that  the  greatest  sum  of 
happiness    will    be   attained  if    all  individuals    are   more 
altruistic  than  egoistic,  it  is  indirectly  said  that  as  a  genera 
truth,  representative  feelings  are  stronger  than  presentative 
feelings — another  impossibility.    Again,  the  doctrine  of  pure 
altruism  assumes   that   happiness   may  be   to   any   extent 
transferred  or  redistributed ;    whereas  the  fact  is  that  plea- 
sures of  one  order  cannot  be  transferred  in  large  measure 
without  results  which  are  fatal  or  extremely  injurious,  and 
that  pleasures  of  another  order  cannot  be  transferred  in  any 


TRIAL  AND   COMPROMISE.  237 

degree.  Further,  pure  altruism  presents  tkis  fatal  anomaly; 
tliat  while  a  riglit  principle  of  action  must  be  more  and 
more  practised  as  men  improve,  th.^  altruistic  principle 
becomes  less  and  less  practicable  as  men  approacli  an  ideal 
form,  because  the  sphere  for  practising  it  continually  de- 
creases. Finally,  its  self-destructiveness  is  made  manifest 
on  observing  that  for  all  to  adopt  it  as  a  principle  of  action, 
which  they  must  do  if  it  is  a  sound  principle,  implies 
that  all  are  at  once  extremely  unegoistic  and  extremely 
egoistic— ready  to  injure  self  for  others'  benefit,  and  ready 
to  accept  benefit  at  the  cost  of  injury  to  others  :  traits 
which  cannot  co-exist. 

The  need  for  a  compromise  between  egoism  and  altruism 
is  thus  made  conspicuous.  We  are  forced  to  recognize  the 
claims  which  his  own  well-being  has  on  the  attention  of  each 
by  noting  how,  in  some  directions  we  come  to  a  deadlock, 
in  others  to  contradictions,  and  in  others  to  disastrous 
results,  if  they  are  ignored.  Conversely,  it  is  undeniable 
that  disregard  of  others  by  each,  carried  to  a  great  extent 
is  fatal  to  society,  and  carried  to  a  still  greater  extent 
is  fatal  to  the  family,  and  eventually  to  the  race.  Egoism 
and  altruism  are  therefore  co-essential. 

§  91.  What  form  is  the  compromise  between  egoism 
and  altruism  to  assume  ?  how  are  their  respective  claims  to 
be  satisfied  in  due  degrees  ? 

It  is  a  truth  insisted  on  by  moralists  and  recognized  in 
common  life,  that  the  achievement  of  individual  happiness 
is  not  proportionate  to  the  degree  in  which  individual 
happiness  is  made  the  object  of  direct  pursuit ;  but  there  has 
not  yet  become  current  the  belief  that,  in  like  manner,  the 
achievement  of  general  happiness  is  not, proportionate  to 
the  degree  in  which  general  happiness  is  made  the  object  of 
direct  pursuit.  Yet  failure  of  direct  pursuit  in  the  last  case 
is  more  reasonably  to  be  expected  than  in  the  first. 

When  discussing  the  relations  of  means  and  ends,  we  saw 


238  THE    DATA   OP    ETHICS. 

tliat  as  individual  conduct  evolves,  its  principle  becomes 
more  and  more  that  of  making  fulfilment  of  means  tlie 
proximate  end,  and  leaving  tlie  ultimate  end,  welfare  or 
happiness,  to  come  as  a  result.  And  we  saw  that  when 
general  welfare  or  happiness  is  the  ultimate  end,  the  same 
principle  holds  even  more  rigorously ;  since  the  ultimate 
end  under  its  impersonal  form,  is  less  determinate  than 
under  its  personal  form,  and  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
achieving  it  by  direct  pursuit  still  greater.  Recognizing, 
then,  the  fact  that  corporate  happiness  still  more  than 
individual  happiness,  must  be  pursued  not  directly  but 
indirectly,  the  first  question  for  us  is — What  must  be 
the  general  nature  of  the  means  through  which  it  is  to 
be  achieved. 
^  It  is  admitted  that  self-happiness  is,  in  a  measure,  to  be 
obtained  by  furthering  the  happiness  of  others.  May  it 
not  be  true  that,  conversely,  general  happiness  is  to  be 
obtained  by  furthering  self-happiness  ?  If  the  well-being  of 
each  unit  is  to  be  reached  partly  through  his  care  for  the 
well-being  of  the  aggregate,  is  not  the  well-being  of  the 
aggregate  to  be  reached  partly  through  the  care  of 
each  unit  for  himself?  Clearly,  our  conclusion  must  be  that 
general  happiness  is  to  be  achieved  mainly  through  the 
adequate  pursuit  of  their  own  happinesses  by  individuals  ; 
while,  reciprocally,  the  happinesses  of  individuals  are  to  be 
T  achieved  in  part  by  their  pursuit  of  the  general  happiness. 
And  this  is  the  conclusion  embodied  in  the  progressing 
ideas  and  usages  of  mankind.  This  compromise  between 
egoism  and  altruism  has  been  slowly  establishing  itself; 
and  towards  recognition  of  its  propriety,  men^s  actual 
beliefs,  as  distinguished  from  their  nominal  beliefs,  have 
been  gradually  approaching.  Social  evolution  has  been  ' 
bringing  about  a  state  in  which  the  claims  of  the  individual 
to  the  proceeds  of  his  activities,  and  to  such  satisfactions  as 
they  bring,  are  more  and  more  positively  asserted;  at  the 
same  time  that  insistance  on  others'  claims,  and  habitual 


TETAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  239 

respect  for  them,  have  been  increasing.  Among  the  rudest 
savages  personal  interests  are  very  vaguely  distinguished 
from  the  interests  of  others.  In  early  stages  of  civiliza- 
tion, the  proportioning  of  benefits  to  efforts  is  extremely 
rude :  slaves  and  serfs  get  for  work,  arbitrary  amounts  of 
food  and  shelter  :  exchange  being  infrequent,  there  is  little 
to  develop  the  idea  of  equivalence.  But  as  civilization 
advances  and  status  passes  into  contract,  there  comes  daily 
experience  of  the  relation  between  advantages  enjoyed  and 
labour  given  :  the  industrial  system  maintaining,  through 
supply  and  demand,  a  due  adjustment  of  the  one  to  the 
other.  And  this  growth  of  voluntary  co-operation — this 
exchange  of  services  under  agreement,  has  been  necessarily 
accompanied  by  decrease  of  aggressions  one  upon  another, 
and  increase  of  sympathy  :  leading  to  exchange  of  services 
beyond  agreement.  That  is  to  say,  the  more  distinct  asser- 
tions of  individual  claims  and  more  rigorous  apportioning 
of  personal  enjoyments  to  efforts  expended,  has  gone  hand 
in  hand  with  growth  of  that  negative  altruism  shown  in 
equitable  conduct  and  that  positive  altruism  shown  in 
gratuitous  aid. 

A  higher  phase  of  this  double  change  has  in  our  own 
times  becomes  conspicuous.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  we  note 
the  struggles  for  political  freedom,  the  contests  between 
labour  and  capital,  the  judicial  reforms  made  to  facilitate 
enforcement  of  rights,  we  see  that  the  .tendency  still  is 
towards  complete  appropriation  by  each  of  whatever  benefits 
are  due  to  him,  and  consequent  exclusion  of  his  fellows 
from  such  benefits.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  consider 
what  is  meant  by  the  surrender  of  power  to  the  masses, 
the  abolition  of  class-privileges,  the  efforts  to  diS"use  know- 
ledge, the  agitations  to  spread  temperance,  the  multitudinous 
philanthropic  societies ;  it  becomes  clear  that  regard  for  the 
well-being  of  others  is  increasing  j^ari  passu  with  the  taking 
of  means  to  secure  personal  well-beiug. 

What  holds  of  the  relations  within  each  society  holds  to 


240  THE    DATA   OP    ETHICS. 

some  extent,  if  to  a  less  extent,  of  the  relations  between 
societies.  Thougli  to  maintain  national  claims,  real  or 
imaginary,  often  of  a  trivial  kind,  the  civilized  still  make 
war  on  one  another ;  yet  their  several  nationalities  are  more 
respected  than  in  past  ages.  Though  by  victors  portions  of 
territory  are  taken  and  money  compensations  exacted ;  yet 
conquest  is  not  now,  as  of  old,  habitually  followed  by  entire 
appropriation  of  territories  and  enslavement  of  peoples. 
The  individualities  of  societies  are  in  a  -larger  measure 
preserved.  Meanwhile  the  altruistic  intercourse  is  greater : 
aid  is  rendered  on  occasions  of  disaster  by  flood,  by  fire,  by 
famine,  or  otherwise.  And  in  international  arbitration  as 
lately  exemplified,  implying  the  recognition  of  claims  by  one 
nation  upon  another,  we  see  a  further  progress  in  this  wider 
altruism.  Doubtless  there  is  much  to  be  said  by  way  of 
set-off;  for  in  the  dealings  of  the  civilized  with  the  un- 
civilized, little  of  this  progress  can  be  traced.  It  may  be 
urged  that  the  primitive  rule — ^''Life  for  life,^'  has  been 
developed  by  us  into  the  rule — "  For  one  life  many  lives,'^ 
as  in  the  cases  of  Bishop  Patteson  and  Mr.  Birch  ;  but 
then  there  is  the  qualifying  fact  that  we  do  not  torture  our 
prisoners  or  mutilate  them.  If  it  be  said  that  as  the 
Hebrews  thought  themselves  warranted  in  seizing  the  lands 
God  promised  to  them,  and  in  some  cases  exterminating 
the  inhabitants,  so  we,  to  fulfil  the  "  manifest  intention  of 
Providence,^'  dispossess  inferior  races  whenever  we  want 
their  territories;  it  may  be  replied  that  we  do  not  kill 
many  more  than  seems  needful,  and  tolerate  the  existence 
of  those  who  submit.  And  should  any  one  point  out  that  as 
Attila,  while  conquering  or  destroying  peoples  and  nations, 
regarded  himself  as  ''^the  scourge  of  God,''  punishing  men 
for  their  sins,  so  we,  as  represented  by  a  High  Commis- 
sioner and  a  priest  he  quotes,  think  ourselves  called  on  to 
chastise  with  rifles  and  cannon,  heathens  who  practise  poly- 
gamy ;  there  is  the  rejoinder  that  not  even  the  most  ferocious 
disciple  of  the  teacher  of  mercy  would  carry  his  vengeance 


TillAL   AND   COMPROMISE.  241 

SO  far  as  to  depopulate  wliole  territories  and  erase  scores  of 
cities.  And  when,  on  the  other  hand,  we  remember  that 
there  is  an  Aborigines  Protection  Society,  that  there  are 
Commissioners  in  certain  colonies  appointed  to  protect 
native  interests,  and  that  in  some  cases  the  lands  of  natives 
have  been  purchased  in  ways  which,  however  unfair,  have 
implied  some  recognition  of  their  claims ;  we  may  say  that 
little  as  the  compromise  between  egoism  and  altruism  has 
progressed  in  international  affairs,  it  has  still  progressed 
somewhat  in  the  direction  indicated. 


\ 


CHAPTER  XIV. 
CONCILIATION. 

§  92.  As  exhibited  in  the  last  chapter^  the  compromise 
between  the  claims  of  self  and  the  claims  of  others  seems  to 
imply  permanent  antagonism  between  the  two.  The  pursuit 
by  each  of  his  own  happiness  while  paying  due  regard  to  the 
happiness  of  his  fellows^  apparently  necessitates  the  ever- 
recurring  question — how  far  must  the  one  end  be  sought 
and  how  far  the  other  :  suggesting,  if  not  discord  in  the 
life  of  each,  still,  an  absence  of  complete  harmony.  This  is 
not  the  inevitable  inference  however. 

When,  in  the  Principles  of  Sociology,  Part  III,  the  pheno- 
mena of  race-maintenance  among  living  things  at  large 
were  discussed,  that  the  development  of  the  domestic 
relations  might  be  the  better  understood,  it  was  shown 
that  during  evolution  there  has  been  going  on  a  concilia- 
tion between  the  interests  of  the  species,  the  interests 
of  the  parents,  and  the  interests  of  the  offspring.  Proof 
was  given  that  as  we  ascend  from  the  lowest  forms 
of  life  to  the  highest,  race-maintenance  is  achieved  with 
a  decreasing  sacrifice  of  life,  alike  of  young  individuals 
and  of  adult  individuals,  and  also  with  a  decreasing 
sacrifice  of  parental  lives  to  the  lives  of  offspring.  "We 
saw  that,  with  the  progress  of  civilization,  like  changes 
go  on  among  human  beings ;  and  that  the  highest  domestic 
relations  are  those  in  which  the   conciliation   of   welfares 


COKCILIATTON 

within  the  family  becomes  greatest,  while  lfio=^9S0^s?€rtyf  the 
society  is  best  subserved.  Here  it  remains  to  be  shown  that 
a  kindred  conciliation  has  been,  and  is,  taking  place  between  \ 
the  interests  of  each  citizen  and  the  interests  of  citizens  | 
at  large ;  tending  ever  towards  a  state  in  which  the  two 
become  merged  in  one,  and  in  which  the  feelings  answering 
to  them  respectively,  fall  into  complete  concord. 

In  the  family  group,  even  as  we  observe  it  among  many 
inferior  vertebrates,  we  see  that  the  parental  sacrifice,  now 
become  so  moderate  in  amount  as  to  consist  with  long- 
continued  parental  life,  is  not  accompanied  by  consciousness 
of  sacrifice ;  but,  contrariwise,  is  made  from  a  direct  desire 
to  make  it :  the  altruistic  labours  on  behalf  of  young  are 
carried  on  in  satisfaction  of  parental  instincts.  If  we  trace 
these  relations  up  through  the  grades  of  mankind,  and 
observe  how  largely  love  rather  than  obligation  prompts/ 
the  care  of  children,  we  see  the  conciliation  of  interests  toN 
be  such  that  achievement  of  parental  happiness  coincides  \ 
with  securing  the  happiness  of  offspring :  the  wish  for  ( 
children  among  the  childless,  and  the  occasional  adoption 
of  children,  showing  how  needful  for  attainment  of  certain 
egoistic  satisfactions  are  these  altruistic  activities.  And 
further  evolution,  causing  along  with  higher  nature  dimi- 
nished fertility,  and  therefore  smaller  burdens  on  parents, 
may  be  expected  to  bring  a  state  in  which,  far  more  than 
now,  the  pleasures  of  adult  life  will  consist  in  raising 
offspring  to  perfection  while  simultaneously  furthering  the 
immediate  happiness  of  offspring. 

Now  though  altruism  of  a  social  kind,  lacking  certain 
elements  of  parental  altruism,  can  never  attain  the  same 
level ;  yet  it  may  be  expected  to  attain  a  level  at  which  it 
will  be  like  parental  altruism  in  s£ontaiifiity — a  level  such 
that  ministration  to  others'  happiness  will  become  a  daily 
need — a  level  such  that  the  lower  egoistic  satisfactions/ 
will  be  continually  subordinated  to  this  higher  egoistic  satis-j 
faction,  not  by  any  effort  to  subordinate  them,  but  by  the 
11 


244  THE  DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

preference  for  this   higher   egoistic    satisfaction  whenever 
it  can  be  obtained. 

Let  us  consider  how  the  development  of  sympathy,  which 
must  advance  as  fast  as  conditions  permit^  will  bring  about 
this  state. 

§  93.  We  have  seen  that  during  the  evolution  of  life, 
pleasures  and  pains  have  necessarily  been  the  incentives  to 
and  deterrents  from,  actions  which  the  conditions  of  exist- 
ence demanded  and  negatived.  An  implied  truth  to  be 
here  noted  is,  that  faculties  which,  under  given  conditions, 
yield  partly  pain  and  partly  pleasure,  cannot  develop  beyond 
the  limit  at  which  they  yield  a  surplus  of  pleasure  :  if  beyond 
that  limit  more  pain  than  pleasure  results  from  exercise  of 
them,  their  growth  must  be  arrested. 

Through  sympathy  both  these  forms  of  feeling  are 
excited.  Now  a  pleasurable  consciousness  is  aroused  on 
witnessing  pleasure  ;  now  a  painful  consciousness  is  aroused 
on  witnessing  pain.  Hence,  if  beings  around  him  habitually 
manifest  pleasure  and  but  rarely  pain,  sympathy  yields  to 
its  possessor  a  surplus  of  pleasure ;  while,  contrariwise,  if 
little  pleasure  is  ordinarily  witnessed  and  much  pain,  sym- 
pathy yields  a  surplus  of  pain  to  its  possessor.  The  average 
development  of  sympathy  must,  therefore,  be  regulated  by 
the  average  manifestations  of  pleasure  and  pain  in  others. 
If  the  life  usually  led  under  given  social  conditions  is  such 
that  suffering  is  daily  inflicted,  or  is  daily  displayed  by  asso- 
ciates, sympathycannot  grow  :  to  assume  growth  of  it  is 
to  assume  that  the  constitution  will  modify  itself  in  such 
way  as  to  increase  its  pains  and  therefore  depress  its  ener- 
gies ;  and  is  to  ignore  the  truth  that  bearing  any  kind  of  pain 
gradually  produces  insensibility  to  that  pain,  or  callousness. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  social  state  is  such  that  manifes- 
tations of  pleasure  predominate,  sympathy  will  increase ; 
since  sympathetic  pleasures,  adding  to  the  totality  of 
pleasures  enhancing  vitality,  conduce  to  the  physical  pros- 


CONCILIATION.  245 

perity  of  tlie  most  sympathetic^  and  since  the  pleasures  of 
sympathy  exceeding  its  pains  in  all,  lead  to  an  exercise  of  it 
which  strengthens  it. 

The  first  implication  is  one  already  more  than  once 
indicated.  We  have  seen  that  along  with  habitual  militancy 
and  under  the  adapted  type  of  social  organization,  sympathy 
cannot  develop  to  any  considerable  height.  The  destructive 
activities  carried  on  against  external  enemies  sear  it;  the 
state  of  feeling  maintained  causes  within  the  society  itself 
frequent  acts  of  aggression  or  cruelty;  and  further,  the 
compulsory  co-operation  characterizing  the  militant  regime 
necessarily  represses  sympathy — exists  only  on  condition 
of  an  unsympathetic  treatment  of  some  by  others. 

But  even  could  the  militant  regime  forthwith  end,  the 
hindrances  to  development  of  sympathy  would  still  be 
great.  Though  cessation  of  war  would  imply  increased 
adaptation  of  man  to  social  life,  and  decrease  of  sundry 
evils,  yet  there  would  remain  much  non-adaptation  and  much 
consequent  unhappiness.  In  the  first  place,  that  form  of 
nature  which  has  generated  and  still  generates  wars,  though 
by  implication  raised  to  a  higher  form,  would  not  at  once 
be  raised  to  so  high  a  form  that  there  would  cease  all  in- 
justices and  the  pains  they  cause.  For  a  considerable  period 
after  predatory  activities  had  ended,  the  defects  of  the  pre- 
datory nature  would  continue :  entailing  their  slowly- 
diminishing  evils.  In  the  second  place,  the  ill-adjustment 
of  the  human  constitution  to  the  pursuits  of  industrial  life, 
must  long  persist,  and  may  be  expected  to  survive  in  a 
measure  the  cessation  of  wars :  the  required  modes  of 
activity  must  remain  for  innumerable  generations  in  some 
degree  displeasurable.  And  in  the  third  place,  deficiencies 
of  self-control  such  as  the  improvident  show  us,  as  well 
as  those  many  failures  of  conduct  due  to  inadequate 
foresight  of  consequences,  though  less  marked  than  now, 
could  not  fail  still  to  produce  suffering. 

Nor    would    even    complete    adaptation,    if    limited  to 


246  THE    DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

disappearance  of  tlie  non-adaptations  just  indicated,  remove 
all  sources  of  those  miseries  wliich,  to  the  extent  of  their 
manifestation,  check  the  growth  of  sympathy.  For  while 
the  rate  of  multiplication  continues  so  to  exceed  the  rate  of 
mortality  as  to  cause  pressure  on  the  means  of  subsistence, 
there  must  continue  to  result  much  unhappiness  ;  either  from 
balked  affections  or  from  over-work  and  stinted  means. 
Only  as  fast  as  fertility  diminishes,  which  we  have  seen  it 
must  do  along  with  further  mental  development  {Principles 
of  Biology,  §  §  367 — 377),  can  there  go  on  such  diminution 
of  the  labours  required  for  efficiently  supporting  self  and 
family,  that  they  will  not  constitute  a  displeasurable  tax  on 
the  energies  I 

Gradually  then,  and  only  gradually,  as  these  various 
causes  of  unhappiness  become  less  can  sympathy  become 
greater.  Life  would  be  intolerable  if,  while  the  causes  of 
misery  remained  as  they  now  are,  all  men  were  not  only  in  a 
high  degree  sensitive  to  the  pains,  bodily  and  mental,  felt  by 
those  around  and  expressed  in  the  faces  of  those  they  met, 
but  were  unceasingly  conscious  of  the  miseries  every- 
where being  suffered  as  consequences  of  war,  crime,  mis- 
conduct, misfortune,  improvidence,  incapacity.  But,  as  the 
moulding  and  re-moulding  of  man  and  society  into  mutual 
fitness  progresses,  and  as  the  pains  caused  by  unfitness 
decrease,  sympathy  can  increase  in  presence  of  the  pleasures 
that  come  from  fitness.  The  two  changes  are  indeed  so 
related  that  each  furthers  the  other.  Such  growth  of 
sympathy  as  conditions  permit,  itself  aids  in  lessening  pain 
and  augmenting  pleasure ;  and  the  greater  surplus  of 
pleasure  that  results  makes  possible  further  growth  of 
sympathy. 

§  94.  The  extent  to  which  sympathy  may  develop  when 
the  hindrances  are  removed,  will  be  better  conceived  after 
observing  the  agencies  through  which  it  is  excited,  and 
setting  down  the  reasons  for  expecting  those  agencies  to 


CONCILIATION.  247 

become  more  efficient.  Two  factors  have  to  be  considered 
— the  natural  language  of  feeling  in  the  being  sympathized 
with^  and  the  power  of  interpreting  that  language  in  the 
being  who  sympathizes.  We  may  anticipate  development  of 
both. 

Movements  of  the  body  and  facial  changes  are  visible 
effects  of  feeling  which,  when  the  feeling  is  strong,  are 
uncontrollable.  When  the  feeling  is  less  strong  however, 
be  it  sensational  or  emotional,  they  may  be  wholly  or  par- 
tially repressed ;  and  there  is  a  habit,  more  or  less  constant, 
of  repressing  them  :  this  habit  being  the  concomitant  of  a 
nature  such  that  it  is  often  undesirable  that  others 
should  see  what  is  felt.  So  necessary  with  our  existing 
characters  and  conditions  are  concealments  thus  prompted, 
that  they  have  come  to  form  a  part  of  moral  duty;  and 
concealment  for  its  own  sake  is  often  insisted  upon  as  an 
element  in  good  manners.  All  this  is  caused  by  the  prevalence 
of  feelings  at  variance  with  social  good — feelings  which 
cannot  be  shown  without  producing  discords  or  estrange- 
ments. But  in  proportion  as  the  egoistic  desires  fall 
more  under  control  of  the  altruistic,  and  there  come  fewer 
and  slighter  impulses  of  a  kind  to  be  reprobated,  the  need 
for  keeping  guard  over  facial  expression  and  bodily  move- 
ment will  decrease,  and  these  will  with  increasing  clearness 
convey  to  spectators  the  mental  state.  Nor  is  this  all. 
Restrained  as  its  use  is,  this  language  of  the  emotions  is  at 
present  prevented  from  growing.  But  as  fast  as  the  emo- 
tions become  such  that  they  may  be  more  candidly  displayed, 
there  will  go,  along  with  the  habit  of  display,  development 
of  the  means  of  display;  so  that  besides  the  stronger 
emotions,  the  more  delicate  shades  and  smaller  degrees 
of  emotion  will  visibly  exhibit  themselves:  the  emotional  V 
language  will  become  at  once  more  copious,  more  varied,^fy^ 
more  definite.  And  obviously  sympathy  will  be  propor-^ 
tionately  facilitated. 

An  equally  important,  if  not  a  more  important,  advance  of 


248  THE    DATA   01?   ETHICS. 

kindred  nature,  is  to  be  anticipated.  The  vocal  sigijs  of 
sentient  states  will  simultaneously  evolve  further.  Loudness 
of  tone,  pitch  of  tone,  quality  of  tone,  and  change  of  tone, 
are  severally  marks  of  feeling ;  and,  combined,  in  different 
ways  and  proportions,  serve  to  express  different  amounts  and 
kinds  of  feelings.  As  elsewhere  pointed  out,  cadences  are 
the  comments  of  the  emotions  on  the  propositions  of  the 
intellect.*  Not  in  excited  speech  only,  but  in  ordinary 
speech,  we  show  by  ascending  and  descending  intervals,  by 
degrees  of  deviation  from  the  medium  tone,  as  well  as  by 
place  and  strength  of  emphasis,  the  kind  of  sentiency  which 
accompanies  the  thought  expressed.  Now  the  manifestation 
of  feeling  by  cadence,  like  its  manifestation  by  visible 
changes,  is  at  present  under  restraint  :  the  motives  for 
repression  act  in  the  one  case  as  they  act  in  the  other.  A 
double  effect  is  produced.  This  audible  language  of  feeling 
is  not  used  up  to  the  limit  of  its  existing  capacity ;  and 
it  is  to  a  considerable  degree  misused,  so  as  to  convey 
other  feelings  than  those  which  are  felt.  The  result  of  this 
disuse  and  misuse  is  to  check  that  evolution  which  normal 
use  would  cause.  We  must  infer,  then,  that  as  moral  adapta- 
tion progresses,  and  there  is  decreasing  need  for  conceal- 
ment of  the  feelings,  their  vocal  signs  will  develop  much 
further.  Though  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  cadences 
will  ever  convey  emotions  as  exactly  as  words  convey 
thoughts,  yet  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  emotional  language 
of  the  future  may  rise  as  much  above  our  present  emotional 
language,  as  our  intellectual  language  has  already  risen 
above  the  intellectual  language  of  the  lowest  races. 

A  simultaneous  increase  in  the  power  of  interpreting  both\ 
visible  and   audible   signs  of  feeling  must   be  taken  into  ) 
account.     Among  those  around  we  see  differences  both  of 
ability  to  perceive  such  signs  and  of  ability  to  conceive  the 
implied  mental  states  and  their  causes  :  here,  a  stolidity  un- 

*  See  Essay  on  "  The  Origin  and  Function  of  Music.'* 


CONCILIATION.  249 

impivssed  by  a  slight  facial  change  or  altered  tone  of  voice, 
or  else  unable  to  imagine  what  is  felt ;  and  there,  a 
quick  observation  and  a  penetrating  intuition,  making 
instantly  comprehensible  the  state  of  mind  and  its 
origin.  If  we  suppose  both  these  faculties  exalted — 
both  a  more  delicate  perception  of  the  signs  and  a 
strengthened  constructive  imagination — we  shall  get  some 
idea  of  the  deeper  and  wider  sympathy  that  will  hereafter 
arise.  More  vivid  representations  of  the  feelings  of  others, 
implying  ideal  excitements  of  feelings  approaching  to  real 
excitements,  must  imply  a  greater  likeness  between  the 
feelings  of  the  sympathizer  and  those  of  the  sympathized 
with  :  coming  near  to  identity. 

By  simultaneous  increase  of  its  subjective  and  objective^ 
factors,  sympathy  may  thus,  as  the  hindrances  diminish,! 
rise  above  that  now  shown  by  the  sympathetic  as  much  as  inV 
them  it  has  risen  above  that  which  the  callous  show.  / 

§  95.  What  must  be  the  accompanying  evolution  of 
conduct  ?  What  must  the  relations  between  egoism  and 
altruism  become  as  this  form  of  nature  is  neared  ? 

A  conclusion  drawn  in  the  chapter  on  the  relativity 
of  pleasures  and  pains,  and  there  emphasized  as  one  to  be 
borne  in  mind,  must  now  be  recalled.  It  was  pointed  out 
that,  supposing  them  to  be  consistent  with  continuance  of 
life,  there  are  no  activities  which  may  not  become  sources  of 
pleasure,  if  surrounding  conditions  require  persistence  in 
tbem.  And  here  it  is  to  be  added,  as  a  corollary,  that  if  the 
conditions  require  any  class  of  activities  to  be  relatively 
great,  there  will  arise  a  relatively  great  pleasure  accompany- 
ing that  class  of  activities.  What  bearing  have  these  general 
inferences  on  the  special  question  before  us  ? 

That  alike  for  public  welfare  and  private  welfare  sympathy 
is  essential,  we  have  seen.  We  have  seen  that  co-operation 
and  the  benefits  which  it  brings  to  each  and  all,  become 
high  in  proportion  as  the  altruistic,  that  is  the  sympathetic. 


250  THE    DATA   OF    ETHICS. 

interests  extend.  The  actions  prompted  by  fellow-feeling 
are  thus  to  be  counted  among  those  demanded  by  social 
conditions.  They  are  actions  which  maintenance  and  further 
development  of  social  organization  tend  ever  to  increase ; 
and  therefore  actions  with  which,  there  will  be  joined  an 
increasing  pleasure.  From  the  laws  of  life  it  must  be  con- 
cluded that  unceasing  social  discipline  will  so  mould  human 
nature,  that  eventually  sympathetic  pleasures  will  be  sponta- 
neously pursued  to  the  fullest  extent  advantageous  to  each, 
and  all.  The  scope  for  altruistic  activities  will  not  exceed 
the  desire  for  altruistic  satisfactions. 

In  natures  thus  constituted,  thougb  the  altruistic  gratifi- 
cations must  remain  in  a  transfigured  sense  egoistic,  yet 
they  will  not  be  egoistically  pursued — will  not  be  pursued 
from  eg:oistic  motives.  Thougb  pleasure  will  be  gained  by 
giving  pleasure,  yet  the  thought  of  the  sympathetic  pleasure 
to  be  gained  will  not  occupy  consciousness,  but  only  the 
thought  of  the  pleasure  given.  To  a  great  extent  this  is  so 
now.  In  the  truly  sympathetic,  attention  is  so  absorbed 
with  the  proximate  end,  others^  happiness,  that  there  is 
none  given  to  the  prospective  self-happiness  which  may 
ultimately  result.     An  analogy  will  make  the  relation  clear. 

A  miser  accumulates  money,  not  deliberately  saying  to 
himself — '^I  shall  by  doing  this  get  the  delight  which 
^possession  gives."  He  thinks  only  of  the  money  and  the 
means  of  getting  it ;  and  he  experiences  incidentally  the 
pleasure  that  comes  from  possession.  Owning  property  is 
that  which  he  revels  in  imagining,  and  not  the  feeling  which 
owning  property  will  cause.  Similarly,  one  who  is  sym- 
pathetic in  the  highest  sense,  is  mentally  engaged  solely 
in  representing  pleasure  as  experienced  by  another;  and 
pursues  it  for  the  benefit  of  that  other,  forgetting  any 
participation  he  will  bave  in  it.  Subjectively  considered, 
then,  the  conciliation  of  egoism  and  altruism  will  eventually  N 
become  such  that  though  the  altruistic  pleasure,  as  being  a 
part   of  the  consciousness  of  one  who  experiences  it,  can 


CONCILIATION.  251 

never  bo   other  than   egoistic,   it  will  not  be    consciously 
egoistic. 

Let  us  now  ask  what  must  happen  in  a  society  composed 
of  persons  constituted  in  this  manner. 

§  96.  The  opportunities  for  that  postponement  of  self  to 
others  which  constitutes  altruism  as  ordinarily  conceived, 
must,  in  several  ways,  be  mOre  and  more  limited  as  the 
highest  state  is  approached. 

Extensive  demands  on  the  benevolent,  presuppose  much 
unhappiness.  Before  there  can  be  many  and  large  calls  on 
some  for  efforts  on  behalf  of  others,  there  must  be  many 
others  in  conditions  needing  help — in  conditions  of  com- 
parative misery.  But,  as  we  have  seen  above,  the  develop- 
ment of  fellow-feeling  can  go  on  only  as  fast  as  misery 
decreases.  Sympathy  can  reach  its  full  height  only  whei 
there  have  ceased  to  be  frequent  occasions  for  anything  lik( 
serious  self-sacrifice. 

Change  the  point  of  view,  and  this  truth  presents  itself 
under  another  aspect.  We  have  already  seen  that  with  the 
progress  of  adaptation  each  becomes  so  constituted  that  he 
cannot  be  helped  without  in  some  way  arresting  a  pleasur- 
able activity.  There  cannot  be  a  beneficial  interference 
between  faculty  and  function  when  the  two  are  adjusted. 
Consequently,  in  proportion  as  mankind  approach  complete  . 
adjustment  of  their  natures  to  social  needs,  there  must  be  j 
fewer  and  smaller  opportunities  for  giving  aid. 

Yet  again,  as  was  pointed  out  in  the  last  chapter,  the 
sympathy  which  prompts  efforts  for  others'  welfare  must  be 
pained  by  self-injury  on  the  part  of  others ;  and  must,  there- 
fore, cause  aversion  to  accept  benefits  derived  from  their 
self -injuries.  What  is  to  be  inferred  ?  While  each  when 
occasion  offers  is  ready,  anxious  even,  to  surrender  egoistic 
satisfactions ;  others,  similarly-natured,  cannot  but  resist 
the  surrender.  If  anyone,  proposing  to  treat  himself  more 
hardly  than  a  disinterested  spectator  would  direct,  refrains 


252  THt;    DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

from  appropriating  that  wliicli  is  due_,  others^  caring  for  him 
if  he  will  not  care  for  himself^  must  necessarily  insist  that 
he  shall  appropriate  it.  General  altruism  then^  in  its  I 
developed  form,  must  inevitably  resist  individual  excesses 
of  altruism.  The  relation  at  present  familiar  to  us  will  be 
inverted ;  and  instead  of  each  maintaining  his  own  claims, 
others  will  maintain  his  claims  for  him :  not,  indeed,  byj 
active  efforts,  which  will  be  needless,  but  by  passively  resists 
ing  any  undue  yielding  up  of  them.  There  is  nothing  in 
such  behaviour  which  is  not  even  now  to  be  traced  in  our 
daily  experiences  as  beginning.  In  business  transactions 
among  honourable  men,  there  is  usually  a  desire  on  either 
side  that  the  other  shall  treat  himself  fairly.  Not  unfre- 
quently,  there  is  a  refusal  to  take  something  regarded 
as  the  other's  due,  but  which  the  other  offers  to  give  up. 
In  social  intercourse,  too,  the  cases  are  common  in  which 
those  who  would  surrender  their  shares  of  pleasure  are  not 
permitted  by  the  rest  to  do  so.  Further  development  of 
sympathy  cannot  but  make  this  mode  of  behaving  in- 
creasingly general  and  increasingly  genuine. 

Certain  complex  restraints  on  excesses  of  altruism  exist, 
which,  in  another  way,  force  back  the  individual  upon  a 
normal  egoism.     Two  may  here  be  noted.  In  the  first 

place,  self-abnegations  often  repeated  imply  on  the  part  of  the 
actor  a  tacit  ascription  of  relative  selfishness  to  others  who 
profit  by  the  self-abnegations.  Even  with  men  as  they  are, 
there  occasionally  arises  a  feeling  among  those  for  whom 
sacrifices  are  frequently  made,  that  they  are  being  insulted 
by  the  assumption  that  they  are  ready  to  receive  them  ;  and 
in  the  mind  of  the  actor  also,  there  sometimes  grows  up  a 
recognition  of  this  feeling  on  their  part,  and  a  consequent 
check  on  his  too  great  or  too  frequent  surrenders  of  pleasure. 
Obviously  in  more  developed  natures,  this  kind  of  check  must 
act  still  more  promptly.  In  the  second  place,  when,  as 

the  hypothesis  implies,  altruistic  pleasures  have  reached  a 
greater  intensity  than  they  now  possess,  each  person  will  be 


CONCILIATION.  253 

debarred  from  undue  pursuit  of  tliem  by  the  consciousness 
that  other  persons,  too,  desire  them,  and  that  scope  for 
others'  enjoyment  of  them  must  be  left.  Even  now 
may  be  observed  among  groups  of  friends,  where  some 
competition  in  amiability  is  going  on,  relinquishments  of 
opportunities  for  self-abnegation  that  others  may  have 
them.  '*Let  her  give  up  the  gratification,  she  will  like  to  do 
so ; ''  "  Let  him  undertake  the  trouble,  it  will  please  him  ; '' 
are  suggestions  which  from  time  to  time  illustrate  this 
consciousness.  The  most  developed  sympathy  will  care  for 
the  sympathetic  satisfactions  of  others  as  well  as  for  their 
selfish  satisfactions.  What  may  be  called  a  higher  equity 
will  refrain  from  trespassing  on  the  spheres  of  others' 
altruistic  activities,  as  a  lower  equity  refrains  from  tres- 
passing on  the  spheres  of  their  egoistic  activities.  And 
by  this  checking  of  what  may  be  called  an  egoistic  altruism, 
undue  sacrifices  on  the  part  of  each  must  be  prevented. 

What  nphfr^";  thf>n^  will  PY_e.^t'^q^^y  remain  for  altruism  as 
it  is  commonly  conceived  ?  There  are  three.  iPn^^  "f  thftm 
must  to  the  last  continue  large  in  extent ;  and  the  others 
must  progressively  diminish,  though  they  do  not  dis- 
appear. The  first  is  that  which  family-life  affords. 
Always  there  must  be  a  need  for  subordination  of  self- 
regarding  feelings  to  other-regarding  feelings  in  the  rearing 
of  children.  Though  this  will  diminish  with  diminution  in 
the  number  to  be  reared,  yet  it  will  increase  with  the 
greater  elaboration  and  prolongation  of  the  activities  on 
their  behalf.  But  as  shown  above,  there  is  even  now  partially 
effected  a  conciliation  such  that  those  egoistic  satisfac- 
tions which  parenthood  yields  are  achieved  through  altruistic 
activities — a  conciliation  tending  ever  towards  completeness. 
An  important  developement  of  family-altruism  must  be 
added :  the  reciprocal  care  of  parents  by  children  during  old 
age — a  care  becoming  lighter  and  better  fulfilled,  in  which 
a  kindred  conciliation  may  be  looked  for.  Pursuit 
of  social    welfare    at    large  must  afford    hereafter,   as  it 


254  THE    DATA   OF    ETHICS. 

does  now,  scope  for  tlie  postponement  of  selfish  interests  / 
to  unselfish  interests,   but  a  continually   lessening  scope  j  / 
because    as    adaptation    to    the     social    state    progresses,/ 
the  needs  for  those  regulative  actions  by  which  social  life/ 
is  made  harmonious  become  less.     And  here  the  amount  of 
altruistic  action  which  each  undertakes  must  inevitably  be 
kept  within   moderate   bounds  by  others ;  for  if  they  are 
similarly   altruistic,   they  will    not   allow    some  to   pursue 
public  ends  to  their  own  considerable  detriment  that  the 
rest  may  profit.  In  the  private  relj^ti^^^  nf   men, 

opportunities  for  self  sacrifice  prompted  by  sympathy,  must 
ever  in  some  degree,  though  eventually  in  a  small  degree, 
be  afforded  by  accidents,  diseases,  and  misfortunes  in 
general ;  since,  however  near  to  completeness  the  adaptation 
of  human  nature  to  the  conditions  of  existence  at  large, 
physical  and  social,  may  become,  it  can  never  reach  com- 
pleteness. Flood,  fire,  and  wreck  must  to  the  last  yield  at 
intervals  opportunities  for  heroic  acts  ;  and  in  the  motives  to 
such  acts,  anxiety  for  others  will  be  less  alloyed  with  love  of 
admiration  than  now.  Extreme,  however,  as  may  be  the  eager- 
ness for  altruistic  action  on  the  rare  occasions  hence  arising, 
the  amount  falling  to  the  share  of  each  must,  for  the  reasons 
given,   be   narrowly   limited.  But   though    in   the 

incidents  of  ordinary  life,  postponements  of  self  to  others 
in  large  ways  must  become  very  infrequent,  daily  inter- 
course will  still  furnish  multitudinous  small  occasions  for 
the  activity  of  fellow  feeling.  Always  each  may  continue 
to  further  the  welfare  of  others  by  warding  off  from  them 
evils  they  cannot  see,  and  by  aiding  their  actions  in  ways  un- 
known-to  them ;  or,  conversely  putting  it,  each  may  have,  as 
it  were,  supplementary  eyes  and  ears  in  other  persons,  which 
perceive  for  him  things  he  cannot  perceive  himself :  so  per- 
fecting his  life  in  numerous  details,  by  making  its  adjust- 
ments to  environing  actions  complete.  i 

§  97.  Must  it  then  follow  that  eventually,  with  this  dimi- 


CONCILIATION.  255 

nution  of  tlie  spheres  for  it,  altruism  must  diminisli  in  total 
amount?  By  no  meacs.  Such,  a  conclusion  implies  a  mis-] 
conception. 

Naturally,  under  existing  conditions,  with  suffering  widely 
diffused  and  so  much  of  effort  demanded  from  the  more  for- 
tunate in  succouring  the  less  fortunate,  altruism  is  under- 
stood to  mean  only  self-sacrifice ;  or,  at  any  rate,  a  mode  of 
action  which,  while  it  brings  some  pleasure,  has  an  accom- 
paniment of  self- surrender  that  is  not  pleasurable.  But  the 
sympathy  which  prompts  denial  of  self  to  please  others,  is  a 
sympathy  which  also  receives  pleasure  from  their  pleasures 
when  they  are  otherwise  originated.  The  stronger  the  fellow- 
feeling  which  excites  efforts  to  make  others  happy,  the 
stronger  is  the  fellow-feeling  with  their  happiness  however 
caused. 

In  its  ultimate  form,  then,  altruism  will  be  the  achieve- 
ment of  gratification  through  sympathy  with  those  gratifica- 
tions of  others  which  are  mainly  produced  by  their  activities 
of  all  kinds  successfully  carried  on — sympathetic  gratificaj 
tion  which  costs  the  receiver  nothing,  but  is  a  gratis  additioi 
to  his  egoistic  gratifications.  This  power  of  representing 
in  idea  the  mental  states  of  others,  which,  during  the  process 
of  adaptation  has  had  the  function  of  mitigating  suffering, 
must,  as  the  suffering  falls  to  a  minimum,  come  to  have 
almost  wholly  the  function  of  mutually  exalting  men^s 
enjoyments  by  giving  everyone  a  vivid  intuition  of  his 
neighbour's  enjoyments.  While  pain  prevails  widely,  it  is 
undesirable  that  each  should  participate  much  in  the  con- 
sciousnesses of  others  ;  but  with  an  increasing  predominance 
of  pleasure,  participation  in  others'  consciousnesses  becomes 
a  gain  of  pleasure  to  all. 

And  so  there  will  disappear  that  apparently-permanent 
opposition  between  egoism  and  altruism,  implied  by  the 
compromise  reached  in  the  last  chapter.  Subjectively 
looked  at,  the  conciliation  will  be  such  that  the  individual 
will  not  have  to  balance  between  self -regarding  impulses 


256  TDE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

and  otlier-regarding  impulses;  but,  instead,  those  satis- 
factions of  other-regarding  impulses  wliicH"  involve  self- 
sacrifice,  becoming  rare  and  much  prized,  will  be  so  unhesi- 
tatingly preferred  that  the  competition  of  self-regarding 
impulses  with  them  will  scarcely  be  felt.  And  the  subjective 
conciliation  will  also  be  such  that  though  altruistic  pleasure 
will  be  attained,  yet  the  motive  of  action  will  not  consciously 
be  the  attainment  of  altruistic  pleasure;  but  the  idea 
present  will  be  the  securing  of  others^  pleasures.  Meanwhile, 
the  conciliation  objectively  considered  will  be  equally 
/complete.  Though  each,  no  longer  needing  to  maintain  his 
/egoistic  claims,  will  tend  rather  when  occasion  offers  to 
I  surrender  them,  yet  others,  similarly  natured,  will  not 
I  permit  him  in  any  large  measure  to  do  this;  and  that 
\  fulfilment  of  personal  desires  required  for  completion  of  his 
life  will  thus  be  secured  to  him :  though  not  now  egoistic 
in  the  ordinary  sense,  yet  the  effects  of  dae  egoism  will  be 
achieved.  Nor  is  this  all.  As,  at  an  earlier  stage,  egoistic 
competition,  first  reaching  a  compromise  such  that  each 
claims  no  more  than  his  equitable  share,  afterwards  rises  to 
a  conciliation  such  that  each  insists  on  the  taking  of 
equitable  shares  by  others ;  so,  at  the  latest  stage,  altruistic 
competition,  first  reaching  a  compromise  under  which  each 
restrains  himself  from  taking  an  undue  share  of  altruistic 
satisfactions,  eventually  rises  to  a  conciliation  under  which 
each  takes  care  that  others  shall  have  their  opportunities 
for  altruistic  satisfactions  :  the  highest  altruism  being  that 
which  ministers  not  to  the  egoistic  satisfactions  of  others 
only,  but  also  to  their  altruistic  satisfactions. 

Far  ofi"  as  seems  such  a  state,  yet  every  one  of  the  factors 
counted  on  to  produce  it  may  already  be  traced  in 
operation  among  those  of  highest  natures.  What  now  in 
them  is  occasional  and  feeble,  may  be  expected  with  further 
evolution  to  become  habitual  and  strong;  and  what  now 
characterizes  the  exceptionally  high  may  be  expected 
eventually  to   characterize   all.     For  that  which  the  best 


CONCILIATION.  257 

human  nature  is  capable  of,  is  within  the  reach  of  human 
nature  at  large. 

§  98.  That  these  conclusions  will  meet  with  any  considerable 
acceptance  is  improbable.  Neither  with  current  ideas  nor 
with  current  sentiments  are  they  sufficiently  congruous. 

Such  a  view  will  not  be  agreeable  to  those  who  lament 
the  spreading  disbelief  in  eternal  damnation ;  nor  to  those 
who  follow  the  apostle  of  brute  force  in  thinking  that  because 
the  rule  of  the  strong  hand  was  once  good  it  is  good  for  all 
time ;  nor  to  those  whose  reverence  for  one  who  told  them 
to  put  up  the  sword,  is  shown  by  using  the  sword  to  spread 
his  doctrine  among  heathens.  The  conception  set  forth 
would  be  received  with  contempt  by  that  Fifeshire  regiment 
of  militia,  of  whom  eight  hundred,  at  the  time  of  the 
Franco -German  war,  asked  to  be  employed  on  foreign 
service,  and  left  the  Government  to  say  on  which  side  they 
should  fight.  From  the  ten  thousand  priests  of  the  religion 
of  love,  who  are  silent  when  the  nation  is  moved  by  the 
religion  of  hate,  will  come  no  sign  of  assent;  nor  from 
their  bishops  who,  far  from  urging  the  extreme  precept  of 
the  master  they  pretend  to  follow,  to  turn  the  other  cheek 
when  one  is  smitten,  vote  for  acting  on  the  principle — 
strike  lest  ye  be  struck.  Nor  will  any  approval  be  felt  by 
legislators  who,  after  praying  to  be  forgiven  their  trespasses 
as  they  forgive  the  trespasses  of  others,  forthwith  decide  to 
attack  those  who  have  not  trespassed  against  them ;  and 
who,  after  a  Queen's  Speech  has  invoked  ''  the  blessing  of 
Almighty  God"  on  their  councils,  immediately  provide  means 
for  committing  political  burglary. 

But  though  men  who  profess  Christianity  and  practise 
Paganism  can  feel  no  sympathy  with  such  a  view,  there  are 
some,  classed  as  antagonists  to  the  current  creed,  who 
may  not  think  it  absurd  to  believe  that  a  rationalized 
version  of  its  ethical  principles  wiU  eventually  be  acted 
upon. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

AD30LUTE  AND  KELATIVE  ETHICS. 

§  99.  As  applied  to  Ethics,  tlie  word  ^'  absolute  "  will  by 
inauy  be  supposed  to  imply  principles  of  right  conduct 
that  exist  out  of  relation  to  life  as  conditioned  on  the 
Earth — out  of  relation  to  time  and  place,  and  independent 
of  the  Universe  as  now  visible  to  us — '^  eternal "  principles 
as  they  are  called.  Those,  however,  who  recall  the  doctrine 
set  forth  in  First  Principles jwill  hesitate  to  put  this  interpre- 
tation on  the  word.  Right,  as  we  can  think  it,  necessitates 
the  thought  of  not-right,  or  wrong,  for  its  correlative ; 
and  hence,  to  ascribe  Tightness  to  the  acts  of  the  Power 
manifested  through  phenomena,  is  to  assume  the  possibility 
that  wrong  acts  may  be  committed  by  this  Power.  But 
how  come  there  to  exist,  apart  from  this  Power,  conditions 
of  such  kind  that  subordination  of  its  acts  to  them  makes 
them  right  and  insubordination  wrong.  How  can  Uncon- 
ditioned Being  be  subject  to  conditions  beyond  itself  ? 

If,  for  example,  any  one  should  assert  that  the  Cause  of 
Things,  conceived  in  respect  of  fundamental  moral  attributes 
as  like  ourselves,  did  right  in  producing  a  Universe  which, 
in  the  course  of  immeasurable  time,  has  given  origin  to 
beings  capable  of  pleasure,  and  would  have  done  wrong  in 
abstaining  from  the  production  of  such  a  Universe;  then, 
the  comment  to  be  made  is  that,  imposing  the  moral  ideas 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  259 

generated  in  his  finite  consciousness,  upon  the  Infinite 
Existence  which  transcends  consciousness_,  he  goes  behind 
that  Infinite  Existence  and  prescribes  for  it  principles  of 
action. 

As  implied  in  foregoing  chapters,  right  and  wrong  as 
conceived  by  us  can  exist  only  in  relation  to  the  actions  of 
creatures  capable  of  pleasures  and  pains ;  seeing  that  analysis 
carries  us  back  to  pleasures  and  pains  as  the  elements  out 
of  which  the  conceptions  are  framed. 

But  if  the  word  '^  absolute/^  as  used  above,  does  not 
refer  to  the  Unconditioned  Being— if  the  principles  of 
action  distinguished  as  absolute  and  relative  concern  the 
conduct  of  conditioned  beings  ;  in  what  way  are  the  words 
to  be  understood  ?  An  explanation  of  their  meanings  will 
be  best  conveyed  by  a  criticism  on  the  current  conceptions 
of  right  and  wrong. 

§  100.  Conversations  about  the  affairs  of  life  habitually 
imply  the  belief  that  every  deed  named  may  be  placed 
under  the  one  head  or  the  other.  In  discussing  a  political 
question,  both  sides  take  it  for  granted  that  some  line  of 
action  may  be  chosen  which  is  right,  while  all  other  lines  of 
action  are  wrong.  So,  too,  is  it  with  judgments  on  the 
doings  of  individuals :  each  of  these  is  approved  or  disap- 
proved on  the  assumption  that  it  is  definitely  classable  as 
good  or  bad.  Even  where  qualifications  are  admitted,  they 
are  admitted  with  an  implied  idea  that  some  such  positive 
characterization  is  to  be  made. 

Nor  is  it  in  popular  thought  and  speech  only  that  we  see 
this.  If  not  wholly  and  definitely  yet  partially  and  by 
implication,  the  belief  is  expressed  by  moralists.  In  his 
Methods  of  Mhics  (1st  Ed.  p.  6.)  Mr.  Sidgwick  says  :— 
"  That  there  is  in  any  given  circumstances  some  one  thing 
which  ought  to  be  done  and  that  this  can  be  known,  is  a 
fundamental  assumption,  made  not  by  philosophers  only^ 
but  by  all  men  who  perform  any  processes  of  moral  reason- 


260  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

ing/'*  In  this  sentence  there  is  specifically  asserted  only 
the  last  of  the*  above  propositions ;  namely,  that,  in  every 
case,  what  "  ought  to  be  done ''  "  can  be  known/^  But 
though  that  "which  ought  to  be  done"  is  not  distinctly 
identified  with  ''the  right,"  it  may  be  inferred,  in  the 
absence  of  any  indication  to  the  contrary,  that  Mr.  Sidgwick 
regards  the  two  as  identical ;  and  doubtless,  in  so  conceiving 
the  postulates  of  moral  science,  he  is  at  one  with  most,  if 
not  all,  who  have  made  it  a  subject  of  study.  At  first  sight, 
indeed,  nothing  seems  more  obvious  than  that  if  actions  are 
to  be  judged  at  all,  these  postulates  must  be  accepted. 
Nevertheless  they  may  both  be  called  in  question,  and  I 
think  it  may  be  shown  that  neither  of  them  is  tenable. 
Instead  of  admitting  that  there  is  in  every  case  a  right  andj 
a  wrong,  it  may  be  contended  that  in  multitudinous  cases! 
no  right,  properly  so-called,  can  be  alleged,  but  only  a  least! 
wrong ;  and  further,  it  may  be  contended  that  in  many  of  I 
these  cases  where  there  can  be  alleged  only  a  least  wrong, 
it  is  not  possible  to  ascertain  with  any  precision  which  is 
the  least  wrong. 

A  great  part  of  the  perplexities   in   ethical  speculation 
arise  from  neglect   of  this  distinction   between  right  and 
least  wrong — between  the  absolutely  right  and  the  relatively  . 
right.      And   many   further   perplexities    are    due   to   the  I 
assumption  that   it  can,  in  some  way,  be  decided  in  every 
case  which  of  two  courses  is  morally  obligatory. 

§  101.  The  law  of  absolute  right  can  take  no  cognizance  of 
pain,  save  the  cognizance  implied  by  negation.  Pain  is  the 
correlative  of  some  species  of  wrong — some  kind  of  diver- 
gence from  that  course  of  action  which  perfectly  fulfils  all 
requirements.     If,  as  was  shown  in  an  early  chapter,  the 

*  I  do  not  find  this  passage  in  the  second  edition  ;  but  the  omission  of 
it  appears  to  have  arisen  not  from  any  change  of  view,  but  because  it  did 
not  naturally  come  into  the  re- cast  form  of  the  argument  which  the  section 
contains. 


ABSOLUTE   AND    RELATIVE    ETHICS.  261 

conception  of  good  conduct  always  proves,  when  analyzed, 
to  be  the  conception  of  a  conduct  which  produces  a  surplus 
of  pleasure  somewhere ;  while,  conversely,  the  conduct 
conceived  as  bad  proves  always  to  be  that  which  inflicts 
somewhere  a  surplus  of  either  positive  or  negative  pain; 
then  the  absolutely  good,  the  absolutely  right,  in  conduct, 
can  be  that  only  which  produces  pure  pleasure — ^pleasure 
unalloyed  with  pain  anywhere.  By  implication,  conduct 
which  has  any  concomitant  of  pain,  or  any  painful  conse- 
quence, is  partially  wrong;  and  the  highest  claim  to  be 
made  for  such  conduct  is,  that  it  is  the  least  wrong  which, 
under  the  conditions,  is  possible — the  relatively  right. 

The  contents  of  preceding  chapters  imply  throughout 
that,  considered  from  the  evolution  point  of  view,  the  acts 
of  men  during  the  transition  which  has  been,  is  still,  and 
long  will  be,  in  progress,  must,  in  most  cases,  be  of  the 
kind  here  classed  as  least  wrong.  In  proportion  to  the 
incongruity  between  the  natures  men  inherit  from  the 
pre-social  state,  and  the  requirements  of  social  life,  must 
be  the  amount  of  pain  entailed  by  their  actions,  either  on 
themselves  or  on  others.  In  so  far  as  pain  is  suffered,  evil  is 
inflicted ;  and  conduct  which  inflicts  any  evil  cannot  be 
absolutely  good. 

To  make  clear  the  distinction  here  insisted  upon  between 
that  perfect  conduct  which  is  the  subject-matter  of  Absolute 
Ethics,  and  that  imperfect  conduct  which  is  the  subject- 
matter  of  Relative  Ethics,  some  illustrations  must  be  given. 

§  102.  Among  the  best  examples  of  absolutely  right 
actions  to  be  named,  are  those  arising  where  the  nature  and 
the  requirements  have  been  moulded  to  one  another  before 
social  evolution  began.     Two  will  here  sufiice. 

Consider  the  relation  of  a  healthy  mother  to  a  healthy 
infant.  Between  the  two  there  exists  a  mutual  dependence 
which  is  a  source  of  pleasure  to  both.  In  yielding  its  natural 
food  to  the  child,  the  mother  receives  gratification ;  and  to 


262  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

tlie  child  there  comes  tlie  satisfaction  of  appetite — a  satis- 
faction which  accompanies  furtherance  of  hfe_,  growth,  and  in- 
creasing enjoyment.  Let  the  relation  be  suspended,  and  on 
both  sides  there  is  suffering.  The  mother  experiences  both 
bodily  pain  and  mental  pain ;  and  the  painful  sensation 
borne  by  the  child,  brings  as  its  results  physical  mischief 
and  some  damage  to  the  emotional  nature.  Thus  the 
act  is  one  that  is  to  both  exclusively  pleasurable,  while 
abstention  entails  pain  on  both ;  and  it  is  consequently  of 
the  kind  we  here  call  absolutely  right.  In  the 

parental  relations  of  the  father  we  are  furnished  with  a 
kindred  example.  If  he  is  well  constituted  in  body  and 
mind,  his  boy,  eager  for  play,  finds  in  him  a  sympathetic 
response  ;  and  their  frolics,  giving  mutual  pleasure,  not  only 
farther  the  child's  physical  welfare  but  strengthen  that  bond 
of  good  feeling  between  the  two  which  makes  subsequent 
guidance  easier.  And  then  if,  repudiating  the  stupidities 
of  early  education  as  at  present  conceived  and  unhappily 
State-enacted,  he  has  rational  ideas  of  mental  development, 
and  sees  that  the  second-hand  knowledge  gained  through 
books  should  begin  to  supplement  the  first-hand  knowledge 
gained  by  direct  observation,  only  when  a  good  stock  of  this 
has  been  acquired,  he  will,  with  active  sympathy,  aid  in. 
that  exploration  of  the  surrounding  world  which  his  boy 
pursues  with  delight ;  giving  and  receiving  gratification  from 
moment  to  moment  while  furthering  ultimate  welfare* 
Here,  again,  are  actions  of  a  kind  purely  pleasurable  alike 
in  their  immediate  and  remote  effects — actions  absolutely 
right. 

The  intercourse  of  adults  yields,  for  the  reason  assigned, 
relatively  few  cases  that  fall  completely  within  the  same 
category.  In  their  transactions  from  hour  to  hour,  more 
or  less  of  deduction  from  pure  gratification  is  caused  on  one^ 
or  other  side  by  imperfect  fitness  to  the  requirements.  The 
pleasures  men  gain  by  labouring  in  their  vocations  and 
receiving  in  one  form  or  other  returns  for  their  services, 


ABSOLUTE    A.ND    RELATIVE   ETHICS.  263 

usually  have  the  drawback  that  the  labours  are  in  a  con- 
siderable degree  displeasurable.  Cases,  however,  do  occur 
where  the  energies  are  so  abundant  that  inaction  is  irksome  ; 
and  where  the  daily  work,  not  too  great  in  duration,  is  of  a 
kind  appropriate  to  the  nature ;  and  where,  as  a  consequence, 
pleasure  rather  than  pain  is  a  concomitant.  When  services 
yielded  by  such  a  one  are  paid  for  by  another  similarly 
adapted  to  his  occupation,  the  entire  transaction  is  of  the 
kind  we  are  here  considering :  exchange  under  agreement 
between  two  so  constituted,  becomes  a  means  of  pleasure  to 
both,  with  no  set-off  of  pain.  Bearing  in  mind  the  form  of 
nature  which  social  discipline  is  producing,  as  shown  in  the ' 
contrast  between  savage  and  civilized,  the  implication  is  that 
ultimately  men's  activities  at  large  will  assume  this  character. 
Remembering  that  in  the  course  of  organic  evolution,  the 
means  to  enjoyment  themselves  eventually  become  sources 
of  enjoyment ;  and  that  there  is  no  form  of  action  which 
may  not  through  the  development  of  appropriate  structures 
become  pleasurable  ;  the  inference  must  be  that  industrial 
activities  carried  on  through  voluntary  co-operation,  will  in 
time  acquire  the  character  of  absolute  Tightness  as  here 
conceived.  Already,  indeed,  something  like  such  a  state  has 
been  reached  among  certain  of  those  who  minister  to  our 
aesthetic  gratifications.  The  artist  of  genius — poet,  painter, 
or  musician — is  one  who  obtains  the  means  of  living  by  acts 
that  are  directly  pleasurable  to  him,  while  they  yield, 
immediately  or  remotely,  pleasures  to  others.  Once 

more,  among  absolutely  right  acts  may  be  named  certain  of 
those  which  we  class  as  benevolent.  I  say  certain  of  them, 
because  such  benevolent  acts  as  entail  submission  to  pain, 
positive  or  negative,  that  others  may  receive  pleasure,  are, 
by  the  definition,  excluded.  But  there  are  benevolent  acts 
of  a  kind  yielding  pleasure  solely.  Some  one  who  has 
slipped  is  saved  from  falling  by  a  bystander:  a  hurt  is 
prevented  and  satisfaction  is  felt  by  both.  A  pedestrian 
is   choosing  a  dangerous  route^  or  a   fellow- passenger   is 


264  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

about  to  alight  at  the  wrong  station,  and,  warned  against 
doing  so,  is  saved  from  evil :  each  being,  as  a  consequence, 
gratified.  There  is  a  misunderstanding  between  friends, 
and  one  who  sees  how  it  has  arisen,  explains :  the  result 
being  agreeable  to  all.  Services  to  those  around  in  the 
small  affairs  of  life,  may  be,  and  often  are,  of  a  kind  which 
there  is  equal  pleasure  in  giving  and  receiving.  Indeed, 
as  was  urged  in  the  last  chapter,  the  actions  of  developed 
altruism  must  habitually  have  this  character.  And  so,  in 
countless  ways  suggested  by  these  few,  men  may  add  to  | 
one  anothers  happiness  without  anywhere  producing  un- 
happiness — ways  which  are  therefore  absolutely  right. 

In  contrast  with  these  consider  the  many  actions  which 
from  hour  to  hour  are  gone  through,  now  with  an  accompani- 
ment of  some  pain  to  the  actor  and  now  bringing  results 
that  are  partially  painful  to  others,  but  which  nevertheless 
are  imperative.  As  implied  by  antithesis  with  cases  above 
referred  to,  the  wearisomeness  of  productive  labour  as 
ordinarily  pursued,  renders  it  in  so  far  wrong;  but  then 
far  greater  suffering  would  result,  both  to  the  labourer  and 
his  family,  and  therefore  far  greater  wrong  would  be  done, 
were  this  wearisomeness  not  borne.  Though  the  pains 
which  the  care  of  many  children  entail  on  a  mother,  form 
a  considerable  set-off  from  the  pleasures  secured  by  them 
to  her  children  and  herself;  yet  the  miseries,  immediate  and 
remote,  which  neglect  would  entail  so  far  exceed  them,  that 
submission  to  such  pains  up  to  the  limit  of  physical  ability 
to  bear  them,  becomes  morally  imperative  as  being  the  least 
wrong.  A  servant  who  fails  to  fulfil  an  agreement  in  respect 
of  work,  or  who  is  perpetually  breaking  crockery,  or  who 
pilfers,  may  have  to  suffer  pain  from  being  discharged;  but 
since  the  evils  to  be  borne  by  all  concerned  if  incapacity  or 
misconduct  is  tolerated,  not  in  one  case  only  but  habitually, 
must  be  much  greater,  such  infliction  of  pain  is  warranted 
as  a  means  to  preventing  greater  pain.  Withdrawal  of 
custom  from  a  tradesman  whose  charges  are  too  high,  or 


ABSOLUTE    AND    RELATIVE   ETHICS.  265 

whose  commodities  are  inferior,  or  wlio  gives  sliort  measure, 
or  who  is  unpunctual,  decreases  his  welfare,  and  perhaps 
injures  his  belongings ;  but  as  saving  him  from  these  evils 
would  imply  bearing  the  evils  his  conduct  causes,  and  as 
such  regard  for  his  well-being  would  imply  disregard  of  the 
well-being  of  some  more  worthy  or  more  efficient  tradesman 
to  whom  the  custom  would  else  go,  and  as,  chiefly,  general 
adoption  of  the  implied  course,  having  the  effect  that  the 
inferior  would  not  suffer  from  their  inferiority  nor  the\ 
superior  gain  by  their  superiority,  would  produce  universal  \ 
misery,  withdrawal  is  justified — the  act  is  relatively  right. 

§  103.  I  pass  now  to  the  second  of  the  two  propositions 
above  enunciated.  After  recognizing  the  truth  that  a  large 
part  of  human  conduct  is  not  absolutely  right,  but  only 
relatively  right,  we  have  to  recognize  the  further  truth  that 
in  many^TJSses  where  there  is  no  absolutely  right  course, 
but  only  courses  that  are  more  or  less  wrong,  it  is  not 
possible  to  say  which  is  the  least  wrong.  Recurrence  to  the 
instances  just  given  will  show  this. 

There  is  a  point  up  to  which  it  is  relatively  right  for  a 
parent  to  carry  self-sacrifice  for  the  benefit  of  offspring; 
and  there  is  a  point  beyond  which  self-sacrifice  cannot  be 
pushed  without  bringing,  not  only  on  himself  or  herself  but 
also  on  the  family,  evils  greater  than  those  to  be  prevented 
by  the  self-sacrifice.  Who  shall  say  where  this  point  is  ? 
Depending  on  the  constitutions  and  needs  of  those  con- 
cerned, it  is  in  no  two  cases  the  same,  and  cannot  be  by 
anyone  more  than  guessed.  The  transgressions  or  short- 
comings of  a  servant  vary  from  the  trivial  to  the  grave,  and 
the  evils  which  discharge  may  bring  range  through  countless 
degrees  from  slight  to  serious.  The  penalty  may  be  in- 
flicted for  a  very  small  offence,  and  then  there  is  wrong 
done ;  or  after  numerous  grave  offences  it  may  not  be 
inflicted,  and  again  there  is  wrong  done.  How  shall  be 
determined  the  degree   of  transgression   beyond  which  to 


^ 


266  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

discharge  is  less  wrong  than  not  to  discliarge?  In  like 
manner  witli  the  shopkeeper's  misdemeanours.  No  one  can 
sum  up  either  the  amount  of  positive  and  negative  pain 
which  tolerating  them  involves,  nor  the  amount  of  positive 
and  negative  pain  involved  by  not  tolerating  them;  and 
in  medium  cases  no  one  can  say  where  the  one  exceeds  the 
other. 

In  men^s  wider  relations  frequently  occur  circumstances 
under  which  a  decision  one  or  other  way  is  imperative,  and 
yet  under  which  not  even  the  most  sensitive  conscience 
helped  by  the  clearest  judgment,  can  decide  which  of 
the  alternatives  is  relatively  right.  Two  examples  will 
suffice.  Here  is  a  merchant  who  loses  by  the  failure 

of  a  man  indebted  to  him.  Unless  he  gets  help  he  himself 
will  fail ;  and  if  he  fails  he  will  bring  disaster  not  only  on 
his  family  but  on  all  who  have  given  him  credit.  Even  if 
by  borrowing  he  is  enabled  to  meet  immediate  engagements, 
he  is  not  safe;  for  the  time  is  one  of  panic,  and  others 
of  his  debtors  by  going  to  the  wall  may  put  him  in  further 
difficulties.  Shall  he  ask  a  friend  for  a  loan  ?  On  the  one 
hand,  is  it  not  wrong  forthwith  to  bring  on  himself,  his 
family,  and  those  who  have  business  relations  with  him,  the 
evils  of  his  failure  ?  On  the  other  hand,  is  it  not  wrong  to 
hopothecate  the  property  of  his  friend,  and  lead  him  too, 
with  his  belongings  and  dependents,  into  similar  risks  ? 
The  loan  would  probably  tide  him  over  his  difficulty ;  in 
which  case  would  it  not  be  unjust  to  his  creditors  did  he 
refrain  from  asking  it  ?  Contrariwise,  the  loan  would  very 
possibly  fail  to  stave  off  his  bankruptcy ;  in  which  case  is 
not  his  action  in  trying  to  obtain  it,  practically  fraudulent  ? 
Though  in  extreme  cases  it  may  be  easy  to  say  which  course 
is  the  least  wrong,  how  is  it  possible  in  all  those  medium 
cases  where  even  by  the  keenest  man  of  business  the  con- 
tingencies cannot  be  calculated  ?  Take,  again,  the 
difficulties  that  not  unfrequently  arise  from  antagonism 
between  family  duties  and  social  duties.     Here  is  a  tenant 


ABSOLUTE   AND   EELATIVE   ETHICS.  267 

farmer  whose  political  principles  prompt  him  to  vote  in 
opposition  to  his  landlord.  If^  being  a  Liberal,  he  votes  for 
a  Conservative,  not  only  does  he  by  his  act  say  that  he 
thinks  what  he  does  not  think,  but  he  may  perhaps  assist 
what  he  regards  as  bad  legislation  :  his  vote  may  by  chance 
turn  the  election,  and  on  a  Parliamentary  division  a  single 
member  may  decide  the  fate  of  a  measure.  Even  neglecting, 
as  too  improbable,  such  serious  consequences,  there  is  the 
manifest  truth  that  if  all  who  hold  like  views  with  himself, 
are  similarly  deterred  from  electoral  expression  of  them, 
there  must  result  a  different  balance  of  power  and  a  different 
national  policy  :  making  it  clear  that  only  by  adherence  of 
all  to  their  political  principles,  can  the  policy  he  thinks  right 
be  maintained.  But  now,  on  the  other  hand,  how  can  he 
absolve  himself  from  responsibility  for  the  evils  which  those 
depending  on  him  may  suffer  if  he  fulfils  what  appears  to 
be  a  peremptory  public  duty  ?  Is  not  his  duty  to  his 
children  even  more  peremptory  ?  Does  not  the  family 
precede  the  State ;  and  does  not  the  welfare  of  the  State 
depend  on  the  welfare  of  the  family  ?  May  he,  then,  take  a 
course  which,  if  the  threats  uttered  are  carried  out,  will  eject 
him  from  his  farm;  and  so  cause  inability,  perhaps  temporary 
perhaps  prolonged,  to  feed  his  children.  The  contingent 
evils  are  infinitely  varied  in  their  ratios.  In  one  case  the 
imperativeness  of  the  public  duty  is  great  and  the  evil  that 
may  come  on  dependents  small ;  in  another  case  the  political 
issue  is  of  trivial  moment  and  the  possible  injury  which  the 
family  may  suffer  is  great;  and  between  these  extremes 
there  are  all  gradations.  Further,  the  degrees  of  probability 
of  each  result,  public  and  private,  range  from  the  nearly 
certain  to  the  almost  impossible.  Admitting,  then,  that  it  is 
wrong  to  act  in  a  way  likely  to  injure  the  State ;  and  admit- 
ting that  it  is  wrong  to  act  in  a  way  likely  to  injure  the 
family;  we  have  to  recognize  the  fact  that  in  countless  cases 
no  one  can  decide  by  which  of  the  alternative  courses  the 
least  wrong  is  likely  to  be  done. 
12 


268  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

These  instances  will  sufficiently  show  that  in  conduct  at 
large,  including  men's  dealings  with  themselves,  with  their 
families,  with  their  friends,  with  their  debtors  and  creditors, 
and  with  the  public,  it  usually  happens  that  whatever  course 
is  taken  entails  some  pain  somewhere ;  forming  a  deduction 
from  the  pleasure  achieved,  and  making  the  course  in  so 
far  not  absolutely  right.  Further,  they  will  show  that 
throughout  a  considerable  part  of  conduct,  no  guiding 
principle,  no  method  of  estimation,  enables  us  to  say 
whether  a  proposed  course  is  even  relatively  right;  as 
causing,  proximately  and  remotely,  specially  and  generally, 
the  greatest  surplus  of  good  over  evil. 

§  104.  And  now  we  are  prepared  for  dealing  in  a  syste- 
matic way  with  the  distinction  between  Absolute  Ethics 
and  Relative  Ethics. 

Scientific  truths,  of  whatever  order,  are  reached  by 
eliminating  perturbing  or  conflicting  factors,  and  recog- 
nizing only  fundamental  factors.  When,  by  dealing  with 
fundamental  factors  in  the  abstract,  not  as  presented  in 
actual  phenomena  but  as  presented  in  ideal  separation, 
general  laws  have  been  ascertained,  it  becomes  possible  to 
draw  inferences  in  concrete  cases  by  taking  into  account 
incidental  factors.  But  it  is  only  by  first  ignoring  these 
and  recognizi  >g  the  essential  elements  alone,  that  we  can 
discover  the  essential  truths  sought.  Take,  in  illustration, 
the  progress  of  mechanics  from  its  empirical  form  to  its 
rational  form. 

All  have  occasional  experience  of  the  fact  that  a  person 
pushed  on  one  side  beyond  a  certain  degree,  loses  his 
balance  and  falls.  It  is  observed  that  a  stone  flung  or 
an  arrow  shot,  does  not  proceed  in  a  straight  line,  but 
comes  to  the  earth  after  pursuing  a  course  which  deviates 
more  and  more  from  its  original  course.  When  trying  to 
break  a  stick  across  the  knee,  it  is  found  that  success  is 
easier  if  the  stick  is  seized  at  considerable  distances  from 


ABSOLUTE   AND   RELATIVE   ETHICS.  269 

the  knee  on  eacli  side  than  if  seized  close  to  the  knee. 
Daily  use  of  a  spear  draws  attention  to  the  truth  that  by- 
thrusting  its  point  under  a  stone  and  depressing  the  shaft, 
the  stone  may  be  raised  the  more  readily  the  further  away 
the  hand  is  towards  the  end.  Here,  then,  are  sundry  expe- 
riences, eventually  grouped  into  empirical  generalizations, 
which  serve  to  guide  conduct  in  certain  simple  cases.  How 
does  mechanical  science  evolve  from  these  experiences  ? 
To  reach  a  formula  expressing  the  powers  of  the  lever,  it 
supposes  a  lever  which  does  not,  like  the  stick,  admit  of 
being  bent,  but  is  absolutely  rigid ;  and  it  supposes  a  fulcrum 
not  having  a  broad  surface,  like  that  of  one  ordinarily  used, 
but  a  fulcrum  without  breath;  and  it  supposes  that  the 
weight  to  be  raised  bears  on  a  definite  point,  instead  of 
bearing  over  a  considerable  portion  of  the  lever.  Similarly 
with  the  leaning  body,  which,  passing  a  certain  inclination, 
overbalances.  Before  the  truth  respecting  the  relations  of 
centre  of  gravity  and  base  can  be  formulated,  it  must  be 
assumed  that  the  surface  on  which  the  body  stands  is  un- 
yielding ;  that  the  edge  of  the  body  itself  is  unyielding ; 
and  that  its  mass,  while  made  to  lean  more  and  more,  does 
not  change  its  form — conditions  not  fulfilled  in  the  cases 
commonly  observed.  And  so,  too,  is  it  with  the  projectile  : 
determination  of  its  course  by  deduction  from  mechanical 
laws,  primarily  ignores  all  deviations  causes"  by  its  shape 
and  by  the  resistance  of  the  air.  The  science  of  rational 
mechanics  is  a  science  which  consists  of  such  ideal  truths, 
and  can  come  into  existence  only  by  thus  dealing  with  ideal 
cases.  It  remains  impossible  so  long  as  attention  is  restricted 
to  concrete  cases  presenting  all  the  complications  of  friction, 
plasticity,  and  so  forth.  But  now,  after  disen- 

tangling certain  fundamental  mechanical  truths,  it  becomes 
possible  by  their  help  to  guide  actions  better;  and  it  becomes 
possible  to  guide  them  still  better  when,  as  presently  happens, 
the  complicating  elements  from  which  they  have  been 
disentangled  are  themselves  taken  into   account.     At  an 


270  THE    DATA   OF    ETHICS. 

advanced  stage,  the  modifying  effects  of  friction  are  allowed 
for,  and  tlie  inferences  are  qualified  to  the  requisite  extent. 
The  theory  of  the  pulley  is  corrected  in  its  application  to 
actual  cases  by  recognizing  the  rigidity  of  cordage;  the 
effects  of  which  are  formulated.  The  stabilities  of  masses, 
determinable  in  the  abstract  by  reference  to  the  centres  of 
gravity  of  the  masses  in  relation  to  the  bases,  come  to  be 
determined  in  the  concrete  by  including  also  their  characters 
in  respect  of  cohesion.  The  courses  of  projectiles  having 
been  theoretically  settled  as  though  they  moved  through  a 
vacuum,  are  afterwards  settled  in  more  exact  correspon- 
dence with  fact  by  taking  into  account  atmospheric 
resistance.  And  thus  we  see  illustrated  the 

relation  between  certain  absolute  truths  of  mechanical 
science,  and  certain  relative  truths  which  involve  them. 
We  are  shown  that  no  scientific  establishment  of  relative 
truths  is  possible,  until  the  absolute  truths  have  been  formu- 
lated independently.  We  see  that  mechanical  science  fitted 
for  dealing  with  the  real,  can  arise  only  after  ideal  mechanical 
science  has  arisen. 

All  this  holds  of  moral  science.  As  by  early  and  rude 
experiences  there  were  inductively  reached,  vague  but  par- 
tially-true notions  respecting  the  overbalancing  of  bodies,  the 
motions  of  missiles,  the  actions  of  levers ;  so  by  early  and  rude 
experiences  there  were  inductively  reached,  vague  but  par- 
tially-true notions  respecting  the  effects  of  men's  behaviour 
on  themselves,  on  one  another,  and  on  society :  to  a  certain 
extent  serving  in  the  last  case,  as  in  the  first,  for  the  guidance 
of  conduct.  Moreover,  as  this  rudimentary  mechanical 
knowledge,  though  still  remaining  empirical,  becomes  during 
early  stages  of  civilization  at  once  more  definite  and  more 
extensive ;  so  during  early  stages  of  civilization  these  ethical 
ideas,  still  retaining  their  empirical  character,  increase  in 
precision  and  multiplicity.  But  just  as  we  have  seen  that 
mechanical  knowledge  of  the  empirical  sort  can  evolve  into 
mechanical   science,    only  by  first   omitting   all  qualifying 


ABSOLUTE  AND  EELATIVE  ETHICS.  271 

circumstances,  and  generalizing  in  absolute  ways  the  funda- 
mental laws  of  forces  ;  so  here  we  have  to  see  that  empiri- 
cal ethics  can  evolve  into  rational  ethics  only  by  first 
neglecting  all  complicating  incidents,  and  formulating  the 
laws  of  right  action  apart  from  the  obscuring  effects  of 
special  conditions.  And  the  final  implication  is  that  just 
as  the  system  of  mechanical  truths,  conceived  in  ideal 
s^epar§iian_as_absolute,  becomes  applicable  to  real  mechanical 
problems  in  such  way  that  making  allowance  for  all  inci- 
dental circumstances  there  can  be  reached  conclusions  far 
nearer  to  the  truth  than  could  otherwise  be  reached;  so,  a 
system  of  ideal  ethical  truths,  expressing  the  absolutely 
right,  will  be  applicable  to  the  questions  of  our  transitional 
state  in  such  ways  that,  allowing  for  the  friction  of  an 
incomplete  life  and  the  imperfection  of  existing  natures, 
we  may  ascertain  with  approximate  correctness  what  is  the 
relatively  right. 

§  105.  In  a  chapter  entitled  '^  Definition  of  Morality  ''  in 
Social  Statics,  I  contended  that  the  moral  law,  properly  so- 
called,  is  the  law  of  the  perfect  man — is  the  formula  of  ideal  I 
conduct — is  the  statement  in  all  cases  of  that  which  should! 
be,  and  cannot  recognize  in  its  propositions  any  elements' 
implying  existence  of  that  which  should  not  be.  Instancing 
questions  concerning  the  right  course  to  be  taken  in  cases 
where  wrong  has  already  been  done,  I  alleged  that  the 
answers  to  such  questions  cannot  be  given  '^on  purely 
ethical  principles. ^^     I  argued  that — 

"  No  conclusions  can  lay  claim  to  absolute  truth,  but  snch  as  depend  upon 
truths  that  are  themselves  absolute.  Before  there  can  be  exactness  in  an 
inference,  there  must  be  exactness  in  the  antecedent  propositions.  A  geo- 
metrician requires  that  the  straight  lines  with  which  he  deals  shall  be  veritably 
straight ;  and  that  his  circles,  and  ellipses,  and  parabolas  shall  agree  with 
precise  definitions — shall  perfectly  and  invariably  answer  to  specified  equations. 
If  you  put  to  him  a  question  in  which  these  conditions  are  not  complied  with, 
he  tells  you  that  it  cannot  be  answered.  So  likewise  is  it  with  the  philosophical 
moralist.  He  treats  solely  of  the  straight  man.  He  determines  the  properties 
of  the  straight  man  ;  describes  how  the  straight  man  comports  himself  j  shows 


272  THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

m  what  relationship  he  stands  to  other  straight  men  ;  shows  how  a  community 
of  straight  men  is  constituted.  Any  deviation  from  strict  rectitude  he  is 
obliged  wholly  to  ignore.  It  cannot  be  admitted  into  his  premises  without 
vitiating  all  his  conclusions.  A  problem  in  which  a  crooJced  man  forms  one  of 
the  elements  is  insoluble  by  him." 

E/eferring  to  this  view,  specifically  in  tbe  first  edition 
of  the  Methods  of  Ethics  but  more  generally  in  the  second 
edition,  Mr.  Sidgwick  says  : — 

"  Those  who  take  this  view  adduce  the  analogy  of  Geometry  to  show 
that  Ethics  ought  to  deal  with  ideally  perfect  human  relations,  just  as 
Geometry  treats  of  ideally  perfect  lines  and  circles.  But  the  most  irregular 
line  has  definite  spatial  relations  with  which  Geometry  does  not  refuse  to 
deal :  though  of  course  they  are  more  complex  than  those  of  a  straight 
line.  So  in  Astronomy,  it  would  be  more  convenient  for  purposes  of  study  if 
the  stars  moved  in  circles,  as  was  once  believed  :  but  the  fact  that  they  move 
not  in  circles  but  in  ellipses,  and  even  in  imperfect  and  perturbed  ellipses,  does 
not  take  them  out  of  the  sphere  of  scientific  investigation  :  by  patience  and 
industry  we  have  learnt  how  to  reduce  to  principles  and  calculate  even  these 
more  complicated  motions.  It  is,  no  doubt,  a  convenient  artifice  for  purposes 
of  instruction  to  assume  that  the  planets  move  in  perfect  ellipses  (or  even — at 
an  earlier  stage  of  study — in  circles) :  we  thus  allow  the  individual's  knowledge 
to  pass  through  the  same  gradations  in  accuracy  as  that  of  the  race  has  done. 
But  what  we  want,  as  astronomers,  to  know  is  the  actual  motion  of  the 
stars  and  its  causes :  and  similarly  as  moralists  we  naturally  inquire  what 
ought  to  be  done  in  the  actual  world  in  which  we  live."    P.  19,  Sec.  Ed. 

Beginning  with  the  first  of  these  two  statements,  which 
concerns  Geometry,  I  must  confess  myself  surprised  to  find 
my  propositions  called  in  question ;  and  after  full  con- 
sideration I  remain  at  a  loss  to  understand  Mr.  Sidgwick's 
mode  of  viewing  the  matter.  When,  in  a  sentence  pre- 
ceding those  quoted  above,  I  remarked  on  the  impossibility 
of  solving  ''  mathematically  a  series  of  problems  respecting 
crooked  lines  and  broken-backed  curves,'^  it  never  occurred 
to  me  that  I  should  be  met  by  the  direct  assertion  that 
"Geometry  does  not  refuse  to  deal'^  with  ^'the  most 
irregular  line.'''  Mr.  Sidgwick  states  that  an  irregular  line_, 
say  such  as  a  child  makes  in  scribbling,  has  "definite 
spatial  relations.'^  What  meaning  does  he  here  give 
to  the  word  "  definite.'*'  If  he  means  that  its  relations 
to  space  at  large  are  definite  in  the  sense  that  by  an 
infinite  intelligence   they   would  be  definable;    the   reply 


ABSOLUTE  AND  EELATIVE  ETHICS.  273 

is  that  to  an  infinite  intelligence  all  spatial  relations  would 
be  definable  :  there  could  be  no  indefinite  spatial  relations — 
the  word  "  definite  '^  thus  ceasing  to  mark  any  distinction. 
li,  on  the  other  hand,  when  saying  that  an  irregular  line  has 
'^definite  spatial  relations,'^  he  means  relations  knowable 
definitely  by  human  intelligence;  there  still  comes  the 
question,  how  is  the  word  *'  definite  '^  to  be  understood  ? 
Surely  anything  distinguished  as  definite  admits  of  being 
defined ;  but  how  can  we  define  an  irregular  line  ?  And 
if  we  cannot  define  the  irregular  line  itself,  how  can 
we  know  its  ^^  spatial  relations  ''  definitely  ?  And  how,  in 
the  absence  of  definition,  can  Geometry  deal  with  it  ?  If 
Mr.  Sidgwick  means  that  it  can  be  dealt  with  by  the  '^method 
of  limits,'^  then  the  reply  is  that  in  such  case,  not  the  line 
itself  is  dealt  with  geometrically,  but  certain  definite  lines 
artificially  put  in  quasi-definite  relations  to  it :  the  indefinite 
becomes  cognizable  only  through  the  medium  of  the  hypo- 
thetically-definite. 

Turning  to  the  second  illustration,  the  rejoinder  to  be 
made  is  that  in  so  far  as  it  concerns  the  relations  between 
the  ideal  and  the  real,  the  analogy  drawn  does  not  shake 
but  strengthens  my  argument.  For  whether  considered 
under  its  geometrical  or  under  its  dynamical  aspect,  and 
whether  considered  in  the  necessary  order  of  its  develop- 
ment or  in  the  order  historically  displayed.  Astronomy 
shows  us  throughout,  that  truths  respecting  simple,  theo- 
retically-exact relations,  must  be  ascertained  before  truths 
respecting  the  complex  and  practically-inexact  relatiocs 
that  actually  exist,  can  be  ascertained.  As  applied  to  the 
interpretation  of  planetary  movements,  we  see  that  the 
theory  of  cycles  and  epicycles  was  based  on  pre-existing 
knowledge  of  the  circle :  the  properties  of  an  ideal  curve 
having  been  learnt,  a  power  was  acquired  of  giving  some 
expression  to  the  celestial  motions.  We  see  that  the 
Copernican  interpretation  expressed  the  facts  in  terms  of 
circular  movements   otherwise   distributed   and   combined. 


274  THE    DATA    OF   ETHICS. 

We  see  that  Kepler's  advance  from  the  conception  of  circular 
movements  to  the  conception  of  elliptic  movements,  was 
made  possible  by  comparing  the  facts  as  they  are  with  the 
facts  as  they  would  be  were  the  movements  circular.  We  see 
that  the  subsequently-learnt  deviations  from  elliptic  move- 
ments, were  learnt  only  through  the  pre-supposition  that  the 
movements  are  elliptical.  And  we  see,  lastly,  that  even  now 
predictions  concerning  the  exact  positions  of  planets,  after 
taking  account  of  perturbations,  imply  constant  references  to 
ellipses  that  are  regarded  as  their  normal  or  average  orbits 
for  the  time  being.  Thus,  ascertainment  of  the  actual  truths 
has  been  made  possible  only  by  pre-ascertainment  of  certain 
ideal  truths.  To  be  convinced  that  by  no  other  course  could 
the  actual  truths  have  been  ascertained,  it  needs  only  to 
suppose  any  one  saying  that  it  did  not  concern  him,  as  an 
astronomer,  to  know  anything  about  the  properties  of 
circles  and  ellipses,  but  that  he  had  to  deal  with  the  Solar 
System  as  it  exists,  to  which  end  it  was  his  business  to 
observe  and  tabulate  positions  and  directions  and  to  be 
guided  by  the  facts  as  he  found  them.  So,  too, 

is  it  if  we  look  at  the  development  of  dynamical  astronomy. 
The  first  proposition  in  Newton's  Frincijpia  deals  with  the 
movement  of  a  single  body  round  a  single  centre  of  force ; 
and  the  phenomena  of  central  motion  are  first  formulated 
in  a  case  which  is  not  simply  ideal,  but  in  which  there  is  no 
specification  of  the  force  concerned  :  detachment  from  the 
real  is  the  greatest  possible.  Again,  postulating  a 
principle  of  action  conforming  to  an  ideal  law,  the  theory 
of  gravitation  deals  with  the  several  problems  of  the  Solar 
System  in  fictitious  detachment  from  the  rest;  and  it  makes 
certain  fictitious  assumptions,  such  as  that  the  mass  of  each 
body  concerned  is  concentrated  in  its  centre  of  gravity. 
Only  later,  after  establishing  the  leading  truths  by  this 
artifice  of  disentangling  the  major  factors  from  the  minor 
factors,  is  the  theory  applied  to  the  actual  problems  in  their 
ascending  degrees  of  complexity  ;  taking  in  more  and  more 


ABSOLUTE   AND    RELATIVE   ETHICS.  275 

of  the  minor  factors.  And  if  we  ask  whether  the  dynamics 
of  the  Solar  System  could  have  been  established  in  any 
other  way_,  we  see  that  here,  too,  simple  truths  holding  under 
ideal  conditions,  have  to  be  ascertained  before  real  truths 
existing  under  complex  conditions  can  be  ascertained. 

The  alleged  necessary  precedence  of  Absolute  Ethics  over 
Relative  Ethics  is  thus,  I  think,  further  elucidated.  One 
who  has  followed  the  general  argument  thus  far,  will  not 
deny  that  an  ideal  social  being  may  be  conceived  as  so  con- 
stituted that  his  spontaneous  activities  are  congruous  with 
the  conditions  imposed  by  the  social  environment  formed  by  1 
other  such  beings.  In  many  places,  and  in  various  ways, 
I  have  argued  that  conformably  with  the  laws  of  evolution 
in  general,  and  conformably  with  the  laws  of  organization  in 
particular,  there  has  been,  and  is,  in  progress,  an  adaptation 
of  humanity  to  the  social  state,  changing  it  in  the  direction 
of  such  an  ideal  congruity.  And  the  corollary  before  drawn 
and  here  repeated,  is  that  the  ultimate  man  is  one  in  whom 
this  process  has  gone  so  far  as  to  produce  a  correspondence 
between  all  the  promptings  of  his  nature  and  all  the  require- 
ments of  his  life  as  carried  on  in  society.  If  so,  it  is  a 
necessary  implication  that  there  exists  an  ideal  code  of 
conduct  formulating  the  behaviour  of  the  completely  adapted 
man  in  the  completely  evolved  society.  Such  a  code  is  that 
here  called  Absolute  Ethics  as  distinguished  from  Relative 
Ethics — a  code  the  injunctions  of  which  are  alone  to  be 
considered  as  absolutely  right  in  contrast  with  those  that  are 
relatively  right  or  least  wrong ;  and  which,  as  a  system  of 
ideal  conduct,  is  to  serve  as  a  standard  for  our  guidance  in 
solving,  as  well  as  we  can,  the  problems  of  real  conduct. 

§  105.  A  clear  conception  of  this  matter  is  so  important 
that  I  must  be  excused  for  bringing  in  aid  of  it  a  further 
illustration,  more  obviously  appropriate  as  being  furnished 
by  organic  science  instead  of  by  inorganic  science.  The 
relation  between  morality  proper  and  morality  as  commonly 


i 


276  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

conceived,  is  analogous  to  tlie  relation  between  physiology 
and  pathology ;  and  tlie  course  usually  pursued  by  moralists 
is  mucli  like  the  course  of  one  who  studies  pathology  with- 
out previous  study  of  physiology. 

Physiology  describes  the  various  functions  which,  as  com- 
bined, constitute  and  maintain  life ;  and  iu  treating  of  them 
it  assumes  that  they  are  severally  performed  in  right  ways, 
in  due  amounts,  and  in  proper  order :  it  recognizes  only 
healthy  functions.  If  it  explains  digestion,  it  supposes  that 
the  heart  is  supplying  blood  and  that  the  visceral  nervous 
system  is  stimulating  the  organs  immediately  concerned. 
If  it  gives  a  theory  of  the  circulation,  it  assumes  that  blood 
has  been  produced  by  the  combined  actions  of  the  structures 
devoted  to  its  production,  and  that  it  is  properly  aerated. 
If  the  relations  between  respiration  and  the  vital  processes 
at  large  are  interpreted,  it  is  on  the  pre-supposition  that  the 
heart  goes  on  sending  blood,  not  only  to  the  lungs  and  to 
certain  nervous  centres,  but  to  the  diaphragm  and  intercostal 
muscles.  Physiology  ignores  failures  in  the  actions  of 
these  several  organs.  It  takes  no  account  of  imperfec- 
tions, it  neglects  derangements,  it  does  nob  recognize  pain, 
it  knows  nothing  of  vital  wrong.  It  simply  formulates  that  I 
which  goes  on  as  a  result  of  complete  adaptation  of  all  parts 
to  all  needs.  That  is  to  say,  in  relation  to  the  inner  actions 
constituting  bodily  life,  physiological  theory  has  a  position 
like  that  which  ethical  theory,  under  its  absolute  form  as 
above  conceived,  has  to  the  outer  actions  constituting  con- 
duct. The  moment  cognizance  is  taken  of  excess  of  function, 
or  arrest  of  function,  or  defect  of  function,  with  the  resulting 
evil,  physiology  passes  into  pathology.  We  begin  now  to 
take  account  of  wrong  actions  in  the  inner  life  analogous  to 
the  wrong  actions  in  the  outer  life  taken  account  of  by 
ordinary  theories  of  morals. 

The  antithesis  thus  drawn,  however,  is  but  preliminary. 
After  observing  the  fact  that  there  is  a  science  of  vital 
actions  normally  carried  on,  which  ignores  abnormal  actions ; 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  277 

we  liave  more  especially  to  observe  that  the  science  of 
abnormal  actions  can  reach  such  definiteness  as  is  possible 
to  it,  only  on  condition  that  the  science  of  normal  actions 
has  previously  become  definite;  or  rather,  let  us  say  that . 
pathological  science  depends  for  its  advances  on  previous  \ 
advances  made  by  physiological  science.  The  very  con-  ) 
ception  of  disordered  action  implies  a  pre-conception  of 
well-ordered  action.  Before  it  can  be  decided  that  the  heart 
is  beating  faster  or  slower  than  it  should,  its  healthy  rate 
of  beating  must  be  learnt ;  before  the  pulse  can  be  recog- 
nized as  too  weak  or  too  strong,  its  proper  strength  must 
be  known ;  and  so  throughout.  Even  the  rudest  and  most 
empirical  ideas  of  diseases,  pre-suppose  ideas  of  the  healthy 
states  from  which  they  are  deviations ;  and  obviously  the 
diagnosis  of  diseases  can  become  scientific,  only  as  fast  as 
there  arises  scientific  knowledge  of  organic  actions  that  are 
undiseased. 

Similarly,  then,  is  it  with  the  relation  between  absolute 
morality,  or  the  law  of  perfect  right  in  human  conduct,  and 
relative  morality  which,  recognizing  wrong  in  human  con- 
duct, has  to  decide  in  what  way  the  wrong  deviates  from  the 
right,  and  how  the  right  is  to  be  most  nearly  approached. 
When,  formulating  normal  conduct  in  an  ideal  society,  we 
have  reached  a  science  of  absolute  ethics,  we  have  simul- 
taneously reached  a  science  which,  when  used  to  interpret 
the  phenomena  of  real  societies  in  their  transitional  states, 
full  of  the  miseries  due  to  non-adaptation  (which  we  may  call 
pathological  states)  enables  us  to  form  approximately  true 
conclusions  respecting  the  natures  of  the  abnormalities,  and 
the  courses  which  tend  most  in  the  direction  of  the  normal. 

§  106.  And  now  let  it  be  observed  that  the  conception  of 
ethics  thus  set  forth,  strange  as  many  will  think  it,  is  one 
which  really  lies  latent  in  the  beliefs  of  moralists  at  large. 
Though  not  definitely  acknowledged  it  is  vaguely  implied 
in  many  of  their  propositions. 


278  THE    DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

From  early  times  downwards  we  find  in  etliical  specula- 
tions, references  to  the  ideal  man,  his  acts,  his  feelings,  his 
judgments.  Well-doing  is  conceived  by  Sokrates  as  the 
doing  of  "  the  best  man,''  who  "  as  a  husbandman,  performs 
well  the  duties  of  husbandry ;  as  a  surgeon,  the  duties  of 
the  medical  art;  in  political  life,  his  duty  towards  the 
commonwealth/'  Plato,  in  Minos,  as  a  standard  to  which 
State-law  should  conform,  "  postulates  the  decision  of  some 
ideal  wise  man  /'  and  in  Laches  the  wise  man's  knowledge 
of  good  and  evil  .is  supposed  to  furnish  the  standard : 
disregarding  "the  maxims  of  the  existing  society"  as  un- 
scientific, Plato  regards  as  the  proper  guide,  that  "  Idea  of 
the  Good  which  only  a  philosopher  can  ascend  to."  Aristotle 
{Eth.  Bk.  iii.  ch.  4),  making  the  decisions  of  the  good  man 
the  standard,  says  : — '^  For  the  good  man  judges  everything 
rightly,  and  in  every  case  the  truth  appears  so  to  him. 
....  And  perhaps  the  principal  difference  between  the 
good  and  the  bad  man  is  that  the  good  man  sees  the  truth 
in  every  case,  since  he  is,  as  it  were,  the  rule  and  measure 
of  it."  The  Stoics,  too,  conceived  of  "  complete  rectitude  of 
action"  as  that  "  which  none  could  achieve  except  the  wise 
man" — the  ideal-man.  And  Epicurus  had  an  ideal  standard. 
He  held  the  virtuous  state  to  be  "  a  tranquil,  undisturbed, 
innocuous,  non-competitive  fruition,  which  approached 
most  nearly  to  the  perfect  happiness  of  the  Gods,"  who 
"  neither  suffered  vexation  in  themselves  nor  caused  vexa- 
tion to  others."* 

If  in  modern  times,  influenced  by  theological  dogmas 
concerning  the  fall  and  human  sinfulness,  and  by  a  theory 
of  obligation  derived  from  the  current  creed,  moralists 
have  less  frequently  referred  to  an  ideal,  yet  references 
are  traceable.  We  see  one  in  the  dictum  of  Kant — ''  Act 
according  to  that  maxim  only,  which  you  can  wish,  at  the 
same  time,  to  become*  a  universal  law."     For  this  implies 

*  Most  of  these  quotations  I  make  from  Dr.  Bain's  Mental  and  Moral 
Science. 


ABSOLUTE  AND  RELATIVE  ETHICS.  279 

the  thouglifc  of  a  society  in  which  the  maxim  is  acted  upon 
by  all  and  universal  benefit  recognized  as  the  effect :  there 
is  a  conception  of  ideal  conduct-  under  ideal  conditions.  And 
though  Mr.  Sidgwick,  in  the  quotation  above  made  from 
him,  implies  that  Ethics  is  concerned  with  man  as  hQ  is, 
rather  than  with  man  as  he  should  bo;  yet,  in  elsewhere 
speaking  of  Ethics  as  dealing  with  conduct  as  it  should  be, 
rather  than  with  conduct  as  it  is,  he  postulates  ideal  conduct 
and  indirectly  the  ideal  man.  On  his  first  page,  speaking 
of  Ethics  along  with  Jurisprudence  and  Politics^  he  says 
that  they  are  distinguished  "  by  the  characteristic  that  they 
attempt  to  determine  not  the  actual  but  the  ideal — what 
ought  to  exist,  not  what  does  exist. ^^ 

It  requires  only  that  these  various  conceptions  of  an  ideal 
conduct  and  of  an  ideal  humanity,  should  be  made  consistent 
and  definite,  to  bring  them  into  agreement  with  the  concep- 
tion above  set  forth.  At  present  such  conceptions  are 
habitually  vague.  The  ideal  man  having  been  conceived  in 
terms  of  the  current  morality,  is  thereupon  erected  into  a 
moral  standard  by  which  the  goodness  of  actions  may  be 
judged ;  and  the  reasoning  becomes  circular.  To  make  the 
ideal  man  serve  as  a  standard,  he  has  to  be  defined  in 
terms  of  the  conditions  which  his  nature  fulfils — in  terms  of 
those  objective  requirements  which  must  be  met  before 
conduct  can  }fe  right ;  and  the  common  defect  of  these  con- 
ceptions of  the  ideal  man,  is  that  they  suppose  him  out  of 
relation  to  such  conditions. 

All  the  above  references  to  him,  direct  or  indirect, 
imply  that  the  ideal  man  is  supposed  to  live  and  act  under 
existing  social  conditions.  The  tacit  inquiry  is,  not  what 
his  actions  would  be  under  circumstances  altogether  changed, 
but  what  they  would  be  under  present  circumstances.  And 
this  inquiry  is  futile  for  two  reasons.  The  co-existence  of  a 
perfect  man  and  an  imperfect  society  is  impossible;  and 
could  the  two  co-exist,  the  resulting  conduct  would  not 
furnish  the  ethical  standard   sought.  In  the 


280  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

first  place,  given  tlie  laws  of  life  as  they  are,  and  a  man  of 
ideal  nature  cannot  be  produced  in  a  society  consisting  of 
men  having  natures  remote  from  the  ideal.  As  well  might 
we  expect  a  child  of  English  type  to  be  born  among  Negroes, 
as  sxpect  that  among  the  organically  immoral,  one  who  is 
organically  moral  will  arise.  Unless  it  be  denied  that 
character  results  from  inherited  structure,  it  must  be  admitted 
that  since,  in  any  society,  each  individual  descends  from  a 
stock  which,  traced  back  a  few  generations,  ramifies  every- 
where through  the  society,  and  participates  in  its  average 
nature,  there  must,  notwithstanding  marked  individual 
diversities,  be  preserved  such  community  as  prevents  any- 
one from  reaching  an  ideal  form  while  the  rest  remain  far 
below  it.  In  the  second  place,  ideal  conduct 

such  as  ethical  theory  is  concerned  with,  is  not  possible  for 
the  ideal  man  in  the  midst  of  men  otherwise  constituted. 
An  absolutely  just  or  perfectly  sympathetic  person,  could  not 
live  and  act  according  to  his  nature  in  a  tribe  of  cannibals. 
Among  people  who  are  treacherous  and  utterly  without 
scruple,  entire  truthfulness  and  openness  must  bring  ruin. 
If  all  around  recognize  only  the  law  of  the  strongest,  one 
whose  nature  will  not  allow  him  to  inflict  pain  on  others, 
must  go  to  the  wall.  There  requires  a  certain  congruity  | 
between  the  conduct  of  each  member  of  a  society  and  other's  ' 
conduct.  A  mode  of  action  entirely  alien  to  ^he  prevailing 
modes  of  action,  cannot  be  successfully  persisted  in — must 
eventuate  in  death  of  self,  or  posterity,  or  both. 

Hence  it  is  manifest  that  we  must  consider  the  ideal  man 
as 'existing  in  the  ideal  social  state.  On  the  evolution- 
hypothesis,  the  two  presuppose  one  another ;  and  only  when 
they  CO -exist,  can  there  exist  that  ideal  conduct  which 
Absolute  Ethics  has  to  formulate,  and  which  Relative  Ethics 
has  to  take  as  the  standard  by  which  to  estimate  divergencies 
from  right,  or  degrees  of  wrong. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE    SCOPE    OF   ETHICS. 

§  107.  At  the  outset  it  was  shown  that  as  the  conduct 
with  which  Ethics  deals,  is  a  part  of  conduct  at  large, 
conduct  at  large  must  be  understood  before  this  part  can 
be  understood.  After  taking  a  general  view  of  conduct,  not 
human  only  but  sub-human,  and  not  only  as  existing  but  as 
evolving,  we  saw  thatXEthics  has  for  its  subject-matter  the 
most  highly-evolved  conduct  as  displayed  by  the  most 
highly-evolved  being,  Man — is  a  specification  of  those  traits 
which  his  conduct  assumes  on  reaching  its  limit  of  evolution. 
Conceived  thus  as  comprehending  the  laws  of  right  living 
at  large.  Ethics  has  a  wider  field  than  is  commonly  assigned 
to  it.  Beyond  the  conduct  commonly  approved  or  repro- 
bated as  right  or  wrong,  it  includes  all  conduct  which  yj 
furthers  or  hinders,  in  either  direct  or  indirect  ways,  the 
welfare  of  self  or  others. 

As  foregoing  chapters  in  various  places  imply,  the  entire 
field  of  Ethics  includes  theHwo  great  divisions,  personal  and 
social.  There  is  a  class  of  actions  directed  to^personal  ends, 
which  are  to  be  judged  in  their  relations  to  personal  well- 
being,  considered  apart  from  the  well-being  of  others : 
though  they  secondarily  affect  fellow-men  these  priuMKily 
afiect  the  agent  himself,  and  must  be  classed  as  intrinsi^&r  . 
right  or  wrong  according  to  their  beneficial  or  detrimental 
effects  on  him.      There  are  actions  of  ^another  class  which 


282  THE    DATA    OP    ETHICS. 

affect  fellow  men  immediately  and  remotely,  and  wliich, 
though  tlieir  results  to  self  are  not  to  be  ignored,  must  be 
judged  as  good  or  bad  mainly  by  tlieir  results  to  others. 
Actions  of  this  last  class  fall  into  two  groups.  Those  of  the 
one  group  achieve  ends  in  ways  that  do  or  do  not  unduly 
interfere  with  the  pursuit  of  ends  by  others — actions  which, 
because  of  this  difference,  we  call  respectively  unjust  or  j"^' 
Those  forming  the  other  group  are  of  a  kind  which  influence 
the  states  of  others  without  directly  interfering  with  the 
relations  between  their  labours  and  the  results,  in  one  way  or 
the  other — actions  which  we  speak  of  as  beneficent  or  malefi- 
cent. And  the  conduct  which  we  regard  as  beneficent  is 
itself  sub-divisible  according  as  it  shows  us  a  self-repression 
to  avoid  giving  pain,  or  an  expenditure  of  effort  to  give 
pleasure — negative  beneficence  and  positive  beneficence. 

Each  of  these  divisions  and  sub-divisions  has  to  be 
considered  first  as  a  part  of  Absolute  Ethics  and  then 
as  a  part  of  Relative  Ethics.  Having  seen  what  its^ 
injunctions  must  be  for  the  ideal  man  under  the  implied 
ideal  conditions,  we  shall  be  prepared  to  see  how  suchi 
injunctions  are  to  be  most  nearly  fulfilled  by  actual  men 
under  existing  conditions.. 

§  108.  For  reasons  already  pointed  out,  a  code  of  perfect 
personal  conduct  can  never  be  made  definite.  Many 
forms  of  life,  diverging  from  one  another  in  considerable 
degrees,  may  be  so  carried  on  in  society  as  entirely  to 
fulfil  the  conditions  to  harmonious  co-operation.  And  if 
various  types  of  men  adapted  to  various  types  of  activities, 
may  thus  lead  lives  that  are  severally  complete  after  their 
kinds,  no  specific  statement  of  the  activities  universally 
required  for  personal  well-being  is  possible. 

But  though  the  particular  requirements  to  be  fulfilled  for 
perfect  individual  well-being,  must  vary  along  with  variations 
in  the  material  conditions  of  each  society,  certain  general 
requirements  have  to  be  fulfilled  by  the  individuals  of  all 


THE    SCOPE   OP   ETIHCS.  283 

societies.  An  average  balance  between  waste  and  nutrition 
has  universally  to  be  preserved.  Normal  vitality  implies  a 
relation  between  activity  and  rest  falling  witliin  moderate 
limits  of  variation.  Continuance  of  the  society  depends  on 
satisfaction  of  those  primarily- personal  needs  which  result 
in  marriage  and  parenthood.  Perfection  of  individual  life 
hence  implies  certain  modes  of  action  which  are  approximately 
alike  in  all  cases,  and  which  therefore  become  part  of  the 
subject-matter  of  Ethics. 

That  it  is  possible  to  reduce  ev^n  this  restricted  part 
to  scientific  definiteness,  can  scarcely  be  said.  But  ethical 
requirements  may  here  be  to  such  extent  affiliated  upon 
physical  necessities,  as  to  give  them  a  partially-scientific 
authority.  It  is  clear  that  between  the  expenditure  of  bodily 
substance  in  vital  activities,  and  the  taking  in  of  materials 
from  which  this  substance  may  be  renewed,  there  is  a  direct 
relation.  It  is  clear,  too,  that  there  is  a  direct  relation 
between  the  wasting  of  tissue  by  effort,  and  the  need  for 
those  cessations  of  effort  during  which  repair  may  overtake 
waste.  Nor  is  it  less  clear  that  between  the  rate  of  mortality 
and  the  rate  of  multiplication  in  any  society,  there  is  a 
relation  such  that  the  last  must  reach  a  certain  level  before 
it  can  balance  the  first,  and  prevent  disappearance  of  the 
society.  And  it  may  be  inferred  that  pursuits  of  other 
leading  ends  are,  in  like  manner,  determined  by  certain 
natural  necessitiesj  and  from  these  derive  their  ethical 
sanctions.  That  it  will  ever  be  practicable  to  lay  down 
precise  rules  for  private  conduct  in  conformity  with  such 
requirements,  may  be  doubted.  But  the  function  of 
Absolute  Ethics  in  relation  to  private  conduct  will  have 
been  discharged,  when  it  has  produced  the  warrant  for 
its  requirements  as  generally  expressed ;  when  it  has  shown 
the  imperativeness  of  obedience  to  them ;  and  when  it  has 
thus  taught  the  need  for  deliberately  considering  whether 
the  conduct  fulfils  them  as  well  as  may  be. 

Under    the    ethics   of    personal  conduct  considered  in 


284  THE   DATA   OF   ETHICS. 

relation  to  existing  conditions,  have  to  come  all  questions 
concerning  the  degree  in  whicli  immediate  personal  welfare 
has  to  be  postponed,  either  to  ultimate  personal  welfare  or 
to  the  welfare  of  others.  As  now  carried  on,  life  hourly 
sets  the  claims  of  present  self  against  the  claims  of  future 
self,  and  hourly  brings  individual  interests  face  to  face  with 
the  interests  of  other  individuals,  taken  singly  or  as  asso- 
ciated. In  many  of  such  cases  the  decisions  can  be  nothing 
more  than  compromises ;  and  ethical  science,  here 
necessarily  empirical,  can  do  no  more  than  aid  in  making 
compromises  that  are  the  least  objectionable.  To  arrive  at 
the  best  compromise  in  any  case,  implies  correct  conceptions 
of  the  alternative  results  of  this  or  that  course.  And, 
consequently,  in  so  far  as  the  absolute  ethics  of  individual 
conduct  can  be  made  definite,  it  must  help  us  to  decide 
between  conflicting  personal  requirements,  and  also  between 
the  needs  for  asserting  self  and  the  needs  for  subordinating 
self. 

§  109.  From  that  division  of  Ethics  which  deals  with  the 
right  regulation  of  private  conduct,  considered  apart  from 
the  effects  directly  produced  on  others,  we  pass  now  to 
that  division  of  Ethics  which^  considering  exclusively  the 
effects  of  conduct  on  others,  treats  of  the  right  regulation 
of  it  with  a  view  to  such  effects. 

The  first  set  of  regulations  coming  under  this  head  are 
those  concerning  what  we  distinguish  as  justice^  Individual 
Hfe  is  possible  only  on  condition  that  each  organ  is  paid  for 
its  action  by  an  equivalent  of  blood,  while  the  organism  as 
a  whole  obtains  from  the  environment  assimilable  matters 
that  compensate  for  its  efforts;  and  the  mutual  dependence 
of  parts  in  the  social  organism,  necessitates  that,  alike  for 
its  total  life  and  the  lives  of  its  units,  there  similarly  shall 
be  maintained  a  due  proportion  between  returns  and 
labours  :  the  natural  relation  between  work  and  welfare 
shall  be  preserved  intact.      Justice,  which  formulates  the 


THE    SCOPE   OP   ETHICS.  285 

range  of  conduct  and  limitations  to  conduct  hence  arising, 
is  at  once  the  most  important  division  of  Ethics  and  the 
division  which  admits  of  the  greatest  definiteness.  That 
principle  of  equivalence  which  meets  us  when  we  seek  its 
roots  in  the  laws  of  individual  life_,  involves  the  idea  of 
measure ;  and  on  passing  to  social  life,  the  same  principle 
introduces  us  to  the  conception  of  equity  or  equalness,  in  the 
relations  of  citizens  to  one  another :  the  elements  of  the 
questions  arising  are  quantitative,  and  hence  the  solutions 
assume  a  more  scientific  form.  Though,  having  to  recog- 
nize differences  among  individuals  due  to  age,  sex,  or  other 
cause,  we  cannot  regard  the  members  of  a  society  as 
absolutely  equal,  and  therefore  cannot  deal  with  problems^ 
growing  out  of  their  relations  with  that  precision  whicl 
absolute  equality  might  make  possible ;  yet,  considering  thei 
as  approximately  equal  in  virtue  of  their  common  human^ 
nature,  and  dealing  with  questions  of  equity  on  this  supposi- 
tion, we  may  reach  conclusions  of  a  sufficiently-definite 
kind. 

This  division  of  Ethics  considered  under  its  absolute  form, 
has  to  define  the  equitable  relations  among  perfect  indivi- 
duals who  limit  one  another's  spheres  of  action  by  co-exist- 
ing, and  who  achieve  their  ends  by  co-operation.  It  has 
to  do  much  more  than  this.  Beyond  justice  between  man 
and  man,  justice  between  each  man  and  the  aggregate  of 
men  has  to  be  dealt  with  by  it.  The  relations  between  the 
individual  and  the  State,  considered  as  representing  all 
individuals,  have  to  be  deduced  —  an  important  and  a 
relatively-difficult  matter.  What  is  the  ethical  warrant  for 
governmental  authority  ?  To  what  ends  may  it  be  legiti- 
mately exercised  ?  How  far  may  it  rightly  be  carried  ?  Up 
to  what  point  is  the  citizen  bound  to  recognize  the  collective 
decisions  of  other  citizens,  and  beyond  what  point  may  he 
properly  refuse  to  obey  them. 

These  relations,  private  and  public,  considered  as  main- 
tained under  ideal  conditions,  having  been  formulated,  there 


286  THE   DATA   OP   ETHICS. 

come  to  be  dealt  with  the  analogous  relations  under  real  con- 
ditions— absolute  justice  being  the  standard,  relative  justice 
has  to  be  determined  by  considering  how  near  an  approach 
may,  under  present  circumstances,  be  made  to  it.  As 
already  implied  in  various  places,  it  is  impossible  during 
stages  of  transition  which  necessitate  ever-changing  com- 
promises, to  fulfil  the  dictates  of  absolute  equity;  and 
nothing  beyond  empirical  judgments  can  be  formed  of  the 
extent  to  which  they  may  be,  at  any  given  time,  fulfilled. 
While  war  continues  and  injustice  is  done  between  societies, 
there  cannot  be  anything  like  complete  justice  within  each 
society.  Militant  organization  no  less  than  militant  action,  is 
irreconcilable  with  pure  equity ;  and  the  inequity  implied  by 
it  inevitably  ramifies  throughout  all  social  relations.  But 
there  is  at  every  stage  in  social  evolution,  a  certain  range  of 
variation  within  which  it  is  possible  to  approach  nearer  to, 
or  diverge  further  from,  the  requirements  of  absolute  equity. 
Hence  these  requirements  have  ever  to  be  kept  in  view  that 
relative  equity  may  be  ascertained. 

§  110.  Of  the  two  sub-divisions  into  which  beneficence 
falls,  the  negative  and  the  positive,  neither  can  be  specialized. 
Under  ideal  conditions  the  first  of  them  has  but  a  nominal 
existence ;  and  the  second  of  them  passes  largely  into  a 
transfigured  form  admitting  of  but  general  definition. 

In  the  conduct  of  the  ideal  man  among  ideal  men,  that 
self-regulation  which  has  for  its  motive  to  avoid  giving  pain, 
practically  disappears.  No  one  having  feelings  which 
prompt  acts  that  disagreeably  afi'ect  others,  there  can  exist 
no  code  of  restraints  referring  to  this  division  of  conduct. 

But  though  negative  beneficence  is  only  a  nominal  part 
of  Absolute  Ethics,  it  is  an  actual  and  considerable  part  of 
Relative  Ethics.  For  while  men's  natures  remain  imperfectly 
adapted  to  social  life,  there  must  continue  in  them  impulses 
which,  causing  in  some  cases  the  actions  we  name  unjust, 
cause  in  other  cases  the  actions  we  name  unkind — unkind 


rri7 

THE   SCOPE   OF%MCS.  287 

now  in  deed  and  now  in  word;  ar^^ft. respect  of  these 
modes  of  behaviour  which_,  though  not  aggi-erssire;  give  pain, 
there  arise  numerous  and  complicated  problems.  Pain  is 
sometimes  given  to  others  simply  by  maintaining  an  equi- 
table claim;  pain  is  at  other  times-  given  by  refusing  a 
request;  and  again  at  other  times  by  maintaining  an  opinion* 
In  these  and  numerous  cases  suggested  by  them,  there  have 
to  be  answered  the  questions  whether,  to  avoid  inflicting 
pain,  personal  feelings  should  be  sacrificed,  and  how  far 
sacrificed.  Again,  in  cases  of  another  class,  pain  is  given 
not  by  a  passive  course  but  by  an  active  course.  How  far 
shall  a  person  who  has  misbehaved  be  grieved  by  showing 
aversion  to  him  ?  Shall  one  whose  action  is  to  be  repro- 
bated, have  the  reprobation  expressed  to  him  or  shall  nothing 
be  said  ?  Is  it  right  to  annoy  by  condemning  a  prejudice 
which  another  displays  ?  These  and  kindred  queries  have  to 
be  answered  after  taking  into  account  the  immediate  pain 
given,  the  possible  benefit  caused  by  giving  it,  and  the 
possible  evil  caused  by  not  giving  it.  In  solving  problems 
of  this  clasSa  the  only  help  Absolute  Ethics  gives,  is  by 
enforcing  the  consideration  that  inflicting  more  pain  than  is 
necessitated  by  proper  self-regard,  or  by  desire  for  another's 
benefit,  or  by  the  maintenance  of  a  general  principle,  is 
unwarranted. 

Of  positive  beneficence  under  its  absolute  form  nothing 
more  specific  can  be  said  than  that  it  must  become  co- 
extensive with  whatever  sphere  remains  for  it;  aiding 
to  complete  the  life  of  each  as  a  recipient  of  services  and  to 
exalt  the  life  of  each  as  a  renderer  of  services.  As  with 
a  developed  humanity  the  desire  for  it  by  every  one  will 
so  increase,  and  the  sphere  for  exercise  of  it  so  decrease, 
as  to  involve  an  altruistic  competition,  analogous  to  the 
existing  egoistic  competition,  it  may  be  that  Absolute  Ethics 
will  eventually  include  what  we  before  called  a  higher  equity, 
prescribing  the  mutual  limitations  of  altruistic  activities. 

Under  its  relative  form,  positive  beneficence  presents  nume- 


288 


THE    DATA   OF   ETHICS. 


rous  problems,  alike  important  and  difficult,  admitting  only 
of  empirical  solutions.  \  How  far  is  self-sacrifice  for  another's 
benefit  to  be  carried  in  each,  case  ? — a  question  which  must 
be  answered  difierently  according  to  the  character  of  the 
other,  the  needs  of  the  other,  and  the  various  claims  of  self 
and  belongings  which  have  to  be  met.  To  what  extent 
under  given  circumstances  shall  private  welfare  be  sub- 
ordinated to  public  welfare  ? — a  question  to  be  answered 
after  considering  the  importance  of  the  end  and  the 
seriousness  of  the  sacrifice.  ^What  benefit  and  what  detri- 
ment will  result  from  gratuitous  aid  yielded  to  another  ? — 
a  question  in  each  case  implying  an  estimate  of  probabilities 
Is  there  any  unfair  treatment  of  sundry  others,  involved  by 
more  than  fair  treatment  of  this  one  other  ?  ^  Up  to  what 
limit  may  help  be  given  to  the  existing  generation  of  the 
inferior^  without  entailing  mischief  on  future  generations 
of  the  superior?  Evidently  to  these  and  many  kindred 
questions  included  in  this  division  of  Eelative  Ethics, 
approximately  true  answers  only  can  be  given. 

But  though  here  Absolute  Ethics,  by  the  standard  it  , 
supplies,  does  not  greatly  aid  Relative  Ethics,  yet,  as  in  | 
other  cases,  it  aids  somewhat  by  keeping  before  con- 
sciousness an  ideal  conciliation  of  the  various  claims  involved ; 
and  by  suggesting  the  search  for  such  compromise  among 
them,  as  shall  not  disregard  any,  but  shall  satisfy  all  to  the 
greatest  extent  practicable. 


THE   END. 


Spencer's  Synthetic  Philosophy. 


"  The  only  complete  and  systematic  statement  of  the  doctrine  (Evolution) 
with  which  I  am  acquainted  is  that  contained  in  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's  '  Sys- 
tem of  Philosophy ' ;  a  work  which  should  be  carefully  studied  by  all 
desire  to  know  whither  scientific  thought  is  tending." — Pt^^f.  T.  H.  Huxley, 
Lecture  before  the  Royal  Institution  of  Great  Britain.  ^ 

"  Of  all  our  thinkers  he  is  the  one  who,  a^it  appears  to  me,  has^ormed 
for  himself  the  largest  new  scheme  of  a  systematic  phUosophy,  and  iitjelation 
to  some  of  the  greatest  questions  of  Philosophy  in  their  jalost  recent  forms, 
as  set  or  reset  by  the  last  speculations  and  revelations  of  science,  has  already 
shot  his  thoughts  the  farthest." — Prof.  David  Masson,  in  '■''Recent  British 
Philosophy.'''' 

"  We  can  not  exhibit  the  grandeur ;  we  can  only,  in  a  few  general  phrases, 
express  our  admiration  of  this  profound,  all-embracing  philosophy.  The  doc- 
trine of  Evolution,  when  taken  up  by  Mr.  Spencer,  was  little  more  than  a 
crotchet;  he  has  made  it  the  idea  of  the  age." — Douglas  A.  Spaulding,  in 
Nature. 

"  Mr.  Spencer  combines,  to  a  degree  certainly  seldom  found  in  any  other 
living  English  writer,  the  power  of  deep  reflection,  of  equally  acute  insight 
and  outsight  of  practical  adaptation,  and  of  expression  and  illustration  as 
felicitous  as  it  is  forcible.  With  the  condensation  and  pointedness  of  Hobbes, 
the  flowing  facility  of  Locke,  the  philosophic  simplicity  and  earnestness  of 
Bishop  Butler,  and  the  profundity  of  Kant,  without  his  diflfuseness  and  ob- 
scurity, he  must  be  classed  in  the  highest  rank  of  British  authors,  not  only  as 
a  thinker,  in  which  line  few  will  be  disposed  to  question  his  preeminence,  but 
as  an  artistic  writer,  in  which  capacity  he  has  perhaps  not  been  so  universally 
recognized." — George  Ripley,  LL.  D.,  in  New  York  Tribune. 

"  His  bold  generalizations  are  always  instructive,  and  some  of  them  may 
in  the  end  be  established  as  the  profoundest  laws  of  the  knowable  universe." 
— Dr.  James  McCosh,  in  the  "  Intuitions  of  Mind.'''' 

"  An  author  who  is  both  extensively  and  profoundly  versed  in  science,  and 
who  writes,  on  all  the  subjects  which  he  handles,  with  great  power,  equally  of 
observation,  abstraction,  and  generalization." — J.  G.  Macvicar,  D.  D.,  "  Mind: 
its  Rowers  and  Capacities.'''' 

"  The  two  deepest  scientific  principles  now  known  of  all  those  relating  to 
material  things,  are  the  law  of  gravitation  and  the  law  of  evolution.  .  .  .  We 
can  not  deny  the  title  of  philosopher  to  such  a  thinker  as  Mr.  Herbert  Spen- 
cer, who  does  genuinely  bind  together  different  and  hitherto  alien  subjects  of 
thought  by  a  clear  and  wide,  though  neither  an  all-comprehensive  nor  a  spirit- 
ual hypothesis,  the  principle  of  Evolution." — Quarterly  Review  (English). 

"  Since  Newton,  there  has  not  in  England  been  a  philosopher  of  more  re- 
markable, speculative,  and  systematizing  talent  than  (in  spite  of  some  errors 
and  some  narrowness)  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer." — London  Saturday  Review. 

"I  question  whether  any  scientific  works  which  have  appeared  sines  the 
'  Principia '  of  Newton  are  comparable  in  importance  with  those  of  Darwin 
and  Spencer,  revolutionizing  as  they  do  all  our  views  of  the  origin  of  bodily, 
mental,  moral,  and  social  phenomena." — W.  Stanley  Jevons,  Professor  of 
Logic  in  Owens  College^  Manchester,  in  "  TJie  Principles  of  Science.''^ 


SPENCER'S   SYNTHETIC  PHILOSOPHY. 

"Among  modern  English  psychologists  the  author  to  whom  I  have  been 
most  indebted  in  this  work  is  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer ;  more  especially  to  the 
very  able  analysis  which  he  has  given  of  the  process  of  reasoning  in  its  quali- 
tative and  quantitative  forms." — Dr.  J.  D.  Morrell,  "  Outlines  of  Mental 
Philosophy. ''' 

"  One  who,  whether  for  the  extent  of  his  positive  knowledge,  or  for  the 
profundity  of  his  speculative  insight,  has  already  achieved  a  name  second  to 
none  in  the  whole  range  of  English  philosophy.  ...  It  appears  to  us  that, 
even  in  its  present  stage,  the  theory  of  evolution  of  moral  sentiments  in  the 
hereditary  conscience  of  the  race  is  the  greatest  advance  which  has  been  made 
in  ethical  speculation  since  the  time  of  Hartley." —  Westminster  Review. 

"  It  is  questionable  whether  any  thinker  of  finer  caliber  has  appeared  in 
our  country.  ...  He  alone  of  all  British  thinkers  has  organized  a  philoso- 
phy."— George  Henry  Lewes,  in  the  '•''History  of  Philosophy.''^ 

"  One  of  the  most  vigorous  as  well  as  boldest  thinkers  that  English  spec- 
ulation has  yet  produced." — John  Stuart  Mill,  in  Review  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton. 

"  Our  great  philosopher." — Charles  Darwin,  in  "  Descent  of  Man." 

"  The  study  of  cases  of  disease  of  the  nervous  system  appears  to  me  to 
supply  continual  illustrations  of  the  correctness  of  many  of  Mr.  Spencer's  de- 
ductions."— Dr.  Hughlings  Jackson,  in  British  Medical  Journal. 

"If  Mr.  Spencer,  with  his  talents,  his  fertility  of  genius,  and  the  almost 
encyclopedic  variety  of  knowledge,  of  which  his  writings  furnish  the  proof, 
had  chosen  to  follow  the  beaten  path,  nothing  would  have  been  more  easy 
than  for  him  to  secure  all  those  honors  of  which  English  society  is  so  prodigal 
to  those  who  serve  her  as  she  wishes  to  be  served.  He  preferred,  however, 
with  a  noble  and  touching  self-denial,  to  put  up  with  poverty,  and,  what  is 
still  more  difficult,  with  obscurity." — M.  Laugel,  in  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes. 

"  In  his  study  of  psychological  phenomena,  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  has  em- 
ployed the  fundamental  processes  of  every  method,  synthesis,  and  analysis. 
In  our  eyes  one  of  the  greatest  merits  of  "this  rare  mind  is  his  skill  in  using 
these  two  difficult  instruments."— Theodore  Ribot,  Professor  of  Philosophy 
in  the  Lycee  of  Laval,  in  "  English  Psychology.'^ 

"  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  in  a  work  of  great  compaFS,  offers  to  our  considera- 
tion a  synthesis  of  the  universe,  as  apprehended  by  an  intellect  enriched  by 
all  the  treasures  won  by  science.  The  friends  of  philosophy  must  devoutly 
hope  that  the  author's  health,  already  shaken  by  intellectual  toil  that  would 
try  the  most  robust  constitution,  may  permit  the  completion  of  a  work  that 
crowns  a  life  of  consecration  to  lofty  studies."— Dr.  E.  Gazelles,  Translator 
of  "  First  Principles  "  and  "  Biology''''  into  French. 

"  I  need  dwell  no  further  on  it  here  "  (Spencer's  research  upon  vegetable 
physiology)  "  than  to  quote  it  as  an  example  of  what  may  be  done  by  an  acute 
observer  and  experimentalist,  versed  in  physics  and  chemistry,  but,  above  all, 
thoroughly  instructed  in  scientific  methods."- Dr.  J.  D.  Hooker,  Inaugural 
Address  at  Meeting  of  British  Association,  1868, 

"  It  is  hardly  possible  to  avoid  admiring  the  manner  in  which  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer  is  able  to  grasp  the  facts  of  all  domains  of  physical  science,  and 
group  them  together  into  apparently  natural  systems.  Of  none  of  his  gen- 
eralizations, perhaps,  is  this  more  true  than  of  his  admirable  description  of 
the  general  functions  and  structure  of  the  nervous  system,  in  the  first  volume 
of  his  'Principles  of  Psychology.'  " — Glasgow  Aledical  Journal. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subjea  to  immediate  recall. 


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